Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3)
[2020] FCA 1629
•11 November 2020
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629
File number: NSD 974 of 2019 Judgment of: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 11 November 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary judgment – whether applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding – whether proceeding is frivolous or vexatious – whether no reasonable cause of action disclosed – whether the proceeding is an abuse of the processes of the Court – whether pleadings should be struck out – whether pleading is evasive, ambiguous or likely to cause prejudice or embarrassment – Held: judgment entered in favour of each respondent against the applicant Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 Australian Consumer Law s 18
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 19, 31A, 31A(2), 37M
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.02, 16.21, 16.21(1)(c), 16.21(1)(d), 16.21(1)(e), 26.01
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 14
Cases cited: Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 217 ALR 226
Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481
Bartlett v Swan Television & Radio Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 638; ATPR 41-434
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71
Byrnes v Majak [2020] NSWSC 906
Cavill Business Solutions Pty Ltd v Jackson [2005] WASC 138
Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 1490
Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1169
Chandrasekaran v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2019] FCA 1687
Chandrasekaran v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2020] FCA 214
Chandrasekaran v Western Sydney Local Health District (No 7) [2019] NSWSC 567
Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775
Clavel v Savage [2015] NSWCA 61
Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434
Council for the City of the Gold Coast v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 791; 157 ALR 135
Fair Work Ombudsman v Eastern Colour Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 803; 209 IR 263
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525
Fuller v Toms (2012) 247 FCR 440
Gallo v Attorney-General (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Full Court, 4 September 1984)
Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 158
Hobbs v Petersham Transport Co Pty Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 220
J C Techforce Pty Ltd v Pearce [1996] FCA 599; 138 ALR 522
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1
Matthews v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 1488
Odeh v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWSC 342
Palmer Bruyn v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2012) 203 FCR 325
Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524
Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251
Shelton v National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd [2004] FCA 1393; 51 ACSR 278
Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
Spiteri v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 905
Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507
Trade Practices Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1990) 22 FCR 305
Trade Practices Commission v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 164
UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77
Von Reisner v Commonwealth (2009) 177 FCR 531
White Industries Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298
Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 189 Date of hearing: 20 November 2019 and 4 March 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P E King (4 March 2020) Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Davis of Mark Davis Legal (20 November 2019) Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K Hooper Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A Stafford Solicitor for the Second Respondent: New South Wales Crown Solicitor’s Office Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Mr M Hamwood of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 974 of 2019 BETWEEN: SUJATHA CHANDRASEKARAN
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
AUSTRALIAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED COMPUTING COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Judgment is entered in favour of the first respondent against the applicant pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
2.Judgment is entered in favour of the second respondent against the applicant pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
3.Judgment is entered in favour of the third respondent against the applicant pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
4.The applicant pay the costs of the first, second and third respondents.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WIGNEY J:
The applicant in this matter, Dr Sujatha Chandrasekaran, has commenced and seeks to prosecute a proceeding in this Court against the Commonwealth of Australia, the State of New South Wales and the Australian Centre for Advanced Computing Communications Pty Ltd (AC3). In the proceeding, Dr Chandrasekaran makes extremely serious and extraordinary, if not somewhat bizarre, allegations against the Commonwealth, the Department of Defence, unspecified “servants or agents” of the Commonwealth and Defence, the State, the New South Wales Ministry of Health (branded NSW Health), the Medical Council of New South Wales, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) and various psychiatrists said to be employed by NSW Health, the Medical Council or AHPRA.
Dr Chandrasekaran’s case against the Commonwealth, the State and AC3 has evolved over time. She has filed numerous interlocutory applications and several lengthy and astonishing affidavits. There has also been various versions of her pleading. As will be seen, the most recent iteration of her statement of claim, which features in this judgement and was apparently prepared by a lawyer, could perhaps be described as enigmatic or idiosyncratic, though other less flattering adjectives could equally be employed. To complicate things further, Dr Chandrasekaran is or was also the applicant and plaintiff in parallel proceedings in both this Court and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Those proceedings involve or involved different parties but a common substratum of facts and allegations.
It is perhaps not surprising, in all the circumstances, that the Commonwealth, the State and AC3 applied for the proceeding to be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The State and AC3 also sought an order, in the alternative, that Dr Chandrasekaran’s pleading be struck out pursuant to r 16.21 of the Rules. The State also contended that the proceeding should be permanently stayed as an abuse of process.
The critical questions for consideration are whether Dr Chandrasekaran has any reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, whether any reasonable cause of action is disclosed and whether the proceedings could fairly be described as frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the processes of this Court.
THE PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
The proceeding has a long and rather tortuous, if not torturous, history. The present application must be considered in light of that history.
Dr Chandrasekaran first commenced the proceeding on 14 June 2019 by the filing of an originating application and a supporting affidavit. She sought, amongst other things, permanent injunctions restraining the Commonwealth and the State from engaging in a broad range of conduct which included harassment, stalking, “gaslighting”, breach of privacy, defamation, fraud, injurious falsehood, breach of fiduciary duty, misfeasance in public office and conspiracy. In her affidavit filed along with the originating application, she alleged that the Commonwealth and the State had contravened and continued to contravene various provisions in a number of Commonwealth and State Acts and had committed or engaged in an astonishing variety of other tortious and unlawful acts.
The essence of Dr Chandrasekaran’s case appeared to be, in summary, that the Commonwealth and, more specifically, Defence, had utilised counterintelligence programs to intercept her communications and obtain her private information. Those communications and that private information was then conveyed to various “third parties”; in particular, certain doctors and psychiatrists said to be employed by the State or some of its agencies, including NSW Health and the Medical Council. Those doctors had then allegedly used the communications and private information to harass and intimidate Dr Chandrasekaran in various extraordinary and unlawful ways.
