MASON C.J., BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ. On 3 December 1991 the Court gave judgment, allowing the appeal and refusing the application for special leave to cross-appeal. In addition the Court set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Victoria allowing the appeal to that Court and dismissing the complaints. In lieu thereof, the Court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Equal Opportunity Board to determine, in accordance with s.17(5)(c) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vict.), whether the requirements or conditions involved in the introduction of scratch tickets and removal of conductors from trams are reasonable and to determine the complaints accordingly.

2. The Court made no order as to the costs of the appeal to it or as to the costs of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria. By consent, the latter costs had been reserved by that Court. The parties have now made written submissions as to the costs in each case.

3. The appellants seek an order that the respondent pay their costs of the appeal to the Court and of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The respondent opposes both applications; it does not seek any order for costs in its favour.

4. As a consequence of the appeal to the Court, the dismissal of the complaints to the Board has been set aside, although the ultimate fate of the complaints remains unknown. The order that the matter be remitted to the Board flows from a successful argument by the respondent as to the proper construction of s.17(5)(c) of the Equal Opportunity Act. Nevertheless, the appellants succeeded in their attack on the judgment of Phillips J. in the Supreme Court, namely, that there was no requirement or condition involved in the removal of conductors from trams and that the conduct of the respondent did not constitute unlawful acts of discrimination since it was necessary in order to comply with a direction of the Minister. The order allowing the appeal to the Court reflects the success of that attack. In the circumstances, the respondent should pay the appellants' costs of the appeal to the Court; the time taken on the s.17(5)(c) issue does not justify awarding only a percentage of costs.

5. As to the proceedings in the Supreme Court, it is true that the order dismissing the complaints has been set aside. But the parties each had some success in the Supreme Court, a success which was to some extent retained in the appeal to the Court. In those circumstances, it would be appropriate to order that the parties bear their own costs of the proceedings in the Supreme Court.

Orders

(1) The respondent pay the appellants' costs of the appeal to this Court.

(2) The parties bear their own costs of the proceedings in the Supreme Court.

Details

AGLC: Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1992] HCA 9
Case: [1992] HCA 9
Decision Date: 20 March 1992

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Waters v Public Transport Corporation*. The case concerned a claim for damages for personal injury brought by the appellant, Mr Waters, against the respondent, the Public Transport Corporation, arising from an incident where Mr Waters was injured while attempting to board a train.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent owed a duty of care to Mr Waters in the circumstances of his boarding the train, and if so, whether that duty had been breached. The Court was required to determine the scope of the duty of care owed by a public transport provider to its passengers, particularly in relation to the risks associated with boarding moving trains.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the respondent did owe a duty of care to Mr Waters. This duty extended to taking reasonable steps to prevent passengers from boarding trains that were in the process of departing. The Court reasoned that the risk of injury to passengers attempting to board a moving train was foreseeable, and that the respondent had the capacity to take reasonable precautions to mitigate this risk, such as ensuring trains did not depart until passengers had safely boarded. The principles of negligence, as established in common law, were applied to assess the reasonableness of the respondent's conduct in the circumstances.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent had breached its duty of care to Mr Waters and was therefore liable for his injuries.

Orders