Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 812

Citation: Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 812
Appeal from: Application for Leave to Appeal: Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCA 745
Parties:

RADHIKA PANKAJ OSWAL v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

PANKAJ OSWAL v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

PANKAJ OSWAL AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BURRUP TRUST v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

File numbers: NSD 1655 of 2013
NSD 1657 of 2013
NSD 1658 of 2013
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 4 August 2014
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the Court should grant leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Court whereby his Honour determined a separate and preliminary question  
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A), s 24(1E)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 104-55
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 35(1)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Pt IVC
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 30.01
Cases cited: Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCA 745; (2013) 2013 ATC 20-403
Oswal v Yara Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] WASC 255; (2011) 86 ACSR 1
Yara Australia Pty Ltd v Oswal (No 2) [2013] WASCA 187
Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379
Bond (Inspector of Taxes) v Pickford [1983] STC 517
Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221
Roome v Edwards [1982] AC 279
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238
Date of hearing: 11 December 2013
Place: Canberra (via video link to Sydney) (Heard in Sydney)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: CATCHWORDS
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr SHP Steward QC and Ms CT Ensor
Solicitor for the Applicants: Balazs Lazanas & Welch LLP
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Sullivan SC, Mrs M Hirschhorn and Mr L Livingston
Solicitor for the Respondent: Maddocks Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1655 of 2013

BETWEEN:

RADHIKA PANKAJ OSWAL
Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 AUGUST 2014

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA (VIA VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application for Leave to Appeal filed by the applicant on 14 August 2013 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to that Application.

3.The legal representatives of the parties approach the Associate to the docket judge with a view to relisting the matter for further directions. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1657 of 2013

BETWEEN:

PANKAJ OSWAL
Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 AUGUST 2014

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA (VIA VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 812
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the Court was an application by Mr and Mrs Oswal for leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Court, which had determined a separate and preliminary question. The primary judge had set aside for preliminary and separate determination two particular questions, but the Court found that this did not mean that the Full Court was obliged to entertain an appeal in respect of those questions. The Court was required to decide whether the alleged substantial injustice to which Mr and Mrs Oswal pointed would be sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the continued fragmentation of the issues in the proceedings below. The Court found that even if the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal, the alleged substantial injustice would not be sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the continued fragmentation of the issues in the proceedings below. The Applications for Leave to Appeal were dismissed with costs.

The Court found that the nature of question 2, which had been set aside for preliminary and separate determination, was such that it was only ever going to be of real utility if the question were answered in the negative. It was always understood by all parties that, should the question be answered in the affirmative, as had happened, there would need to be a trial before the primary judge of all remaining issues in the proceedings. The Court found that, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court. The Court also found that the alleged substantial injustice to which Mr and Mrs Oswal pointed would not be sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the continued fragmentation of the issues in the proceedings below. The Applications for Leave to Appeal were dismissed with costs.

The Court considered the principles which should govern the grant of leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of a single judge of the Court. The Court found that the test for leave to appeal comprised the following two integers: (1) whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and (2) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong. The Court found that, in this case, the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court, and that the alleged substantial injustice would not be sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the continued fragmentation of the issues in the proceedings below. The Applications for Leave to Appeal were dismissed with costs.

The Court dismissed the Applications for Leave to Appeal filed by Mr and Mrs Oswal and ordered that they pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to those Applications. The Court also directed the parties to approach the docket judge with a view to having each of the proceedings below relisted in order to progress the final determination of those proceedings. There will be orders accordingly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Application for Leave to Appeal filed by the applicant on 14 August 2013 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to that Application.

3. The legal representatives of the parties approach the Associate to the docket judge with a view to relisting the matter for further directions.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The mere fact that the primary judge thought fit to set aside for preliminary and separate determination two particular questions does not mean that the Full Court is obliged to entertain an appeal in respect of those questions. Given the nature of question 2, it was only ever going to be of real utility if the question were answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the arguments being propounded by Mr and Mrs Oswal. It was always understood by all parties that, should the question be answered in the affirmative, as has happened, there would need to be a trial before his Honour of all remaining issues in the proceedings. In my judgment, even if I were minded to think that his Honour’s decision was attended by sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave to appeal, I would not be persuaded that the alleged substantial injustice to which Mr and Mrs Oswal point would be sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the continued fragmentation of the issues in the proceedings below. CONCLUSIONS For all of the above reasons, the Applications for Leave to Appeal must all be dismissed with costs. I propose to direct the parties to approach the docket judge with a view to having each of the proceedings below relisted in order to progress the final determination of those proceedings. There will be orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Clause 19 sets out the Trustee’s powers. Under cl 19.14, the Trustee has the power to transfer the whole or any power of the Fund to another trust. CONSIDERATIONThe Relevant Principles (Leave to Appeal) In Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 at 248–251 [25]–[37], the Full Court summarised the relevant principles which this Court will apply when considering an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of a single judge of this Court. At 248–249 [26]–[29], the Full Court said: 26In this Court, it is well established that the relevant test (or “litmus test”) for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment will be granted, comprises the following two integers:(1)Whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2)Whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong. (Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–400). 27In Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [29] (p 231), McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ said that: The principles that govern the grant of leave to appeal are well established. An applicant for leave must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The applicant must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal. 28The test for leave to appeal explained by the High Court in Bienstein v Bienstein is the same test as the Full Court had earlier articulated in Décor. 29As the Full Court itself said in Décor, the test which it described is appropriate for the general run of cases. The test should not, however, be applied as if it were some hard and fast rule. Each case must be considered on its merits. At 249–251 [30]–[37], the Full Court went on to consider the different ways in which the Court might approach the question of leave depending upon the practical effect of the orders in respect of which leave is sought. If the practical effect of the relevant order or orders is to finally determine the rights of the parties, leave is more likely to be granted. On the other hand, if the order is concerned solely with the mechanics of case management and pre-trial preparation, leave is unlikely to be granted. In Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221 at 225, the High Court (Latham CJ and Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) considered the principles which should govern the grant of leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of a Supreme Court of a State or Territory pursuant to s 35(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). At 227, after discussing and explaining the relevant principles in the preceding two pages, the Court pointed out that, in some cases, a decision by the High Court upon an interlocutory matter may save much expense and delay. When it is shown that this is the case, or that it may probably be the case, the Court will be more ready to grant leave to appeal.