Dr Chandrasekaran’s originating application included a claim for urgent interlocutory relief, including ex parte injunctions against the Commonwealth and the State restraining them from continuing to engage in the impugned conduct. On 27 June 2019, she filed an interlocutory application which sought an Anton Piller or search order in respect of the business premises of AC3. Lengthy affidavits, which annexed voluminous documentary exhibits, including affidavits sworn for the purpose of a previous proceeding in this Court, were filed in support of the claims for interlocutory relief against the Commonwealth, the State and AC3. At this point in time, Dr Chandrasekaran was not legally represented, in this proceeding at least. She represented herself at the hearing of her interlocutory applications on 3 July 2019.
Dr Chandrasekaran’s claims for interlocutory relief were dismissed on 3 July 2019: Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1169 (Chandrasekaran No 1).
In dismissing Dr Chandrasekaran’s claims for interlocutory relief, the Court noted as follows in relation to the claims against the Commonwealth (at [17]):
Dr Chandrasekaran’s claims that various Commonwealth agencies have used counterintelligence programs or allowed such programs to be used by others appears, at this stage at least, to be based on nothing more than bare assertion or speculation on her behalf. Dr Chandrasekaran has not identified the specific provisions of the various Commonwealth and State Acts which she alleges have been contravened, let alone the particular individuals or entities that have allegedly contravened those provisions. Her allegations of tortious conduct and other common law causes of action against the Commonwealth are also, at this stage at least, entirely unparticularised and appear to amount to little more than broad or sweeping assertions based mostly on speculation. The basis of the Commonwealth’s liability for the other tortious or unlawful actions is presently unclear.
As will be seen, the lack of proper particularisation of Dr Chandrasekaran’s case against the Commonwealth is a major plank in the Commonwealth’s claim that this proceeding should be summarily dismissed. The important point to note is that Dr Chandrasekaran has been on notice of this apparent deficiency in her case since at least July 2019. As will be seen, she has had numerous opportunities to particularise her case properly or adequately since this deficiency was first exposed and explained to her.
The claims against the State were found to be equally amorphous and inadequately particularised. Moreover, in dismissing Dr Chandrasekaran’s claims against the State, it was observed that the claims made against the doctors who were said to be employed by or on behalf of the State appeared to be the subject of other proceedings which Dr Chandrasekaran had commenced in this Court against the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists: proceeding NSD 1535 of 2018: Chandrasekaran No 1 at [18]-[19]. Indeed, the evidence that Dr Chandrasekaran adduced in support of her interlocutory relief included the affidavits she had filed in that other proceeding.
As will be seen, the overlap and parallels between this proceeding and Dr Chandrasekaran’s proceeding against the College, as well as another proceeding that Dr Chandrasekaran had commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the Western Sydney Local Health District, which was said to be a body corporate established by the State, is a major plank in the State’s claim that this proceeding should be summarily dismissed or the pleading struck out.
Following the dismissal of Dr Chandrasekaran’s claims for interlocutory relief, the proceeding was listed for a case management hearing on 11 July 2019. The orders made at that hearing included that the matter proceed by way of pleadings, that Dr Chandrasekaran have leave to join AC3 as a respondent and that Dr Chandrasekaran file and serve a statement of claim by 29 July 2019. Following the case management hearing, Dr Chandrasekaran filed a series of interlocutory applications, including applications to join various other entities and persons including ING Bank (Australia) Limited, applications for injunctive relief, applications for expedition and applications for leave to issue various subpoenas to various third parties. It is unnecessary to detail the precise nature and outcome of those various interlocutory applications. It suffices to say that Dr Chandrasekaran eventually filed a statement of claim, albeit not until 13 August 2019.
At a further case management hearing on 29 August 2019, Dr Chandrasekaran was given leave to file an amended statement of claim so as to remedy apparent deficiencies in her initial pleading. Those deficiencies had been identified in correspondence sent to Dr Chandrasekaran by the Commonwealth’s solicitors. The main deficiency identified in the correspondence was the absence of appropriate particulars of the alleged wrongdoing on the part of the Commonwealth, particularly in light of the seriousness of the allegations. Timetabling orders were also made in respect of a number of foreshadowed interlocutory applications, including various foreshadowed applications by Dr Chandrasekaran and foreshadowed applications by the other parties to strike out Dr Chandrasekaran’s pleading or summarily dismiss the proceeding.
On 1 September 2019, Dr Chandrasekaran filed an interlocutory application, in which she sought various orders, including: further injunctive relief; the joining of Amazon Pty Ltd to the proceeding; a freezing order against ING Bank; and a review of the decision to list any strike out application for hearing on 30 October 2019. Dr Chandrasekaran’s application concerning the hearing of the strike out application was ultimately dismissed by Griffiths J, who heard the matter as duty judge, though orders extending the timetable were made: Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 1490.
Dr Chandrasekaran filed an amended statement of claim on 9 September 2019. The amended statement of claim was, in effect, an entirely new pleading. It was over 80 pages in length. The allegations against the Commonwealth included: fraud; abuse of process; breach of confidence; stalking; harassment; assault and battery; false imprisonment; “cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, punishment and torture”; injurious falsehood; conspiracy; and misfeasance in public office. The allegations against the State were similarly expansive and included: fraud; conspiracy; abuse of process; cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, punishment and torture; injurious falsehood; defamation; inducing breach of contract; breach of confidence; intimidation; unlawful interference in trade; misleading and deceptive conduct; racial discrimination; and sexual discrimination. The claims against AC3 included breach of confidence and conspiracy.
