Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1366

Citation: Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1366
Appeal from: Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2015] FCA 1143
Parties: RADHIKA PANKAJ OSWAL, PANKAJ OSWAL and PANKAJ OSWAL AS TRUSTEE OF THE BURRUP TRUST v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number(s): NSD 1446 of 2015
NSD 1449 of 2015
NSD 1450 of 2015
Judge(s): GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 2 December 2015
Catchwords: TAXATION – interlocutory applications seeking leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia (‘FCA’) ordering the applicants to pay security for costs – where applicants sought a stay of the primary judge’s orders – where applicants contended the FCA had no power to order security for costs in circumstances where the applicants are in substance defendants – whether effect of order requiring the applicants to pay security for costs renders the tax assessments incontestable in proceedings under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – whether the FCA erred in exercising discretion
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 25(2)(e), 56

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 19.01(1), 36.08

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 177(1)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZ(1)(a)(ii), 14ZZR

Cases cited:

Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685

Aquatown Pty Ltd v Holder Stroud Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 939 citation [1995] FCA 1667); (1995) 18 ACSR 622

Aurora Networks Pty Ltd v Halbedl; In the Matter of Aurora Networks Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 632

Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchard Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1867

Coshott v Prentice [2013] FCA 1036

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ansett Resources & Industries Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 833

Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2009] FCA 1446

House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

K P Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 76; (1995) 56 FCR 189

MacCormick v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1984] HCA 20; (1984) 158 CLR 622

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 1269

Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporations [1996] FCA 460; (1996) 67 FCR 65

Putney Group Pty Limited v The Royal Rehabilitation Centre Sydney [2009] NSWSC 424

Reinsurance Australia Corp Ltd v HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (In Liq) [2003] FCA 803

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2013] FCAFC 138

Waters v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Taxation Office) [2015] FCAFC 46

Date of hearing: 2 December 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicants: Ms R L Seiden SC with Ms S Kaur-Bains
Solicitor for the Applicants: Kennedys (Australasia) Pty Ltd
Counsel for the…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1366
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation, the applicants sought leave to appeal against the Federal Court of Australia's decision that required them to pay security for costs in tax proceedings under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). The applicants argued that the order for security for costs rendered the tax assessments incontestable, contrary to constitutional requirements. The central legal issue before the court was whether the Federal Court had the power to order security for costs in such circumstances, and if so, whether this rendered the tax assessments incontestable.

The applicants contended that the order for security for costs effectively made the tax assessments incontestable, which would be unconstitutional. The Commissioner of Taxation, however, argued that the applicants' understanding of the concept of an "incontestable tax" was misconceived. The court found that the constitutional requirement was to provide a taxpayer with a judicial process to challenge an assessment, which Part IVC of the TAA does by allowing recourse to judicial power. The court also noted that various procedural matters, including the order for security for costs, could arise in the exercise of judicial power.

The court considered the principles for granting leave to appeal, emphasizing that leave is more likely to be granted if the order finally determines the parties' rights, and less likely for matters of practice and procedure. The applicants had not demonstrated sufficient doubt in the correctness of the primary judge's decision, and the court found no error in the exercise of discretion by the primary judge.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications and ordered the applicants to pay the respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court's reasoning underscored the importance of judicial restraint in matters of practice and procedure, and reaffirmed the principles governing the grant of leave to appeal in interlocutory decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The two interlocutory applications dated 18 November 2015 be dismissed.

