Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network, G.P [2009] FCA 1446

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal indemnity costs order – whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay – whether there are sufficient prospects of success if leave were granted – whether there are ‘special reasons’ to justify the extension of time

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – indemnity costs order as a result of a Court ordered mediation being abandoned – whether the Court has the power to order one party pay the costs of the other party in these circumstances

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules, O 52 r 10, O 52 r 10(2A), O 52 r 15(2)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802
Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network G.P [2009] FCA 1445
SZJFC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1322
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225
Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229
Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608
Wu v Avin Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 792

FOOD CHANNEL NETWORK PTY LTD ACN 079 015 339 v TELEVISION FOOD NETWORK, G.P

QUD 132 of 2009 

REEVES J
4 DECEMBER 2009
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 132 of 2009

BETWEEN:

FOOD CHANNEL NETWORK PTY LTD ACN 079 015 339
Applicant

AND:

TELEVISION FOOD NETWORK, G.P
Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be granted an extension of time to 5 June 2009 in which to file its application for leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment delivered 5 February 2008.

2.The applicant be granted leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment delivered on 5 February 2008.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 132 of 2009

BETWEEN:

FOOD CHANNEL NETWORK PTY LTD ACN 079 015 339
Applicant

AND:

TELEVISION FOOD NETWORK, G.P
Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE:

4 DECEMBER 2009

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 5 June 2009, Food Channel Network Pty Ltd (“Channel”) filed an application under O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules seeking leave to file and serve a notice of appeal out of time against an order made on 5 February 2008.  On that date, the primary judge ordered that Channel pay Television Network G.P’s (“Television”) costs thrown away, on an indemnity basis, as a result of a Court ordered mediation being abandoned.

    APPLICATION…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1446
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP, the applicant, Food Channel Network Pty Ltd, sought an extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment made by the primary judge in the Federal Court. The interlocutory judgment involved an order for indemnity costs against the applicant, which arose from the applicant's failure to attend a mediation conference. The applicant argued that the primary judge should have granted an extension of time for filing the application for leave to appeal, and that the appeal should be allowed on the basis that the interlocutory judgment was incorrect and that the applicant had a substantial case on appeal.

The court considered whether the applicant had met the conditions for granting an extension of time and leave to appeal. The court noted that the applicant's case was strong on its merits and that substantial injustice would flow if leave was not granted. The court also noted that the explanation for the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal was reasonable, and that the applicant had shown special reasons for the delay. The court held that the applicant had met the conditions for granting an extension of time and leave to appeal.

The court also considered whether the primary judge had the power to order that one party pay the costs of another party in relation to a consensual mediation. The court held that the Court did have the power to make such an order, and that it was consistent with public policy to do so. The court held that the primary judge had not acted upon any wrong principle in making the indemnity costs order.

The court granted the applicant an extension of time to file its application for leave to appeal, and granted the applicant leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment. The court held that the primary judge had the power to order that one party pay the costs of another party in relation to a consensual mediation, and that it was consistent with public policy to do so. The court held that the primary judge had not acted upon any wrong principle in making the indemnity costs order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted an extension of time to 5 June 2009 in which to file its application for leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment delivered 5 February 2008.

2. The applicant be granted leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment delivered on 5 February 2008.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

