Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District [2020] FCA 1616  

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal from: Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council New South Wales [2019] FCA 1782
File numbers: NSD 1880 of 2019
NSD 1881 of 2019
NSD 1882 of 2019
Judgment of: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 6 November 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal decision of the primary judge refusing leave to commence proceedings under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – whether sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave – whether error in primary judge’s reasons and orders reasonably arguable – no error made out – application dismissed
Legislation:

 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46PO, 46PH

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Racial Discrimination Act1975 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21(1)(b), (d), (f)

Cases cited:  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing [2019] FCAFC 125; (2019) 371 ALR 545
Bellamy’s Australia Limited v Basil [2019] FCAFC 147
BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207
Budini v Sunnyfield [2019] FCA 2164
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
EBT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 200
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
Jones v Westpac Banking Corporation [2020] FCA 238
King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 140; (2001) 4 VR 619
Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585
Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70
Ryan v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2019] FCA 1607
Rossi v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 1080
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238
Snowside Pty Ltd as trustee for the Snowside Trust, in the matter Boart Longyear Ltd [2019] FCA 2159
Wilson v Britten-Jones (No 2) [2020] FCA 1290
Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 61
Date of hearing: 1 July 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S Kettle
Solicitor for the Respondents: Hicksons Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1880 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE

Applicant

AND:

SOUTH EASTERN SYDNEY LOCAL HEALTH DISTRICT

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal is refused.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1616
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District, the applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the primary judge that had refused leave to commence proceedings under section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The primary judge had concluded that there was no sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal, and the application was dismissed. The applicant's grounds for appeal included allegations of miscarriages of justice, fraudulent conduct by the respondents, and procedural unfairness. The primary judge found that the applicant had not established any error in the primary judge's reasons and orders that would warrant the granting of leave to appeal. The applicant had filed three sets of written submissions, one for each matter, in which further grounds of appeal were alleged. However, much of the applicant's submissions were directed to the merits of what she alleges as her treatment by the respondents over the years, and not to establishing that the reasons for the discretionary judgment of the primary judge or the orders made, are such as to warrant the granting of leave to appeal.

The primary judge had considered the relevant legal principles to the application of the issues to be determined and found that there was no suggestion that there was any error in respect to those principles. The primary judge also noted that the applicant had a long history of proceedings instigated in other Courts and Tribunals directed to the same underlying factual complaints. The primary judge concluded that independent consideration had been given to the claims made by the applicant in one or other of these other proceedings, and that each of the decisions reached seemed to be a proper exercise of the power conferred. The primary judge also considered that the applicant's argument that she had been denied procedural fairness in each decision-making process was not supported by any evidence.

The court found that the applicant had not made out any error in the primary judge's reasons and orders that would warrant the granting of leave to appeal. The court also found that the applicant's submissions were not focused on establishing that the reasons for the discretionary judgment of the primary judge or the orders made, are such as to warrant the granting of leave to appeal. The court concluded that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or taxed.

