Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT

Link copied
Case Copied 41 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT [2015] FCA 62

Citation: Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT [2015] FCA 62
Parties: ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS PTY LTD ACN 004 762 341 v DELAP IMPEX KFT, ANDRAS PARADI, SUZANNE SZABO and AB ELECTROLUX
File number: NSD 844 of 2013
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 10 February 2015
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – default judgment – operation of r 5.23(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

CONSUMER LAW – misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law – warranty not compliant with s 102 of the Australian Consumer Law – non-compliance with safety standards under s 106 of the Australian Consumer Law – knowing participation in contravention – remedies – injunctions – when appropriate

TRADE MARKS – importing and offering for sale in Australia goods bearing trade mark – infringement action brought by authorised user under s 120 of the Trade Marks Act – consent of registered owner

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 1965 done at The Hague on 15 November 1965

Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 850
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chen (2003) 132 FCR 309
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1427
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2007) 161 FCR 513
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] ATPR 42-290; [2009] FCA 682
Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1
Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31
Given v Pryor (1979) 24 ALR 442
Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd (2006) 154 FCR 425
Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd v Lonsdale Australia Ltd [2012] FCAFC 130
R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Pilkington ACI (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 142 CLR 113
Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Limited (1986) 12 FCR 477
Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227
Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 296
Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661
Date of hearing: 28 January 2015; 10 February 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 83
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Wheelhouse SC with Mr P Wallis
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sydney Legal Advisers
Counsel for the Respondents: The respondents did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 844 of 2013

BETWEEN:

ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS PTY LTD ACN 004 762 341
Applicant

AND:

DELAP IMPEX KFT
First Respondent

ANDRAS PARADI
Second Respondent

SUZANNE SZABO
Fifth Respondent

AB ELECTROLUX
Sixth Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd initiated proceedings against Delap Impex KFT, Andras Paradi, and Ms Szabo, seeking relief under the Australian Consumer Law and the Trade Marks Act 1995. The claims revolve around the alleged unauthorised use of Electrolux's trademarks and the sale of non-compliant electrical goods in Australia. The defendants are accused of importing and selling domestic appliances bearing trademarks similar to Electrolux's, which do not meet Australian safety standards, thus infringing on Electrolux's intellectual property rights.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Delap, Mr Paradi, and Ms Szabo had defaulted in their response to the proceedings, and if so, whether Electrolux was entitled to the relief sought, including injunctions and damages. The court also needed to determine whether the relief claimed could be granted despite the absence of the respondents. The analysis focused on the application of Federal Court Rules regarding default judgments and the principles guiding the exercise of discretion in such cases.

The court found that Delap, Mr Paradi, and Ms Szabo were in default as they had not responded to the proceedings despite being served with the initiating process. The service was deemed valid under the Hague Convention and within sufficient time to enable the respondents to enter an appearance. The court exercised its discretion to grant default judgment based on the deemed admissions of the facts and the entitlement to relief as pleaded in the statement of claim. The court highlighted that while the facts were deemed admitted, it could consider evidence that did not alter the pleaded case but could not entertain facts that were not pleaded.

The court granted Electrolux the injunctions sought, restraining the respondents from advertising, promoting, selling, or supplying electrical goods bearing trademarks similar to Electrolux's, and from representing themselves as authorised resellers. Additionally, costs were awarded to Electrolux against the defaulting respondents. The detailed orders included specific prohibitions on the use of the contested trademarks and the sale of non-compliant goods, ensuring the protection of Electrolux's intellectual property rights in Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to the applicant to file in Court a notice of motion seeking default judgment returnable instanter against the first respondent, the second respondent and the fifth respondent.

2. Judgment is given against the first respondent and the second respondent.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

3. In these Orders, words bear the meanings assigned to them as follows:

a. Nominated Websites means:

· www.euappliances.com;

· www.deluxeappliances.com; and

· www.deluxeappliances.com.au.

b. AEG Mark means the trade marks 1244653 and 895938 and the Electrolux Mark means trade mark 1033311 of which the Sixth Respondent is the registered owner under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

c. electrical goods means goods coming within the classes 7, 9, 11, 12, 37 and 42.

First Respondent

4. An injunction is granted restraining the first respondent itself or by its servants or agents from:

a. Advertising, promoting, selling or supplying to consumers located in Australia electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark;

b. Displaying on any of the Nominated Websites or on any other website or in any form whatsoever any advertising material by which electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark are offered for sale to consumers located in Australia; and

c. Publishing in either written or electronic form any document bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark including but not limited to any warranty, manual for use or instructions in connection with the supply of electrical goods to consumers located in Australia.

