State of Victoria v Tucker

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

State of Victoria v Tucker [2023] FedCFamC2G 796

File number(s): MLG 1600 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS
Date of judgment: 30 August 2023
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – application for a sequestration order heard together with application for dismissal of creditor’s petition – whether the Court has jurisdiction to make sequestration order pursuant to s 43(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether at time of act of bankruptcy the respondent had a dwelling-house in Australia for purpose of s 43(1)(b)(ii) – whether the creditor’s petition is an abuse of the Court’s process - petition opposed on the basis of asserted offsetting and counter-claims and extant fraud proceeding directed at the underlying judgment debt – application for summary dismissal dismissed – creditor’s petition dismissed
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43, 52

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 143

Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) s 77.

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021 r 13.13

Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 101.

Cases cited:

Alford v Alford (2017) 252 FCR 168; [2017] FCA 782

Bride v KMG Hungerfords (a firm) (unreported, Federal Court of Australia Full Court, Carr, Branson and Nicholson JJ, 23 April 1998)

Cadence (90) Investments Pty Ltd v Chalmers, in the matter of Chalmers [2021] FCCA 29

Clapham v Commonwealth Bank [2013] FCAFC 84 Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2015) 228 FCR 334; [2015] FCAFC 33

Commissioner of Taxation v Vasiliades (2016) 344 ALR 558; [2016] FCAFC 170

Comaz (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2015) 101 ATR 339; [2015] VSC 294

Fuller v Alford (2017) 252 FCR 168; [2017] FCA 782

Guss v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 238 FCR 509; [2015] FCA 841

Leach v Burston [2022] FCA 87

Li v Ren [2018] FCCA 806

Li v Wu [2020] FCA 776

Mathai v Kwee [2005] FCA 932

Napiat Pty Ltd v Salfinger; In the Matter of Salfinger (No 7) (2011) 202 FCR 264; [2011] FCA 1322

Re Boles [2000] FCA 1782

Re Brauch (A Debtor) Ex parte Britannic Securities & Investments Ltd (1978) 1 Ch 316

Re Coyne, Ex parte Binningup (South) Pty Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, French J, 10 November 1992)

Re Hecquard (1889) 24 QBD 71

Re Majory; ex parte Debtor v F A Dumont Ltd [1955] Ch 600

Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407

Totev v Sfar (2006) 230 ALR 236; [2006] FCA 470

Tucker v McKee (2022) 292 FCR 666; [2022] FCAFC 98

Tucker v State of Victoria [2022] FCA 1449

Tucker v State of Victoria [2023] VSCA 126

Tucker v State of Victoria & Anor [2022] VSC 760

Tucker v Victoria [2021] VSCA 120

Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; [1992] HCA 34

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 164
Date of last submission: 31 May…
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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 796
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the State of Victoria against Mr Tucker, the primary dispute centred around the legitimacy of a creditor's petition filed by the State seeking to establish Mr Tucker's bankruptcy. This case was adjudicated by the Federal Court of Australia, where the key legal issues revolved around the debtor's nexus with Australia at the time of the alleged act of bankruptcy and the validity of the creditor's petition under the Bankruptcy Act. Specifically, the court examined whether Mr Tucker had a dwelling-house in Australia at the time of the alleged act of bankruptcy, which is a critical factor under section 43(1)(b)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Act.

The court was required to determine whether the State had satisfactorily demonstrated that Mr Tucker had the requisite connection to Australia, as mandated by the law. Mr Tucker contested the State's assertion that he had a dwelling-house in Australia, arguing that his prolonged absence from the country and the lack of evidence supporting his occupancy of the property in question undermined the State's claim. The court considered the evidence provided, including travel records and affidavits, to assess whether Mr Tucker had maintained a dwelling-house in Australia, as required by the legal standards. Additionally, the court reviewed the implications of Mr Tucker's cross-claims and their potential to offset the judgment debt, as well as the State's untaxed costs orders, to determine the overall financial obligations and prospects of success for both parties.

In its reasoning, the court found that the State had not provided sufficient evidence to substantiate that Mr Tucker had maintained a dwelling-house in Australia, as required by section 43(1)(b)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court highlighted the importance of actual occupancy and use of the property as a dwelling-house, aligning with the decision in Mathai v Kwee. The court also noted that Mr Tucker's absence from Australia for most of the relevant period and the lack of evidence supporting his occupancy of the Portsea address undermined the State's petition. Consequently, the court dismissed the State's creditor's petition, ruling that it lacked the necessary jurisdictional basis.

