Baird v Queensland - [2005] FCA 1516

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Baird v State of Queensland [2005] FCA 1516
DISCRIMINATION LAW/RACIAL DISCRIMINATION – Limitations of Actions – whether the Applicants’ complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission gives rise to a cause of action – whether the applicants’ cause of action for unlawful discrimination is statute barred.
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 3, 46P, 46PF, 46PH, 46PO
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 9, 15
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 10
Sullivan v Oil Company of Australia Ltd (2002) 2 QdR 94 distinguished
JAMES STANLEY BAIRD, MARIE CREEK, FRANK TAYLEY, HENRY WALKER, HENRY DEERAL, EDGAR IVAN GIBSON, ANITA KAREN GORDON AND ELLA WOIBO v STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Q 91 OF 2003
DOWSETT J
30 AUGUST 2005
BRISBANE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 91 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

JAMES STANLEY BAIRD
FIRST APPLICANT

MARIE CREEK
SECOND APPLICANT

FRANK TAYLEY
THIRD APPLICANT

HENRY WALKER
FOURTH APPLICANT

HENRY DEERAL
FIFTH APPLICANT

EDGAR IVAN GIBSON
SIXTH APPLICANT

ANITA KAREN GORDON
SEVENTH APPLICANT

ELLA WOIBO
EIGHTH APPLICANT

AND:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

30 AUGUST 2005

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I have previously delivered my reasons for judgment in this matter. However I omitted to deal with one matter, namely the respondent’s submission that the claims were statute-barred by virtue of the operation of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (the “Limitations Act”). For present purposes I assume, without deciding, that the Limitations Act applies to claims made under Commonwealth legislation and that the relevant limitation period is six years as prescribed by par 10(1) of that Act which provides that:
‘The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action arose -
(a)      …
(b)      …
(c)       …
(d)an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture.’
The relevant question is when ‘the cause of action arose’, but that question necessitates consideration of the meaning of the expression “cause of action”. The Queensland Court of Appeal considered both questions in Sullivan v Oil Company of Australia Ltd (2002) 2 QdR 94. At [41] – [44] Muir J cited the following propositions and authorities:
‘In Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd, Wilson J. said:
“The concept of a ‘cause of action’ would seem to be clear. It is simply the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue. In an action for negligence, it consists of the wrongful act or omission and the consequent damages: cf. Cooke v. Gill …; Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128, at 131.”
Lord Diplock gave this explanation in Letang v. Cooper:
“A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.”
In

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Baird v Queensland

Details

AGLC: Baird v Queensland [2005] FCA 1516
Case: [2005] FCA 1516
Decision Date: 30 AUGUST 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Baird v State of Queensland, the applicants, James Stanley Baird, Marie Creek, Frank Tayley, Henry Walker, Henry Deeral, Edgar Ivan Gibson, Anita Karen Gordon, and Ella Woibo, initiated proceedings against the State of Queensland, alleging racial discrimination in employment. The applicants sought relief under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The State of Queensland argued that the applicants' claims were statute-barred under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), which provides a limitation period of six years for actions to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment.

The central legal issue the court had to decide was when the applicants' cause of action arose, and whether it was statute-barred by the Limitation of Actions Act. The court examined the meaning of "cause of action" and referred to the Queensland Court of Appeal's decision in Sullivan v Oil Company of Australia Ltd (2002) 2 QdR 94 for guidance. The court concluded that a cause of action accrued to each applicant at the time of the termination of their complaints by the President of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. This was because the relevant legislation did not create any right to relief prior to the termination of the complaints.

Dowsett J held that the applicants' cause of action arose at the time of the termination of their complaints, and that the proceedings were not statute-barred. The court noted that although the Racial Discrimination Act previously contained provisions for enforcement and sanctions, those provisions were removed and replaced by the provisions in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, which the applicants relied upon. The respondent did not argue that the earlier provisions applied.

This decision reinforces the understanding that a cause of action in discrimination cases accrues at the point when a complaint is terminated by the President of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. It also highlights the importance of understanding the statutory framework governing discrimination claims and the limitations on such claims.

Orders