Mathews v State of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mathews v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 1488

Citation: Mathews v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 1488
Parties: RUSSELL MATHEWS v STATE OF QUEENSLAND
File number: QUD 532 of 2014
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 24 December 2015
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for default judgment under rr 5.22 and 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where failure to appear at hearing – where no request to appear in a manner other than in person – where non-appearance was a deliberate default

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under s 31A(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – consideration of whether no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting claims – where alleged grounds of error include denial of natural justice, apprehended bias and breach of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) – consideration of the principle of open justice – consideration of provisions allowing for appearances other than in person under ss 47 to 47G of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where no reasonable prospect of succeeding on any alleged ground

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for a vexatious proceedings order under s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where applicant has repeatedly failed to appear at hearings – where applicant has lodged a large number of applications found to have been made without reasonable grounds – where applicant has made repeated allegations of bias and/or impropriety against judicial officers without any evidence to support those allegations – consideration of whether proceedings frequently instituted without reasonable grounds – consideration of whether proceedings conducted to achieve a wrongful purpose – consideration of this Court’s associated jurisdiction under s 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Held: the applicant is a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian Courts within the terms of s 37AO(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Legislation:

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth)
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)
Constitution
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Federal Magistrates Court Act 1999 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Justices Act 1886 (Qld)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld)

Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14
Agapis v Plumbers Licensing Board (No 2) [2014] FCA 1045
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Alstom Power Ltd v Polar Circle AS [2004] FCA 607
Attorney-General (NSW) v Chan [2011] NSWSC 1315
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1488
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mathews v State of Queensland, the court dealt with multiple applications from the State of Queensland against the applicant, Mr Mathews. These applications included requests for a default judgment, a summary judgment, and a vexatious proceedings order. The court was tasked with determining whether these applications should be granted based on Mr Mathews' repeated failures to appear at hearings and his history of instituting proceedings without reasonable grounds. The substantive proceeding involved allegations including denial of natural justice, apprehended bias, and breaches of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

The legal issues before the court centred on the principles governing applications for default and summary judgments, and the criteria for making a vexatious proceedings order. Specifically, the court considered whether Mr Mathews' failure to appear at hearings constituted a deliberate default warranting dismissal under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The court also evaluated whether there was no reasonable prospect of Mr Mathews successfully prosecuting his claims, and if his conduct indicated that his proceedings were frequently instituted without reasonable grounds and were being conducted to achieve a wrongful purpose.

The court found that Mr Mathews' repeated non-appearance at hearings, despite being aware of the scheduled times, constituted a deliberate default. The court emphasised the need to exercise caution in summarily dismissing proceedings but noted that the circumstances in this case warranted such action. The court determined that there was no reasonable prospect of Mr Mathews succeeding on any of his alleged grounds, and his conduct aligned with the definition of a vexatious litigant under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court considered the principle of open justice and Mr Mathews' failure to request alternative means of appearing at hearings.

The court granted the State of Queensland's applications. It prohibited Mr Mathews from instituting any further proceedings against the State of Queensland in both the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court. Additionally, the court ordered Mr Mathews to pay the State's costs associated with these applications and the substantive proceeding. The court's decision highlighted the importance of appearing at hearings and the consequences for litigants who repeatedly fail to do so without reasonable justification.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Mr Mathews is prohibited from instituting any proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against the State of Queensland, its agencies, statutory bodies and their employees.

2. Mr Mathews is prohibited from instituting any proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against the State of Queensland, its agencies, statutory bodies and their employees.