5. An injunction be granted restraining the first respondent itself or by its servants or agents from directly or indirectly:

a. representing on any of the Nominated Websites or on any other website or by any other means whatsoever that it is an authorised or appointed re-seller or supplier to consumers located in Australia of electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark.

b. causing to be delivered to consumers located in Australia electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or AEG Mark.

Second Respondent

6. An injunction be granted restraining the second respondent himself or by his servants or agents from:

a. Advertising, promoting, selling or supplying to consumers located in Australia electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark;

b. Displaying on any of the Nominated Websites or on any other website or in any form whatsoever any advertising material by which electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark are offered for sale to consumers located in Australia;

c. Publishing in either written or electronic form any document bearing trade marks the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or AEG Mark including but not limited to any warranty, manual for use or instructions in connection with the supply of electrical goods to consumers located in Australia;

d. Aiding or abetting or being knowingly concerned in or party to the first respondent or any other corporation or entity engaging in any activity of a kind described in paragraphs a-c of this Order.

7. An injunction is granted restraining the second respondent himself or by his servants or agents from directly or indirectly:

a. Representing on any of the Nominated Websites or on any other website or by any other means whatsoever that he or the first respondent is an authorised or appointed re-seller or supplier to consumers located in Australia of electrical goods bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark; or

b. Causing to be delivered to consumers located in Australia electrical goods, bearing a trade mark the same as or deceptively similar to the Electrolux Mark or the AEG Mark; or

c. Aiding or abetting or being knowingly concerned in or party to the first respondent or any other corporation or entity engaging in any activity of a kind described in paragraphs a. or b. of this Order.

Costs

8. The first and second respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Electrolux seeks injunctions to restrain Delap, Mr Paradi and Ms Szabo from a range of conduct including advertising, promoting or supplying appliances bearing the Marks to Australian consumers. The originating application claims the relief under s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law and s 120 of the Trade Marks Act.BACKGROUND The following factual claims are made in the amended statement of claim filed on 17 June 2013 (Statement of Claim). Electrolux is a wholly owned subsidiary of AB Electrolux, a Swedish company. Electrolux AB is the registered owner in Australia of trade marks pleaded at [7] of the Statement of Claim (Trade Marks) and Electrolux is an authorised user of the Trade Marks in Australia. Delap is incorporated in Hungary. Mr Paradi is, and was at all material times, a director and the directing mind and will of Delap. The domain name “ (Euappliances Website) is registered to Delap and Mr Paradi. Mr Paradi is the registrant contact person and “tech” contact name for the website styled (Deluxe Appliances Website). I will refer to these websites as the Websites. At all material times, Ms Szabo was the Australian contact for the Euappliances Website. At no time has Delap, Mr Paradi or Ms Szabo been an authorised user of the Trade Marks. Without authorisation and through the Websites, from 2012 onwards Delap advertised, offered for sale and sold to Australian customers domestic appliances coming within the classes 7, 9, 11, 12, 37 and 42 and bearing Marks which are the same as or deceptively similar to the Trade Marks. Those appliances include dishwashers, dryers, washing machines, stoves and ovens (white goods) that do not meet Australian standards. This conduct infringes the intellectual property rights of Electrolux as an authorised user of the Trade Marks. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 24 April 2013, AB Electrolux wrote to Delap (attention the Managing Director) and Deluxe Appliances (attention Ms Szabo) asserting its ownership of the Trade Marks registered in Australia in classes 7, 9 and 11. The letter said specifically that it did not authorise or consent to the use of the Trade Marks by Delap or Ms Szabo in connection with the importation into Australia and sale to Australian consumers of goods or services in those classes and it would regard any such activities as infringement of its rights as registered owner. By a further letter dated 26 April 2013 addressed in the same way, AB Electrolux through its solicitors Sydney Legal Advisers Pty Ltd advised that Electrolux sells goods employing the Trade Marks in Australia under exclusive arrangements and the activities of which AB Electrolux complains are contrary to its arrangements with Electrolux. Delap and Mr Paradi replied, initially in Hungarian and subsequently in Hungarian and English, indicating an intention to defend vigorously any action taken by Electrolux. The last email contact from Delap or Mr Paradi appears to have been on 24 October 2012. It was an email to Mr Fitzpatrick of Sydney Legal Advisers (Electrolux’s solicitors) which follows as written (errors in original): Mr Fitzpatrick,I have heard you are threatening our domain renter. If you do not stop immediately and confirm closing this case today, I will do the followings:1. move the a website to a different domain name,2. start a new marketing strategy targeting Electrolux products on online media like Facebook,3. reduce all of Electrolux and AEG prices to wholesale price,4. on all big Australians forums start to public comments about price fixing in Australia compare to the whole world for Harvey Normann and Retravision, etc, and the real value of these products compare to the image been built by Electrolux Australia.This also means your chance to achieve an agreement with us will be zero.You should understand, Delap Impex was just a hobby for me till now, but if you do not close this case, it will be my goal to sell more AEG in Australia and make the Australian public understand how overpriced the AEG products are. In long term, I can not loose anything, only Electrolux Australia. I do not really care, if I sell a few ovens a month or not, but AEG position can change dramatically. I will start direct comparison on prices with Australian retailers.You can sue Delap Impex, but you will achieve nothing, it is 10 minutes to set up a new company anywhere in Europe.Please send your answer today by 5pm Sydney time, I will move webshop this afternoon. Good luck.Andras Paradi

