Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling (NSW) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling (NSW) Pty Limited [2012] FCAFC 193

Citation: Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling (NSW) Pty Limited [2012] FCAFC 193
Appeal from: Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling [2012] FMCA 122
Parties: FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN v TOYOTA MATERIAL HANDLING (NSW) PTY LIMITED (ACN 105 011 309)
File number: NSD 406 of 2012
Judges: MARSHALL, NORTH AND FLICK JJ
Date of judgment: 21 December 2012
Catchwords:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – Federal statutory cause of action – applicability of State limitation law – whether limitation statute capable of applying to Commonwealth enactment – whether Commonwealth enactment has “otherwise provided” – Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79 – Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 18

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – penalty – proper characterisation of a statutory cause of action – whether statutory cause of action “a cause of action to recover a penalty” – Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 18

Legislation: Criminal Appeal Act1912 (NSW)
Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 1, Sch 2
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 25
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 79, 82
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act of 1956 (Qld) s 5
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 18, 26 and 57
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (as in force on 23 March 2006) ss 170CE, 170CP, 170VA, 170VV, 170VW, 170WG, 170VP, 177A, 178, 179
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (as in force after 23 March 2006) ss 321, 337, 400, 405, 407, 643, 719, 720, 721, 824, Sch 7


Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Anying Group Pty Ltd v Wang [2012] FCA 702
Austral Pacific Group Limited (in liquidation) v Airservices Australia [2000] HCA 39, 203 CLR 136
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 123, 169 FCR 227
Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 244 CLR 638
Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111
Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1984) 54 ALR 767
De Vos v Daly (1947) 73 CLR 509
DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 8 NSWLR 204
Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling [2012] FMCA 122
Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling (NSW) Pty Limited [2012] FCA 347
Gapes v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd[No 2](1979) 27 ALR 87
John Robertson & Co Limited (in liquidation) v Ferguson Transformers Pty Limited (1973) 129 CLR 65
Kelly v Saadat-Talab [2008] NSWCA 213, 72 NSWLR 305
Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO [1999] HCA 8, 196 CLR 553
O’Mara Constructions Pty Ltd v Avery [2006] FCAFC 55, 151 FCR 196
Pavich v Bobra Nominees Pty Ltd (1988) 84 ALR 285
Pedersen v…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 193
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Fair Work Ombudsman brought proceedings against Toyota Material Handling (NSW) Pty Ltd, seeking to recover pecuniary penalties for breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) applied to statutory causes of action under federal law and, if not, whether the statutory cause of action qualified as one to recover a penalty under section 18 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).

The court examined the statutory framework governing limitation periods for federal causes of action. The Fair Work Act and the Workplace Relations Act provided specific limitation periods for certain causes of action but omitted such periods for others, including those in question. The court found that the deliberate omission of a limitation period by the Commonwealth indicated a "complete legislative scheme," leaving no room for state limitation laws to apply under section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Furthermore, the court concluded that the statutory causes of action in question constituted actions to recover a penalty, as intended by section 18 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). However, because the Commonwealth legislation had otherwise provided for limitation periods, the state limitation law did not apply.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the order of the Federal Magistrates Court. The matter was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for further proceedings in line with the court's reasons.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is granted.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court of 27 February 2012 is set aside.

