Clarke v Health Care Complaints Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clarke v Health Care Complaints Commission [2024] FCA 753

Appeal from: Clarke v Health Care Complaints Commission [2023] FedCFamC2G 916
File number: NSD 1327 of 2023
Judgment of: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 11 July 2024
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from vexatious proceedings orders made pursuant to s 239 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) – whether primary judge erred in having regard to judgments and orders in other proceedings not in evidence – where primary judge’s reasons incorporated a chronology relating to other proceedings and including references to judgments and orders therein – where primary judge was provided with chronology as an aide memoire – where respondent to appeal accepted that the chronology was not in evidence – whether primary judge erred by treating chronology as evidence when it was not admitted in evidence – where respondent to appeal sought to tender judgments and orders referred to in chronology at the hearing of appeal – whether such judgments and orders should be admitted pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether primary judge’s orders should be set-aside or varied

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from vexatious proceedings orders made pursuant to s 239 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) –whether form of order made by primary judge pursuant to s 239 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) not limited to proceedings in Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was beyond power conferred by the section

Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 7, 239

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 27, 37AO

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 91, 144

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.10

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law ss 139(a), 144(d)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(4)

Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) s 8

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 292

Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070

Clarke (Naicker) v Health Care Complaints Commission [2024] NSWSC 153

Clarke v Adams [2021] NSWDC 256

Clarke v Adams [2021] NSWSC 1665

Clarke v Dale (District Court (NSW), 8 October 2020, unrep)

Clarke v Fenn [2018] NSWDC 336

Clarke v Health Care Complaints Commission (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 15

Clarke v Herrick (District Court (NSW), 8 October 2020 unrep)

Clarke v Herrick [2019] NSWDC 533

Clarke v Herrick [2020] NSWCA 71

Clarke v Herrick [2021] NSWCA 102

Clarke v New South Wales Nurses and Midwives' Association (The Union) [2022] NSWSC 349

Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2017] NSWCATOD 163

Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council New South Wales [2019] FCA 1782

Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council NSW [2020] FCA 1617

Clarke…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 753
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sharmain Daisy Clarke (the appellant) appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the Court), made by Justice Logan, to make orders under s 239 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (the Act). The Health Care Complaints Commission (the respondent) applied for the orders, which restrained the appellant from instituting proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court against or relating to the respondent in relation to any matter arising from the appellant’s professional practice. The appeal concerned the orders made by the primary judge and the basis upon which they were made. The appeal was allowed in part, with the order being varied to restrict its application to the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in considering judgments and orders in other proceedings that were not in evidence, whether the form of order made by the primary judge was beyond the power conferred by s 239 of the Act, and whether the orders should be set aside or varied. The Court found that the primary judge had erred in considering the chronology of prior proceedings as evidence when it was not admitted in evidence. However, the Court found that the appellant was not prejudiced by this error, as she was familiar with the judgments and orders referred to in the chronology. The Court also found that the form of order made by the primary judge was beyond the power conferred by s 239 of the Act, as it was not limited to proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The Court varied the order to restrict its application to the Federal Circuit and Family Court, and dismissed the appeal otherwise.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed in part.

2. Order 2 made by the primary judge on 11 October 2023 be varied to provide as follows:

Pursuant to section 239(2)(b) of the Act, the Applicant, Ms Sharmain Daisy Clarke, is prohibited from instituting proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia against, or relating to, the Health Care Complaints Commission, its staff, consultants, executive officers and agents in relation to any matter arising from the Applicant’s professional practice.

