Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2021] FCA 360

File number(s): NSD 911 of 2020
Judgment of: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 15 April 2021
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory applications by applicant for default and summary judgment – interlocutory applications by ten respondents for summary judgment and strike out – whether proceeding is not maintainable because of issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel – where issues finally determined by other courts – whether proceeding is an abuse of process – whether applicant has no reasonable prospects of success – whether applicant’s pleading is frivolous or vexatious – summary judgment entered in favour of each respondent – applicant’s interlocutory applications dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 18, 21, 236-7 of Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law)

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 22(2) and 42

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 31A

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 18

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 9, 11, 17, 18C and 42

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51A, 52, 82, 87, 88

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 5.02, 5.22(a), 5.23(2)(c), 9.41, 11.06, 16.02, 16.11, 26.01, 36.03(a)

Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)

Cases cited:

ACOHS Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 577

Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 217 ALR 226

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 146; 161 FCR 513

Australian Parking and Revenue Control Pty Ltd v Reino International Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 744

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Cassimatis [2013] FCA 641; 220 FCR 556

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629

Commonwealth v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57; 269 FCR 18

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Sibai [2015] FCA 1465

Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT [2015] FCA 62

Fortescue Metals Group v Warrie [2019] FCAFC 177; 273 FCR 350

Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60; 167 FCR 372

Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226; 258 FCR 575

Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2015] NSWDC 152

Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 201

Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2016] HCASL 305

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2017] NSWCATAD 209

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWCATAP 38

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWSC 1461

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2018] FCCA 699

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2018] FCA 1004

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2018] NSWSC 1007

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2019] NSWSC 1437

Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; 220 CLR 363

Lambidis v Commissioner of Police (1995) 37 NSWLR 320

Lenijmar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 338

Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 360
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney concerned a claim by Mr Kitoko against the University of Technology Sydney and various respondents, alleging racial discrimination and other misconduct. The case reached the court on multiple interlocutory applications, including applications by the respondents for summary judgment and strike out, and applications by Mr Kitoko for default and summary judgment. The court had to determine whether the proceeding was maintainable, whether it constituted an abuse of process, and whether Mr Kitoko had reasonable prospects of success. Additionally, the court needed to assess if Mr Kitoko’s pleading was frivolous or vexatious.

The court found that Mr Kitoko's claims were not supported by evidence and were largely speculative and fanciful. The allegations of a "Mirvac network" and collusion among the respondents were rejected as lacking credibility. The court noted that the reason for the discontinuance of Mr Kitoko’s Ph.D. candidature was his failure to achieve satisfactory academic progress and address deficiencies in his thesis, not due to any discriminatory conduct by the respondents. Given the lack of substantive evidence, the court concluded that Mr Kitoko had no reasonable prospects of success, and his claims were frivolous and vexatious. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion under section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 and rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 to enter summary judgment in favour of each respondent.

The court dismissed Mr Kitoko's interlocutory applications and ordered that judgment be entered in favour of each respondent. The court also ordered that the applicant pay each of the respondents' costs of the proceeding, including the costs of the interlocutory applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The third respondent’s name be changed to “Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd ACN 003 342 452”.

2. The fourth respondent’s name be changed to “David Cooper”.

3. The sixth respondent’s name be changed to “DLA Piper Australia”.

4. Judgment is entered in favour of each of the respondents against the applicant pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

5. The applicant’s interlocutory applications filed on 27 October 2020, 18 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 11 December 2020 are dismissed.

