Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 1080

File number: NSD 1549 of 2019
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 31 July 2020
Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – application for leave to commence proceeding alleging unlawful discrimination in contravention of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) – where a complaint of discrimination was terminated under s 46PF(1)(b) and s 46PH(1)(b) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – consideration of matters affecting discretion to grant leave –whether proposed claims have reasonable prospects of success – whether it would be palpably unjust to grant leave in circumstances of lapse of time since relevant events – merit of case not demonstrated to be proportionate to time and resources likely to be consumed if leave granted – application for leave refused against second and third respondents – application for leave against first respondent adjourned pending determination of application to set aside settlement deed
Legislation:

Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1984 (Cth) ss 46PF, 46PH, 46PO

Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 70

County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 78

County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 (Vic) r 15.03

County Court Civil Rules of Procedure in Civil Proceedings 1999 (Vic) Order 15

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 3, 6, 24, 122

Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2017 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 53

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 3

Cases cited:

Abela v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 832

Bainbrigge v Browne [1881] 18 Ch D 188

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541

Budini v Sunnyfield [2019] FCA 2164

Cooper v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission & Anor [1999] FCA 180; (1999) 93 FCR 481

Crago v McIntyre [1976] 1 NSWLR 729

Croft v Sanders [2019] NSWCA 303

Dunwoodie v Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd [2014] NSWCA 24

Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045; (2015) 239 FCR 381

Gibbons v Wright [1954] HCA 17; (1954) 91 CLR 423

Herron v McGregor (1985) 6 NSWLR 246

Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116; (2006) 154 FCR 425

Innes v Rail Corporation (NSW) No. 2 [2013] FMCA 36

James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083

Louth v Diprose [1992] HCA 61; (1992) 175 CLR 621

Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49; (2017) 263 CLR 85

Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349

Date of hearing: 29 May 2020, 18 June 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 125
Counsel for the Applicant: K Edwards
Solicitor for the Applicant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: E Raper SC with A Smorchevsky
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ashurst Australia
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: R Davern
Solicitor for…
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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1080
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 2), the Federal Court was asked to decide whether the applicant, Ms Rossi, had a reasonably arguable case against Maurice Blackburn and Mr McCristal, two law firms and a solicitor respectively, for indirect discrimination, bullying, and undue pressure in the context of a workers compensation claim. Ms Rossi also sought leave to sue Qantas Airways for sexual harassment.

The court considered whether Ms Rossi had a reasonably arguable case against the firms and Mr McCristal, and if it would be palpably unjust to grant leave due to the time that had passed since the relevant events. The court concluded that Ms Rossi did not have a reasonably arguable case against either party. The court was not satisfied that the merit of Ms Rossi's case was proportionate to the time and resources likely to be consumed if leave was granted. The court found that it would be difficult or impossible for the respondents to address complex factual questions arising from Ms Rossi's medical conditions in 2008 and events affecting her medical conditions since 2003.

The court also considered the application concerning Qantas. The court decided to adjourn the application pending the determination of Ms Rossi's application to set aside the deed between Ms Rossi and Qantas, executed in October 2008. If that application fails, the application for leave to proceed will be futile.

In conclusion, the court refused leave to make an application alleging unlawful discrimination by Maurice Blackburn and Mr McCristal, and adjourned the application for leave to make an application alleging unlawful discrimination by Qantas pending the determination of Ms Rossi's application to set aside the deed. The court ordered that Ms Rossi pay the costs of the application and listed the application for orders 1(a), (b) and (c) in the originating application for a case management hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to make an application pursuant to s 46PO(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1984 (Cth) alleging unlawful discrimination by the second respondent or the third respondent, being respondents to the complaint made by the applicant to the Australian Human Rights Commission and terminated by a delegate of the President of the Commission on 23 July 2019, be refused.

2. The applicant pay the second and third respondents’ costs of the application.

3. The application for leave to make an application alleging unlawful discrimination by the first respondent be adjourned pending the determination of the application for orders 1(a), (b) and (c) in the originating application.

