Praljak v Bond University Limited
[2024] QSC 45
•25 March 2024
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Praljak v Bond University Limited [2024] QSC 45
PARTIES:
ADRIAN PRALJAK
(plaintiff)v
BOND UNIVERSITY LIMITED(defendant)
FILE NO:
BS 5369 of 2021
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
25 March 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
9 February 2024
JUDGE:
Sullivan J
ORDER:
The order of the Court will be as follows:
1. The Statement of Claim filed 2 November 2023 is struck out pursuant to r 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules and the inherent power of the Court.
2. The proceeding is dismissed pursuant to the inherent power of the Court.
3. Pursuant to s 5(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the defendant has leave to apply to the Court for a vexatious proceedings order in relation to the plaintiff.
4. Pursuant to s 6(2)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the plaintiff is prohibited from instituting proceedings in a Queensland State Court or Queensland State Tribunal against:
a. the defendant; or
b. any current or former employee, officer or Council member of the defendant,
without prior leave of the Court.
5. To the extent necessary, the plaintiff is given leave to appeal these orders of 25 March 2024 to the Court of Appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – where the defendant seeks to have the Amended Statement of Claim struck out – where the defendant seeks to have the proceeding dismissed – whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to strike out the Amended Statement of Claim – whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to dismiss the proceedings
PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – POWERS AND GENERALLY – VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS – where the defendant seeks leave to apply to the Court for a vexatious proceedings order under Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) against the plaintiff – where the defendant seeks an order that the plaintiff be prohibited from commencing proceedings in the jurisdiction of Queensland against the defendant and any employee, officer, Council member or student of the Defendant without leave of the Court - whether discretion should be exercised to make vexatious proceedings orders
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth),
s 46PO(3A)(a)Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 604
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 2.26
Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld), r 45(3)(a)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 16, r 22,
r 149, r 171, r 371, r 444, r 668Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld), s 5, s 6, s 10, s 11
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld)Althaus v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 221, considered
Brisbane City Council v Russell Gordon Haig Mathews [2006] QSC 025, cited
Cooper v Mbuzi [2012] QSC 105, cited
Jorgensen v Jorgensen [2016] QSC 193, considered
Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2015] QCA 128, considered
Mbuzi v Griffith University (2014) 323 ALR 248, cited
Mbuzi v Hall [2010] QSC 359, considered
Mowen v Rockhampton Regional Council [2018] QSC 192, considered
Praljak v Bond University Limited; Praljak v McConvill [2022] QCA 213, cited
Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438, cited
Praljak v Services Australia [2022] FWCFB 62, cited
Praljak v State of Queensland [2022] FCA 1437, cited
Praljak v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 030, cited
Praljak v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 310, cited
Professional Nominees Pty Ltd v Walsh [1998] QCA 296, considered
Quinlan v Rothwell [2002] 1 Qd R 647, considered
Robertson v Hollings (Imagination Television Ltd) [2009] QCA 303, citedCOUNSEL:
The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf
S J Webster for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf
Minter Ellison for the respondent
Introduction
The current application is brought by the defendant and seeks a variety of relief. That relief can be summarised as follows:
(a)the amended Statement of Claim filed 2 November 2023 be struck out;
(b)the proceeding be dismissed;
(c)the defendant have leave to apply to the Court for a vexatious proceedings order in relation to the plaintiff pursuant to s 5(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld);
(d)the plaintiff be prohibited from instituting proceedings in Queensland against:
(i) the defendant; or
(ii) any current or former employee, officer, Council member or student of the defendant,
without the prior leave of the Court, pursuant to s 6(2)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act;
(e)the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding, including this application, on an indemnity basis.
It is appropriate to deal with the first and second parts of the relief together, and then deal with third and fourth parts of the relief together.
Striking out the Amended Statement of Claim and dismissal of the proceeding
(i) Background to application
The plaintiff commenced the current proceeding on 11 May 2021.
On 9 June 2021, Justice Williams struck out the then plaintiff’s Statement of Claim pursuant to r 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”). Her Honour’s reasons included the following conclusions:
(a) the Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable causes of action;
(b) there were no material facts pleaded in a way which enabled the defendant to clearly understand the nature of the causes of action which were sought to be raised against it;
(c) the pleading included allegations of a nature which were scandalous and irrelevant.
Her Honour noted that a submission had been made by the plaintiff during the hearing of the application that whilst he was a qualified legal practitioner, he did not have any experience in relation to pleading civil matters in the Supreme Court. Her Honour observed, in part, that the UCPR was available on the Court website, it was written in plain English, and it was easy to understand. Her Honour also identified that there was a considerable volume of publicly available case law in respect of the application of the UCPR, including the pleading rules, which would assist a litigant in person (particularly a person that has legal training) to understand and appreciate the pleading rules.
The defects in the then Statement of Claim were so extensive that her Honour also ordered that the plaintiff must obtain the leave of the Court in order to re-plead.
The plaintiff’s next step in the proceeding was not to seek to re-plead and obtain the Court’s leave, but instead the plaintiff commenced an appeal against William J’s order. That Notice of Appeal itself was fundamentally defective and was struck out on 30 August 2021 by President Sofronoff. Again, the defects in the Notice of Appeal were so extensive that Sofronoff P ordered that:
(a) no further Notice of Appeal was to be filed without the Court of Appeal’s leave; and
(b) the plaintiff was to file any draft Notice of Appeal by 16 October 2021.
The plaintiff failed to provide any draft Notice of Appeal, whether by 16 October 2021 or otherwise. As a result, on 31 October 2022, the Court of Appeal struck out the plaintiff’s appeal. Justice of Appeal McMurdo identified in the Court of Appeal’s reasons, that in correspondence with the Registrar in December 2021, the plaintiff had stated “that he had…absolutely no knowledge in relation of how to redraft and what to say.”[1]
[1]Praljak v Bond University Limited; Praljak v McConvill [2022] QCA 213 per McMurdo JA.
