Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Limited (No 7)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Limited (No 7) [2019] FCA 818

File number: ACD 62 of 2012
Judge: MCKERRACHER   J
Date of judgment: 4 June 2019
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – causes of action pleaded and claims for damages under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) – where the AHRC provides an exclusive regime for remedying contraventions – whether the Court can entertain the claims – principles and application of s 46PO of the AHRC Act – s 734 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and consideration of a ‘general protections court application’

CONSUMER LAW – claims of unconscionable conduct – s 20 and s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law – consideration of the principles applying to the construction of ‘in trade or commerce’ – where conduct arose during the course of employment – where conduct arose during the course of litigation

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – application to strike out paragraphs of a concise statement of claim – whether the claims have a reasonable prospect of success – whether the claims are an abuse of process – whether the claims are likely to cause embarrassment and delay proceedings

Held: application allowed

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law, sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 20, 21, 22

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 11(1)(aa), 11(1)(f)(i), 46PO(1), 46PO(2), 46PO(3), 46PH, 46PH(1)(b), 46PH(2), 46PP

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 117, 340(1)(a)(ii), 343, 351(1), 365, 368, 368(3)(a), 368(4), 369, 370, 545(2)(b), 570, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 732(3), 734(1), 743(2)

Fair Work Amendment Act 2013 (Cth) s 3, Sch 4A item 4

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A(2)

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 82

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 16.51, 16.51(1), 16.51(3), 16.51(4), 16.52, 16.53, 26.01(1)(a), 40.12

Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 23

Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) ss 23K(2), 56(1)

Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) ss 93K, 93K(4)(c)

Cases cited:

ABC Transport Pty Ltd [2012] FWAFB 3212

Augment Communications Pty Ltd v Sedgwick [2008] NSWDC 251

Australian Competition And Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 253

Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2012) 296 ALR 706

Barto v GPR Management Services Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 389

Bride v Shire of Katanning [2016] FCA 65

Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978

Chan v Harris (No. 2) [2010] FCA 1393

Chaplin v Birdogan (1998) 146 FLR 243

Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 105 FCR 573

Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594

David Walker v Salomon Smith Barney Securities Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1099

Dossett v TKJ Nominees Pty Ltd  (2003) 218 CLR 1

Fair Work Ombudsman v Austrend International Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 171

Fewin Pty Limited…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 818
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Limited (No 7) was heard by the Federal Court of Australia and involved a dispute regarding claims of discrimination, unlawful termination, and unconscionable conduct under Australian law. Dr Zaghloul, the plaintiff, alleged that Woodside Energy Limited, the defendant, discriminated against him on the grounds of race and disability, unlawfully terminated his employment, and engaged in unconscionable conduct during the course of employment and litigation. The court had to determine whether Dr Zaghloul's claims were precluded by the double-dipping provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and if the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) provided an exclusive regime for remedying contraventions.

The court considered the principles and application of section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) and section 734 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The court found that the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) provides an exclusive regime for remedying contraventions and therefore, the court could not entertain Dr Zaghloul's claims. The court further held that the double-dipping provisions in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) precluded Dr Zaghloul from making a general protections court application in relation to the matters already complained of to the Australian Human Rights Commission.

The court allowed Woodside Energy Limited's interlocutory application, finding that Dr Zaghloul's claims were precluded by the double-dipping provisions in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and that the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) provided an exclusive regime for remedying contraventions. The court ordered that Woodside Energy Limited provide a minute of proposed orders within 7 days of the publication of these reasons and that Dr Zaghloul pay Woodside Energy Limited's costs of this interlocutory application, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s interlocutory application be allowed.

2. Within 7 days of the publication of these reasons, the respondent provide a minute of proposed orders giving effect to these reasons.

