Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1169

File number: NSD 974 of 2019
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 3 July 2019
Date of publication of reasons:  2 August 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application – application for urgent ex parte interlocutory relief for injunctions – application for Anton Piller search order against third party to proceeding – application for leave to issue subpoena to third party – where application for ex parte relief has no merit – consideration of principles relating to search orders – where requirements for Anton Piller search order not met – where search order sought against third party to proceedings – where application for leave to issue subpoena to third party dismissed.
Legislation:

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Telecommunications Act 1996 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 7.42, Div 7.5

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (NSW)

Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Limited (1976) Ch 55

Long v Specifier Publications Pty Limited (1998) 44 NSWLR 545

Metso Minerals Limited v Kalra (No. 3) [2008] FCA 1201

Microsoft Corporation v Goodview Electronics Pty Limited [1999] FCA 754; 46 IPR 159

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple (2011) 217 FCR 238

Television Broadcasts Limited v Nguyen (1988) 21 FCR 3

Date of hearing: 3 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: The Second and Third Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

NSD 974 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SUJATHA CHANDRASEKARAN

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for interlocutory injunctions referred to in the Originating Application dated 14 June 2019 be dismissed.

2.The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 June 2019 be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

  1. The applicant, Dr Sujatha Chandrasekaran, has applied for urgent ex parte interlocutory relief against the respondents, the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of New South Wales.  The relief sought by Dr Chandrasekaran includes injunctions restraining the respondents from engaging in a very broad range of conduct against or in respect of her.  Dr Chandrasekaran has also filed an interlocutory application seeking an Anton Piller or search order in respect of the premises of the Australian Centre for Advanced Computing and Communication (ACACC), as well as leave to issue a subpoena to that company. 

  2. For the reasons that follow, Dr Chandrasekaran’s ex parte application for interlocutory injunctions and a search order has no merit and must be dismissed.

    THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS

  3. On…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1169
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia was a case before the Federal Court of Australia, in which Dr Chandrasekaran sought urgent ex parte interlocutory relief for injunctions and an Anton Piller search order against a third party to the proceedings, as well as leave to issue a subpoena to the third party. The primary focus of the case was on the application for ex parte relief, specifically whether an Anton Piller search order should be granted against a third party and whether leave should be granted to issue a subpoena to the third party. The case hinged on whether the stringent requirements for an Anton Piller order were met, particularly in the context of a third party not directly involved in the litigation.

The court had to determine whether the requirements for an Anton Piller search order were satisfied. This included whether there was a real and substantial risk that evidence would be destroyed or concealed, whether the application was made promptly, and whether there was a serious question to be tried. The court also had to consider whether the application was made in good faith and whether the relief was proportionate to the gravity of the situation. Given that the application was made against a third party, the court examined whether the principles of natural justice and fairness were observed.

The court found that the application for ex parte relief had no merit. It concluded that the stringent requirements for an Anton Piller search order were not met, particularly as the application was against a third party. The court emphasised the importance of meeting the high threshold for such orders and noted that the application did not adequately demonstrate a real and substantial risk of evidence being destroyed or concealed. Furthermore, the court found that the application was not made in good faith and that the potential prejudice to the third party outweighed any potential benefit. Consequently, the application for leave to issue a subpoena to the third party was also dismissed.

The court's decision was final, and the orders made were that the applicant's application for interlocutory injunctions and her interlocutory application be dismissed. The case underscores the importance of meeting the strict criteria for obtaining an Anton Piller order, especially in cases involving third parties, and highlights the need for applications to be made promptly and in good faith.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for interlocutory injunctions referred to in the Originating Application dated 14 June 2019 be dismissed.

2. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 June 2019 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Dr Chandrasekaran, a psychiatrist, filed an originating application against the Commonwealth of Australia, alleging that a counterintelligence program run by Commonwealth agencies facilitated harassment, bullying, intimidation, and other unlawful conduct against her by other psychiatrists and individuals. The allegations pertain to potential contraventions of various acts, including the Telecommunications Act, the Privacy Act, the Surveillance Devices Act, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, and the Criminal Code. The claim is partly related to a previous proceeding against the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists. On 27 June 2019, Dr Chandrasekaran filed an interlocutory application seeking an Anton Piller search order against ACACC, a third party to the proceeding, and leave to issue a subpoena to ACACC for the production of documents and evidence. This application was supported by two affidavits: the main affidavit filed with the originating application and a search order affidavit filed with the interlocutory application.

