FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Ltd (No 5) [2014] FCA 1042
Citation: Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Ltd (No 5) [2014] FCA 1042 Parties: DR HASSAN ZAGHLOUL v WOODSIDE ENERGY LIMITED (ACN 005 482 986) File number: ACD 62 of 2012 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 26 September 2014 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by applicant seeking summary judgment - circumstances where there are disputed questions of fact – respondent’s intention to call witnesses to dispute allegations – applicant’s application dismissed – application by respondent seeking summary judgment and other relief – effect of ss 60(2) and 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) - whether or not claims made pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) maintainable – applicant’s claims for damages for personal injury under the TPA dismissed – respondent’s interlocutory application otherwise dismissed.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – trial of separate question – whether or not the Court is able to award damages in tort or contract in respect of mental or physical injury allegedly suffered by the applicant - construction of s 93K(4) of Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (Compensation Act)– where applicant commenced proceedings before making an election under the Compensation Act – meaning of “within…the period of 30 days” – separate question answered in the affirmative.
Legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 82(1), 82(1AAA)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01, 8.03(2), 16.44
Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) ss 5, 57B(2)(a), 93B, 93C, 93K(4)(c)
Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Amendment Act 2011 (WA) s 96
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 37(1)(c)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 60(2), (4)
Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Regulations 1982 (WA) reg 22Cases cited: Barminco Investments Pty Ltd v O'Brien [2006] WASCA 88
CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390
Dowsley v Westpac Life Insurance Services Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1208
Earl of Morton’s Trustees v Macdougall [1944] SC 410
Evalena Pty Ltd v Rising Sun Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 622
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372
Magman International Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 32 FCR 1
McNamara v San (No 3) (2010) 183 FCR 328
PAFF v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364
Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118
St John of God Health Care Inc v Austin (2014) 46 WAR 208
Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 574
T v T (2008) 216 FLR 365
Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
Ward v Walton (1989) 99 FLR 21
Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 947Date of hearing: 23 July 2014
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1042
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the applicant's claims under the TPA were maintainable given his bankruptcy and whether the statutory provisions precluded such claims. Additionally, the court had to interpret the meaning of "within the period of 30 days" in section 93K(4) of the Compensation Act, to ascertain if the applicant's claims for damages for personal injury were time-barred. The court also needed to address a separate question regarding whether the court could award damages for mental or physical injury under tort or contract.
The court dismissed the respondent's application for summary judgment, noting that there were disputed questions of fact, particularly regarding the respondent's intention to call witnesses. It rejected the respondent's argument that the applicant's TPA claims were maintainable and dismissed those claims. The court found that the statutory language of section 93K(4) of the Compensation Act required proceedings to be commenced "within the period of 30 days" after the worker received notice of the registration of the election to retain the right to seek damages. The court held that this meant proceedings must be commenced after the notice was given but not later than 30 days after it was given. Finally, the court answered the separate question in the affirmative, stating that it could award damages for mental or physical injury under tort or contract.
The court made several orders: dismissing the applicant's interlocutory application, dismissing the applicant's claims for damages for personal injury under the TPA, dismissing the respondent's interlocutory application except for the separate question, and answering the separate question in the affirmative, allowing for the award of damages for mental or physical injury under tort or contract.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 24 March 2014 be dismissed.
2. The applicant’s claims for damages for personal injury under s 82(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) be dismissed.
3. Otherwise, the respondent’s amended interlocutory application dated 9 May 2014 be dismissed.
4. The separate question of whether the Court can award damages in tort or contract in respect of mental or physical injury allegedly suffered by the applicant, ordered, on 20 May 2014, to be tried, be answered in the affirmative.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicant's application for summary judgment should be granted.
2. Whether the claims made pursuant to section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) are maintainable.
3. Whether the respondent's interlocutory application seeking various orders, including a declaration regarding the effect of the trustees' election under the Bankruptcy Act, should be granted.