It is unnecessary to give any further consideration to the broad, sweeping and serious allegations included in the amended statement of claim. That is because most of the allegations appear now to have been largely abandoned, or at least have not found their way into the further amended statement of claim, at least in explicit terms. One point should, however, be noted. That point is this: despite the length of the pleading and the seriousness of the allegations, the manifest deficiencies in the particularisation of the many allegations remained. Most significantly, particularly insofar as the claims against the Commonwealth were concerned, the pleading did not specify the names of the individual Commonwealth officers who were said to be responsible for most of the alleged serious wrongdoing. In relation to the claims against the State, while a number of doctors were named, there was no clear articulation of exactly how the State was said to be responsible for the alleged wrongdoing by those doctors. There was also a distinct lack of specificity and particularity in respect of many other aspects of the serious allegations.
On 16 September 2019, the Commonwealth, the State and AC3 filed applications for summary dismissal and, in the case of the State and AC3 at least, an order striking out the amended statement of claim. Affidavit evidence and written submissions were in due course filed by the parties in relation to the interlocutory applications.
Shortly prior to the hearing of the interlocutory applications, Dr Chandrasekaran applied for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that her counsel was said to be overseas. This was the first indication that Dr Chandrasekaran was legally represented. The hearing of the applications to summarily dismiss the proceeding or strike out the amended statement of claim were in due course adjourned, essentially on the basis that Dr Chandrasekaran had secured legal representation and that her counsel foreshadowed an application for leave to further amend the pleading. Dr Chandrasekaran’s lawyer advised the Court that the proposed further amended pleading would be significantly narrower and confined than the amended statement of claim. It was tolerably clear that, in applying for leave to amend in the face of the summary dismissal and strike out applications, Dr Chandrasekaran, through her lawyer, effectively conceded that the existing amended statement of claim was defective and liable to be struck out.
As foreshadowed, Dr Chandrasekaran eventually furnished a further amended statement of claim (FASC) which purported to be prepared and certified by a lawyer. The Commonwealth, the State and AC3 each ultimately adopted an eminently sensible and practical approach to Dr Chandrasekaran’s amendment application. They did not oppose Dr Chandrasekaran being granted leave to amend and leave to file the proposed further amended statement of claim, though their non-opposition to that course was expressed to be strictly on the basis that they would maintain or renew their applications for summary dismissal or the striking out of the pleading, albeit on the basis of the new pleading. In short, they maintained that many of the defects and deficiencies which were said to be inherent in Dr Chandrasekaran’s amended statement of claim and the proceeding generally had not been remedied by the filing of the further amended statement of claim.
THE CURRENT PLEADING
The current pleading is perhaps best understood by first summarising the factual allegations made against each of the Commonwealth, the State and AC3, and then analysing the causes of action which are said to flow from some of those allegations.
Factual allegations against the Commonwealth
There would appear to be four or possibly five broad categories of allegations against the Commonwealth spread throughout the pleading. As has already been noted, the allegations are all serious and extraordinary. As will be seen, some of them also border on the bizarre.
Collecting, accessing and intercepting information and communications
The first category of allegations involve various claims that the Commonwealth, by its servants or agents, allegedly intercepted, collected or accessed Dr Chandrasekaran’s personal, confidential and private information: FASC [3] and [4]. This was said to have been done by requesting “others” to intercept Dr Chandrasekaran’s communications. Those others were said to include Google LLC, Amazon Pty Ltd, AC3, Over The Wire Pty Ltd, Anticlockwise Pty Ltd, Entrust Inc Pty Ltd, GTT Communications Pty Ltd and “others presently unknown”: FASC [3].
The following observations may be made about this category of allegations.
First, the timeframe in which this conduct is alleged to have occurred is somewhat unclear but appears to involve a very lengthy period. The timeframe is particularised as being “[o]n or before 12 August 2017” (FASC [3]), though in the submissions made on Dr Chandrasekaran’s behalf it was suggested that this was an error and that it should read “[o]n or after 12 August 2017”. Either way, the time period is expressed in very broad terms. There are no particulars of any incident involving an alleged interception or accessing of information on a specific date.
Second, there is equally a complete lack of specificity in terms of the information said to have been accessed and the communications said to have been intercepted. Later paragraphs of the pleading refer to the information and communications as including “online accounts, telephonic communications, devices, bank accounts”: FASC [10], see also [16], [17]. That is, however, as specific as the pleading gets. Other than in the context of one of the allegations made against the State and AC3, there are no particulars of any specific communication or any specific item of information which was allegedly accessed or intercepted by the Commonwealth or any of its servants or agents. As referred to in more detail later, there is also a broad allegation concerning GPS tracking.
Third, there are no particulars of any specific servant or agent of the Commonwealth who was said to be responsible for, or involved in any way in, the interception or accessing of Dr Chandrasekaran’s information and communications. Later paragraphs of the pleading appear to focus on Defence as being the main body or entity who is alleged to have intercepted, accessed or collected Dr Chandrasekaran’s information and communications: see FASC [10], [11], [16] and [17]. The pleading does not, however, identify any officer or agent of Defence who was said to be responsible for this conduct. The only individual identified in the pleading as being an officer of the Commonwealth and Defence is a doctor, Dr Bruce Boman, who is also said to be employed from time to time by NSW Health: FASC [9] particular (i) and (ii). It is not, however, alleged that Dr Boman was in any way responsible for intercepting, accessing or collecting Dr Chandrasekaran’s information or communications. The only allegation against Dr Boman appears to be that he made certain representations, or that the Commonwealth provided information to him. Those allegations are considered separately.
Fourth, there is no indication in the pleading of the motive or reason that the Commonwealth or Defence had, or would or even might have had, to intercept, access or collect Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidential information and communications. While it is not suggested that it is necessary for Dr Chandrasekaran to plead a motive on the part of the Commonwealth, that would certainly assist in making sense of what are otherwise extraordinary allegations.
