Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council NSW

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council NSW [2020] FCA 1617  

File number: NSD 1295 of 2019
NSD 34 of 2020
Judgment of: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 6 November 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal decision of the Federal Circuit Court summarily dismissing the matter on the basis that the applicant had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings and that the proceedings were otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the Court – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt to grant leave – application dismissed  
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.10, 16.05
Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing [2019] FCAFC 125; (2019) 371 ALR 545

Bellamy’s Australia Limited v Basil [2019] FCAFC 147

BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207

Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

EBT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 200

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564

King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 140; (2001) 4 VR 619

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70

Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

Snowside Pty Ltd as trustee for the Snowside Trust, in the matter Boart Longyear Ltd [2019] FCA 2159

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of hearing: 1 July 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First and Fourth Respondents: Mr S Kettle
Solicitor for the First and Fourth Respondents: Hicksons Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Ms P Thew
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Moray & Agnew

ORDERS

NSD 1295 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE

Applicant

AND:

NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL NSW

First Respondent

NURSING AND MIDWIFERY BOARD

Second Respondent

NURSES AND MIDWIVES ASSOCIATION

Third Respondent

MS VIOLET STOJKOVA

Fourth Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal is refused.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first, second, third and fourth respondents, as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


ORDERS

NSD 34 of 2020
BETWEEN:

SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE

Applicant

AND:

NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL NSW

First Respondent

NURSING AND MIDWIFERY BOARD

Second Respondent

NURSES AND MIDWIVES ASSOCIATION

Third Respondent

MS VIOLET STOJKOVA

Fourth Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1617
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Clarke sought leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that summarily dismissed their claim against the Nursing and Midwifery Council NSW. Clarke’s appeal was against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss their case for want of prosecution and on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The Federal Circuit Court had found Clarke’s pleadings to be incoherent and meaningless, and that Clarke had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the case. Clarke argued that the Federal Circuit Court’s decision was wrong and that they had reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting their claim. The Federal Court found that Clarke’s grounds of appeal were incoherent and disordered and failed to properly articulate any legal issue. The Federal Court also found that Clarke’s affidavits filed in support of the application for leave to appeal were similarly incoherent and filled with conclusions and assertions rather than legal arguments. The Federal Court held that Clarke’s appeal had no reasonable prospects of success and dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Federal Court also ordered Clarke to pay the costs of the third respondent.

The Court exercised its discretion to refuse leave to appeal as Clarke's grounds of appeal were incoherent and failed to properly articulate any legal issue. The Court found that Clarke's pleadings and affidavits were similarly incoherent and filled with conclusions and assertions rather than legal arguments. The Court held that Clarke's appeal had no reasonable prospects of success and dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Court also ordered Clarke to pay the costs of the third respondent. The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court's decision to summarily dismiss Clarke's claim was correct and that Clarke had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting their claim. The Court held that Clarke's appeal was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal is refused.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the third respondent, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In light of the number of applications for leave to appeal it is necessary to recite the contents of each judgment in some detail. I note at the outset the primary judge in his reasons for judgment referred to the caution necessarily exercised in considering applications in the nature made, and by the fact that the applicant was a self-represented litigant. Primary judgment: [2019] FCCA 2127 The primary judge summarised the factual background to the application at [8]-[20]. At [22], the primary judge concluded:I have come to the clear view that the Points of Claim as against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents, should be struck out. The Points of Claim are incoherent, do not properly and meaningfully plead the material facts relied upon and do not properly and meaningfully set out any legal claims cognisable by the law. They are embarrassing in the technical sense. And further at [24]-[26]:It would be wrong, in my view, to require the First, Second and Fourth Respondents to plead to the Points of Claim. They are argumentative, conclusionary and, as I have said, do not properly and coherently plead material facts. It is not the role or obligation of the Respondents to disentangle the Points of Claim and to divine and spell out the claim which is intended to be made against them. Further and in particular with respect to the claim of fraud against the Second Respondent, the Points of Claim do not comply with the principles relating to the pleading of a claim in fraud….Accordingly, the Points of Claim should be struck out as bad in form as against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents.Further, in my view the evidence led by the First and Second Respondents clearly establishes that all their actions of which complaint seems to be made by the Applicant merely constituted their carrying out of statutory duties and obligations under statutory procedures that required them to act in the way in which they did. A claim of fraud against the Second Respondent could not succeed. The Second Respondent only carried out a merely ministerial function authorised by the Law. In the whole body of the evidence relied upon by the Applicant there is nothing which would base a cause of action against the Fourth Respondent. Accordingly, the Points of Claim should also be struck out on the basis that there are no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents. And finally, at [30]-[31]:In my view, the proceeding as against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents should be summarily dismissed pursuant to s.17A of the Act and r.13.10 of the Rules because the Court is satisfied that the Applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding against them and the proceeding against them is otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court.It is often the case that when a pleading is struck out the Court gives leave to replead. However, in this case I decline to give leave to replead. First, I do not consider that the Applicant would be able of herself to produce a proper pleading and there is no suggestion that she intends to retain a lawyer. Second, the Applicant is not able to refer me or point to a skerrick of wrongdoing which would give rise to a cause of action or proper legal complaint against the First, Second or Fourth Respondents.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I note also that both before and after the hearing of the interlocutory application the applicant sought leave to issue a number of subpoenas to persons involved in the respondents directed to providing documents and/or to give evidence in relation to factual matters in relation to her underlying complaints. Such evidence, not before the primary judge, is not relevant to the issues in these proceedings, and nor is there a basis for witnesses to give evidence. Leave was not granted to issue the subpoenas.Consideration The applicant alleges 21 grounds of appeal which appear to challenge the primary judgment, although some appear relevant to the second and fourth judgment in relation to costs. In addition the applicant has filed additional grounds in respect to the fourth judgment which relates only to the costs ordered to be paid to the third respondent, which are addressed below. In addition, lengthy affidavits dated 14 August 2019, 30 January 2020 and 15 June 2020 were filed by the applicant in support of her application. I note at this stage that after the completion of the hearing the applicant sent many emails to the Court, many of which appeared unrelated to these proceedings. The applicant was not given leave to file any further submissions or material in relation to this matter. Therefore, any material and emails received by the Court after the hearing which attempted to reargue this matter have not been considered: see for example, Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 258; BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207 at [43]. Each of the respondents in opposing the application contended, inter alia, that none of the grounds are coherently articulated such as to be able to be properly understood. The grounds are variously described as confusing, misconceived, disordered and suffering significant flaws. They were said to be reflective of the same problems as the documents filed in the proceedings which were struck out by the primary judge. Those descriptions of the grounds are to be accepted. The first and fourth respondents also took issue with the affidavits of the applicant sworn and dated 14 August 2019 and 30 January 2020 filed in support of the application, on the basis that the terms are “incoherent, incomprehensible or objectionable, not relevant and replete with conclusions, bald allegations and submissions in generally unhelpful terms that appear to be unrelated to the identified grounds of appeal set out within the Amended Draft Notice of Appeal”. The applicant’s written submission filed in support of the application does not assist. Rather most of the submission is conclusory assertions as to what she contends are the facts and repeats her grievances as to how she was dealt with. The applicant takes issues with facts in the evidence relied on by the respondents. The submission recites alleged wrongs against her. Much of the submission are bare assertions as to facts or conduct. This submission appears to be in support of the contention that it was a “clear cut” case of the application for summary dismissal being an “abuse of process”.