Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 481  

File number: NSD 1262 of 2020
Judgment of: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 10 May 2021
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary judgment – application for leave to appeal – leave refused – decision not attendant with sufficient doubt

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious and embarrassing pleadings – failure to plead material facts – failure to plead material facts of relevance to causes of action

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for reconstitution of the Court – application rejected

Legislation:

Evidence Act1995 (Cth) s 79

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) ss 24, 31A

Cases cited:

ACE Insurance Ltd v Trifunovski [2012] FCA 235, (2012) 291 ALR 46

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170

BIX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1116, (2017) 72 AAR 569

Brilliant Digital Entertainment Pty Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 270, (2004) 63 IPR 373

Cash’s (Australia) Pty Ltd v Foster’s Australia Ltd [2013] FCA 695

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 1490

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1169

Chandrasekaran v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2019] FCA 1687

Chandrasekaran v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists (No 2) [2019] FCA 1028

Clenae Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1999] VSCA 35, (1999) 2 VR 573

Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs(Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525

Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network, G.P [2009] FCA 1446

Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 158, (2009) 229 ALR 566

Khondoker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 654

Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388

NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 77, 228 CLR 470

National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation (1988) 19 FCR 155

Nyoni v Chee Koon Hee (No 2) [2014] FCA 83

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 4) [2012] FCA 1170, (2012) 208 FCR 128

Petroulias v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 795, (2011) 84 ATR 110

Rana v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 189

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342

Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc [2013] FCAFC 138

Sandhurst Trustees Limited v Clarke [2015] FCAFC 21, (2015) 321 ALR 1

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28, (2010) 241 CLR 118

SZSKO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 105

SZTKB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 653

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of…
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 481
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia involved the plaintiff, Dr Chandrasekaran, pursuing legal action against the Commonwealth of Australia, which was represented by the Minister for Health, the Commonwealth of Australia and AC3, a company. The plaintiff alleged various causes of action including negligence, breach of statutory duty, and breach of contract, stemming from her employment with AC3, a Commonwealth-owned corporation. The dispute was adjudicated by the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary judge granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's claims.

The legal issues in the case revolved around whether the plaintiff's pleadings were sufficient to support her causes of action and whether the court should have granted her an opportunity to further amend her pleadings before entering summary judgment. The primary judge considered the plaintiff's multiple attempts to amend her statements of claim, noting that each version was increasingly deficient in particulars and substance. The court also assessed whether the plaintiff's continued pursuit of her causes of action constituted an abuse of process.

The court concluded that the plaintiff's pleadings, even after multiple amendments, remained inadequate and speculative, lacking the necessary particulars to support her claims. The primary judge found no reason to doubt the correctness of the initial decision to grant summary judgment, as the plaintiff had had ample opportunity to properly plead her case. The court further reasoned that allowing further amendments would not likely result in a viable pleading and would amount to an abuse of process. The application for leave to appeal was refused, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendants' costs.

The court rejected the application to reconstitute the panel and upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's proceeding. The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, and the final orders included rejecting the application for reconstitution, refusing leave to appeal, dismissing the proceeding, and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application that the Court be reconstituted is rejected.

2. Leave to appeal is refused.

3. The proceeding is dismissed.

4. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondents, either as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves Dr Chandrasekaran, who filed multiple statements of claim against the Commonwealth of Australia, the State, and AC3. The initial Statement of Claim was dated 12 August 2019, followed by an Amended Statement of Claim on 9 September 2019. A Further Amended Statement of Claim was filed on 15 November 2019 and a variant on 20 November 2019. The pleadings were repeatedly found to be deficient and inadequately particularised, leading to multiple applications for summary judgment or to strike out the claims. The primary judge considered whether Dr Chandrasekaran should be afforded a further opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in her pleadings, but ultimately concluded that it would be unlikely to achieve a better result.