His Honour noted that the plaintiff was a self-represented litigant, although he also observed that the plaintiff had a law degree and had been admitted to practice in the Australian Capital Territory. The reasons recorded that the plaintiff had admitted that he could not progress the appeals without legal representation. The plaintiff had told the Court of his efforts to secure representation by contacting Legal Aid Queensland, the Queensland Law Society, LawRight and a number of community legal centres, but that his endeavours to obtain assistance had been without result. His Honour went on to observe that the plaintiff had not been entirely inactive, noting that, apart from writing to the Registrar in terms which sometimes contained scandalous and irrelevant allegations, it appeared that the plaintiff had commenced proceedings against the defendant in the Federal Court.
In striking out the Notice of Appeal, McMurdo JA recorded that this was a plain case of lengthy delay involving breaches of the Court’s orders, and that the plaintiff had had a reasonable time to present a draft Notice of Appeal if he had an arguable point in the case.
Even after the dismissal of the Appeal, the plaintiff continued to be inactive in this proceeding. He continued to fail to deliver a draft Statement of Claim for which leave might then have been sought.
On 4 August 2023, the defendant’s solicitors wrote a r 444 letter (in accordance with the UCPR) to the plaintiff identifying that the plaintiff was required to, but had not, sought leave to re-plead pursuant to the Order of Williams J of 9 June 2021. The letter identified that the defendant would bring an application to have the current proceeding dismissed.
By an email of 5 August 2023, the plaintiff stated, inter alia, that he did not have the “Legal Skill Set or good Health” to “draft an application for leave to replead and all other relevant Legal Documents which the Court requires”; and that for various reasons, he had been “Unlawfully treated by The Supreme Court of Brisbane” as well as the legal firm representing the defendant, and that this is why the Statement of Claim in the proceeding had remained struck out.[2]
[2]The quoted section of the email from the plaintiff dated 5 August 2023 is precisely replicated, including grammatical and typographical errors.
On 24 October 2023, the defendant brought an application for the dismissal of the proceeding.
On 2 November 2023, the plaintiff filed in the Supreme Court Registry a document described as a “Statement of Claim”. That document was not a document for which leave had been sought, let alone obtained. On the first page of that document at paragraph numbered [2], it provided as follows:[3]
“I…the plaintiff…I seek Leave pursuant to (rule 377(1)) from their Honour Justices to submit this Amended Statement of Claim on the Lawful Grounds of the following; I am Adding New Legal Causes of Action (which are stated in this Amended Statement of Claim Legal Document), In the Interest of Justice, Medical Grounds, Financial Hardship, and Any Other Lawful Grounds which may apply to grant Leave.”
[3]This portion of the document from the plaintiff is precisely replicated, including any grammatical and typographical errors.
The existing application was then amended by the defendant to seek the striking out of this document, in addition to the dismissal of the proceeding.
(ii) The Statement of Claim and its contents
The purported Statement of Claim document was filed without leave, and accordingly its presence on the Court file amounts to an abuse of process.
I indicated to the plaintiff that I would be prepared to deal with the content in paragraph [2] as if it were an application for leave to file the document as a Statement of Claim to be determined at the hearing of the present application.
The plaintiff and the defendant were content to proceed on this basis.
I turn then to the document itself. The document is one for which leave would never be granted for it to stand as a Statement of Claim. I will make an order for the striking out of the document, both pursuant both to r 171 of the UCPR and the inherent power of the Court. The basis for this conclusion is set out below.
In no respect does this document meet the requirements for an acceptable Statement of Claim. It does not plead material facts which support tenable causes of action. Its structure can be described as follows.
Paragraphs [1] and [3] identify the two parties. Paragraph [2] contains the reference to the seeking of leave as previously referred to.
Paragraph [4] simply contains an exhortation that the allegations that are made are credible and sound against the defendant.
Paragraph [5] is a largely unintelligible grouping of words and phrases with the following features:
(a) it commences with 14 and a-half lines containing, inter alia, general descriptors of civil causes of action (e.g. “Contractual”, “Fraudulent misrepresentation”, “Negligence”, “Criminal Levels of Defamation”);
(b) within that first 14 and a-half lines, there are also brief generalised assertions at a very high level, some of which are of a scandalous nature, in respect of the defendant in some way doing something in respect of the plaintiff, “e.g. (Intentionally depriving the interest of the plaintiff in property through unauthorized acts and causing numerous significant losses”…“e.g. (Numerous derogatory and false statement, verbal and written, made with malice and negligence by the defendant to numerous third parties leading to numerous serious losses and injuries to the Plaintiff: Mr Adrian Praljak, reputation…)”;[4]
(c) in the next 12 lines there is then, inter alia, a series of general descriptors of perceived criminal offences or pseudo criminal conduct;
(d) within those 12 lines there are again interspersed generalised assertions at a very high level, including allegations of a scandalous nature, asserting conduct by the defendant, or other unnamed associates of the defendant;[5]
(e) all of the content referred to in (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, are contained in a single, substantially unintelligible sentence over approximately 26 lines;
(f) the last five lines of paragraph [5] are in the form of a second sentence, which is, in effect, an exhortation to the Court to consider other “Legal Causes of Action” which it might think fit.
[4]This portion of the document from the plaintiff is precisely replicated, complete with any typographical or grammatical errors.
[5]Examples will not be set out of these matters referred to in (c) and (d), due to the scandalous nature of much of the allegations, which are unsupported by the pleading of appropriate material facts.
Paragraph [6] asks the Court to grant financial compensation, punitive damages and remedies.
Paragraph [7] then contains content which relates to an order and a conviction which have historically been made by Queensland Courts in relation to the plaintiff. The first is a domestic violence order apparently made in 2017. The second is a stalking conviction apparently entered against the plaintiff in 2018. The paragraph discusses, in a confusing way, the plaintiff’s complaints about those two matters, and contains an assertion that both were unlawful. None of those matters evidently concern the defendant. They appear to be irrelevant to a civil proceeding brought against the defendant. Indeed, the paragraph goes on to seek the quashing or overturning of both the domestic violence order and the stalking conviction. That is self-evidently not relief relevant to the defendant, or able to be sought against the defendant.
