Praljak v State of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Praljak v State of Queensland [2022] FCA 1437  

File number: QUD 423 of 2021
Judgment of: MCEVOY J
Date of judgment: 30 November 2022
Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – separate question – application for leave pursuant to s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – where applicant complained to the Australian Human Rights Commission of unlawful discrimination by respondent on the ground of disability – where after inquiries the AHRC terminated the complaint on the basis that an inquiry into the complaint was not warranted in the circumstances – applicant claims discrimination by a magistrate in the Southport Magistrates Court on the basis of acrophobia impairment – where s 46PO(3A)(a) provides that application must not be made unless the court grants leave to do so – whether leave should be granted – doctrine of judicial immunity applies – proceeding is an abuse of process – leave refused.
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46, 46F(5)(a), 46P, 46PF, 46PH, 46PO

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 3, 6

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)

Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) s 51

Cases cited:

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27

Bropho v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1209

Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118

Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381; [2015] FCA 1045

Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 34

French v Gray, Special Minister of State (2013) 217 FCR 404; [2013] FCA 263

Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121

James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083

Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204; [1997] HCA 28

Nudd v R (2006) 225 ALR 161; [2006] HCA 9

Praljak v State of Queensland [2022] FCA 572

R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35

Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522

Re East; Ex Parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354; [1998] HCA 73

Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; [1995] HCA 66

Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; [1994] HCA 42

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28

UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; [2018] HCA 45

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77

Wentworth v Wentworth (2001) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350

Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48

Nakhla v McCarthy [1978] 1 NZLR 291

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 50
Date of last submissions: 7 July 2022 (Respondent)
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant represented himself
Solicitor for the Respondent:  Crown Law

ORDERS

QUD 423 of 2021
BETWEEN:

ADRIAN PRALJAK

Applicant

AND:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MCEVOY J

DATE OF ORDER:

30…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1437
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Praljak v State of Queensland involves an application for leave to file a complaint with the Federal Court regarding an alleged act of discrimination by a magistrate. The applicant, Praljak, claims that a magistrate in the Southport Magistrates Court discriminated against him on the basis of his acrophobia, which is categorised as a disability under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). The State of Queensland is the respondent in this case. The Federal Court was required to decide whether the applicant's complaint should proceed, particularly in light of the requirement under section 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) that leave must be granted by the court before such an application can be made.

The court considered the application of the doctrine of judicial immunity and the principle of abuse of process in its decision. It found that the doctrine of judicial immunity applied to the proceedings, as the actions of the magistrate were protected from liability in their judicial capacity. This immunity is an important safeguard to ensure that judges can perform their duties without fear of personal repercussions. Additionally, the court concluded that the proceeding constituted an abuse of process because it sought to challenge the actions of a judicial officer in a manner that was not permitted by law. Consequently, the court held that the application for leave should be refused as it would not only undermine the integrity of the judicial system but also contravene established legal principles.

In reaching its decision, the court emphasised that the protection afforded to judicial officers by the doctrine of immunity is critical to maintaining the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The court's ruling underscores the importance of respecting the boundaries of judicial authority and the procedural safeguards designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process. The court dismissed the originating application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, as stipulated in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. This outcome reinforces the principle that challenges to judicial actions must adhere to the legal frameworks and processes designed to address such matters appropriately.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) be refused.

2. The originating application be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be fixed by a Registrar if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Mr Praljak, lodged a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) alleging unlawful discrimination by the State of Queensland, specifically by a magistrate of the Southport Magistrates Court, on the ground of his disability, namely acrophobia. According to Mr Praljak, his acrophobia led to discriminatory treatment during his court appearances, causing him undue hardship and distress. The AHRC conducted an inquiry into the complaint and subsequently terminated it, concluding that an inquiry was not warranted in the circumstances. Dissatisfied with the AHRC's decision, Mr Praljak applied to the court for leave to seek judicial review of the AHRC's decision to terminate the complaint, pursuant to section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The application was made without the required leave of the court, as stipulated by section 46PO(3A)(a) of the Act.

The case before the court was an application for leave to seek judicial review of the AHRC's decision to terminate a complaint of unlawful discrimination. This application was brought pursuant to section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The application was made directly to the court without the required leave, as mandated by section 46PO(3A)(a) of the Act. The matter proceeded on the basis of the application for leave and the associated arguments regarding the applicability of the doctrine of judicial immunity and the nature of the proceeding as an abuse of process.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether leave pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) should be granted to the applicant to seek judicial review of the AHRC's decision to terminate the complaint?
2. Does the doctrine of judicial immunity apply to the proceeding, thereby precluding the grant of leave?
3. Is the proceeding an abuse of process, warranting the refusal of leave?

Held
1. The court decided that leave pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) should not be granted to the applicant to seek judicial review of the AHRC's decision to terminate the complaint.
2. The doctrine of judicial immunity applied to the proceeding, precluding the grant of leave.
3. The proceeding was considered an abuse of process, warranting the refusal of leave.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining whether leave should be granted to the applicant under s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). This section requires that an application for judicial review cannot be made unless leave is granted by the court. The applicant had lodged a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) regarding alleged discrimination by a magistrate in the Southport Magistrates Court on the basis of acrophobia impairment. The AHRC terminated the complaint, finding it unwarranted. The applicant sought leave to challenge this decision. The court considered whether the AHRC's decision warranted judicial review under the specified provision, ultimately deciding against granting leave.

In determining whether judicial immunity applied, the court noted that the proceeding involved allegations against a judicial officer, specifically a magistrate. The doctrine of judicial immunity is well-established in Australian law, protecting judicial officers from being subject to civil proceedings for acts performed in their judicial capacity, unless the acts are without jurisdiction or in bad faith. The court held that the doctrine applied, thereby precluding the grant of leave to seek judicial review of the AHRC's decision. This decision was grounded in the principle that judicial officers must be shielded from such proceedings to maintain the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Finally, the court addressed the question of whether the proceeding constituted an abuse of process. The court reasoned that pursuing judicial review of the AHRC's decision in these circumstances amounted to an abuse of process. The court found that the application was not only an indirect attack on the magistrate's decision but also an improper use of the judicial review process. This consideration was pivotal in the court's decision to refuse leave, as it sought to prevent the misuse of legal processes to challenge judicial decisions indirectly. The court concluded that granting leave would not only be futile but would also undermine the proper administration of justice. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that the doctrine of judicial immunity and the principle against abuse of process are significant factors in determining whether leave for judicial review should be granted in cases involving complaints against judicial officers.