Providing information to others
The second category of allegations is that the Commonwealth, or Defence, provided Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidential information to “others”, without her authorisation, for the “purposes of misuse”: FASC [13] and [14]. It is also alleged that the information was misused, both by Defence and by the persons to which it was provided, including to: portray Dr Chandrasekaran in a “false light” and to “create false communications and activities” (FASC [15]); cast Dr Chandrasekaran “as a person of ridicule” (FASC [15] particular (i)); and to repeat the information to Dr Chandrasekaran and others in a manner that is “inappropriate, out of context and non-sensical with the intention to humiliate, degrade, violate and insult her in the form of a parody” and “shun and ostracise” her (FASC [15] particular (vi); [16] particular (i), (iv), (v), (vi); [17] particular (iv), (vii), (viii), (ix); [18] particular (iii)). The persons to whom the information was said to be provided include Dr Boman and other persons who are employed by NSW Health: FASC [13], [16] particular (iii) and [18] particular (iii).
The following observations may be made about this category of allegations.
First, the timeframe in which the Commonwealth’s misuse of Dr Chandrasekaran’s information was alleged to have occurred is unclear and not properly particularised. It would appear to be alleged that it has occurred “since at least April 2012”: FASC [14]. No further particulars are provided. That date also does not coincide with the date from which, or before which, it is alleged that the Commonwealth began “collect[ing]” Dr Chandrasekaran’s information, which as noted earlier was 12 August 2017: see FASC [3]. If, as was submitted on Dr Chandrasekaran’s behalf at the hearing of the summary dismissal application, 12 August 2017 was the date from which the Commonwealth started collecting Dr Chandrasekaran’s information, it is unclear how it can then be alleged that the Commonwealth began misusing her information from as early as April 2012. In any event, the lack of specificity in respect of the timing of the alleged receipt and misuse of the information is manifest.
Second, the pleading contains no particulars whatsoever of any individuals employed or retained by the Commonwealth, or Defence, who Dr Chandrasekaran alleges were or are responsible for receiving and providing her information to others for the purposes of misuse. The only person who is identified and alleged to be an officer of the Commonwealth is Dr Boman; though, as discussed next, the allegation against him is that he made false representations against Dr Chandrasekaran, not that he was a Commonwealth officer who was responsible for providing Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidential information to others for the purpose of “misuse”.
Third, the Commonwealth’s reason or motive for receiving and providing Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidential information to others for the purpose of misuse in the way she alleges is again left entirely unexplained. While motive may not be an essential element of any of the causes of action alleged against the Commonwealth, the absence of any rational explanation for the serious allegations is again capable of casting doubt on the veracity of those allegations.
Intentionally making false representations and slander
This category of allegation against the Commonwealth is related to the allegation that the Commonwealth provided Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidential information to other persons for the purpose of misuse. It is alleged that Dr Boman, who is said to be an officer “in” Defence, intentionally made representations to Defence “and others present” to the effect that Dr Chandrasekaran is a threat to national security and is involved in terrorist offences (FASC [9] particular (i), [16] particular (ii), [17] particular (v), [18] particular (ii); see also [20], albeit in the context of claims against the State). There is no indication of the position that Dr Boman occupied at Defence, or who at Defence he made the false representations to or who the “others present” were. Nor is there any particularisation of the timeframe in which these false representations were said to have been made.
It is also alleged that Dr Boman, amongst various other psychiatrists employed by NSW Health, “spread slanders” against Dr Chandrasekaran after she resigned from a particular clinic in April 2012: FASC [20]. Those allegations appear in that part of the pleading which is said to contain Dr Chandrasekaran’s case against the State, but nevertheless appear to relate in some way to the claims against the Commonwealth. Those slanders are said to have been published to “other medical officers” and are said to include that Dr Chandrasekaran is “[p]aranoid, erotomaniac, homosexual, a sexual deviant and has an eating disorder” and has “[c]aused conflict and is involved in terrorism as a sympathiser and offender”: FASC [20] particulars (ii) and (iii). The basis upon which the Commonwealth could be held responsible for the alleged spreading of those slanders is entirely unclear, other than perhaps the unparticularised allegation that Dr Boman is an officer of Defence.
The sweeping allegations concerning false representations and slander are almost entirely devoid of any meaningful particulars. There is no indication of when they were made, or who they were made to or the means, manner or circumstances in which they were made. It appears, however, to be alleged that they were made so as to destroy Dr Chandrasekaran’s career advancement: FASC [20] particulars (v), (vii) and (ix). Exactly why anyone at Defence would want to do that is entirely unclear.
The Defence “program” – Accessing GPS data, stalking, harassment and trespass
It is at this point, if indeed not before, that the allegations in the pleading could fairly be considered to be somewhat bizarre. It is alleged that the slanders about Dr Chandrasekaran “were published in advance of the program Defence deployed consisting of workplace mobbing and sabotage, privacy violations … harassment that has the appearance of co-incidence, cyberstalking, physical stalking, gaslighting, false evidence and fabrication of official documents including subpoena, black bag jobs and damage to property and vandalism”: FASC [20] particular (iv). Needless to say, no particulars are provided in relation to these allegations.
If that were not enough, it appears to be alleged that the Commonwealth, via Defence, tracks Dr Chandrasekaran’s location by accessing her “devices” and uses that information to stalk her, enter her premises, vandalise and damage her property, take photographs of her which are then manipulated, meddle with the mechanics of her car and even spike her drinks: FASC [10] and [18] and the particulars thereto.
These are obviously extremely serious allegations. Most of them would, if substantiated, constitute serious criminal offences. They are, however, allegations that are entirely unsupported by any meaningful particulars as to time and place, let alone particulars of the persons who are said to have been responsible for these egregious activities. They amount to nothing more than a sweeping catalogue of bare assertions and conclusions.