Paragraph [8] then seeks a public apology from the defendant.
Paragraph [9] then seeks injunctions or other types of orders against the defendant, and other persons described as the defendant’s past and current associates. The injunctions are to stop the defendant (and, presumably, the other entities) from committing what are said to be forms of offences or crimes against the plaintiff.
Paragraph [10] then seeks orders associated with financial compensation, again, in a largely incomprehensible way, said to be arising from various allegations of criminal conduct.
Paragraph [10] has embedded in it scandalous allegations similar to those contained in paragraph [5].
Finally, there is then a prayer for relief which, amongst other things, seeks compensation, costs and the overturning or quashing of the domestic violence order of 2017 and the stalking conviction of 2018. This paragraph asserts that the domestic violence order and the conviction were obtained by the Queensland Police Service. This assertion emphasises that these matters are irrelevant to a proceeding brought against the defendant. The prayer for relief also seeks a formal apology and for the restoration of the plaintiff’s “lawyer career reputation in Queensland, Australia, internationally”.
That pleading has the following defects.
First, it is substantially unintelligible as a drafted document, particularly paragraph [5].
Secondly, as a pleading it fails to disclose tenable causes of action. It does not attempt to plead material facts in support of a tenable cause of action.
Thirdly, it can properly be described as frivolous and vexatious. It is frivolous and vexatious to simply assert descriptors of what a person perceives to be various civil causes of action and criminal offences without the pleading of material facts to support them. Further, it is vexatious to include allegations which are obviously irrelevant to the defendant, specifically the domestic violence order and the stalking conviction. The pleading makes scandalous assertions without in any way properly pleading material facts which could arguably support the making of such serious allegations. This is also vexatious.
Fourthly, all the factors set out above result in this document being an abuse of this Court’s process.
In consequence of these defects, I will order the striking out of the document titled Statement of Claim, filed 2 November 2023, both pursuant to r 171 of the UCPR and the inherent power of the Court.
Further, I will formally refuse leave for that document to stand as a Statement of Claim in this proceeding.
(iii) Principles for a dismissal of the proceeding
The defendant also seeks for the proceeding to be dismissed. This relief is sought pursuant to the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate its own proceedings, and pursuant to r 5(4), r 16(e) and r 371(2) of the UCPR.
The principles in relation to the dismissal of a proceeding on the basis that it is an abuse of process may be summarised as follows.
The power to strike out a proceeding as an abuse of process under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is a power which may be employed for groundless claims. In an individual case, it must be very clear that a claim is groundless before the Court should summarily dismiss it and thereby prevent a hearing and a determination in the usual way. Cases where this may occur include cases where there is an abuse of process by reason of the way in which a party prosecutes or fails to prosecute the process.[6]
[6]Professional Nominees Pty Ltd v Walsh [1998] QCA 296 at [2].
While it may be recognised that the Court is anxious to ensure that plaintiffs who do not have the benefit of legal representation should have every opportunity to present a viable claim if they have one, this consideration by the Court is not a licence for unrepresented plaintiffs to abuse the process of the Court by using proceedings as a vehicle for oppression or as an instrument of vexation.[7] A self-represented litigant should not be permitted to disregard rules and to conduct litigation in a manner which is unjust to other parties and contrary to the interests of justice.[8]
[7]Althaus v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 221 at [20].
[8]Mbuzi v Hall [2010] QSC 359 at [27] per Applegarth J.
In Robertson v Hollings,[9] Keane JA (as his Honour then was) observed:
“…litigation is not a learning experience. The Courts do not permit litigants, even unrepresented litigants, to prosecute claims which cannot proceed fairly to the other parties.”
[9]Robertson v Hollings (Imagination Television Ltd) [2009] QCA 303 at [11] per Keane JA.
(iv) Conclusion on dismissal of the proceeding
I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case to dismiss the current proceedings as an abuse of process pursuant to the inherent power of the Supreme Court. My reasoning for this conclusion is as follows.
First, it is fundamental to the bringing of a claim in the Supreme Court that it be accompanied by a Statement of Claim that complies with the UCPR. This is recognised by r 22 of the UCPR, which identifies that a Statement of Claim must accompany a Claim when filed. The purpose of such a pleading is succinctly identified in the general requirements of r 149 of the UCPR. The pleading must be as brief as the nature of the case permits, and must contain a statement of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies. It performs the role of disclosing whether there is a tenable cause of action being put forward and allows a defendant to understand and respond fairly to the case that has been brought against it.
In the current proceeding, there has never been a document which has met this requirement of the UCPR.
Secondly, the original Statement of Claim filed in the Supreme Court on 11 May 2021 was struck out under r 171 of the UCPR on 9 June 2021 by Williams J. It was wholly defective. Since that strike out on 9 June 2021, there had been no attempt by the plaintiff to produce a Statement of Claim and seek leave for the filing of such a Statement of Claim, prior to the filing by the defendant, on 25 October 2023, of an application for dismissal of the proceeding. The plaintiff, in effect, did nothing to seek to prosecute the current proceeding, in circumstances where the original Statement of Claim had been struck out as wholly defective. The filing of the Notice of Appeal provided no excuse for this non-prosecution. The bringing of an appeal does not operate as a stay on the proceeding. I note that the Notice of Appeal itself was also struck out and the appeal later dismissed, in part, for want of prosecution.
Thirdly, when the most recent purported Statement of Claim was produced on 2 November 2023, it was simply filed in the registry of the Supreme Court without any leave having been sought and provided. The order of Williams J had been clear that leave was required before any document could stand as a Statement of Claim. The document, in any event, in no way functioned as a Statement of Claim, inter alia, because it did not plead material facts disclosing any tenable claim. It has been struck out for the reasons set out above.