4. The matter is remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court to hear and determine in accordance with these reasons for judgment.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Similarly, the Work Choices Act provided for a six year time limit in respect of some causes of action, such as in sub-sections 719(9) and 719(10) concerning the recovery of underpayments and a proceeding for a penalty for breach of an award. The same time limit applied to proceedings under s 721(2) for breach of an ITEA. In the case of s 407, Parliament made a deliberate choice not to impose such a time limit.Conclusion on whether Commonwealth law “otherwise provides” Parliament has chosen to impose time limits in respect of some causes of action and none in respect of others in the relevant legislation. Where time limits have been imposed, they have usually been for six years and not the State choice of two years. The exercise of such a choice reveals a Commonwealth legislative scheme “complete on its face”, leaving no room for the picking up by s 79 of the Judiciary Act of the State limitation law; see Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 244 CLR 638 at [25] and the cases there referred to in the joint judgment of French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ. For the foregoing reasons, the Limitation Act did not apply to the proceeding below insofar as it was based on s 170VV of the Pre-Reform WR Act and s 407 of the Work Choices Act. That is because laws of the Commonwealth, being the above Acts and the Transitional Act, have otherwise provided. It follows that leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal allowed and the order of the Court below made on 27 February 2011, summarily dismissing parts of the application be set aside. Although it is not strictly necessary to do so, the following reasons deal with two other matters raised by FWO on the current application. As will be seen below, neither of them has merit. ACTION TO RECOVER A PENALTY The actions based on s 407 of the Work Choices Act and 170VV of the Pre-Reform WR Act are actions on a cause of action to recover a penalty. They are what is commonly known as civil proceedings to recover a penalty of the type discussed by the Full Court in Gapes as referred to at [10] above, and as long ago as 1910 in R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 742 per Isaacs J. As is apparent from the judgment of J.B. Sweeney J in Gapes at 102, “a proceeding for the recovery of pecuniary penalties” is often used interchangeably with a “civil action for penalties”. Counsel for FWO sought to confine the operation of s 18 of the Limitation Act to causes of action to recover penalties which had previously been imposed. Section 18 also refers to the recovery of a “sum by way of a penalty”. It evinces an intention to apply broadly to matters where penalties are either sought or sought to be enforced. There is no merit in the submission that, save for Commonwealth laws “otherwise providing”, s 18 would not apply to actions such as those based on s 170VV of the Pre-Reform WR Act and s 407 of the Work Choices Act. Section 82 of the Judiciary Act provides:Suits to recover pecuniary penalties and forfeitures under the laws of the Commonwealth may be brought either in the State or Territory where they accrue or in the State or Territory where the offender is found.The terms of s 82 of the Judiciary Act support the contention that s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act encompassed civil proceedings for the imposition of a penalty. Section 82 refers to “suits to recover…penalties” being brought in State courts. The use of the word “recover” should not be interpreted as referable to actions where penalties have been imposed and are now sought to be recovered. So much would also be inconsistent with Gapes, as discussed at [22] of these reasons for judgment.CAN S 18(1) OF THE LIMITATION ACT APPLY TO A COMMONWEALTH ENACTMENT?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The merit in the arguments raised by the Fair Work Ombudsman, it is considered, warrants the grant of leave to appeal. The importance of the issues to be resolved, even though they may hopefully be of decreasing practical application as time progresses, warrants the grant of leave. The resolution of the issues to be resolved may well also have implications for other potential proceedings. SECTION 79 – ITS BROAD PURPOSE & OPERATION Section 79(1) of the Judiciary Act provides as follows: The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable. The “broad purpose” of s 79 was explained as follows by Mason J in John Robertson & Co Limited (in liquidation) v Ferguson Transformers Pty Limited (1973) 129 CLR 65 at 95:The broad purpose of s. 79 is to ensure that the laws of the States are applied by courts in the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In general that purpose is achieved by the application of a State law according to its terms. Indeed, s. 79 contains no express provision which would enable a court exercising federal jurisdiction to alter the language of a State statute and apply it in that altered form. However, the presence of the words "including the laws relating to procedure evidence and the competency of witnesses" exhibits a clear intention that State laws relating to those topics should apply to federal jurisdiction. This purpose would fail partly in its objective if State laws on these topics are to be given a literal application under s. 79 by courts other than State courts. State laws dealing with matters of procedure, as the earlier consideration of s. 37 of the Limitation of Actions Act has shown, are often expressed so as to apply to State courts only, and in some instances they refer to particular State courts. To ensure that State laws dealing with the particular topics mentioned in the section are applied in the exercise of federal jurisdiction by courts other than State courts, it is necessary that State laws be applied according to the hypothesis that federal courts do not necessarily lie outside their field of application. Section 79 requires the assumption to be made that federal courts lie within the field of application of State laws on the topics to which it refers, at least in those cases in which the State laws are expressed to apply to courts generally. This departure from the general principle that the section requires a State law to be applied according to its terms is justified, indeed demanded, by the clear requirement that State laws on the topics mentioned are to be applied in federal jurisdiction. Whether that requirement supports the broader view that a similar approach is to be taken in applying s. 79 to substantive as well as procedural laws it is not now necessary to determine. The objective of s 79 is to facilitate the particular exercise of federal jurisdiction by the application of a coherent body of law, elements of which may comprise the laws of the State or Territory in which the jurisdiction is being exercised, together with the laws of the Commonwealth, but subject always to the overriding effect of the Constitution itself: Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO [1999] HCA 8 at [80], 196 CLR 553 at 568 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J.