4. The application for orders 1(a), (b) and (c) in the originating application be listed for a case management hearing on Thursday 20 August 2020 at 9:30 am.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Cooper v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission & Anor [1999] FCA 180; (1999) 93 FCR 481 at [41], Madgwick J explained the concept of permission in s 122 as follows:… [F]or the purposes of the Disability Discrimination Act, one person permits another to do an unlawful discriminatory act if he or she permits that other to do an act which is in fact discriminatory. … In Adelaide City Corporation v Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481 at 490-91, Isaacs J said:“the word ‘permits’ is of very extensive connotation... the primary [dictionary] meaning of ‘permit’ is: ‘to allow, suffer, give leave; not to prevent ...’ As an illustration, a person ‘permits’ his hall to be used for the public performance of a play ... if he knows or has reason to know or believe that the particular play ... will or may be performed and, having the legal power to prevent it, nevertheless disregards that power and allows his property to be used for the purpose. For example... McCardie J held that [a claim that copyright in a musical work had been infringed by the hall proprietors] was rightly abandoned. But that was because the hall proprietors ‘had no reasonable ground for suspecting that there would be an infringement of copyright by the band’.” (Emphasis added.) Alleged facts Ms Rossi alleges that:(1)In about mid-2006, she commenced proceedings under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) for recovery of damages due to injury at work during her employment with Qantas.(2)In about July 2007, she engaged MB Gippsland to advise and represent her in relation to her workers compensation claim. Mr McCristal was the solicitor with the carriage of the claim. The principal relevant services are the services provided to Ms Rossi by MB Gippsland and Mr McCristal in connection with the workers compensation claim.(3)Ms Rossi alleges that MB Gippsland and Mr McCristal “imposed conditions or requirements on [her] at the time of settling” the workers compensation claim in conversations on 27, 28 and 29 October 2008. These were requirements that Ms Rossi possess the following three characteristics:(a)legal capacity;(b)normal emotional resilience;(c)normal cognitive capacity (three requirements).(4)On 29 October 2008 Ms Rossi signed the deed in circumstances described in her AHRC complaint and particularised at para 125 of the ASoC, by which the workers compensation claim was purportedly resolved.(5)Ms Rossi alleges that she entered into the deed as a result of Mr McCristal’s undue pressure upon her, and in circumstances in which she lacked legal capacity.(6)On 1 December 2008, Ms Rossi spoke with Mr McCristal and raised concerns about her fitness to sign the deed and her view that the deed was “not right”. Since then, she has taken steps to obtain assistance to have the deed set aside but has so far been unsuccessful. As part of these efforts, Ms Rossi has sought unsuccessfully to return the settlement monies to Qantas.(7)From about 22 October 2009, Maurice Blackburn aided and permitted Mr McCristal to “continue” his breach of the DDA when that firm:(a)continued to represent Ms Rossi in relation to the workers compensation claim;(b)required Ms Rossi to accept the “Settlement” (which I infer is the 29 October 2008 settlement of the workers compensation proceeding); and (c)failed to address her concerns in respect of the purported settlement (ASoC para 121A).(8)From about 24 May 2011, Maurice Blackburn provided legal services to Ms Rossi (ASoC para 5(c)).(9)From about 30 June 2011, Maurice Blackburn provided services to Ms Rossi comprising legal advice and representation to her in respect of the workers compensation claim including but not limited to the resolution of the claim. From this time, Maurice Blackburn managed the legal work associated with the claim including but not limited to engaging in correspondence in relation to the claim. Further, the services included appointing a suitably qualified practitioner to undertake the legal work associated with the services and Maurice Blackburn appointed Mr McCristal to this role from about 30 June 2011 (ASoC para 111A). Mr McCristal