As to the second condition (above), I explained in Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network G.P [2009] FCA 1445, that the sufficiency of the doubt about the interlocutory judgment and the extent of the potential injustice involved, must be balanced against each other and not considered in isolation: see at [14]. For similar reasons, I consider that the explanation for the delay and the requirement to show special reasons should also be included in the same balancing process. In other words, if Channel’s case is strong on its merits and if it can show substantial injustice will flow if leave is not granted, I consider I should be less demanding in relation to its explanation for delay and the special reasons it is required to show. In this respect, I note, and respectfully agree with, what appears to be a similar approach, outlined by Rares J in SZJFC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1322 at [20] – [21].FACTUAL BACKGROUND Before turning to consider whether Channel has met these conditions, it is appropriate to set out some of the factual background to illuminate the circumstances in which the indemnity costs order was made. The substantive proceedings before the primary judge involved an appeal by Television against a decision of a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks in favour of Channel. The delegate found that Television had not substantiated its grounds of opposition in respect of the Trade Mark and ordered that the Trade Mark proceed to registration under the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth). Mr Lawrence, the sole director of Channel, was given leave to appear for Channel at various case management directions hearings conducted throughout 2007. However, the primary judge had made it clear to Mr Lawrence that this leave would not extend to him appearing for Channel at any pre-trial mediation, or at the trial of the proceedings, and he would need to retain legal assistance for those purposes. On 30 November 2007, the primary judge ordered the parties “to attend, participate in and act reasonably and genuinely in a mediation to be conducted at a time and place to be agreed between the parties”. The primary judge also ordered that “the mediation [was] to be conducted by a Registrar of the Court or such other mediator as agreed between the parties” and it was to occur by 4.00 pm on 13 February 2008. On 7 December 2007, a Registrar of the Court sent a letter to the parties confirming the direction of the primary judge that they attend a mediation conference, stating it was to be conducted “pursuant to Order 72 of the Federal Court Rules”, and giving notice that the mediation conference had been listed at 9.30 am on 22 January 2007 (sic 2008). Channel alleges that it did not receive this letter, claiming it was sent to the wrong address. Apparently it was later returned to the Court unclaimed. On 22 January 2008, the same Registrar sent a further letter to the parties. This letter did not refer to O 72 of the Federal Court Rules, nor the mediation conference that was supposed to have occurred at 9.30 am on the date of this letter. Instead, it noted that the “mediation is to be conducted by a Registrar of the Court or such other mediator as agreed between the parties”. The letter went on to state: “It has been assumed, in the absence of advice to the contrary, that the parties require the mediation to be undertaken by a Registrar. To that end, a mediation conference has been listed for 10.00 am on 4 February 2007 (sic 2008)”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

REEVES J
There is a further aspect of this matter, not specifically raised by counsel for either party, but one that I think involves a more fundamental question about this costs order. That is whether the Court has power to order, and if it does, whether it is consistent with public policy, for a court to order that one party to proceedings pay the costs of another party, in relation to a consensual mediation (albeit one ordered by the Court) conducted as an adjunct to those proceedings.CONCLUSION For these reasons, I order that:·Channel be granted an extension of time to 5 June 2009 in which to file its application for leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment delivered 5 February 2008.·Channel be granted leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment delivered on 5 February 2008.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: REEVES J

Having heard these submissions, the primary judge proceeded to give the following ex tempore reasons and then made the orders sought by Mr Bennett:… Frankly, from what I have heard this morning I am in complete agreement with Mr Bennett. I had made it very clear to Mr Lawrence of the importance of having representation. The fact that he has taken those urgings which I sort of made to him and those orders which I indeed made to him to heart somewhat late in the piece is hardly the problem of the applicants. I had given him leave to appear, [for] the purpose of the directions previously [and] it was [made] very clear to him he needed representation including at the mediation. I also made it very clear from my last orders on 30 November that the parties were directed to attend a mediation in good faith and to participate reasonably. The fact that Mr Lawrence have left it so late to advise that they really weren’t ready for a mediation again is not the problem of the applicants.If the applicants have sought to engage senior counsel ordinarily I would be somewhat persuaded that, questionable whether senior counsel is necessary but I have heard what Mr Bennett has said in this case. It is not uncommon to have senior counsel in a mediation. I am prepared to make the order sought by Mr Bennet (sic) in those circumstances.MATTERS CENTRAL TO CONSIDERATION OF CHANNEL’S APPLICATION Bearing in mind the comments I have made above (at [5]) about the importance of the strength of the merits and the extent of the injustice involved, I will proceed to consider those matters first. Before doing so, I set out below three observations that I consider are central to my consideration of Channel’s application. First, a court should be careful to avoid converting a leave application of this kind into a preliminary hearing of the appeal. I should therefore avoid making any detailed analysis of the issues raised, or expressing any concluded views on them. I consider my assessment of the issues should be more akin to the “rough and ready” approach suggested by Brennan CJ and McHugh J in Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [9]. Secondly, the indemnity costs order made by the primary judge was a discretionary order and it follows that, in order for Channel to succeed on any appeal against such an order, it must show that the primary judge acted upon some wrong principle in making the order: see House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. Thirdly, an indemnity costs order involves a departure from the usual position that costs are awarded on a party/party basis. It follows that there must be some special or unusual features to justify such an order being made: Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 232 – 233 per Sheppard J and Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 at 234 per Black CJ and French J. Furthermore, where an indemnity costs order is sought on the basis of the misconduct of a party, the Court will require some evidence of that misconduct before making the order: see Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608 at 616 per Mason P (with whom Meagher and Clarke JJA agreed) and Wu v Avin Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 792 at [41] – [42] per Kenny J.CHANNEL’S CONTENTIONS