It should also be noted in this context that other serious allegations are made against Defence in that part of the pleading that details Dr Chandrasekaran’s case against AC3. Those allegations will be discussed later in that context. It suffices to say that Dr Chandrasekaran alleges that Defence had an agreement with AC3 whereby it granted AC3 permission to access her communications “in tandem with and alongside other cloud providers”: FASC [39]. Like virtually all of the allegations made against Defence, however, this serious allegation is entirely unsupported by meaningful particulars. Those particulars that are provided amount to little more than a series of bizarre, general assertions about the means by which Dr Chandrasekaran’s communications are supposedly intercepted.
Hacking bank accounts and unauthorised transactions
Finally, there is a category of allegations which involve allegations that Defence has “hacked” Dr Chandrasekaran’s online bank accounts. It is alleged that Defence has accessed Dr Chandrasekaran’s bank accounts, made unauthorised transactions on those accounts and otherwise misused the information obtained from that access to parody and ridicule, or facilitate others to parody and ridicule, Dr Chandrasekaran.
These broad and sweeping allegations are again, for the most part, entirely unparticularised, though there is reference to one specific incident where it is alleged that Dr Chandrasekaran received an “unwanted anonymous gift in the form of champagne containing sedatives” when she stayed at the Hotel Windsor on 2 May 2015: FASC [17] particular (x). What is unclear, however, is exactly how or why Dr Chandrasekaran alleges that the Commonwealth was responsible for this alleged conduct. Her case in that regard would appear to amount to nothing more than speculation or conjecture.
Causes of action pleaded against the Commonwealth
It is possible to discern four potential causes of action in that part of the pleading which concerns the Commonwealth. Each of them appears to be a common law, not statutory, cause of action. None of them are properly pleaded or particularised.
The first cause of action appears to be an action for breach of confidence: FASC [5] and [15]. The elements of the equitable action for breach of confidence were summarised in the following terms by Gummow J in Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434 at 443:
It is now settled that in order to make out a case for protection in equity of allegedly confidential information, a plaintiff must satisfy certain criteria. The plaintiff: (i) must be able to identify with specificity, and not merely in global terms, that which is said to be the information in question; and must also be able to show that (ii) the information has the necessary quality of confidence (and is not for example, common or public knowledge); (iii) the information was received by the defendant in such circumstances as to import an obligation of confidence; and (iv) there is actual or threatened misuse of this information...
As discussed in more detail later, the pleading does not properly address the essential elements of this cause of action. In particular, nowhere in the pleading does Dr Chandrasekaran identify “with specificity” the relevant information. Nor does the pleading identify the circumstances in which the Commonwealth received the information which would “import” an obligation of confidence.
The second potential cause of action would appear to be some form of common law cause of action for breach of privacy: FASC [6]. The difficulty for Dr Chandrasekaran, however, is that, whatever may be the position in overseas jurisdictions, there is no recognised tort or other common law action for breach of privacy in Australia.
The third potential cause of action would appear to be an action in bailment or negligence: FASC [7]. It would appear to be alleged that the Commonwealth became a “bailee” of Dr Chandrasekaran’s “intangible property” and that, as bailee, the Commonwealth owed Dr Chandrasekaran a duty of care not to hurt or harm her. The viability or availability of this claim will be considered in detail later. It suffices at this point to make the following brief observations. First, the apparent claim that, by unlawfully intercepting Dr Chandrasekaran’s communications, the Commonwealth somehow became the bailee of the information contained in those communications and thereby owed Dr Chandrasekaran a duty of care in that capacity, could fairly be said to be novel, to say the very least. Second, it is, at best, doubtful that it is possible in any circumstances to become a bailee of intangible property. Third, there is in any event no proper particularisation of exactly what intangible property of Dr Chandrasekaran’s is alleged to be the subject of the bailment. And fourth, even if the dubious proposition that the Commonwealth might owe a duty of care to Dr Chandrasekaran as a consequence of its position as bailee is accepted, there is in any event no allegation that the Commonwealth breached that duty of care, let alone proper particulars of that breach. Nor are there any proper particulars in relation to loss or damage.
The fourth potential cause of action is said to be an action for damages “under the principle in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 in respect of nervous shock resulting from the intentional false representation”: FASC [9]. The pleading does not, however, properly identify or plead the elements of that cause of action.
The existence in Australia of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress or nervous shock, based on the decision in Wilkinson v Downton, is not without controversy: see Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775 at [11] to [36] and the case cited therein (and not disturbed on appeal, Clavel v Savage [2015] NSWCA 61); see also Byrnes v Majak [2020] NSWSC 906 at [63]; Odeh v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWSC 342 at [20]. It is unnecessary to enter into that debate here. It suffices to note that, if such an action is recognised in Australia, its elements are: first, a deliberate act by the tortfeasor; second, an intention (including reckless indifference) by the tortfeasor to cause physical or psychiatric harm by that conduct; third, the occasioning of harm (including psychiatric injury, but not mere distress) as a result of the conduct; fourth, the harm was caused to a person to whom the harm was intended to be caused and in circumstances where the conduct was reasonably likely to cause harm in a normal person; and fifth, the tortfeasor engaged in the conduct without cause or lawful excuse: Clavel at [36].
The relevant conduct in this case would appear to be the alleged false representations about Dr Chandrasekaran by Dr Boman. As already noted, however, there is no proper particularisation of those representations or their falsity. More significantly, there is no proper pleading or particularisation of any of the other elements of this cause of action, including the intention to cause physical or psychiatric harm and the physical or psychiatric injury, amounting to more than mere distress, said to have been suffered by Dr Chandrasekaran.
The final point to note in relation to the causes of action pleaded against the Commonwealth is there is nothing in the pleading to suggest why or how this Court has jurisdiction to try any of these four causes of action. More will be said in relation to that issue later.