Fourthly, the plaintiff has made submissions consistent with his being unable to produce an acceptable Statement of Claim. At the hearing of this application, the plaintiff variously submitted, in relation to the content of the purported Statement of Claim filed on 2 November 2023, that he had “done the best that I can do to say what is a civil legal cause of action, what is a criminal legal cause of action…” and “I’ve done the best job that I can do in the past and currently and I submit that it is in the interests of justice - in the public’s best interest and - and this case for natural justice and to restore the - to correct the past, current and maybe ongoing miscarriage of justice.” Those submissions were broadly similar to statements made by the plaintiff in his written response to the defendant’s r 444 letter.
By reference to the history of this proceeding and the content of the most recent purported Statement of Claim, I am satisfied that there is no realistic prospect that the plaintiff will produce a Statement of Claim document articulating a tenable claim. In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the material which was read by the plaintiff in the application. That material does not support a different conclusion. Further, the statements of the plaintiff that this 2 November 2023 document represents his best efforts after the proceeding has been on foot for almost three years underscores and additionally supports the conclusion I have reached. The plaintiff has been given every opportunity to produce a compliant Statement of Claim which pleads material facts which may support a tenable cause of action. He has not done so. It is evident that he is unable to do so.
Fifthly, the plaintiff is a person who has obtained a law degree from the defendant. The material supports that the plaintiff was admitted to practice as a legal practitioner in the Australian Capital Territory at some time in the past. Whilst he informed the Court of Appeal previously on the occasion of the striking out of his Notice of Appeal that he did not have experience in litigation and pleading, a person who has undertaken a law degree will have a level of familiarity with both civil and criminal causes of action. Even if that were not the case, and the plaintiff was simply an unrepresented person with no formal legal training, that would not make him immune from the requirements of the UCPR in relation to prosecuting an action in a proper and efficient way, and complying with the rules of Court in relation to the delivery of a Statement of Claim disclosing tenable causes of action. This is not a case where it could be said that there is simply a difficulty in articulating what were otherwise evidently viable causes of action.
In all of those circumstances, I am satisfied that the conduct of the plaintiff in being unable to articulate a Statement of Claim for tenable causes of action, after almost three years, is an abuse of the process of this Court and is also a sufficient failure to prosecute the action as to warrant the dismissal of the proceeding.
Accordingly, I will dismiss the proceeding pursuant to the inherent power of the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to consider any of the other specific rules relied upon.
Relief sought under the Vexatious Proceedings Act
(i) General principles
I turn then to the relief sought by the defendant under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. That relief can be summarised as follows:
(a) a grant of leave to apply to the Court for a Vexatious Proceedings Order in relation to the plaintiff, pursuant to s 5(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act;
(b) an order prohibiting the institution of proceedings in Queensland against the defendant, and any current or former employee, officer, Council member or student of the defendant, without leave of the Court, pursuant to s 6(2)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
The Vexatious Proceedings Act relevantly provides as follows:
“5 Applications for vexatious proceedings orders
(1) Any of the following persons may apply to the Court for a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person mentioned in section 6(1)(a) or (b)—
(a) the Attorney-General;
(b) the Crown solicitor;
(c) the registrar of the Court;
(d)a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding;
(e) a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.
(2) An application may be made by a person mentioned in subsection (1)(d) or (e) only with the leave of the Court.
6 Making vexatious proceedings orders
(1) This section applies if the Court is satisfied that a person is—
(a)a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia; or
(b)a person who, acting in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is mentioned in paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in Australia.
(2) The Court may make any or all of the following orders—
(a)an order staying all or part of any proceeding in Queensland already instituted by the person;
(b)an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in Queensland;
(c)any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.
Examples of another order for paragraph (c)—
• an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail
• an order to give security for costs
• an order for costs
(3) The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of a person mentioned in section 5(1).
(4) The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.
(5) For subsection (1), the Court may have regard to—
(a)proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal, including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section; and
(b)orders made by any Australian court or tribunal, including orders made before the commencement of this section.
…
10 Vexatious proceedings order prohibiting institution of proceedings
(1) If the Court makes a vexatious proceedings order prohibiting a person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in Queensland—
(a)the person may not institute proceedings, or proceedings of the particular type, in Queensland without the leave of the Court under section 13; and
(b)another person may not, acting in concert with the person, institute proceedings, or proceedings of the particular type, in Queensland without the leave of the Court under section 13.
…
Schedule Dictionary
Australian court or tribunal means a court or tribunal of the Commonwealth or of a State.
Court means the Supreme Court.
…
institute, in relation to proceedings, includes—
(a) for civil proceedings—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started against a party; and
(b) for proceedings before a tribunal—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started before the tribunal; and
(c) for criminal proceedings—the making of a complaint or the obtaining of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged offender; and
(d) for civil or criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary to start an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision made in the course of the proceedings.
…
proceeding includes—
(a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal; and
(b) any proceeding, including any interlocutory proceeding, taken in connection with or incidental to a proceeding pending before a court or tribunal; and
(c) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way.
Proceedings of a particular type includes—
(a) proceedings in relation to a particular matter; and
(b) proceedings against a particular person; and
(c) proceedings in a particular court or tribunal.
Vexatious proceeding includes—
(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and
(b) a proceeding instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and
(c) a proceeding instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; and
(d) a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.
…”
The application for leave to seek the ultimate relief is made pursuant to ss 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. Such a leave application may be heard in the same application which seeks the final relief under the Vexatious Proceedings Act.[10] The assessment of whether leave ought to be granted will usually involve a consideration of the merits of the final relief which is sought in the application.[11]
[10]Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2015] QCA 128 at [22].
[11]Jorgensen v Jorgensen [2016] QSC 193 at [55].
Normally, an application is brought by the Attorney-General, the Crown Solicitor or the Registrar of the Supreme Court. An order on such an application will be made when the public interest in the administration of justice is an issue. The legislation, however, contemplates that a private person (with the requisite leave) may bring an application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. Where that course is undertaken, generally the orders will be designed to prevent damage to the particular person who is the applicant, rather than orders involving a broader prohibition.[12]
[12]Mowen v Rockhampton Regional Council [2018] QSC 192 at [41] per Davis J.