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Among other things, Ms Rossi contends that the circumstances in which she signed the deed involved indirect discrimination and bullying. Ms Rossi’s claims against Maurice Blackburn and Mr McCristal extend to their alleged respective conduct in response to Ms Rossi’s efforts to return the settlement monies to Qantas up to December 2011.SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS I am not satisfied that Ms Rossi has a reasonably arguable case against either Maurice Blackburn or Mr McCristal. Accordingly, leave to proceed should be refused in relation to Ms Rossi’s claims against those parties. If I am wrong in concluding that Ms Rossi does not have a reasonably arguable case against Maurice Blackburn and Mr McCristal, I would not grant leave to proceed against either party because it would be palpably unjust to require a respondent to address the main issues that would be in dispute in this case, so long after that event. In particular, it would be difficult or impossible for Maurice Blackburn and Mr McCristal to address complex factual questions which arise about Ms Rossi’s medical conditions in 2008 and the events and circumstances that affected her medical conditions from time to time, but at least since 2003. Further, in my view, the cases that Ms Rossi wishes to bring are likely to consume very considerable time and resources, particularly in addressing as yet unarticulated questions concerning the precise nature of the services that are said to have been provided on a discriminatory basis, and the differential impact of those services on persons in Ms Rossi’s cohort and persons not affected by those alleged disabilities. Ms Rossi has not demonstrated that the alleged indirect discrimination is ongoing, or has affected or might affect any person other than herself. In those circumstances, any merit which her cases against Maurice Blackburn and Mr McCristal might have is not demonstrated to be proportionate to the time and resources likely to be consumed by dealing with it in this Court. The application concerning Qantas should be adjourned pending the determination of Ms Rossi’s application to set aside the deed between Ms Rossi and Qantas, executed in October 2008. If that application fails, then the application for leave to proceed will be futile.LEGAL FRAMEWORKRequirement for leave Section 3 of the SDA provides:The objects of this Act are:(a)to give effect to certain provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and to provisions of other relevant international instruments; and(b)to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination against persons on the ground of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy or breastfeeding in the areas of work, accommodation, education, the provision of goods, facilities and services, the disposal of land, the activities of clubs and the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs; and(ba)to eliminate, so far as possible, discrimination on the ground of family responsibilities in the area of work; and(c)to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination involving sexual harassment in the workplace, in educational institutions and in other areas of public activity; and(d)to promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the principle of the equality of men and women.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There are four complaints of sexual harassment comprising two instances of continuing conduct and two particular instances. In summary, the alleged facts are:(1)The distribution of the “Black & White” magazine to first and business class passengers in about 2000 and thereafter, despite an oral complaint made by Ms Rossi to Ms Gray. (2)From about December 2000, unidentified male crew members would look at Ms Rossi’s breasts rather than her face when speaking with Ms Rossi while she was not wearing her uniform jacket.(3)In about January 2003, Ms Rossi’s line manager, Mr Larsen told Ms Rossi that she should not “worry about complaints made about her by crew member because he loved” Ms Rossi.(4)On about 13 April 2003, during a return leg from Adelaide to Sydney, there was a problem with the personal announcement safety system and the Captain came out of the flight desk, took the phone handset, placed it to his groin area as if it was an erect penis, wiggled it around and looked at Ms Rossi, and said “Have we tried this?”Consideration There is a significant amount of evidence going to the various considerations identified by Mortimer J in WorkPower. However, I have concluded that I should not make detailed findings in relation to those considerations, where there is an unresolved issue concerning whether Ms Rossi’s claims against Qantas are reasonably arguable, being Ms Rossi’s challenge to the operation of the deed. The precise relief sought by Ms Rossi in her originating application includes declarations or orders that would have the effect of setting aside the deed on the grounds of duress and/or unconscionable conduct by Maurice Blackburn and/or Mr McCristal; a declaration that at the time of signing the deed, Ms Rossi was a handicapped person within the meaning of r 15.03(3) of the County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 (Vic) (County Court Rules), and a declaration that the deed is void by operation of s 70 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) and order 15 of the County Court Rules (deed claims). These issues should be resolved promptly and before the question of leave to proceed is finally determined. Senior counsel for Qantas, Ms Raper SC, made a submission to the effect that the Court would not have jurisdiction to deal with Ms Rossi’s claims to set aside the deed if leave to proceed under the AHRCA was refused. It is not necessary to address that submission, which was directed to a different eventuality. It is sufficient to note that the Court’s jurisdiction “is engaged by an action in respect of subject matter with which the court can deal”: Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116; (2006) 154 FCR 425 at [10]. The question of the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the claims to set aside the deed will need to be resolved if it is contested. Although Ms Rossi did not ask me to decide her deed claims, there was some argument on the topic. I have reached some preliminary views which it is appropriate to record.