6. The applicant pay each of the respondents’ costs of the proceeding, including the costs of the interlocutory applications the subject of these reasons for judgment, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At [190]-[196], Nicholls J made the following general remarks concerning the applicant’s allegations (emphasis added): 190. As set out above, and as against this background, in essence, the entirety of Mr Kitoko’s case is that Professor Nguyen was responsible for, and acted to cause, the discontinuance of his Ph.D. candidature. The assertion is that Mr Nguyen was motivated to do so, and engaged in various conduct to that end, because he racially discriminated against Mr Kitoko (because he was a “black man” or a “black African”), and did so in the knowledge that Mr Kitoko had suffered injuries, and had a disability, as a result of an accident in 2010.191.In short, Mr Kitoko’s view of relevant events, and his belief that Professor Nguyen engaged in some “collusion” with various parties, is simply an expression of Mr Kitoko’s opinion and is not supported by the evidence before the Court. There is nothing in the evidence to support Mr Kitoko’s belief that Professor Nguyen, and for that matter, anyone else at UTS, acted adversely to Mr Kitoko’s interests because, or for reason of, his being a “black African” or for any putative disability.192. It may be unpalatable for Mr Kitoko to accept that on the evidence before the Court, the reason for the discontinuance of his Ph.D. candidature, endorsed on appeal by the committee, was his own failure to achieve satisfactory academic progress and the continuing failure to address deficiencies in his thesis when these were brought to his attention.193.It must also be said that parts of Mr Kitoko’s submissions go beyond being characterised as simply lacking any probative evidence, to being described as “fanciful”. These were matters in which, in particular, he sought to pursue in cross examination of Professor Nguyen.194.As set out above, Mr Kitoko believes that Professor Nguyen was part of the Mirvac network. Mr Kitoko’s proposition was that Professor Nguyen’s son was employed by the CPH as a “reward” for Professor Nguyen’s “collusion” with Mirvac, in ensuring the cessation of Mr Kitoko’s Ph.D. candidature.195.The “scheme” envisaged by Mr Kitoko is that Dr Lord, who was employed at the CPH, and had previously treated Mr Kitoko, and who had also “discriminated” against Mr Kitoko because he was a “black African”, was also a part of the “Mirvac network”, and this meant that somehow Professor Nguyen’s son secured employment at the hospital as a result of this “scheme”.196.Even if this entire proposition had some rational basis (which it does not), on the evidence before the Court, it still does not establish, let alone indicate, that Professor Nguyen discriminated against Mr Kitoko because he was a “black African”. Even within its own “logic”, Mr Kitoko’s asserted “scheme” proposes that Professor Nguyen was motivated not by racial reasons, but to obtain a “reward” for his son. With respect to the alleged conspiracy between the so-called “Mirvac network”, Nicholls J found at [104] that “[t]he parallel drawn by Mr Kitoko in the absence of any other evidence, to support the various iterations of his claim that a number of people have “colluded” to discriminate against him, must be rejected on any reasonable or rational view of the evidence”. To similar effect, Nicholls J concluded at [218]:218.The state of the evidence before the Court is such that it cannot be said there is any substance to the claim of a “Mirvac network” or “collusion”. The breadth of this claim, the involvement of such a large number of parties, and institutions, that otherwise have no relevant established links, supports the view that the claim has no inherent credibility.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The relevant legal principles guiding the exercise of the Court’s power to give summary judgment, to strike out pleadings, and the principles concerning abuse of process, issue estoppel and/or Anshun estoppel are not in dispute. They can be summarised as follows. (a) Summary judgment For the Court to give summary judgment in favour of an applicant under s 31A(1) or r 26.01(e) of the 2011 FCRs, the applicant bears the onus of establishing that the respondents have no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or otherwise establishing one of the matters identified in r 26.01(1)(a)-(d) of the 2011 FCRs. Conversely, for the Court to give summary judgment in favour of respondents under s 31A(2) or r 26.01(a) and (c), the respondents bear the onus of establishing that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding (Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226; 258 FCR 575 at [62]). In addition, r 26.01 expressly provides for summary judgment in other circumstances, such as where the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious or is an abuse of the process of the Court. The respondents carry the onus of establishing those matters if they are relied upon. The following principles guide the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 31A:(a)The effect of s 31A is to lower the bar below that fixed by previous authorities for obtaining summary judgment. It is not necessary to demonstrate that a claim/defence be “hopeless” or “bound to fail” for it to have no reasonable prospects of success (s 31A(3) of the FCA Act; Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118 at [17]-[26] per French CJ and Gummow J).(b)The Court must make a practical judgment as to whether the opposing party has reasonable prospects of success, one which is “real, not fanciful or merely arguable” (Spencer at [25] per French CJ and Gummow J);(c)Where the moving party establishes a prima facie case in support of summary judgment, the onus shifts to the opposing party to point to factual or evidentiary issues making a trial necessary (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60; 167 FCR 372 at [127] per Gordon J).(d)Determination of an application for summary dismissal is a value judgment to be made in the particular circumstances of the case, in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix; in other words requiring a “practical judgment” of the case at hand. It does not require a “mini trial”, but rather a “critical examination of the available material to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial” (Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Cassimatis [2013] FCA 641; 220 FCR 556 at [46] per Reeves J).(e)The Court retains a discretion whether or not to determine proceedings summarily or to refer them to trial, albeit that this discretion must be exercised judicially (Cassimatis at [50] per Reeves J). (f)Notwithstanding that s 31A of the FCA Act sets a lower bar than previously stated for the summary determination of a proceeding, the power to enter summary judgment is not to be exercised lightly (Spencer at [60] per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established