In Cooper v Mbuzi,[13] Mullins J (as her Honour then was), usefully identified a number of further aspects of the operation of the statutory scheme. I gratefully adopt her Honour’s observations in this respect as follows:[14]
[13]Cooper v Mbuzi [2012] QSC 105.
[14]Cooper v Mbuzi [2012] QSC 105 at [66]-[70].
“[66] That definition of what can be a vexatious proceeding is expansive and not prescriptive. That is consistent with the objective of the Act, as expressed in the Explanatory Notes for the Vexatious Proceedings Bill 2005 to address the problems created by vexatious litigants:
“A vexatious litigant is a person who demonstrates particular behaviours in the pursuance of legal actions through the courts. These behaviours include taking legal action without any reasonable grounds, a repetition of arguments which have already been rejected, disregard for the court’s practices and rulings, and persistent attempts to abuse the court’s processes. The consequences of pursuing such actions include wastage of public resources and the harassment and annoyance of defendants in litigation that lacks a reasonable basis.”
[67] In Re Cameron [1996] 2 Qd R 218 , 220, Fitzgerald P considered what makes legal proceedings vexatious:
“It is also necessary to decide what makes legal proceedings vexatious. Although there are sometimes statutory indications, the broad test potentially concerns such factors as the legitimacy or otherwise of the motives of the person against whom the order is sought, the existence or lack of reasonable grounds for the claims sought to be made, repetition of similar allegations or arguments to those which have already been rejected, compliance with or disregard of the court’s practices, procedures and rulings, persistent attempts to use the court’s processes to circumvent its decisions or other abuse of process, the wastage of public resources and funds, and the harassment of those who are the subject of the litigation which lacks reasonable basis … .”
[68] The justification for imposing restrictions under the Act on a vexatious litigant was referred to by White JA in Hambleton v Labaj [2011] QCA 17 at [71] (Labaj):
“As Kirby J observed in Re Skyring it is a serious thing to keep a person out of the courts and the rule of law requires that, ordinarily, a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. But the resources of the court are not limitless and must be deployed responsibly. Those against whom proceedings are commenced which are vexatious at their inception, or which become so by frequent, irrational interlocutory processes, may expect to be protected from the abusive use of the court’s processes.” (footnote omitted)
[69] The term “frequently” is a relative term that must be considered in the context of the relevant litigation: Jones v Cusack (1992) 66 ALJR 815, 816. Making a mistake in bringing an application or using a particular means to proceed (such as r 668 of the UCPR) where it is not appropriate does not necessarily characterise the litigation as vexatious. Persistence in repeating the mistaken application or inappropriate means of proceeding may result in characterising the litigation as vexatious.
[70] If the conditions for the making of a vexatious proceedings order under the Act are satisfied, the court must consider whether, in all the circumstances, the order should be made in the exercise of the court’s discretion. Relevant matters include the serious implications of interfering with a person’s right of access to the courts and other powers available to the court to regulate and control its own proceedings: Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 484.
…” (Footnotes omitted)
Any order which is made under s 6(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act should be formulated in a way whereby the ambit of the order goes no further than is necessary to control the vexatious behaviour.[15]
[15]Jorgensen v Jorgensen [2016] QSC 193 at [73].
I will have regard to each of these principles for the purposes of making the determinations below.
(ii)Factual basis underlying the granting of leave and making of the relevant orders sought
The defendant relies upon fifteen proceedings brought by the plaintiff for the purpose of satisfying the Court that the plaintiff is a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, as required by s 6(1)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
The concept of “proceeding”, as defined in the Schedule to the Vexatious Proceedings Act, includes any proceeding before a State or Commonwealth Court or Tribunal, whether interlocutory or substantive proceedings, and includes any appeal from a prior decision of a Court or Tribunal. I will deal with each proceeding in turn below.
First, the defendant relies upon the current Supreme Court proceeding BS5369/21. This is proceeding one.
For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that this is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. It is a proceeding which has been conducted as an abuse of process of the Court. It is also a proceeding which was instituted and pursued without any reasonable ground.
For the entirety of this Supreme Court proceeding, some almost three years, the plaintiff has been unable to produce a Statement of Claim disclosing tenable causes of action. Further, both of the documents which the plaintiff wished to stand as a Statement of Claim have contained scandalous assertions made without the pleading of material facts which could have arguably supported those serious allegations. Finally, the last such document contained irrelevant matters concerning third parties which could never have supported relief against the defendant.
I am satisfied that the Supreme Court proceeding BS5369/21 is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Secondly, the defendant relies upon the appeal from the decisions of Williams J in the current proceeding, being Court of Appeal No CA6675/21. This is proceeding two.
As previously identified, the initial Notice of Appeal was struck out by Sofronoff P, together with an order that no further Notice of Appeal could be filed, except with the Leave of the Court of Appeal, and that any draft amended Notice of Appeal had to be filed by 16 October 2021. The plaintiff then took no further steps in that appeal. Ultimately, the appeal itself was struck out on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to prosecute the appeal. That strike out order was made on 31 October 2022. That proceeding was also an abuse of process of the Court. The plaintiff failed throughout the life of the appeal to articulate tenable grounds of appeal, and then failed to prosecute the appeal. It was, accordingly, a proceeding instituted and pursued without any reasonable grounds.
I am satisfied that the Court of Appeal proceeding CA6675/21 is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Thirdly, the defendant relies on Federal Court proceeding QUD218/22. This is proceeding three.
In this proceeding, the plaintiff claimed relief against the defendant which included a claim for $29,950,000,000 in punitive damages, $400,000 for tuition fees, $250,000 for relevant expenses incurred whilst he was a student, and $USD100,000 for earnings that the plaintiff claimed he would have earnt as a lawyer in the USA. This proceeding was ultimately dismissed by the Federal Court on 30 November 2022. On that date, his Honour Justice McEvoy ordered, inter alia:
(a)the plaintiff’s Originating Application filed 29 June 2022 be set aside and the proceeding dismissed as vexatious and an abuse of process;
(b)the plaintiff’s affidavit of 29 June 2022 be removed from the Court file;
(c)the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs on an indemnity basis, to be fixed by a registrar if not agreeable.