3. The appeal be otherwise dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be allowed in part but only for the purpose of correcting what appears to me to be a slip affecting order 2. The terms of that order are not limited to proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia and the restraint imposed therefore travels beyond the limits of s 239(2)(b) of the Act. Subject to order 2 being varied to correct the slip, the appeal should be otherwise dismissed. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Annexure A to the Primary Judgment is a chronology prepared by the HCCC setting out the factual and procedural history of proceedings commenced by the appellant in various Australian courts and tribunals (“Chronology”). Although the primary judge incorporated the Chronology into her judgment, it is apparent from the transcript of the proceeding below that her Honour told the parties at the time she received the Chronology that she would treat it as an “aide memoire” only. Counsel for the HCCC accepted that, at the hearing before the primary judge, the HCCC sought to deploy the Chronology as an aide memoire and not as evidence. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to proceed on the basis that the Chronology was not evidence, and that the evidence concerning the other proceedings to which she was party was contained only in the evidence that was tendered by the HCCC, which primarily consisted of a bundle of copies of judgments and other court documents marked by the primary judge as Exhibit 1. Her Honour had regard to the prior proceedings referred to in the Chronology. However, while the effect of s 239(7) of the Act is that proceedings instituted are relevant to a Court’s consideration of whether to make an order under s 239(2) of the Act, it does not obviate the need for evidence of the prior proceedings. In this case the primary judge had evidence of some but not all of the various proceedings referred to in the Chronology. In fact, Exhibit 1 included only a small number of the various judgments referred to in the Chronology. Section 37AO(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“Federal Court Act”) is equivalent to s 239(7) of the Act. It has been suggested that for the purposes of s 37AO(6) the Court may have regard to judgments handed down in prior proceedings as “authorities”: Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070 at [54] per Charlesworth J. I respectfully disagree. When determining whether to make an order under s 239(2) of the Act or an equivalent section, the Court may have regard to previous proceedings to establish the involvement of the relevant person in such proceedings and their conduct of those proceedings. Referring to a judgment for this purpose is quite distinct from referring to a judgment as a legal authority. Such judgments may be admissible as evidence of “the outcome of the proceedings, and the course they had taken, and to record the person’s conduct of those proceedings”: Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30 (“Fokas”) at [66] per Wheelahan J. However, unless admitted into evidence, or unless the Court is entitled to take judicial notice of their existence in accordance with s 144 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“Evidence Act”), judgments such as those relied on by the HCCC in this case may not be relied on in support of an order under s 239(7) of the Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commission’s letter, signed by a Delegate of the President, advised that it would terminate the appellant’s complaint under s 46PF(1)(b) and 46PH(1)(g) of the AHRCA. The Delegate provided the following reasons for the decision:Reasons for my decisionYour complaint is about action taken by the HCCC to seek disciplinary findings and orders against you on the basis that you have an impairment and are not competent to practice as a nurse; and associated requests for you to attend an independent health assessment. You claim that the HCCC has imputed a psychiatric disability to you, that you do not have and that there is no utility in you seeing a psychiatrist because you are not in need of that service.I acknowledge your concerns as set out in the complaint. However, as explained below, I am of the view that the subject matter of your complaint could be more effectively and/or conveniently addressed in the current proceedings before NCAT’s Occupational Division.I understand that a key issue to be addressed in those proceedings is the factual dispute between you and the HCCC as to whether you have an impairment as defined in the National Law. As you are aware, NCAT’s Occupational Division is separate from, and independent of, health professional councils such as the NMC; and has specific expertise in considering disciplinary action regarding health professionals. Further, while this Commission does not have the ability to conduct a hearing or make an enforceable determination about unlawful discrimination, NCAT has the ability to make enforceable decisions directly relevant to your desired outcome of being able to work as a registered nurse. I also anticipate that any concerns you may have about procedural unfairness in relation to the HCCC’s processes can be raised in the NCAT proceedings.Publicly available documents indicate that NCAT has already conducted preliminary hearings in relation to this matter, and the substantive hearing is listed to commence on 31 October 2022. I note that in your email to the Commission of 4 October 2022, you express concerns about prior decisions by NCAT. I appreciate that you may disagree with NCAT's previous decisions in relation to your matters. However, for the reasons set out above, I am of the view that it is appropriate to terminate your complaint without inquiry, as I am satisfied the subject matter of the complaint could be more effectively and/or conveniently dealt with by NCAT. (Footnote omitted) The hearing of the NCAT proceedings referred to in the Delegate’s reasons commenced (as anticipated by the Delegate) on 31 October 2022. The 2022 NCAT Decision (discussed above) was made on 17 November 2022. THE PROCEEDING BELOW On 19 December 2022, the appellant lodged with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia her originating application alleging unlawful discrimination under s 46PO of the AHRCA (“Originating Application”). The appellant sought several orders, including financial compensation. Some of the orders sought appear to be misconceived. For instance, the third order purportedly sought is “Civil Penalty provisions and Trade practices to be affected, due to a denial of earning any remunerations commencing 2015”. The appellant also purported to claim interlocutory relief, which included a request that decisions handed down in the Supreme Court of NSW and the Tribunal be “rescinded and or otherwise revoked”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The remainder of the appellant’s submissions about Exhibit 2 were essentially based on her complaints about the outcome of each proceeding. The appellant accepted that each of the proceedings referred to in the Chronology was a proceeding to which she was a party. She also expressed her preference that the matter should be determined by me were I to form the opinion that the primary judge had erred in her exercise of power under s 239, rather than have me remit the matter back to the Federal Circuit and Family Court for re-hearing before another judge. Counsel for the HCCC contended, correctly, that the appellant was on notice that decisions referred to in the Chronology were decisions on which the HCCC relied in support of its application for orders under s 239(2). The judgments referred to in the Chronology were known to and accessible by the appellant. It is apparent from her submissions that she is and was at all relevant times familiar with each and every such judgment. I do not consider that the appellant has been prejudiced by tender of Exhibit 2 in any relevant way. In the circumstances, Exhibit 2 is admitted as evidence of the existence of the proceedings, their outcomes, the course they took, and the appellant’s conduct of them.CONSIDERATION OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS The first proceeding the Chronology refers to is Sharmain Naicker and NSW Health Service - Government of New South Wales for South Eastern Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service [2008] NSWIRComm 1104. That proceeding was originally commenced in the NSW Industrial Relations Commission (“NSWIRC”) by the New South Wales Nurses’ Association (“the Association”) on behalf of the appellant, but representation was later ceased. The Association alleged that the appellant had been “harshly, unreasonably or unjustly dismissed” (at [1]). The matter was unsuccessfully conciliated. The decision states that the appellant was employed as a permanent full-time perioperative nurse at Prince of Wales Hospital, Randwick (“the hospital”), from 7 April 2003 to 13 March 2008 (the date of her dismissal). At [3], the NSWIRC noted that the hospital’s decision to dismiss the appellant:…stemmed from a series of events that began with a dispute with other staff on 31 August 2007 in which the [appellant] was alleged to have misconducted herself, including allegations that the [appellant] shouted at staff and grabbed a nurse. It is important to note, however, that the events on 31 August 2007, themselves, were not the reason for the dismissal. Rather, the dismissal was, instead, based on events subsequent to the alleged altercation in which the [appellant] was, as noted in the letter of termination dated 13 March 2008, “considered [to have] wilfully and fraudulently falsified and submitted a witness statement, which is considered to be a breach of the Code of Conduct”. The alleged falsification of the witness statement was the subject of the dispute before the NSWIRC. The NSWIRC accepted that the process investigating and dismissing the appellant was, in some respects, procedurally unfair, but found ultimately that its discretionary intervention was not warranted at [23]. The application was dismissed.