The matter came before the court following multiple applications for summary judgment and to strike out the claims. The first hearing was held on 11 November 2019 and was subsequently adjourned to 4 March 2020. Dr Chandrasekaran applied for an adjournment to enable her counsel to draft a further amended statement of claim. Despite the filing of the further amended statement of claim, the Commonwealth, the State, and AC3 maintained their applications for summary dismissal or striking out the pleading. The primary judge considered the issue of whether Dr Chandrasekaran should be granted a further opportunity to amend her pleadings before ultimately deciding to enter summary judgment.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Again, the conclusions reached by the primary Judge expose no reason to doubt their correctness – including the conclusion that the continued pursuit of those causes of action would constitute an abuse of process. Little point is served by seeking to express in different terms the reasons and conclusions of the primary Judge. Concurrence is expressed with those reasons and conclusions. Summary judgment v liberty to re-plead But such reasons and conclusions leave open for resolution a question as to whether Dr Chandrasekaran should have been afforded a further opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in her pleadings as filed. One option open to a primary judge, when confronted with circumstances in which the then form of pleading is manifestly deficient, is to consider whether the appropriate way forward is to grant liberty to re-plead as opposed to entering summary judgment. Chronologically, the sequence of the pleadings was (in very summary form) as follows: ·the initial Statement of Claim was dated 12 August 2019; ·the Amended Statement of Claim was dated 9 September 2019; and ·the Further Amended Statement of Claim was dated 15 November 2019, with a further variant being dated 20 November 2019. The one dated 15 November 2019 was expressed to have been “prepared by Mr Peter King, lawyer”, albeit signed by another lawyer (Mr Davis); the one dated 20 November 2019 was expressed to have been “prepared by Mark Davis, lawyer”, and bore his signature. The first hearing before the primary Judge was held on 11 November 2019 and thereafter being adjourned to 4 March 2020. The question as to whether a further opportunity should be afforded to permit Dr Chandrasekaran to further amend her pleadings was a matter that occupied the attention of the primary Judge, as is self-evident from his Honour’s reasons (at para [174]). One of the submissions presently relied upon by Dr Chandrasekaran is that the Further Amended Statement of Claim was nevertheless recognised as a pleading in need of further amendment and that the primary Judge erred in not affording her a further opportunity to re-plead. The Further Amended Statement of Claim, as noted as follows by the primary Judge, followed upon the adjournment of the scheduled hearing in order to enable Dr Chandrasekaran’s Counsel the opportunity to draft or at least have an input into a proposed amendment: [20] Shortly prior to the hearing of the interlocutory applications, Dr Chandrasekaran applied for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that her counsel was said to be overseas. This was the first indication that Dr Chandrasekaran was legally represented. The hearing of the applications to summarily dismiss the proceeding or strike out the amended statement of claim were in due course adjourned, essentially on the basis that Dr Chandrasekaran had secured legal representation and that her counsel foreshadowed an application for leave to further amend the pleading. Dr Chandrasekaran’s lawyer advised the Court that the proposed further amended pleading would be significantly narrower and confined than the amended statement of claim. It was tolerably clear that, in applying for leave to amend in the face of the summary dismissal and strike out applications, Dr Chandrasekaran, through her lawyer, effectively conceded that the existing amended statement of claim was defective and liable to be struck out.[21] As foreshadowed, Dr Chandrasekaran eventually furnished a further amended statement of claim (FASC) which purported to be prepared and certified by a lawyer. The Commonwealth, the State and AC3 each ultimately adopted an eminently sensible and practical approach to Dr Chandrasekaran’s amendment application. They did not oppose Dr Chandrasekaran being granted leave to amend and leave to file the proposed further amended statement of claim, though their non-opposition to that course was expressed to be strictly on the basis that they would maintain or renew their applications for summary dismissal or the striking out of the pleading, albeit on the basis of the new pleading. In short, they maintained that many of the defects and deficiencies which were said to be inherent in Dr Chandrasekaran’s amended statement of claim and the proceeding generally had not been remedied by the filing of the further amended statement of claim.His Honour then proceeded as follows to consider the utility in granting a further opportunity to amend as opposed to the course of entering summary judgment: [134] Dr Chandrasekaran was made aware at the very outset, when her interlocutory application was dismissed in Chandrasekaran No 1, that her attempts to rely on broad and inadequately particularised allegations, supported by nothing more than her bald assertions and speculation, would most likely be unsuccessful. She has had ample opportunities to correct this manifest deficiency. The current pleading is Dr Chandrasekaran’s fourth attempt to plead her case properly. It is the first pleading that was supposedly drafted and certified by a legal practitioner. It is, with the greatest respect to the lawyers said to be responsible for the drafting, certification and defence of the current pleading, difficult to see how any competent lawyer could associate himself or herself with it. If anything, the current pleading is even more devoid of adequate particulars than its previous iterations, though it is at least shorter and narrower in compass and scope. There is, in all the circumstances, absolutely no basis for thinking that giving Dr Chandrasekaran or her lawyers a further opportunity to attempt to plead her case would be likely to achieve any better result.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court found that the primary Judge's conclusions on the correctness of the summary judgment and the futility of allowing further amendments to the pleadings were not attended with sufficient doubt. The Court expressed concurrence with the primary Judge's reasons and conclusions, including the conclusion that the continued pursuit of the causes of action would constitute an abuse of process. However, the Court considered the question of whether Dr Chandrasekaran should have been afforded a further opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in her pleadings. The Court acknowledged that one option open to a primary judge, when confronted with manifestly deficient pleadings, is to consider whether the appropriate way forward is to grant liberty to re-plead as opposed to entering summary judgment. The primary Judge had considered this option and concluded that there was no basis for thinking that giving Dr Chandrasekaran or her lawyers a further opportunity to attempt to plead her case would be likely to achieve any better result. The Court agreed with this conclusion and found that the application for reconstitution of the Court should be rejected. The Court also found that the application for leave to appeal should be refused as the decision was not attended with sufficient doubt. Finally, the Court dismissed the proceeding and ordered that the Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondents, either as taxed or agreed. The Court noted that the entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.