His Honour delivered reasons in support of that order.
As part of his Honour’s reasons, McEvoy J found that the Federal Court proceeding was substantially the same as the present Supreme Court proceeding. His Honour noted that the Statement of Claim in the current Supreme Court proceeding had been struck out by Williams J with an order that the plaintiff not be allowed to file a Statement of Claim without leave of the Supreme Court. His Honour found that it was apparent that the plaintiff had sought to advance substantially the same complaint in the Federal Court to the one which had been brought in the Supreme Court.[16] His Honour then found that the application in the Federal Court had failed to disclose reasonable causes of action and was otherwise based on scandalous and embarrassing allegations.[17] His Honour further noted that part of the relief which had been sought in the Federal Court was for the amount of $USD29,950,000,000 for punitive damages. McEvoy J observed that it is an abuse of process to use procedures of the Court to contend for an amount of damages which is extravagant in the sense that it is unsupportable on any view of the law and facts in issue in the proceeding.[18] His Honour ultimately found that the proceeding was an abuse of process and was vexatious to the defendant.[19]
[16]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [22].
[17]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [23].
[18]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [24].
[19]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [25]-[26].
I am satisfied that Federal Court proceeding QUD218/22 is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Fourthly, the defendant relies on Supreme Court proceeding BS5371/21. This is proceeding four.
This proceeding was commenced on 11 May 2021 by the plaintiff against a former employee of the defendant, a Mr James McConvill. In that proceeding, the plaintiff claimed $1,068,901.20 against Mr McConvill for allegedly:
(a) causing the plaintiff to suffer from severe acrophobia; and
(b) destroying the plaintiff’s legal and political careers, business and aspirations.
The allegations in the Statement of Claim for that proceeding are based, in part, on the plaintiff alleging that he was the employee of James McConvill & Associates (a legal firm) in 2017 and 2018. There were various assertions in the pleading relating to the plaintiff having suffered damages in relation to the employment.
On 30 June 2021, his Honour Justice Freeburn struck out the Statement of Claim pursuant to r 171 of the UCPR and ordered that the plaintiff must obtain the leave of the Court to re-plead. His Honour also ordered that any application by the plaintiff for leave to re-plead must attach a proposed Statement of Claim. In his Honour’s short ex-tempore reasons, he identified the numerous defects in the pleading in paragraphs [1] and [3] to [9] of the then Statement of Claim. In respect of paragraph [8], his Honour found that the paragraph was incomprehensible. After identifying the defects, Freeburn J concluded as follows:[20]
“It is beyond argument that the defendant is entitled to proper notice of the case it has to meet. This pleading does not give proper notice. It breaches the rules - the basic requirements of natural justice. Further, I note that the plaintiff specifically declined an invitation to re-plead. Before me in oral argument, the plaintiff told me that the pleading is his “absolute best effort”. In the circumstances, there seems to be no point in giving leave to re-plead. I propose to strike out the statement of claim pursuant to rule 171 and to order that the plaintiff must obtain the leave of the Court to re-plead. I am going to make an order in terms of the draft handed to me by the plaintiff’s solicitor.”
[20]Transcript of proceedings on 30 June 2021; T3-ll13-21.
I note that an appeal from that decision was commenced. It was also struck out by the Court of Appeal on 31 October 2022, at the same time as the appeal from the order of Williams J in this proceeding was struck out.[21]
[21]Praljak v Bond University Limited; Praljak v McConvill [2022] QCA 213.
This proceeding had been an abuse of process in terms of its prosecution up to and including the determination of Freeburn J, in that at no time had the plaintiff proceeded with a Statement of Claim which pleaded material facts demonstrating tenable causes of action. This was a proceeding which was instituted and pursued without reasonable grounds.
I am satisfied that Supreme Court proceeding BS5371/21 (which is against Mr McConvill) was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Fifthly, the applicant then relies upon the appeal proceeding brought in respect of the decision of Freeburn J, that is appeal number CA7563/21. This is proceeding five.
That appeal was heard together with the appeal in the current proceedings from the order of Williams J. The appeal was struck out because the grounds on the Notice of Appeal had previously been struck out, and the plaintiff then failed to prosecute the appeal within a reasonable time and in accordance with the Court of Appeal orders. For the same reasons as set out above in relation to the appeal from the order of Williams J, this was the instituting of a proceeding which had no reasonable grounds. There was also a failure to prosecute the appeal. Both circumstances supported that the appeal was an abuse of process.
I am satisfied that appeal number CA7563/21 against Mr McConvill was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Sixthly, the plaintiff relies on a Federal Court proceeding QUD233/21. This is proceeding six.
This was a proceeding brought on 12 July 2021 by the plaintiff against the Commonwealth of Australia (the Department of Defence) and a Captain Je Noonan by way of an originating application. It sought the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (“AHRC Act”). The proceeding sought a determination that the plaintiff had been unlawfully discriminated against under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 on the basis of his medical history, when he had made repeated unsuccessful applications for recruitment to the Australian Defence Force.
Leave was required under s 46PO(3A)(a) of the AHRC Act in order for the plaintiff to make an application in relation to a complaint which had been dismissed by the Australian Human Rights Commission on an earlier date.
On 14 December 2021, his Honour Justice Logan dismissed the application for leave. His Honour delivered written reasons in this respect. Relevantly, at paragraph [37] of those reasons, his Honour concluded as follows: “It only comes to this. I do not consider that the case is one which enjoys sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of leave.”[22]
[22]Praljak v Department of Defence [2021] FCA 1668 at [37].
Whilst his Honour observed, at paragraph [17], that the precise nature of the grounds of complaint of the plaintiff were not altogether easy to discern from the originating application, he did not make any finding in his written reasons to the effect that he regarded the proceeding as one which was either an abuse of process or vexatious. His Honour disposed of the matter in a way which does not disclose whether his Honour considered the application to be vexatious or an abuse of process in substance or in how it had been presented.
