FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045
Citation: Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045 Parties: SUPRIYA ELIEZER v THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, JAMES GUTHRIE, SHARRON O'NEILL, JOHN ROBERTS and SUE NEWBERRY File number: NSD 1098 of 2014 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 21 September 2015 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – where interlocutory application seeks summary dismissal of application alleging sex and pregnancy discrimination in the course of employment, education and the provision of services – where no complaint made to, or terminated by, the Australian Human Rights Commission as against the second to fifth respondents – whether statutory preconditions for Court to entertain claim for damages for unlawful discrimination contrary to ss 14, 21 and 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) satisfied – whether amendments to include additional causes of action can “cure” lack of jurisdiction – where second to fifth respondents should not be required to await the possibility that applicant may plead presently unidentified causes of action – where proceedings as against second to fifth respondents dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where alleged unlawful conduct occurred more than six years before applicant lodged complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission – where summary dismissal sought on grounds of abuse of process – discussion of principles governing summary dismissal under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether proceedings can constitute an abuse of process due to delay where not statute barred – where delay in making complaint and notifying respondents of alleged unlawful conduct without adequate explanation has caused prejudice to respondents in defending claims – where applicant made earlier workers compensation claim for the same psychological injury on different grounds – where inconsistency in the position adopted by the applicant as to the cause of her psychological injury has caused prejudice to respondents in defending claims
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where applicant seeks leave to amend originating application to include additional causes of action –where ample opportunity already provided for the applicant to amend – where proposed additional claims are based on same alleged conduct and would similarly constitute an abuse of process or lack jurisdiction
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where applicant sought to be assisted in Court by spouse under s 46PQ(1)(c) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – where spouse did not meet statutory criteria due to status as an admitted practitioner – where applicant granted leave to make submissions through her spouse with assurance from spouse that he was cognisant of his ethical obligations as an admitted practitioner of the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 46PH, 46PO, 46PQ, 46PR
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 8.21(1)(g), 26.01
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 55B(3)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), ss 14, 21, 22, 106Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis [2013]…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1045
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court further found that the application for leave to amend the originating application to include additional causes of action should be denied as the proposed additional claims were based on the same alleged conduct and would similarly constitute an abuse of process or lack jurisdiction. The applicant's request to be assisted in court by her spouse, who was an admitted practitioner, was also denied as he did not meet the statutory criteria to act as her litigation representative. However, the applicant was granted leave to make submissions through her spouse with the assurance that he was cognisant of his ethical obligations as an admitted practitioner of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
The court concluded that Mrs Eliezer's application for leave to amend the originating application was dismissed, and the proceedings were summarily dismissed under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) with costs. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the applications and otherwise of or incidental to the proceedings as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for leave to amend the originating application is dismissed.
2. The proceedings are summarily dismissed under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
3. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the applications in orders 1 and 2 above and otherwise of or incidental to the proceedings as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
To illustrate the application of these principles, Reeves J explained at [47] that the moving party is more likely to succeed if she or he demonstrates that the applicant’s success relies on a question of fact that is implausible, improbable, tenuous or contradicted by all the available documents or evidence. Conversely, his Honour explained that, as a general principle, such an application is unlikely to succeed where, on a critical examination of all the available materials, the Court is satisfied that there appears to be a real question of fact to be determined. The latter, in his Honour’s view, is more likely to be the case where the available materials include pleadings that raise factual disputes that can truly be described as significant, substantial, plausible or weighty. 4.2 Consideration of the application for summary dismissal of the claims against the second to fifth respondents on jurisdictional grounds Part IIB of the AHRC Act establishes a regime for redress for “unlawful discrimination” under various Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws (collectively, the Unlawful Discrimination Laws) including, relevantly, Part II of the Sex Discrimination Act in which ss 14, 21 and 22 appear. It is well established that this regime is an exclusive one for remedying contraventions of the Unlawful Discrimination Laws, including the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (Disability Discrimination Act) and the Sex Discrimination Act: Picos v Australian Federal Police [2015] FCA 118 at [36]-[38] (Perry J) and the authorities cited therein; Picosv Servcorp Limited [2015] FCA 344 (Servcorp) at [46]-[49] (Perry J). As a result, a contravention of ss 14, 21 and 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act or the Disability Discrimination Act gives rise only to a right to invoke the procedures, and to obtain the remedies provided for, in the AHRC Act: Bropho v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1209 at [29] and [51]-[53] (RD Nicholson J); French v Gray [2013] FCA 263; (2013) 217 FCR 404 at [149]-[151] (Besanko J); Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 at [71] (the Court). Section 46PO of Part IIB of the AHRC Act provides that if a complaint has been terminated by the President under, relevantly, s 46PH of the AHRC Act:…any person who was an affected person in relation to the complaint may make an application to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court, alleging unlawful discrimination by one or more of the respondents to the terminated complaint. (Emphasis added.) The term “respondent, in relation to a complaint” is defined in s 3 of the AHRC Act to mean “the person or persons against whom the complaint is made.” As such, on an ordinary reading of the provision, s 46PO makes no provision for an application to be made to this Court for unlawful discrimination against any respondents other than the respondents to the complaint terminated by the President: Servcorp at [5]-[6], [48]-[49] and [56] (Perry J). This construction of s 46PO was adopted by the Full Court in Grigor-Scott v Jones [2008] FCAFC 14; (2008) 168 FCR 450 (Grigor-Scott). In that case, the respondent, Mr Jones, instituted a complaint of racial discrimination under Part IIB of the (then) Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth) (HREOC Act) (now titled the AHRC Act). However, the complaint did not nominate any person or entity as respondent (at [24]). On the President terminating the complaint, Mr Jones brought proceedings against the Bible Believers’ Church which had been referred to by the President as the respondent. However, while the Church was not a legal entity capable of being sued, orders were made joining the appellant, Mr Grigor-Scott, who was a Minister of the Church and had responded to the complaint in the Commission by making submissions for the Church.