Factual allegations against the State
The pleading contains two broad factual allegations against the State.
The first category of allegations concerns the making of false representations to “third parties including the general public” about Dr Chandrasekaran so as to “cause the lowering of an opinion of her in the eyes of reasonable people in her trade or profession as a psychiatrist”: FASC [20]. The false representations were alleged to have been made by various psychiatrists including, as noted in the context of the claims against the Commonwealth, Dr Boman, as well as various doctors who it is alleged were employed by “NSW Health, the Medical Council of NSW and [AHPRA]”: FASC [20].
The nature of the alleged “slanders” was considered earlier in the context of the factual allegations against the Commonwealth, as was the “Defence program” of which these slanders supposedly formed a part. As was there noted, the alleged false misrepresentations are almost entirely unparticularised as to time, content, place, recipient and means of communication or publication. The most that is said is that the representations have allegedly been made since “at least 2012” and that they have been made to “third parties including the general public”. The broad subject matter of the alleged slanders is referred to, but no specific representation is included in the pleading. It is alleged that the various psychiatrists who made the statements knew that they were false.
The second allegation is more specific. It involves the allegation that the Crown Solicitor’s Office and NSW Health “knowingly relied on a falsified expert witness report” in the proceedings that Dr Chandrasekaran commenced against the Western Sydney Local Health District (proceeding 2018/177874): FASC [23]. Two specific lawyers who it is alleged were employed or retained by the Crown Solicitor’s Office are identified as having known that the report was false, or contained false representations. No officers of NSW Health are identified. This conduct is alleged to have been “consistent with fraud” and the intention of the relevant lawyers or officers is alleged to be “fooling the court that [Dr Chandrasekaran] has a psychiatric illness so as to appoint a tutor to derail her self-representation and claim”: FASC [20] particulars (i), (ii) and (iii). The conduct is alleged to have cause Dr Chandrasekaran to suffer humiliation, “annihilation” and trauma: FASC [20] particular (v).
There could be little doubt that those allegations are extremely serious. If substantiated, they would constitute a contempt of court, albeit one that should be dealt with in the Supreme Court proceeding. It would also appear that this allegation has in fact been aired in the Supreme Court proceeding. It is referred to, albeit somewhat obliquely, in the amended pleading filed in that proceeding in May 2019.
Causes of action pleaded against the State
It is almost impossible to discern any properly pleaded cause of action against the State. This was effectively conceded by counsel who appeared for Dr Chandrasekaran, who described the pleading against the State as “idiosyncratic”.
One of the pleaded causes of action would appear to be the tort of injurious falsehood: FASC [20]. The elements of that cause of action are: first, a false statement of or concerning the plaintiff’s goods or business; second, publication of that statement by the defendant to a third person; third, malice on the part of the defendant; and fourth, proof by the plaintiff of actual damage suffered as a result of the statement: Palmer Bruyn v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388 at [52] (per Gummow J referring to Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 at 527-528). It is readily apparent that, amongst other things, the pleading does not specifically address each of those four elements of the cause of action. Most significantly, the pleading does not contain any allegation that the representations related to Dr Chandrasekaran’s business or any allegation of malice.
There is also a potential limitation issue in relation to this cause of action. The limitation period for an action for injurious falsehood is six years: see s 14 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). The false representations that are said to form the basis for this cause of action are alleged to have been made “[s]ince at least 2012”. The absence of any proper particulars of the false representations makes it difficult to reach any firm conclusion in relation to whether the action is statute barred, though it is highly unlikely that Dr Chandrasekaran could rely on any representations made before 14 June 2013.
There is a suggestion or hint in the pleading of one other cause of action against the State, being a cause of action in negligence. That suggestion or hint arises because it is alleged, in connection with the allegations concerning the reliance on the false expert witness report in the Supreme Court proceeding, that the Crown Solicitor’s Office and NSW Health breached a duty of care they owed to Dr Chandrasekaran: FASC [23]. There is, however, no indication of the alleged basis upon which it is alleged that any such a duty of care was owed. The contention that a solicitor owes a duty of care to the opposing party in litigation would appear to have little or no merit. Nor is there any proper allegation or particularisation of the alleged breach of the duty of care in the circumstances.
Counsel for Dr Chandrasekaran made a last-minute submission that there was a pleaded cause of action under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law, being Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). That submission was, to say the very least, both brazen and desperate. Putting aside the obvious absence of any reference to that statutory provision in the pleading, there is nothing in the pleading to suggest that any of the conduct allegedly engaged in by the State was engaged “in trade or commerce”. It is not alleged that any allegedly false statement made by the State or anyone employed by it was made in trade or commerce. Nor, not surprisingly, is it alleged that the allegedly false expert witness report was somehow employed in trade or commerce.
Counsel for Dr Chandrasekaran did not contend that there was any other cause of action against the State. He expressly disavowed any contention that the allegations concerning the allegedly false expert witness report gave rise to any cause of action involving fraud or deceit, despite the reference to fraud in the pleading.
Factual allegations against AC3
It would appear to be essentially uncontentious that AC3 had, at the relevant time, been retained to provide services to certain departments or agencies of the State, including the Department of Communities and Justice. Those services include managing the computer networks of the Crown Solicitor’s Office and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The factual allegations made against AC3 by Dr Chandrasekaran must be considered in that context.
The central allegation against AC3 would appear to be, in substance, that AC3 somehow received Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidential information and then disclosed it to third parties without Dr Chandrasekaran’s authority. That allegation is pleaded in both specific and general terms.
