[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
KUJUNDZIC v MAS National [2013] FMCA 8
Case
[2013] FMCA 8
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an application by the second respondent, Inner Northern Group Training Ltd, for the summary dismissal of proceedings brought by the applicant, Joika Kujundzic. The applicant had lodged a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission alleging unlawful discrimination by the respondents. The Commission terminated the complaint, and the applicant subsequently commenced proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court alleging discrimination in contravention of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992. The second respondent sought to have the proceeding dismissed on the basis that it was statute barred. The Court found that the applicant's cause of action accrued when the Commission issued a notice of termination of her complaint. The Court also found that s.14(1) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) was inconsistent with s.46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 and invalid to the extent of that inconsistency. The Court therefore dismissed the second respondent's application for summary dismissal.