This case involves an interlocutory application filed by Dr Chandrasekaran seeking urgent ex parte interlocutory relief, including an Anton Piller search order and leave to issue a subpoena to a third party. The matter was heard by the court, which had to decide on the merits of the application for ex parte relief and the dismissal of the interlocutory application. The court examined the principles relating to search orders and whether the requirements for an Anton Piller search order were met. Additionally, the court considered whether the search order should be granted against a third party and whether leave to issue a subpoena to that third party should be granted.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 27 June 2019, Dr Chandrasekaran filed an interlocutory application. As already adverted to in that interlocutory application, Dr Chandrasekaran applied for a search order against ACACC and sought leave to issue a subpoena to that company which would require it to not only produce documents but also to give evidence.EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERLOCUTORY RELIEF Dr Chandrasekaran relied on two affidavits in support of the interlocutory relief sought by her. The first affidavit, affirmed on 14 June 2019, is the affidavit which she filed together with the originating application. I will refer to that affidavit as the main affidavit. Dr Chandrasekaran filed a second affidavit, affirmed by her on 27 June 2019, in support of her interlocutory application for the search order. I will refer to that affidavit as the search order affidavit. The main affidavit is itself a very lengthy affidavit. It annexes three earlier affidavits affirmed by Dr Chandrasekaran which appear to have been prepared for and perhaps filed in other proceedings which Dr Chandrasekaran has commenced in this Court. Those proceedings are against the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists (NSD 1535 of 2018 proceeding). I will refer to those three annexed affidavits as affidavit A, affidavit B and affidavit C, which is the terminology used by Dr Chandrasekaran in her affidavit. Those three affidavits are dated 30 November 2018, 5 June 2019 and 24 May 2019 respectively. Affidavits B and C annex a large number of documentary exhibits, with the result that the main affidavit exceeds 200 pages in length. It would appear from affidavits A, B and C that Dr Chandrasekaran is a psychiatrist. Her action against the College involves serious allegations that she has, for many years, been subjected to harassment, bullying, intimidation and other forms of unlawful and tortious conduct by other psychiatrists and other persons with whom she worked or had some other form of professional association. It would also appear that these proceedings relate in some way to, or perhaps even emanate from, the NSD 1535 of 2018 proceeding. That is because it would appear that the essence of the claim that Dr Chandrasekaran wishes to advance in this proceeding against the Commonwealth is that the harassment, intimidation and breaches of privacy that she has suffered at the hands of others has somehow been facilitated or assisted by a counterintelligence program run by Commonwealth agencies, including the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation. It is the alleged utilisation of those counterintelligence programs that Dr Chandrasekaran claims constitute contraventions by the Commonwealth of the Telecommunications Act, the Privacy Act, the Surveillance Devices Act, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law and the Criminal Code. Dr Chandrasekaran also appears to allege that the Commonwealth and its agencies somehow became involved in the various forms of unlawful conduct against her at the behest of a particular doctor, who is said to have some current or former association with the Australian Defence Force.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the application for interlocutory injunctions referred to in the Originating Application dated 14 June 2019 should be dismissed.
2. Whether the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 June 2019 should be dismissed.

Held
The court concluded that the application for interlocutory injunctions referred to in the Originating Application dated 14 June 2019 should be dismissed. The court also held that the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 27 June 2019 should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In deciding whether to grant interlocutory injunctions, the court considered the principles relating to search orders as outlined in the case of *Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh* (1995) 183 CLR 273. The court noted that for an Anton Piller search order to be granted, three cumulative conditions must be met: there must be a serious question to be tried, there must be clear evidence pointing to the presence of documents or things on the premises to be searched, and there is a real risk that the documents or things may be destroyed if the order is not granted. The court found that Dr Chandrasekaran's application did not meet these requirements, particularly because the search order was sought against a third party, the Australian Commission on Accreditation of Coronary Angiography and Cardiac Catheterisation (ACACC), which was not directly involved in the proceedings. The court emphasised that an Anton Piller search order is typically granted against a party to the proceedings, not a third party.

Further, the court held that the application for leave to issue a subpoena to ACACC was also without merit. The court noted that Dr Chandrasekaran’s affidavits did not provide sufficient grounds to justify such an intrusive order against a third party. The court also dismissed the application for an urgent ex parte injunction, finding that Dr Chandrasekaran had not demonstrated the urgency or necessity required to warrant such relief without notice to the other parties involved. The court concluded that Dr Chandrasekaran's applications were speculative and did not satisfy the stringent criteria necessary for the grant of such interlocutory relief.