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 10.70 imposes restrictions on the power to enter default judgment if a certificate of service has been filed under the Hague Convention. It provides as follows:10.70Restriction on power to enter default judgment if certificate of service filed(1) This rule applies if:(a)a certificate of service of initiating process has been filed in the proceeding (being a certificate in due form (within the meaning of rule 10.66(2)), stating that service has been duly effected; and(b)the respondent has not appeared or filed a notice of address for service.(2)In circumstances to which this rule applies, default judgment may not be given against the respondent unless the Court is satisfied that:(a) the initiating process was served on the respondent:(i)by a method of service prescribed by the internal law of the Convention country for the service of documents in domestic proceedings on persons who are within its territory; or(ii)if the applicant requested a particular method of service (being a method under which the document was actually delivered to the respondent or to the respondent’s residence) and that method is compatible with the law in force in the country, by that method; or(iii)if the applicant did not request a particular method of service, in circumstances where the respondent accepted the document voluntarily; and(b)the initiating process was served in sufficient time to enable the respondent to enter an appearance in the proceeding.(3)In paragraph (2)(b), sufficient time means:(a)42 days from the date specified in the certificate of service in relation to the initiating process as the date service of the process was effected; or(b)such lesser time as the Court considers, in the circumstances, to be a sufficient time to enable the respondent to enter an appearance in the proceeding. Under r 30.21(1)(b)(i), where a respondent is absent on the date fixed for hearing, the Court may order that the hearing proceed in the absence of the respondent. Having regard to the procedural history set out above, I am satisfied that Delap, Mr Paradi and Ms Szabo are in default and that service of the initiating process on Delap and Mr Paradi was effected by the required method and in sufficient time. I was satisfied that the hearing on 28 January 2015 should proceed in their absence. The principles applicable to the discretion to enter a default judgment were set out in Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 (Speedo Holdings) per Flick J (emphasis in original): 19 A number of principles that have been established in respect to the former Order 35A r 3(2)(c) continue to be equally applicable to the current r 5.23(2)(c). Some of those principles of relevance to the present application are as follows.20First, the power invoked by the Applicants remains discretionary. So much necessarily follows from the discretion conferred by r 1.32: cf Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East v Ship MV “Mawashi Al Gasseem” (No 2) [2007] FCA 815 at [9], 240 ALR 120 at 122 per Mansfield J; United Broadcasting International Pty Ltd v Turkplus Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1413 at [42] per Yates J. Just as the discretion must be exercised “cautious[ly]” where it is the applicant that is in default (cf McKenzie v South Australia [2005] FCA 22 at [26], 214 ALR 214 at 221 per Finn J; Lawson v NSW Minister for Land and Water Conservation [2007] FCA 8 at [22] per Stone J; Tucker v Western Australia [2009] FCA 1459 at [9] per Marshall J), the same caution must be exercised where it is the applicant who is seeking orders as against a defaulting respondent.21Other than necessarily recognising that the power must be exercised with caution, there is little detailed consideration as to how the discretion must otherwise be exercised. One source of assistance may, however, be found in ACOHS Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 577…22 Second, the discretionary power to enter a default judgment is enlivened when … an applicant applies to the court for an order. Rule 5.23(2) provides that where a respondent is in default “an applicant may apply to the Court”. An applicant may, of course, decide not to do so.23Third, there is a difference in the terms in which the ambit of the power conferred by the former r 3(2)(c) (“the relief... that the applicant appears entitled to on the statement of claim”) and the wording of the current r 5.23(2)(c) (“the relief claimed in the statement of claim to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled”). Notwithstanding that difference in language, the requirement imposed is not that an applicant prove by way of evidence the claim sought to be advanced; the requirement is that the Court needs to be “satisfied” on the face of the statement of claim that the applicant is entitled to the “relief” claimed: … The facts as alleged in the statement of claim are deemed to have been admitted by a respondent: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 146 at [42], 161 FCR 513 at 523 per Moore, Dowsett and Greenwood