Given the way his Honour dealt with the matter, I am not prepared to find that Federal Court proceeding QUD233/21 was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Seventhly, the defendant relies upon Federal Court proceeding QUD136/22. This is proceeding seven.
This Federal Court proceeding was one commenced against the Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) and Logan J. It was done by way of an Originating Application. The plaintiff in that proceeding alleged that the Federal Court and Logan J had unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) by:
(a) failing to arrange pro bono legal advice and representation for the plaintiff’s benefit;
(b) failing to disclose a purported “serious” conflict of interest in that Logan J held the position of president of the Australian Defence Force Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal;
(c) failing to take into account the plaintiff’s health condition.
Leave was required for the Originating Application to proceed. Leave was refused by the Federal Court on two independent grounds. The first ground was that, clearly, Logan J had judicial immunity. The second was that in respect of each of the three separate complaints, McEvoy J found that no plausible causes of action could conceivably arise from the allegations as made.[23]
[23]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [25]-[27].
It is also relevant to note that at paragraph [28] of the reasons, his Honour further found that the decision in the AHRC Act to terminate the original underlying complaint against Logan J and the Federal Court had thoroughly answered the alleged merits of the complaint, and made it clear that the complaint was not reasonably arguable.[24] Despite having the benefit of that determination below, the plaintiff still elected to bring a Federal Court proceeding which was hopeless.
[24]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [28].
This proceeding represents an example of a proceeding where the underlying allegations disclosed no tenable causes of action. As McEvoy J stated, each of the alleged grounds ought to be rejected as no plausible causes of action could conceivably arise from them.[25] This was a proceeding instituted and conducted without reasonable grounds.
[25]Praljak v Commonwealth of Australia (Federal Court of Australia) [2022] FCA 1438 at [25]-[27].
I am satisfied that Federal Court proceeding QUD136/22 is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Eighthly, the defendant relies upon Federal Court proceeding QUD423/21. This is proceeding eight.
This proceeding was commenced on 7 December 2021 against the State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) by way of an Originating Application. The plaintiff sought to initiate the proceeding under the AHRC Act, and contended that the plaintiff had been unlawfully discriminated against by the Southport Magistrates Court. The relief sought was described as follows:
(a)an apology from the respondent;
(b)no less than $USD50 million damages;
(c)the quashing of the plaintiff’s convictions for domestic violence and unlawful stalking;
(d)the one hundred per cent restoration of the plaintiff’s career as a solicitor.
The proceeding concerned the plaintiff’s pleas of guilty to charges of domestic violence and unlawful stalking. He alleged that he had pleaded guilty under duress. The duress was said to be, at least in part, that he was required to appear in a courtroom that was not located on the ground floor whilst he was suffering from severe acrophobia.
Leave under s 46PO(3A)(a) of the AHRC Act was refused, and on 30 November 2022, the Originating Application was dismissed. His Honour McEvoy J delivered written reasons in support of those orders. His Honour found that the application should be dismissed on two separate grounds.
The first was because of judicial immunity.
The second was because the proceedings were an abuse of process. His Honour dealt with the abuse of process issue at paragraphs [42] to [49]. His Honour ended with the following conclusion:[26]
“In all the circumstances, I accept the respondent’s submission in relation to these matters. No cogent arguments are advanced by the applicant to the contrary. The applicant’s claims represent an abuse of process. The application seeks to advance grounds for an illegitimate purpose, it seeks to re-litigate matters relating to the applicant’s convictions which were the result of proceedings in 2017 and 2018 before the Magistrates Court, and seeks remedies that are beyond the power of the Court.”
[26]Praljak v State of Queensland [2022] FCA 1437 at [49].
This proceeding was an abuse of process. In addition, the proceeding was instituted and pursued without reasonable grounds.
I find that Federal Court proceeding QUD423/21 is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Ninthly, the defendant seeks to rely upon Fair Work Commission proceeding number C2022/1529. This is proceeding nine.
This was an appeal brought under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The plaintiff required permission from the appellant body to conduct the appeal. The appeal was from a first instance decision of Deputy President Lake, who had concluded that the plaintiff had not been dismissed for the purposes of the Fair Work Act, by Services Australia. Consequent on that finding, the underlying application had been dismissed by Deputy President Lake.
The plaintiff sought permission to continue with the appeal. The members of the appellant body considered each ground and rejected them all for reasons which were set out in their judgment. They ultimately concluded as follows:[27]
“Having considered Mr Praljak’s submissions and all the material filed on appeal, we are not satisfied that there is an arguable case of error. It is clear that the basis on which the Deputy President reached his Decision discloses an orthodox approach to the determination of the Application. The Deputy President applied the correct legal principles, considered, and dealt with the evidence that was before him, and made findings of fact based on the evidence before him.”
[27]Praljak v Services Australia [2022] FWCFB 62 at [34].
This particular proceeding is, again, borderline in terms of being vexatious. There was no finding or express conclusion that the appeal was vexatious or an abuse of process. However, it does stand as an example of a case where the Court found that there was no arguable case of error.
Ultimately, I am not prepared to find that the Fair Work Commission proceeding C2022/1529 was one which was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Tenthly, the plaintiff relies upon the decision of Deputy President Merrell in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, which covered three separate proceedings. The matters were appeals numbered WC/2022/165, WC/2022/166 and WC/2022/167. These are proceedings ten, eleven and twelve respectively.
These were appeals from three review decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Regulator. They related to the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant as a former employer, James McConvill & Associates as a former employer and Wyndham Vacation Resorts Pty Ltd as a former employer had each caused him injury whilst employed. Each of those reviews was by way of a Notice of Appeal.
Deputy President Merrell noted that the plaintiff had not attended a conference listed on 17 March 2023 for these appeals.
On 14 June 2023, the regulator took issue with the inadequate nature of the grounds of appeal and the facts which were alleged in each of the three Notices of Appeal.
