FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Reurich v Sureway Employment and Training Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 680
File number: NSD 2015 of 2017 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 17 May 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time – where no reasonable explanation for substantial delay in making application – where there is a risk of prejudice to respondents – where evidence unclear as to whether applicant had an arguable case – whether extension of time should be granted – application refused. Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46PO(1), 46PO(2), 46PO(3) Cases cited: Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381
Date of hearing: 18 April 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Respondents: Ms A Sharp Solicitor for the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Respondents: Bartier Perry ORDERS
NSD 2015 of 2017 BETWEEN: PETER GEORGE REURICH
Applicant
AND: SUREWAY EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PTY LTD
First Respondent
LISA NELSON
Second Respondent
EMMA BROWN (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for an extension of time under s 46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) be dismissed.
2.The amended originating application under the AHRC Act be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first, second, fifth and sixth respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
The applicant, Peter George Reurich, seeks an extension of time pursuant to s 46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) to make his application under that Act.
Mr Reurich lodged a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission (Commission) against Sureway Skills Training Pty Ltd alleging unlawful discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act) which was terminated by the Commission on 11 May 2016. Pursuant to s 46PO(2), in the absence of further time being allowed by the court, Mr Reurich had until 10 July 2016 to make his application to this Court or the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
Mr Reurich lodged the originating application commencing this proceeding on 16 November 2017 which was 18 months and 5 days after the termination by the Commission of Mr Reurich’s complaint and 16 months and 6 days after the last day permitted by s 46PO(2) of the AHRC Act for the making of such an application. With the leave of the Court Mr Reurich subsequently filed an amended originating application in which he corrected the name of the first respondent.
Mr…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 680
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Mr Reurich had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay in lodging his application, despite acknowledging the 60-day period following the termination notice from the Commission. The court emphasised that Mr Reurich's explanation, which included personal difficulties and memory issues, did not sufficiently account for the significant delay, particularly after receiving advice from Justice Connect in June 2017 that he was out of time. The court also noted that while there was some risk of prejudice to the respondents due to the resignation of certain employees, this factor was not heavily weighed given the limited evidence on efforts to locate potential witnesses.
Consequently, the court ruled that Mr Reurich's application for an extension of time should be refused. The court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, coupled with the potential prejudice to the respondents, did not warrant the exercise of discretion in favour of Mr Reurich. Additionally, the court dismissed Mr Reurich's amended originating application and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceeding to the respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for an extension of time under s 46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) be dismissed.
2. The amended originating application under the AHRC Act be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first, second, fifth and sixth respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [14] Jagot J said that, while she had the power to extend the time for making an application to the Court, there had to be some material sufficient to persuade her that the discretion to do so should be exercised in the applicant’s favour. Her Honour noted that while the delay was not particularly long, it was also not a short delay. In light of the 60 day period available, Jagot J was not persuaded, in all of the circumstances, that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the applicant.CONSIDERATIONDelay Mr Reurich was aware of the 60 day time limit. His explanation for the delay seems to be that he overlooked the termination notice from the Commission and/or because his “brain was not functioning”. He also submitted that perhaps relevant reminder emails went into his junk mail box and he did not know to check there. He described his life as extremely busy and disordered at the time. That Mr Reurich’s life was busy and disordered is no more than a manifestation of the “daily exigencies” of his life. The fact that Mr Reurich may have overlooked the termination notice from the Commission, perhaps because he was busy or because of the disorder in his life is not, in my opinion, an acceptable explanation for the delay. Mr Reurich knew that he had made a complaint to the Commission. It was incumbent on him to follow up and monitor communications from the Commission about it. On 5 May 2016 Mr Reurich described his memory as “stretched” and said that he forgot things. At that time he sought out an appointment with Tamara Lee, who he described as his psychologist. But, even if I accept this evidence and that Mr Reurich was having some memory difficulty in early May 2016, it does not explain the delay following the 60 day period after receipt of the notice of termination. As is evident from the email from Ms Farmer at Justice Connect referred to at [12(2)] above, by 21 June 2017 Mr Reurich was well and truly aware of the fact that his complaint had been terminated by the Commission and, indeed, that he was already out of time in making an application to the Federal Circuit Court or this Court. Thus, even if I was satisfied that Mr Reurich had an acceptable explanation for his delay up until that point in time, which I am not, he has provided no explanation for the further delay of nearly five months up until the date he lodged his application with this Court. In my opinion, Mr Reurich has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in making his application to the Court.Prejudice The Respondents submitted that they have suffered prejudice as a result of Mr Reurich’s delay in commencing the proceeding. That prejudice is said to be caused by two things: first, because certain employees relevant to the claim, Ms Brown, Ms Weeks and Ms Jackson, have resigned from Sureway during the period of the delay and Sureway does not have current addresses for those former employees; and secondly, because the passing of time will have caused the memories of relevant witnesses to fade.