Jorgensen v Jorgensen

Case [2016] QSC 193


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

 Jorgensen v Jorgensen & Ors [2016] QSC 193

PARTIES:

BRIAN LAURENCE JORGENSEN

(applicant)

v
ALAN JORGENSEN

(first respondent)
and
MANTONELLA PTY LTD (ACN 069 012 531)
(second respondent)
and
MIJAC INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 089 820 280)
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

No 12751 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Civil Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

5 September 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 February 2016; 28 April 2016

JUDGE:

Daubney J

ORDERS:

1.      The applicant Brian Laurence Jorgensen has leave to apply for a vexatious proceedings order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005.

2. Pursuant to s 6(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005, it is ordered that the first respondent Alan Jorgensen, or any entity controlled by the first respondent (including each of the second respondent and the third respondent) shall not without the leave of the Court institute or cause to be instituted any proceedings with respect to, connected with or arising out of the Rainbow Motor Inn Unit Trust.

3.      The respondents shall pay the applicant’s standard costs of and incidental to the application.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS – VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS – where the applicant has brought an application for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) and/or by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to prevent an abuse of process – where the applicant seeks orders against the respondent to restrain proceedings – where the respondent has been involved in frequent litigation – where the respondent has exhibited behaviour of disregard for practices and rulings of the courts and tribunals – whether leave should be granted to bring the application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) – whether the respondent is a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia – whether an order should be made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld)

PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS – TO PREVENT ABUSE OF PROCESS – GENERALLY – where the applicant has brought an application for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) and/or by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to prevent an abuse of process – where the respondent has evinced an intention to seek to abuse court processes – whether it is an appropriate case for the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process

Vexatious Proceeding Act 2005 (Qld) s 5(2), s 6

Cooper v Mbuzi [2012] QSC 105, considered
Hambleton & Anor v Labaj [2011] QCA 17, cited
Schultz v Rowe [2015] QSC 143, cited

Von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 681, cited

COUNSEL:

R Perry QC for the applicant

The first respondent appeared on his own behalf

A Jorgensen appeared in his capacity as director of Mantonella Pty Ltd…

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AGLC
Jorgensen v Jorgensen [2016] QSC 193
Case
[2016] QSC 193
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Jorgensen v Jorgensen was heard in the Queensland District Court, where Brian Laurence Jorgensen sought an application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) to restrain Alan Jorgensen from instituting any further proceedings in relation to the Rainbow Motor Inn Unit Trust. Brian claimed that Alan had frequently instituted vexatious proceedings and exhibited behaviour of disregard for the practices and rulings of the courts and tribunals. The application was brought under both the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to prevent an abuse of process.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether leave should be granted to Brian to bring the application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld). Additionally, the Court needed to determine whether Alan was a person who had frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia and whether an order should be made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld). The Court also considered whether it was an appropriate case to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process.

The Court found that Brian was entitled to leave to apply for a vexatious proceedings order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005. It was established that Alan had frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, and the Court was satisfied that it was an appropriate case to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process. Consequently, the Court granted the application and ordered that Alan, or any entity controlled by him, shall not institute or cause to be instituted any proceedings in relation to the Rainbow Motor Inn Unit Trust without the leave of the Court. Additionally, the respondents were ordered to pay Brian's standard costs of and incidental to the application.

This case underscores the importance of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in preventing abuse of process by vexatious litigants. The Court's decision to grant the application and impose restrictions on the respondent's ability to institute further proceedings highlights the seriousness with which the Court views such conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant Brian Laurence Jorgensen has leave to apply for a vexatious proceedings order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005.

2. Pursuant to s 6(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005, it is ordered that the first respondent Alan Jorgensen, or any entity controlled by the first respondent (including each of the second respondent and the third respondent) shall not without the leave of the Court institute or cause to be instituted any proceedings with respect to, connected with or arising out of the Rainbow Motor Inn Unit Trust.

3. The respondents shall pay the applicant’s standard costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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