The specific allegation concerns an email that Dr Chandrasekaran sent to the Medical Council in June 2019: FASC [27]-[29]. Dr Chandrasekaran alleges that the Medical Council “transferred” that email to AC3 “for reward” and AC3 thereby become a bailee for reward of that “intangible property”: FASC [30]-[31]. That in turn allegedly gave rise to a duty of care that AC3 owed to Dr Chandrasekaran not to “damage the intangible property” by disclosing it to third parties without her authority: FASC [32]. It is alleged that, in breach of that duty, AC3 disclosed the email on 56 separate occasions between 21 June 2019 and 13 July 2019: FASC [33]. That allegedly caused Dr Chandrasekaran to suffer significant loss and damage, including harm to her reputation, stress and disappointment and loss of personal safety, privacy and well-being: FASC [34].
It is important to emphasise at this juncture that the particulars of the alleged breach of duty by AC3 which are included in the pleading refer to certain paragraphs of an affidavit sworn by Dr Chandrasekaran. It is readily apparent from those paragraphs of the affidavit that Dr Chandrasekaran’s case that AC3 received her email and forwarded it on to others is entirely reliant on the fact that IP addresses associated with AC3 appear in a report prepared by her which purports to trace the occasions that this email was accessed. As discussed in more detail later in these reasons, AC3 adduced affidavit evidence in support of its summary dismissal application which provided an entirely innocent explanation for the fact that one of its IP addresses may appear in Dr Chandrasekaran’s report.
The general allegation against AC3 is that since 21 June 2019, AC3 has received further “personal, confidential, private and/or privileged information” of Dr Chandrasekaran and disclosed that information to third parties “in breach of duty and without the consent or authority of [Dr Chandrasekaran]”: FASC [36]. It is alleged that Dr Chandrasekaran has suffered, and continues to suffer, loss and damage from that alleged breach of duty.
The following points should be made concerning that general allegation. First, no particulars whatsoever are provided of the “further information” that Dr Chandrasekaran alleges AC3 received after 21 June 2019. There are also no particulars whatsoever of the “third parties” to whom AC3 is alleged to have disclosed the unspecified information, or of the loss and damage allegedly suffered by Dr Chandrasekaran as a result of the alleged disclosures.
Dr Chandrasekaran also relies on an additional or alternative factual allegation against AC3. This allegation, which was alluded to earlier in the context of the factual allegations against the Commonwealth, is both serious and somewhat bizarre. Dr Chandrasekaran alleges that AC3 “by its servants or agents” intercepts Dr Chandrasekaran’s email communications pursuant to an agreement it has with Defence for and on behalf of the Commonwealth: FASC [38]. The terms of that agreement would appear to be that Defence has granted AC3 “permission to access [Dr Chandrasekaran’s] communications in tandem with and alongside other cloud providers”: FASC [39].
Particulars of the alleged agreement and the means by which AC3 accesses Dr Chandrasekaran’s emails are provided in the pleading, but even the most cursory analysis of those particulars reveals that they comprise little more than a series of sweeping and bald assertions that are, at best, speculative. It is, for example, asserted that the agreement includes “verbal or written contractual agreements” the details of which “cannot be known until discovery”: FASC [39] particular (d). It is also readily apparent that Dr Chandrasekaran has no evidence of the interception of her emails because that access is said to be “automated and based on an algorithm” which uses “bots” and occurs “upstream” with the result that the interceptions do not appear on the “IP logs” of her email accounts: FASC [39] particulars (a) and (h). No particulars of the emails said to have been intercepted in this way are provided.
Dr Chandrasekaran alleges that AC3’s conduct in intercepting her emails as alleged has caused her to suffer loss and damage “through emotional trauma, violation, sabotage to her activities in trade to cause loss of income, employment and livelihood”: FASC [40]. Needless to say, no proper particulars of that loss or damage are provided.
Causes of action pleaded against AC3
There would appear to be only one cause of action pleaded against AC3. That cause of action is either an action in bailment or an action in negligence for breach of the duty of care said to arise as a result of AC3’s position as a bailee for reward of Dr Chandrasekaran’s intangible property. It is alleged that AC3 breached that duty of care by disclosing the intangible property to third parties. The damage allegedly suffered as a result of the breach would appear to be damage to Dr Chandrasekaran’s reputation, as well as stress and disappointment. It does not appear to be alleged that the intangible property said to be the subject of the bailment was itself damaged.
The observations made earlier about the similar cause of action in bailment, or in negligence arising from a bailment, alleged against the Commonwealth apply equally to this cause of action alleged against AC3. The viability or availability of the cause of action will be discussed in more detail later.
There does not appear to be any pleaded cause of action arising from the factual allegations concerning AC3’s accessing of Dr Chandrasekaran’s emails pursuant to its agreement with Defence.
OTHER PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BY DR CHANDRASEKARAN
It is necessary to give some brief consideration to the other proceedings that Dr Chandrasekaran has commenced against various bodies or entities in both this Court and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. That is because, as will be seen, there are significant parallels between those proceedings and this proceeding, particularly in relation to the nature of the allegations and the relief sought. Most significantly, there would appear to be a common substratum of factual allegations against many of the same individuals that form the basis of the relief sought in the proceedings. Indeed, the allegations which are the subject of this proceeding could perhaps be characterised as an expansion and escalation of the allegations which were first made in the other proceedings. The timing of the commencement of this proceeding also tends to suggest that it was prompted by difficulties that Dr Chandrasekaran was experiencing in the other proceedings.
Dr Chandrasekaran first commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court in the first half of 2018. The defendants to that proceeding were the Western Sydney Local Health District and a private company, Charterhouse Medical Pty Limited. The main focus of that proceeding, when first commenced at least, was the alleged termination of Dr Chandrasekaran’s employment by, or the termination of the arrangements pursuant to which she provided services to, Westmead Hospital, a hospital administered by the Western Sydney Local Health District. Significantly, however, Dr Chandrasekaran soon sought to escalate the proceedings to include both the Medical Council and the State. That came about because, following the termination of her services, a complaint against Dr Chandrasekaran was lodged with the Medical Council. That complaint led to a condition being imposed on her registration, that condition being that she not practise medicine. It would appear that Dr Chandrasekaran sought to challenge the Medical Council’s imposition of the condition on her registration and sought to pursue the persons who she considered to be responsible for the complaint that led to that action by the Medical Council.