On 15 June 2023, the plaintiff was ordered to file and serve amended Notices of Appeal, with a further conference to be held on 14 August 2023. On 16 June 2023, the plaintiff filed new Notices of Appeal in relation to each of the appeals. The conference was then held on 14 August 2023, and the inadequacy of the new Notices of Appeal were again raised by the regulator. As a consequence, on 14 August 2023, Merrell DP made directions for a further amended Notice of Appeal in each appeal. It was specifically directed that each further Notice of Appeal was to be one “which puts the respondent on notice of the case it has to come to meet in relation to the grounds of appeal (section 5 of the Notice of Appeal) and in relation to the facts relied on (section 6 of the Notice of Appeal).”
The plaintiff was given until 29 September 2023 to file and serve those further amended Notices of Appeal. This date was, in part, to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to seek assistance from Legal Aid Queensland in order to provide him with legal advice and legal representation. This was as a result of the plaintiff having informed Merrell DP that he had applied for such assistance.
On 17 August 2023, the plaintiff filed and served three new amended Notices of Appeal. In his decision of Praljak v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 310, Merrell DP found, inter alia, that the Notice of Appeal dated 17 August 2023 did not reasonably put the regulator on notice of the grounds of appeal or the facts relied on in appealing the three review decisions. After having gone through an analysis of what was provided, Merrell DP noted that the obligations on an appellant were not particularly onerous, but the grounds of appeal and the facts relied upon must be relevant to the circumstance of the workers’ compensation claim so as to provide a proper basis for challenging the correctness of the review decision.
Ultimately, Merrell DP decided in respect of each of the appeals that they would be dismissed. He noted in his reasons that the plaintiff had been given three opportunities to file and serve Notices of Appeal which reasonably put the Regulator on notice of the grounds of appeal and the facts relied upon in relation to each of the appeals. He also found that none of the grounds of appeal and the facts relied upon in the Notices of Appeal dated 17 August 2023 were relevant to the circumstances of the workers’ compensation claims that were made, so as to provide a proper basis for challenging the correctness of the review decisions. Deputy President Merrell went on to find, in particular, that given the specific orders that he had made on 14 August 2023, it should have been very evident to the plaintiff what was required in respect of the further amended Notices of Appeal so as to reasonably put the regulator on notice about the case it had to meet. He found that the plaintiff did not set out any precise or relevant grounds upon which he contended the review decisions (or any of the decisions made by WorkCover Queensland) were wrong in fact or unlawful.
Finally, Merrell DP observed that he had no confidence that if he gave the plaintiff a further opportunity to file another amended notice of appeal in each appeal, that the plaintiff would do so.
In those circumstances, he exercised his discretion pursuant to r 45(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld) to dismiss each appeal.
It is apparent from the reasons of Merrell DP that at no time was the plaintiff able to articulate grounds of appeal and supporting facts which could provide a reasonable basis for challenging the correctness of each review decision. The conduct of the plaintiff in how he brought and prosecuted the three appeals was an abuse of process due to this failure to articulate tenable grounds of appeal and supporting facts at any point. It also amounted to the instituting and pursuing of a proceeding without reasonable grounds.
I am satisfied that each of these appeals in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission numbered WC/2022/165, WC/2022/166 and WC/2022/167 represented a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
Eleventhly, the defendant relies upon a decision of the President of the Industrial Court of Queensland, Justice Davis, in respect of three appeals from the respective decisions of Merrell DP, previously dealt with immediately above. The appeals before Davis J were numbered C/2023/40, C/2023/41 and C/2023/42. These are proceedings thirteen, fourteen and fifteen respectively.
I order that pursuant to s 6(2)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the plaintiff is prohibited from instituting proceedings in a Queensland State Court or Queensland State Tribunal against:
(a) the defendant;
(b) any current or former employee, any officer, and any Council member of the defendant;
without the prior leave of the Supreme Court of Queensland.
The form of that order is justified to extend to any current or former employee, officer, or Council member of the defendant, in the circumstances where there have been threats to commence further proceedings not just simply against the defendant, but against persons who meet those descriptions. The evidence does not support that the order should extend to any current or former student of the defendant. In my view, such an order would be too wide. The evidentiary material does not support that the threat to commence proceedings against any such current or former student has been the focus of the plaintiff.
In formulating this order, I note that in a somewhat similar scenario, Collier J of the Federal Court in Mbuzi v Griffith University (2014) 323 ALR 248 made an order which covered Griffith University, together with any employee, officer, Council member or student of the university. In addition, Fryberg J made an order in Brisbane City Council v Russell Gordon Haig Mathews [2006] QSC 025, which covered not only the Council, but also extended to Council employees. In that case, the evidence showed that there had been a threat to commence proceedings against employees of the Council, in addition to the Council itself.
The order should also make clear that its operation is limited to Queensland State Courts and Queensland State Tribunals. It would be inappropriate to make an order that might be interpreted as one intended to interfere with the commencement of proceedings in Commonwealth Courts or Commonwealth Tribunals.[35]
[35]Brisbane City Council v Russell Gordon Haig Mathews [2006] QSC 025.
I note that there are separate Commonwealth provisions dealing with vexatious litigants within that jurisdiction.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the primary orders of the court will be:
1.The plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Claim filed 2 November 2023 is struck out.
2.The proceeding is dismissed.
3.Pursuant to s 5(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the defendant has leave to apply to the Court for a vexatious proceedings order in relation to the plaintiff.
4.Pursuant to s 6(2)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the plaintiff is prohibited from instituting proceedings in Queensland State Courts and Queensland State Tribunals against:
(i)the defendant; or
(ii)any current or former employee, officer, or Council member of the defendant;
without prior leave of the Supreme Court.
Costs
I will hear the parties on costs.
Addendum
After the publication of these reasons, the following additional order was made with the consent of the defendant:
“5. To the extent necessary, the plaintiff is given leave to appeal these orders of 25 March 2024 to the Court of Appeal.”
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