4. Whether the court can award damages in tort or contract for mental or physical injury allegedly suffered by the applicant, despite the commencement of proceedings before an election under the Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) was made.
Held
1. The applicant's application for summary judgment was dismissed due to the presence of disputed questions of fact, and the respondent's intention to call witnesses to dispute the allegations.
2. The claims made pursuant to section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) were dismissed as they fell away due to the limitations contained in the Bankruptcy Act.
3. The respondent's interlocutory application seeking various orders, including a declaration regarding the effect of the trustees' election under the Bankruptcy Act, was dismissed.
4. The court can award damages in tort or contract for mental or physical injury allegedly suffered by the applicant, despite the commencement of proceedings before an election under the Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) was made.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent submits that the majority decision in Austin is plainly wrong. Consideration I find the following submissions of the respondent persuasive. The language and sequential structure of s 93K(4) and most of all the requirement that the proceedings be commenced within “the period” of 30 days after the worker is given notice of registration of the election make clear that the proceeding has to be commenced after the notice was given but not later than 30 days after it is given. Even accepting that “within” is capable of meaning “before the end of” or “no later than”, the construction adopted by the majority in Austin renders the words “the period of” superfluous. A court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The ordinary meaning of the words, read in context, is confirmed by the scheme of the Compensation Act and the policy considerations discussed by Newnes JA, to which I will shortly turn, as well as by the Minister's Second Reading Speech set out in part by his Honour at [34]. I do not regard the majority decision in Austin as correct and in so doing respectfully adopt the analysis of Newnes JA and in particular the following paragraphs:[25] Section 93K was introduced as part of wide-ranging amendments to the Act made by the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act 2004 (WA). They included a number of amendments to the provisions of the Act relating to restrictions on the awarding of damages for personal injury. As this Court observed in Thomas Peacock [& Sons Pty Ltd v Abreu [2013] WASCA 19], the evident purpose of those amendments was to deter small, disproportionately costly, claims for damages being brought in respect of workplace accidents (at [30]).[26] The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:93C Limit on power of courts to award damagesIf this Division applies a court is not to award damages to a person contrary to this Division.93K Constraints on awards…(4) Damages in respect of an injury can only be awarded if – (a) the worker elects, in the manner prescribed in the regulations, to retain the right to seek the damages; and(b) the Director registers the election in accordance with the regulations; and(c) court proceedings seeking the damages are commenced within –(i)the period of 30 days after the Director gives the worker written notice that the Director has registered the election; or(ii) any further time provided for in the regulations to allow for things to be done before court proceedings are commenced;and (d) the court is satisfied that the worker’s degree of permanent whole of person impairment is at least 15%.[27] (Section 93K(4)(c) has since been amended to omit the words “within” and “the period of 30 days”, so that it now simply requires that court proceedings seeking damages “are commenced after the Director gives the worker written notice that the Director has registered the election”).[28] An election under s 93K(4) of the Act to retain the right to damages can only be made if either the worker and the employer agree that the worker’s whole of body impairment is at least 15% or it has been assessed to be at least 15%, and that agreement or assessment has been registered by the Director at the written request of the worker: s 93L(2).[29] If a claim for weekly payments of workers’ compensation has been made in respect of the injury, an election to retain the right to damages cannot be made later than one year after the claim for weekly payments was made, unless a later date is fixed under s 93M(3) or s 93M(4): s 93M(1). Under s 93M(3), if a determination of the liability of the employer to make weekly payments is made more than three months after the claim is made, the termination date is nine months after the determination of liability. Section 93M(4) enables the Director to extend the termination date in certain circumstances.[30] A failure to elect to retain the right to damages within the required time is fatal to any entitlement of the worker to recover damages for the injury. So too is a failure to commence an action for damages within the time specified. The stipulation of that time is clearly intended to ensure that proceedings are brought promptly after the election has been made and registered.