JJ. …24Fourth, to be satisfied that an applicant “is entitled” to the relief claimed in the statement of claim, the Court needs to be satisfied that “each element of the relevant civil wrong involved is properly and discretely pleaded in the statement of claim”: Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle [2005] FCA 1239 at [24]; 146 FCR 400 at 406 to 407 per Conti J; Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle [2008] FCA 1417 at [20] per Jagot J.25Fifth, in addition to the facts alleged in a statement of claim, the Court may permit recourse to limited further evidence. But it may not admit evidence which would alter the case as pleaded.26 … It is unnecessary for present purposes to consider whether the difference in language between the former Order 35A r 3(2)(c) and the current r 5.23(2)(c) also now permits the Court to grant any relief other than that claimed in the statement of claim.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although no evidence need be adduced in relation to the facts deemed to be admitted by the respondents, evidence which would not alter the pleaded case may be admitted in relation to the relief sought. Regard ought not to be had to evidence of facts which could have been but were not pleaded concerning the conduct of the respondents. Additional or different relief from that asked for in the statement of claim might also be granted, depending on the nature of the case, the order sought and whether the respondent is, or can be taken to be, cognisant of the prospect of such an order being made: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1427 at [46]-[50].CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the facts as alleged in the Statement of Claim are deemed to have been admitted by Delap, Mr Paradi and Ms Szabo. That being the case, what must be determined regarding each of the contraventions alleged is whether, on the face of the Statement of Claim, Electrolux has demonstrated an entitlement to the relief claimed. Trade Marks Electrolux’s first claim is relevantly as follows:7.At all material times the Sixth Respondent was the registered owner of trade marks in connection with the supply of goods coming within the classes 7, 9, 11, 12, 37 and 42 (the Trade Marks).Particularsa. trade marks 1244653 and 895938 (the AEG Mark)b. trade mark 1033311 (the Electrolux Mark)8.At all material times the Applicant was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sixth Respondent and was an authorised user of the Trade Marks in Australia within the meaning of s 8(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995.9.None of the First Respondent, Second Respondent … and Fifth Respondent has at any time been an authorised user of the AEG Mark or the Electrolux Mark.10.Commencing during 2012 and continuing to date the First Respondent has by means of the deluxeappliances website and the euappliances website (the websites) advertised, offered for sale in Australia and sold in Australia domestic electrical appliances including dishwashers, dryers, washing machines, stoves and ovens (white goods).11.The white goods advertised, offered for sale in Australia and sold in Australia by the First Respondent include goods of the same description as the goods in respect of which the Trade Marks are registered being goods coming within classes 7, 9, 11, 12, 37 and 42 that are advertised and offered for sale as AEG brand goods and Electrolux brand goods and which bear the Trade Marks or marks which are essentially identical with or deceptively similar to the Trade Marks (Infringing Marks).12.The offering for sale, sale and supply in Australia by the First Respondent of white goods of the same description as goods in respect of which the Trade Marks are registered and bearing the Infringing Marks infringes the intellectual property rights of the Applicant as an authorised user of the Trade Marks in Australia. Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act relevantly provides:120 When is a registered trade mark infringed?(1)A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.Note 1: For registered trade mark see section 6.Note 2: For deceptively similar see section 10.Note 3:In addition, the regulations may provide for the effect of a protected international trade mark: see Part 17A.(2)A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to:(a)goods of the same description as that of goods (registered goods) in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or(b)services that are closely related to registered goods; or(c)services of the same description as that of services (registered services) in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or(d)goods that are closely related to registered services.However, the person is not taken to have infringed the trade mark if the person establishes that using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.Note 1:For registered trade mark see section 6.Note 2:For deceptively similar see section 10.Note 3:In addition, the regulations may provide for the effect of a protected international trade mark: see Part 17A.…