2. The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In accordance with the requirements of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), notices were given below which described the constitutional issue in the following terms (emphasis added):The constitutional issue involved in these proceedings is whether a Court in tax proceedings under Part IVC of the [TAA] may order dismissal of proceedings on non-payment of security for costs in circumstances where a taxpayer’s right to approach the Court to appeal an objection decision is what makes a tax constitutionally valid: Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146. As the Commissioner pointed out, the s 78B notices which were then distributed shortly prior to the hearing of the applications for leave to appeal identified the constitutional issue in the following different terms (emphasis added):The constitutional issue involved in these proceedings is whether the Federal Court of Australia, in an appeal pursuant to s 14ZZ(1)(a)(ii) under Part IVC of the [TAA], may order security for costs and a stay or dismissal of the proceedings on non-payment, in circumstances where a taxpayers right to approach the Court to appeal an objection decision is what makes a tax constitutionally valid: Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146. The primary judge rejected the applicants’ case that the effect of making an order for security for costs in Part IVC proceedings was to render the tax incontestable. For the following reasons, the applicants have not demonstrated sufficient doubt in the correctness of his Honour’s rejection of that claim. I did not understand the Commissioner to dispute the essential proposition that, for constitutional reasons, a tax must not be incontestable. It would be difficult to do so, not the least having regard to Dixon CJ’s observations in Brown at 40:Although there is no judicial decision to that effect, it has, I think, been generally assumed that under the Constitution liability for tax cannot be imposed upon the subject without leaving open to him some judicial process by which he may show that in truth he was not taxable or not taxable in the sum assessed, that is to say that an administrative assessment could not be made absolutely conclusive upon him if no recourse to the judicial power were allowed. This is not the occasion to go into the basis of this view. (See also Futuris at [80] at per Kirby J and MacCormick v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1984] HCA 20; (1984) 158 CLR 622 at 639-640 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). As the Commissioner pointed out, the way in which the applicants now presented the constitutional point focuses upon the proposition that the possible dismissal of a Part IVC proceeding for failure to satisfy an order to provide security for costs is contrary to a taxpayer’s entitlement to engage in Part IVC proceedings. I accept the Commissioner’s submission that the applicant’s case misconceives the concept of an “incontestable tax”. That is because, as the primary judge found:(a)the constitutional requirement is that the taxpayer be provided with a judicial process to challenge an assessment and, as the High Court found in Futuris, Part IVC of the TAA provides a taxpayer with “recourse to the judicial power”; and(b)in circumstances where a taxpayer chooses to take advantage of that judicial process (as opposed to appealing to the AAT), a wide range of procedural matters may arise in the exercise of judicial power, including the possible making of an order for security for costs under s 56 of the FCA Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge then turned his mind to the appropriate quantum of the security and, after making various reductions on the amount sought by the Commissioner, he determined that the applicants should pay a total amount of $1.2m within 28 days. Consideration(a) Some relevant principles concerning leave to appeal Unsurprisingly, there was no dispute regarding the relevant principles to apply in considering whether to grant the applicants leave to appeal against Nicholas J’s orders. Those principles are authoritatively established in Full Court authorities such as Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 and Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 (Samsung). Some of the principles are set out in Samsung at [26]-[29]:26In this Court, it is well established that the relevant test (or ‘litmus test’) for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment will be granted, comprises the following two integers:(1)Whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2)Whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-400). 27In Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [29] (p 231), McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ said that:The principles that govern the grant of leave to appeal are well established. An applicant for leave must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The applicant must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal.28The test for leave to appeal explained by the High Court in Bienstein v Bienstein is the same test as the Full Court had earlier articulated in Décor.29As the Full Court itself said in Décor, the test which it described is appropriate for the general run of cases. The test should not, however, be applied as if it were some hard and fast rule. Each case must be considered on its merits. In Samsung, the Full Court discussed the different ways in which the question of leave might be approached depending upon the practical effect of the orders the subject of the leave application. The Full Court stated that leave is more likely to be granted where the practical effect of the relevant order is finally to determine the parties’ rights. If, however, the order is concerned with matters of practice and procedure, it is less likely that a stay will be granted unless matters of principle are involved. It is well established that a court should exercise restraint in determining whether to grant leave in respect of matters of practice and procedure. That point was emphasised recently by Flick J in Waters v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Taxation Office) [2015] FCAFC 46 (Waters) at [8], noting also that these observations were made in the context of an application for leave to appeal from a decision to order security for costs (emphasis in original):In respect to interlocutory decisions affecting matters of practice and procedure it is further recognised that “if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice”: Re the Will of F B Gilbert (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323 per Jordan CJ. The Chief Justice there went on to observe that if a “tight rein” were not so exercised the “disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal”. Appl'd: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177 per Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ; National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1988) 19 FCR 155 at 161 per Bowen CJ, Woodward and Lockhart JJ. The risk to the proper administration of justice is not only posed by those with “a long purse”. In respect to decisions involving the exercise of a discretionary judgment, a Court will not intervene unless there is some error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499, 10 ALJR 202. Appl'd: Welsh v Digilin Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 149 at [16], (2008) 250 ALR 13 at 19 per Tamberlin, Greenwood and Collier JJ.