[31] In my view, it is evident from both the language and the purpose of the Act that the effect of s 93K(4)(c)(i) is that the proceedings must be commenced after notice of the registration of an election is given to the worker. The Act provides for a staged approach to the worker’s right to obtain an award of damages. The purpose of s 93K(4) is to act as a screening or filtering device to deter claims for damages being brought until it has been established that they satisfy the statutory threshold. As Kirby J said in Dossett v TKJ Nominees Pty Ltd (2003) 218 CLR 1 at [61], in relation to an earlier provision having similar effect, it is a “procedural gateway through which the [worker] had to pass before being entitled to commence proceedings for damages”.[32] The first step is the determination whether the worker has suffered a whole of body impairment of at least 15%. As mentioned above, no election to retain the right to damages can be made until that is resolved and the relevant agreement or assessment resolving it is registered by the Director: s 93L(2). Once the agreement or assessment is registered, an election may then be made by the worker. If an election to retain the right to damages is made, that election must also be registered by the Director. Once the election has been registered and the Director has given the worker written notice of its registration, legal proceedings for damages must be commenced “within the period of 30 days” after the Director gives the notice. [33] In my opinion, the words “within the period of 30 days” clearly mean that the proceedings must be commenced within the 30 day period immediately after the worker is given notice of the registration of his or her election. That is, the proceedings must be commenced after the notice is given but not later than 30 days after it is given. That is made plain by the stipulation that the proceedings must be commenced within “the period” of 30 days after the notice is given.[34] That construction is consistent too with the Minister’s Second Reading Speech on the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act, in which, having described the procedure now contained in Div 2 of Pt IV of the Act for a worker to elect to retain the right to seek damages, the Minister said:Upon the worker receiving notification of the registration of the election, he or she will be required to lodge a writ within 30 days or in accordance with the District Court rules. [35] I do not accept the respondent's contention that s 93K(4)(c)(i) is to be understood to mean simply “not later than” 30 days after the worker is given notice of registration of the election; that is, that the proceedings can be commenced at any earlier time. I do not consider the cases relied on by the respondent support that construction. While it can readily be accepted that the word “within” may, in a particular statutory context, mean simply “not later than” the time or event specified, the meaning it bears must, of course, depend upon the context. We were not referred to any cases where the precise language used in s 93K(4) has arisen for consideration and my own research has not unearthed any. The cases relied upon by the respondent depended upon provisions in different terms and in different contexts. . . .[43] In the present case, the relevant provisions of the Act are not only in different terms but they are concerned with a quite different issue to those cases; namely, to deter actions for damages being brought in respect of workplace accidents where the claim is below the statutory threshold. Once it is established that the threshold has been satisfied and an election to retain the right to seek damages registered, s 93K(4)(c) then requires any action for damages to be instituted promptly.[44] If the respondent’s argument were to be accepted it would mean that an action for damages could be commenced long before it was established that the statutory threshold was satisfied, so long as the action did not proceed to judgment before the requirements of s 93K(4)(a) and (b) had been fulfilled. In light of the legislative purpose, that cannot, in my view, have been intended. It could not have been intended by the legislature that a worker might commence proceedings in the hope or expectation that the statutory threshold would be met and the requirements of s 93K(4)(a) and (b) fulfilled so that the ability to obtain relief by an award of damages would arise before judgment in the action. On the contrary, speculative litigation of such a nature seems to me the complete antithesis of what was contemplated by the legislature. It is not, in my opinion, an answer to say that an employer might (inevitably at some cost) be able to obtain an order staying such an action pending notice by the Director of registration of an election by the worker.[45] Nor, in my view, is it to the point that in a particular case the limitation period for an action for damages might run out before the requirements of s 93K(4) have been fulfilled. That is simply the balance that has been struck by the legislature. And as was pointed out in Thomas Peacock, having regard to the regime set out in the Act such a case should be rare (at [34]). The time limits under the Act by which the necessary steps are to be taken envisage that ordinarily the process will not be unduly prolonged. In that context, the delay which has occurred in this case in the resolution of the issue of the appellant’s liability to pay workers’ compensation is extraordinary.