FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1366
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1366
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants contended that the order for security for costs effectively made the tax assessments incontestable, which would be unconstitutional. The Commissioner of Taxation, however, argued that the applicants' understanding of the concept of an "incontestable tax" was misconceived. The court found that the constitutional requirement was to provide a taxpayer with a judicial process to challenge an assessment, which Part IVC of the TAA does by allowing recourse to judicial power. The court also noted that various procedural matters, including the order for security for costs, could arise in the exercise of judicial power.
The court considered the principles for granting leave to appeal, emphasizing that leave is more likely to be granted if the order finally determines the parties' rights, and less likely for matters of practice and procedure. The applicants had not demonstrated sufficient doubt in the correctness of the primary judge's decision, and the court found no error in the exercise of discretion by the primary judge.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications and ordered the applicants to pay the respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court's reasoning underscored the importance of judicial restraint in matters of practice and procedure, and reaffirmed the principles governing the grant of leave to appeal in interlocutory decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The two interlocutory applications dated 18 November 2015 be dismissed.
2. The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge then turned his mind to the appropriate quantum of the security and, after making various reductions on the amount sought by the Commissioner, he determined that the applicants should pay a total amount of $1.2m within 28 days. Consideration(a) Some relevant principles concerning leave to appeal Unsurprisingly, there was no dispute regarding the relevant principles to apply in considering whether to grant the applicants leave to appeal against Nicholas J’s orders. Those principles are authoritatively established in Full Court authorities such as Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 and Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 (Samsung). Some of the principles are set out in Samsung at [26]-[29]:26In this Court, it is well established that the relevant test (or ‘litmus test’) for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment will be granted, comprises the following two integers:(1)Whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2)Whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-400). 27In Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [29] (p 231), McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ said that:The principles that govern the grant of leave to appeal are well established. An applicant for leave must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The applicant must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal.28The test for leave to appeal explained by the High Court in Bienstein v Bienstein is the same test as the Full Court had earlier articulated in Décor.29As the Full Court itself said in Décor, the test which it described is appropriate for the general run of cases. The test should not, however, be applied as if it were some hard and fast rule. Each case must be considered on its merits. In Samsung, the Full Court discussed the different ways in which the question of leave might be approached depending upon the practical effect of the orders the subject of the leave application. The Full Court stated that leave is more likely to be granted where the practical effect of the relevant order is finally to determine the parties’ rights. If, however, the order is concerned with matters of practice and procedure, it is less likely that a stay will be granted unless matters of principle are involved. It is well established that a court should exercise restraint in determining whether to grant leave in respect of matters of practice and procedure. That point was emphasised recently by Flick J in Waters v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Taxation Office) [2015] FCAFC 46 (Waters) at [8], noting also that these observations were made in the context of an application for leave to appeal from a decision to order security for costs (emphasis in original):In respect to interlocutory decisions affecting matters of practice and procedure it is further recognised that “if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice”: Re the Will of F B Gilbert (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323 per Jordan CJ. The Chief Justice there went on to observe that if a “tight rein” were not so exercised the “disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal”. Appl'd: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177 per Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ; National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1988) 19 FCR 155 at 161 per Bowen CJ, Woodward and Lockhart JJ. The risk to the proper administration of justice is not only posed by those with “a long purse”. In respect to decisions involving the exercise of a discretionary judgment, a Court will not intervene unless there is some error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499, 10 ALJR 202. Appl'd: Welsh v Digilin Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 149 at [16], (2008) 250 ALR 13 at 19 per Tamberlin, Greenwood and Collier JJ.