FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council NSW [2020] FCA 1617
File number: NSD 1295 of 2019
NSD 34 of 2020Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 6 November 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal decision of the Federal Circuit Court summarily dismissing the matter on the basis that the applicant had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings and that the proceedings were otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the Court – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt to grant leave – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.10, 16.05 Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing [2019] FCAFC 125; (2019) 371 ALR 545
Bellamy’s Australia Limited v Basil [2019] FCAFC 147
BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
EBT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 200
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 140; (2001) 4 VR 619
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585
Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238
Snowside Pty Ltd as trustee for the Snowside Trust, in the matter Boart Longyear Ltd [2019] FCA 2159
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of hearing: 1 July 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First and Fourth Respondents: Mr S Kettle Solicitor for the First and Fourth Respondents: Hicksons Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz Counsel for the Third Respondent: Ms P Thew Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Moray & Agnew ORDERS
NSD 1295 of 2019 BETWEEN: SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE
Applicant
AND: NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL NSW
First Respondent
NURSING AND MIDWIFERY BOARD
Second Respondent
NURSES AND MIDWIVES ASSOCIATION
Third Respondent
MS VIOLET STOJKOVA
Fourth Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal is refused.
2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first, second, third and fourth respondents, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 34 of 2020 BETWEEN: SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE
Applicant
AND: NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL NSW
First Respondent
NURSING AND MIDWIFERY BOARD
Second Respondent
NURSES AND MIDWIVES ASSOCIATION
Third Respondent
MS VIOLET STOJKOVA
Fourth Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1617
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court exercised its discretion to refuse leave to appeal as Clarke's grounds of appeal were incoherent and failed to properly articulate any legal issue. The Court found that Clarke's pleadings and affidavits were similarly incoherent and filled with conclusions and assertions rather than legal arguments. The Court held that Clarke's appeal had no reasonable prospects of success and dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Court also ordered Clarke to pay the costs of the third respondent. The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court's decision to summarily dismiss Clarke's claim was correct and that Clarke had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting their claim. The Court held that Clarke's appeal was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the third respondent, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I note also that both before and after the hearing of the interlocutory application the applicant sought leave to issue a number of subpoenas to persons involved in the respondents directed to providing documents and/or to give evidence in relation to factual matters in relation to her underlying complaints. Such evidence, not before the primary judge, is not relevant to the issues in these proceedings, and nor is there a basis for witnesses to give evidence. Leave was not granted to issue the subpoenas.Consideration The applicant alleges 21 grounds of appeal which appear to challenge the primary judgment, although some appear relevant to the second and fourth judgment in relation to costs. In addition the applicant has filed additional grounds in respect to the fourth judgment which relates only to the costs ordered to be paid to the third respondent, which are addressed below. In addition, lengthy affidavits dated 14 August 2019, 30 January 2020 and 15 June 2020 were filed by the applicant in support of her application. I note at this stage that after the completion of the hearing the applicant sent many emails to the Court, many of which appeared unrelated to these proceedings. The applicant was not given leave to file any further submissions or material in relation to this matter. Therefore, any material and emails received by the Court after the hearing which attempted to reargue this matter have not been considered: see for example, Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 258; BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207 at [43]. Each of the respondents in opposing the application contended, inter alia, that none of the grounds are coherently articulated such as to be able to be properly understood. The grounds are variously described as confusing, misconceived, disordered and suffering significant flaws. They were said to be reflective of the same problems as the documents filed in the proceedings which were struck out by the primary judge. Those descriptions of the grounds are to be accepted. The first and fourth respondents also took issue with the affidavits of the applicant sworn and dated 14 August 2019 and 30 January 2020 filed in support of the application, on the basis that the terms are “incoherent, incomprehensible or objectionable, not relevant and replete with conclusions, bald allegations and submissions in generally unhelpful terms that appear to be unrelated to the identified grounds of appeal set out within the Amended Draft Notice of Appeal”. The applicant’s written submission filed in support of the application does not assist. Rather most of the submission is conclusory assertions as to what she contends are the facts and repeats her grievances as to how she was dealt with. The applicant takes issues with facts in the evidence relied on by the respondents. The submission recites alleged wrongs against her. Much of the submission are bare assertions as to facts or conduct. This submission appears to be in support of the contention that it was a “clear cut” case of the application for summary dismissal being an “abuse of process”.