By November 2018, Dr Chandrasekaran’s statement of claim in the Supreme Court proceeding had undergone a number of revisions and amendments. It is unnecessary to discuss the allegations made by Dr Chandrasekaran in the Supreme Court proceedings in any great detail. It suffices to note that the allegations included allegations against various doctors that they had breached Dr Chandrasekaran’s confidence and misused or disclosed her personal information, made misleading or deceptive statements about her and made vexatious complaints about her to AHPRA and the Medical Council. Many of those doctors were the same doctors that featured in either the affidavits filed by Dr Chandrasekaran in support of her interlocutory application in this matter, or in earlier iterations of the pleadings in this matter. In addition, as noted earlier, the allegation in this proceeding that the Crown Solicitor’s Office relied on a “falsified expert witness report” (FASC [23]) is also relied on in the Supreme Court proceeding.
Dr Chandrasekaran filed an application to join the Medical Council and the State to her action in the Supreme Court in March 2019. That application was dismissed on 15 May 2019: Chandrasekaran v Western Sydney Local Health District (No 7) [2019] NSWSC 567. This proceeding, which also involves serious allegations against the Medical Council and the State, or doctors said to be employed by the Medical Council and the State, was commenced within a matter of weeks of Dr Chandrasekaran’s failed attempt to join those parties in the proceeding in the Supreme Court.
At the hearing of the summary dismissal applications, Dr Chandrasekaran’s counsel effectively conceded that there was a relevant overlap between the Supreme Court proceeding and this proceeding. He accepted, in those circumstances, that there was a proper basis for the Court to order that this proceeding be temporarily stayed pending the outcome of the proceeding in the Supreme Court. It was not, however, conceded that a permanent stay was appropriate.
Dr Chandrasekaran commenced the other proceedings in this Court, NSD 1535 of 2018, by filing an originating application on 21 August 2018. The respondent was the College. On 16 October 2019, Flick J effectively acceded to an application by the College to summarily dismiss the proceeding: Chandrasekaran v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2019] FCA 1687 (Chandrasekaran v College). His Honour ordered Dr Chandrasekaran to pay the College’s costs and ordered that, if those costs were paid, Dr Chandrasekaran could, within 28 days, file an application seeking leave to file a statement of claim certified by counsel. The orders made by Flick J also provided that if no such application was filed, judgment was to be entered in favour of the College pursuant to s 31A of the FCA Act and r 26.01 of the Rules.
The main reason given by Flick J for effectively summarily dismissing the claim was “the absence of any satisfactory specificity in the cause or causes of action sought to be pursued by Dr Chandrasekaran and, even more fundamentally, the absence of any clearly articulated basis upon which Dr Chandrasekaran sought to attribute liability to the College”: Chandrasekaran v College at [4]. That “fundamental difficulty” had “plagued the proceeding from the outset”: Chandrasekaran v College at [4]. Needless to say, much the same could be said about this proceeding. His Honour concluded, in effect, that in those circumstances it would be “an abuse of process to allow the matter to proceed to hearing”: Chandrasekaran v College at [9].
It would appear that Dr Chandrasekaran did not pay the College’s costs and did not file an interlocutory application seeking leave to file a statement of claim certified by counsel. Instead, she filed an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal. That application was dismissed on 19 February 2020: Chandrasekaran v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2020] FCA 214.
It is readily apparent that the substratum of facts and allegations that Dr Chandrasekaran sought to rely on in her case against the College are the same as, or at least overlap substantially with, the facts and allegations relied on by Dr Chandrasekaran in this proceeding. This was again effectively conceded by Dr Chandrasekaran’s counsel at the hearing of the summary judgment application. The overlap is, in any event, obvious.
Dr Chandrasekaran’s claim against the College was based on allegations against various psychiatrists “[s]ince 2012”. As has already been noted, the allegations in this proceeding also date from 2012. The allegations made against the psychiatrists in her claim against the College included that they would: repeat the same sentences “in a manner intended to humiliate and ridicule”; illegally and unlawfully access Dr Chandrasekaran’s communications; slander her; engage in “cyberstalking” and “gaslighting”; physically stalk her; and break and enter into her residence and car: see Chandrasekaran v College at [10], [28], [32]-[35], [40]-[42], [66]-[67]. It would appear that the evidence relied on by Dr Chandrasekaran in her proceedings against the College specifically referred to the same doctors who feature in her allegations in this matter, including Dr Boman, Dr Stephen Jurd, Dr Andrew Pethebridge, Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Saretta Lee.
Dr Chandrasekaran also alleged in her affidavits filed in her proceedings against the College that the College or the relevant psychiatrists, or someone else, had entered into a conspiracy with the “Australian Signals Directorate or ASIO or Department of Defence” with the “intention to victimise [Dr Chandrasekaran] and push her out of the profession” and to harm her “psychologically, physically, socially and financially”: Chandrasekaran v College at [66]-[67]. Those actions were said to have been made possible “through a third party/agency through identity fraud relating to terrorism”. Thus, it would appear that while the Commonwealth was not a party to the proceeding Dr Chandrasekaran commenced against the College, the allegations made by her in that proceeding included that Commonwealth entities or agencies had engaged in conduct which somehow facilitated the conduct of the psychiatrists upon which the proceeding focussed.
Orders will be made that judgment be entered against the applicant and that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty-nine (189) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wigney. Associate:
Dated: 11 November 2020
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