In summary, the court found that the applicant had not established any error in the primary judge's reasons and orders that would warrant the granting of leave to appeal. The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent. The court found that the applicant's submissions were not focused on establishing that the reasons for the discretionary judgment of the primary judge or the orders made, are such as to warrant the granting of leave to appeal. The court concluded that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal is refused.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons detailed below, leave is refused in relation to each application.The judgment below The primary judge considered the relevant legal principles to the application of the issues to be determined and there is no suggestion that there is any error in respect to those principles. These proceedings have a long history, including many proceedings instigated by the applicant in other Courts and Tribunals directed to the same underlying factual complaints (although the individual proceedings may have related to only part of the complaints made). This history is detailed by the primary judge at [24]-[44]. That included a recitation of aspects of the reasons given in relation to some of those proceedings. Thereafter the primary judge concluded at [53]-[54]:Whatever be the reason for the fate of each of the claims sought to be pursued by Ms Clarke, what is of present relevance is the fact that:•repeated independent consideration has been given to the claims sought to be agitated, even if it be for the limited purposes of permitting a claim to continue (for example) in the Industrial Relations Commission or for the purposes of amending pleadings (in some cases with the assistance of pro bono counsel: cf. Sharmain Daisy Clarke v South East Sydney Health District (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 226 at [12]); and •independent consideration has been given in one or other of these other proceedings to the comparability of claims agitated elsewhere in another forum. Each of the decisions reached seem, on their face, to be a proper exercise of the power conferred. In the absence of reason to reach a contrary conclusion, such consideration as has already been given to the claims made by Ms Clarke would soundly warrant the refusal of leave pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Human Rights Commission Act. Having addressed the history of the proceedings, the primary judge identified that procedural fairness was a significant aspect of the applicant’s argument. In that respect the primary judge summarised as follows at [56]:Notwithstanding the number of claims made by Ms Clarke and the manner in which those claims have been heard and resolved, Ms Clarke’s response to the case sought to be mounted against her by the Respondents was not to deny the myriad of hearings that have taken place or the prior investigations into her many claims. Her response was to simply say that in respect to each decision-making process:•she had been denied procedural fairness; and/or•that her health condition was such that she could not properly participate in any hearing or investigation into her claims. Be that the decision-making process before the Industrial Relations Commission, the Supreme Court, the Midwifery Council or the other forums Ms Clarke sought to ventilate her claims, Ms Clarke’s contention was that she had not been able to properly participate. If this be correct, the outcome from any of the myriad of forums in which she has to-date pursued her claims could possibly be set aside. Ms Clarke now seeks, by the grant of leave to commence or continue proceedings in this Court, an examination into each of the factual matters which gave rise to her claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In any event, I have had regard, inter alia, to the affidavits and submissions filed by the applicant before the hearing before the primary judge. The applicant is plainly aware of that material. There was no denial of procedural fairness. Consideration The grounds on which leave to appeal is sought, as set out in the application for leave in respect to each matter, can be described as follows:(1)the judgment and orders are affected from actions of miscarriages of justice under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Ground 1);(2)the judgment and orders are affected by fraudulent conduct and statements made in the summary dismissal applications by the respondents (Ground 2);(3)the affidavits and submissions in the application for dismissal were “defect[ive]” and “vague” (Ground 3);(4)An error of law [in that] termination of the complaints by the President was made under section 46PH(1)(b) and the respondents submitted false and misleading information when it was submitted by the respondents that termination of the complaint was under s 46PH(1B)(b) (Grounds 4 and 5);(5)Ms Stojkova, by her affidavits in each of the proceedings “actioned a miscarriage of justice” (Ground 6). The applicant has filed three sets of written submissions, one for each matter, in which further grounds of appeal were alleged. The complaint, which was common to each matter was an allegation that the applicant was denied procedural fairness below because, amongst other things, all the matters were heard together so that the interlocutory applications were not determined; the matters were separate causes of action and the applicant was denied her rights in respect to legitimate claims which is a breach of her fundamental human right to defend the allegations made about her; the matters were set down only for case management hearings and she was denied the proper conduct of the proceeding; and that the respondents submitted false and misleading information to the Court. In respect to the proceedings the applicant also complained of procedural unfairness by the respondents relying on an affidavit of Ms Stojkova. Two observations can be made. First, much of the applicant’s submissions, both written and oral were directed to the merits of what she alleges as her treatment by the respondents over the years, and not to establishing that the reasons for the discretionary judgment of the primary judge or the orders made, are such as to warrant the granting of leave to appeal. The submissions included matters which were not before the primary judge, and address, amongst other things, other proceedings instituted by the applicant after these proceedings. There were repeated unsubstantiated allegations made about the respondents and their conduct of the matter which appear generally to be based on the fact that they disagree or oppose the submissions/course of action that the applicant seeks to advance. As noted by the primary judge, there is no evidence in support of those allegations.