3. Judgment for the State of Queensland against Mr Mathews in relation to the whole of this proceeding.

4. Mr Mathews pay the State of Queensland its costs of and incidental to these applications and to this proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is convenient to deal with this application at this juncture. While I considered the provision of a transcript of the hearing conducted on 2 April 2015 was necessary to allow Mr Mathews to understand the context in which the State’s application to amend arose, there is no similar reason why Mr Mathews should now be provided with a copy of the transcripts of all the hearings that have been conducted to date. That is all the more so where he has chosen not to attend almost all of those hearings.THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT APPLICATIONThe application Because it raises many of the issues that arise in the State’s summary judgment application and, indeed, Mr Mathews’ substantive proceeding, it is convenient to begin with the State’s third application (see at [3] above). That is: since Mr Mathews failed to appear at the hearing of these applications on 2 April 2015, his substantive proceeding should be summarily dismissed under rr 5.22 and 5.23 of the Rules.The relevant principles This is essentially the same application as that considered by Logan J in Mathews v MacDonnell [2011] FCA 825 (mentioned by Judge Jarrett at paragraphs 5 and 11 of [19] above), albeit that Logan J there relied upon O 35A r 3 of the former Rules of Court. However, it is to be noted that in Yeo v Damos Earthmoving Pty Ltd, Re Beachwood Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1129, Gordon J held at [9] that rr 5.22 and 5.23 of the Rules are akin to O 35A of the former Rules. In Dauguet v Centrelink [2015] FCA 395 (Dauguet), Mortimer J set out at [135] the principles relevant to the operation of r 5.23, as follows:… The power to dismiss a proceeding for want of prosecution, or non-compliance is, as a power summarily to dismiss a proceeding without determination of the merits of the claim, one which should be exercised cautiously: see Lawson v NSW Minister for Land & Water Conservation [2007] FCA 8 at [22] per Stone J, referring to McKenzie v South Australia (2005) 214 ALR 214; [2005] FCA 22 at [25]-[26] per Finn J. There may be circumstances in which the power should not be exercised if it is obvious to the Court that an applicant does wish to prosecute her or his claim: see for example Jarrett v Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2008] FCA 1043. In that case, an applicant failed to appear at the first directions hearing and the Court stood the matter over. The applicant then sought leave to appear on the next occasion by telephone, which leave was refused. The applicant did not appear in person and at that stage the respondent applied for orders under the then equivalent to r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules. Flick J declined to make the order and instead stood the matter over for final hearing, at which the applicant appeared.Ultimately, Mortimer J did not adopt the approach of Flick J, deciding instead to dismiss the proceeding under r 5.23 because her Honour considered it had “travelled well beyond the circumstances with which Flick J dealt in Jarrett”: see Dauguet at [136]. Similarly, in Stephenson v ACN 000 007 492 Ltd (Under Judicial Management) (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) (No 1) [2010] FCA 785 (Stephenson), Perram J used O 35A of the former Rules to dismiss the proceeding where “the moving party [had] failed to appear consecutively at two directions hearings” (see at [3]).Consideration

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Dauguet v Centrelink [2015] FCA 395 (Dauguet), Mortimer J set out at [135] the principles relevant to the operation of r 5.23, as follows:… The power to dismiss a proceeding for want of prosecution, or non-compliance is, as a power summarily to dismiss a proceeding without determination of the merits of the claim, one which should be exercised cautiously: see Lawson v NSW Minister for Land & Water Conservation [2007] FCA 8 at [22] per Stone J, referring to McKenzie v South Australia (2005) 214 ALR 214; [2005] FCA 22 at [25]-[26] per Finn J. There may be circumstances in which the power should not be exercised if it is obvious to the Court that an applicant does wish to prosecute her or his claim: see for example Jarrett v Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2008] FCA 1043. In that case, an applicant failed to appear at the first directions hearing and the Court stood the matter over. The applicant then sought leave to appear on the next occasion by telephone, which leave was refused. The applicant did not appear in person and at that stage the respondent applied for orders under the then equivalent to r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules. Flick J declined to make the order and instead stood the matter over for final hearing, at which the applicant appeared.Ultimately, Mortimer J did not adopt the approach of Flick J, deciding instead to dismiss the proceeding under r 5.23 because her Honour considered it had “travelled well beyond the circumstances with which Flick J dealt in Jarrett”: see Dauguet at [136]. Similarly, in Stephenson v ACN 000 007 492 Ltd (Under Judicial Management) (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) (No 1) [2010] FCA 785 (Stephenson), Perram J used O 35A of the former Rules to dismiss the proceeding where “the moving party [had] failed to appear consecutively at two directions hearings” (see at [3]).Consideration There can be no doubt that Mr Mathews was aware of the hearing on 2 April 2015 because, about a week before that hearing, the Court Registry sent him a letter by email to the email address provided by him, stating that the State’s applications had been listed for hearing before myself on that date. That email was sent at 2.56 pm on 24 March 2015. At 3.36 pm on the same day, Mr Mathews sent an email in response to the Court Registry. The contents of that email are already set out at [32] above. It will be noted from this email exchange that Mr Mathews did not, on that occasion, apply to appear by telephone, or apply to be excused from appearing in person, or ask for leave to appear in some other form. Instead, he merely asserted that “due to [his] disability [he] cannot appear in real time”. However, this email, and paragraphs 3 and 4 of his affidavit filed in June 2015 (see at [34] above), demonstrate that Mr Mathews was well aware of at least two things. First, that as the applicant in the substantive proceeding, he was required to appear at any hearings related to that proceeding. And, secondly, that he needed to apply for and obtain the leave of the Court if he wanted to be excused from appearing in person at those hearings, or if he wished to appear in a manner other than in person.