3. Within a further 7 days, the applicant has leave to raise any objections to the minute contemplated in order 2.

4. Any dispute as to orders giving effect to these reasons be determined on the papers.

5. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of this interlocutory application, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Woodside also applies to strike out paras 30, 32, 33, 38, 39 and 42 of the CSOC on the grounds that they fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and are likely to cause embarrassment and delay in the proceedings.EVIDENCE Woodside relies on an affidavit of Ms Young, sworn 26 February 2019. Dr Zaghloul relies upon two affidavits he has affirmed in these proceedings. The first was affirmed on 12 September 2018 and the second on 8 February 2019. It is unnecessary to summarise in any detail Ms Young’s evidence. It goes to various formalities and produces certain correspondence and pleaded documents. Dr Zaghloul’s evidence, on the other hand, is far more wide ranging. Although, given the nature of this interlocutory proceeding, which essentially relies upon legal grounds for opposition to the claims advanced by Dr Zaghloul, much of that evidence is unnecessary. Dr Zaghloul’s 12 September 2018 affidavit In his affidavit affirmed on 12 September 2018, Dr Zaghloul annexed correspondence by which Woodside accepted liability on 31 January 2013 under its Self-Insurers Policy for:anxiety and/or depressive disorder causing total incapacity for work with effect from 13 April 2011, resulting from unsatisfactory management of [Dr Zaghloul’s] work performance.He says that on 28 April 2011, he advised certain people that the psychiatric injury was caused by workplace bullying. He also annexed correspondence from the Mechanical/Structural/Civil Engineering Manager for Woodside, dated 26 May 2011, confirming that Woodside would provide ongoing financial assistance to support Dr Zaghloul’s recovery and return to work in the form of Salary Continuance payments. The 12 September 2018 affidavit also annexed correspondence from Mr Ian Masson, Vice President Human Resources of 23 April 2012, addressed to Dr Zaghloul’s former solicitors by which Mr Masson had requested Meridian Services provide copies of requested materials to him and following receipt of the material he would forward them onto the solicitors. That correspondence also recorded:In accordance with the Salary Continuance Documentation, we request that Dr Zaghloul participate in a full medical assessment by the Company’s Designated Occupational Physician. This assessment is likely to require appropriate independent medical specialist opinion. Dr Zaghloul continued to refuse to be examined by an independent medical specialist, notwithstanding his ongoing obligation to do so in response to receipt of the Salary Continuance payments. There was much correspondence on this topic. Ultimately, it did become clear that the requirement was for Dr Zaghloul to attend an examination by a psychiatrist to be recommended by Dr Heather Campbell, Woodside’s Designated Occupational Physician, who had been endeavouring to assist Dr Zaghloul. Dr Zaghloul did not make himself available for examination, such that Salary Continuance payments ceased and he suffered anxiety and panic attacks. On 7 August 2012, Dr Zaghloul deposes to having been examined by Dr Gemma Edwards-Smith, Woodside’s nominated psychiatrist. He goes on to describe further attendances at treatment and advice from Woodside’s solicitors that it was considering dismissal on the basis of the Salary Continuance policy. On 5 February 2013, Dr Zaghloul received notice of the termination of his employment.

Decision

Reasons for decision

That application was not an application under Div 2 of the Pt 4-1 of the FW Act, nor an application for orders in relation to a contravention of Pt 3-1 of that Act. It could not enliven s 734 of the FW Act or preclude the making of the first AHRC complaint. Conclusion For those reasons, in my view, the arguments advanced by Woodside are correct in relation to all of the Fair Work claims. That is, in summary:(a)the lodging of the first AHRC complaint against Woodside under the AHRC Act alleging race and disability discrimination; and (b)the lodging of the second AHRC complaint against Mr Masson. mean that Dr Zaghloul is precluded by the double-dipping provisions in ss 725, 728, 732 and 734 of the FW Act from now making a general protections court application in relation to those matters. It follows that judgment will be given for Woodside in relation to paras 48 to 57.ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS MADE AT THE HEARING At the hearing of the interlocutory application Dr Zaghloul appeared to argue, by what purported to be an amended statement of claim (ASOC), that the ASOC enlivened the double dipping provisions in the FW Act precluding him from making any subsequent applications to the AHRC, such that the AHRC applications which he did make on 23 April 2014 and 27 October 2016 were of no effect and could not now be relied upon by Woodside to defeat the FW Act claims made in his CSOC. It appeared that Dr Zaghloul was also asserting that the requirements of s 46PO of the AHRC Act were satisfied by the purported ASOC so as to allow him to make the claims under the DD Act in his CSOC. Similar arguments appear to have been advanced in Dr Zaghloul’s written outline of submissions in support of his 2014 summary judgment application. However, as it was not clear from Dr Zaghloul’s written submissions in relation to the application presently before this Court that he was repeating the same or similar arguments based on his alleged ASOC as he had previously appeared to advance, Woodside did not address these in its written reply submissions. Woodside submits that there is no ASOC as alleged. It was sought to be filed without leave on 19 May 2014, being 24 pages long, but accompanied by 253 pages of annexures. It was discussed in proceedings before Gilmour J on 23 July 2014. When Dr Zaghloul raised the alleged ASOC on that occasion for the first time, Gilmour J said that there was ‘only one statement of claim’ and that Dr Zaghloul had never applied for leave to amend his statement of claim. Dr Zaghloul said that he relied upon subrule 16.51(4) of the Rules in support of the submission that he could amend at any time under that subrule without leave. However, Woodside submitted that the subrule did not apply for reasons now dealt with below, following which his Honour indicated that he would deal with the question of amendment in the course of his reasons. It appears that Gilmour J was of the view that the remarks he had made as to the lack of any existing amended statement of claim under the Rules during the course of the hearing on 23 July 2014 dealt with the situation because the matter was not otherwise mentioned in his Honour’s reasons in Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Ltd (No 5) [2014] FCA 1042 in any express terms. It was clear from the reasons that his Honour was only considering the statement of claim as it stood at the time and that his Honour did not regard the original statement of claim as having been amended. He referred in several places to the statement of claim. By reference to various paragraph numbers, it is clear that his Honour was clearly referring to the original statement of claim and not the alleged ASOC.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 368 relevantly provides:368 Dealing with a dismissal dispute (other than by arbitration)(1)If an application is made under section 365, the FWC must deal with the dispute (other than by arbitration).…(3)If the FWC is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute (other than by arbitration) have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful, then:(a)the FWC must issue a certificate to that effect; and(b)if the FWC considers, taking into account all the materials before it, that arbitration under section 369, or a general protections court application, in relation to the dispute would not have a reasonable prospect of success, the FWC must advise the parties accordingly.(4)A general protections court application is an application to a court under Division 2 of Part 4-1 for orders in relation to a contravention of this Part. Section 370 provides:370 Taking a dismissal dispute to courtA person who is entitled to apply under section 365 for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute unless:(a)both of the following apply:(i)the FWC has issued a certificate under paragraph 368(3)(a) in relation to the dispute;(ii)the general protections court application is made within 14 days after the day the certificate is issued, or within such period as the court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days; or(b)the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction. … Section 370 of the FW Act (subject to paragraph (b)) prohibits absolutely the making of a general protections court application in relation to a dispute concerning a dismissal allegedly in contravention of Pt 3-1 without a certificate. A certificate under subs 368(3)(a) is a precondition of the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with such a dispute: Ward v St Catherine’s School [2016] FCA 790 per Pagone J (at [6]-[7]); Hill v Compass Ten Pty Ltd (2012) 205 FCR 94 per Cowdroy J (at [28]-[31]); Shea (at [26] and [61]). It should be noted that Hill and Shea were decided prior to amendments to Div 8 of Pt 3-1 which commenced on 1 January 2014: s 3 and Sch 4A item 4 of the Fair Work Amendment Act 2013 (Cth). The amendments repealed former ss 368, 369, 370 and 371 and replaced them with new sections 368, 369 and 370. The purpose of the amendments was to set out a new compliance framework for contraventions of Pt 3-1 involving dismissal to take account of the new consent arbitration jurisdiction exercisable by the FWC: see the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Amendment Bill 2013 (at [203]). However, the provisions requiring a certificate as a precondition of the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with a dispute were reproduced in materially the same terms and with no change in effect: see Halls v KR & MA McCardle & Sons Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 316 per Judge Lindsay (at [36]-[38]). In relation to new s 370 the Revised Explanatory Memorandum said at [218]:New section 370 sets out the two circumstances in which a dismissed employee can make a general protections court application in relation to a dismissal. They are:•if the FWC has issued a certificate under new paragraph 368(3)(a) in relation to the dispute and the court application is made within 14 days of the certificate being issued unless the court allows otherwise (paragraph 370(a)); or •the court application includes an application for an interim injunction (paragraph 370(b)). This recognises that applicants may decide not to involve the FWC where urgent relief is sought and the allegations are particularly serious, the facts in dispute are particularly complex, or the employer is unlikely to agree to consent arbitration.