In conclusion, the court's decision effectively nullified the State's creditor's petition, thereby preventing the establishment of Mr Tucker's bankruptcy. The court ordered that the creditor's petition be dismissed, and no bankruptcy order would be made against Mr Tucker based on the State's petition. This ruling underscored the critical importance of establishing the debtor's connection to Australia in bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The State submitted that Mr Tucker had failed in these circumstances to demonstrate any real likelihood of success in any of the above four proceedings. Further, and this being a separate question to prospects, Mr Tucker had failed to demonstrate how his cross-claims would ultimately “comfortably” exceed the judgement debt, while also ignoring the State’s untaxed costs orders which the State identified as comprising: (i) costs (on a standard basis) of three separate appeals brought by Mr Tucker in the injunction proceeding; (ii) costs of the undertaking as to damages claim in the injunction proceeding (on an indemnity basis); costs of a notice to produce and application to set the same aside in the injunction proceeding (on an indemnity basis); costs of the penalties proceeding (on an indemnity basis); and costs of the penalties appeal (on an indemnity basis).The State’s response to the judgment debt argument As far as Mr Tucker’s application to set aside the judgment debt was concerned, the State submitted that the fact that such an application had been made was not a ground in and of itself for dismissing the creditor’s petition, especially where the application was made after the creditor’s petition was filed (referring to Guss v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 841 at [62]). The State submitted that instead, it was within the wide discretion of the bankruptcy judge to determine whether the creditor’s petition should be adjourned. However, such a step would be justified only where it had been demonstrated that there were “substantial” or “genuine and arguable grounds” that the appeal would be successful so as to bring the judgment debt under the bankruptcy threshold of $10,000. The State submitted that it was necessary for the Court to enquire as to the grounds for the appeal and to consider their substance. In order to provide context to this inquiry the State identified the following facts leading up to and following the judgment debt order, none of which were challenged in any meaningful way by Mr Tucker. Mr Tucker was an employee of the State Revenue Office. In June 2017, two sets of allegations were documented by Mr Tucker’s superiors against him in respect of his employment and were the subject of separate investigations, one relating to what was described as oral allegations of misconduct by a female co-worker (harassment investigation) and the other relating to his access to private information of taxpayers (customer search investigation). The harassment investigation report was provided to Mr Tucker on a redacted basis. In a proceeding commenced on 12 December 2017(this being the injunction proceeding), Mr Tucker asserted that the State had breached its obligations to Mr Tucker in respect of the harassment investigation and the customer search investigation. Mr Tucker also sought an interlocutory injunction enjoining the State from finalising proposed disciplinary outcomes. The court granted the injunction on an undertaking as to damages provided by Mr Tucker.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issue of “jurisdiction” or “the dwelling-house issue” arises by virtue of the requirement on the part of the State (as the petitioning creditor) to (amongst other things) satisfy the Court that the debtor has the required nexus with Australia at the time of commission of the act of bankruptcy. This requirement is contained in s 43(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, which states:Jurisdiction to make sequestration orders(1) 43(1) Subject to this Act, where:(a)a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy; and(b)at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor;(i)was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;(ii)had a dwelling-house or place of business in Australia;(iii)was carrying on business in Australia, either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or(iv)was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners or of an agent or manager.the Court may, on a petition presented by a creditor, make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. It is common ground that the act of bankruptcy relied upon by the State occurred on 4 March 2022 and that the State prepared and filed its creditor’s petition on the basis that at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, Mr Tucker had a dwelling-house in Australia. It is also common ground that the address of the “dwelling-house” has been consistently identified by the State as the property known as or located at, 3558 Point Nepean Road, Portsea, Victoria (the Portsea address). Mr Tucker submits however that the State has failed to produce evidence that would allow the Court to find that at the relevant time, he had a dwelling-house for the purpose of s 43(1)(b)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Act and in particular, by reference to the decision of Mathai v Kwee [2005] FCA 932 at [116], has failed to produce evidence that he had maintained “a house in Australia which he uses or has used and may use as his residence and to which he may repair at his whim at any time”. In this regard, Mr Tucker submits that in circumstances where the incontrovertible evidence (taken from the travel records and his 2 December 2022 affidavit) is that he has been in Australia for only 21 days in the past three years and was last in Australia on 20 February 2022, the State’s position is untenable. Mr Tucker referred the Court to English authority (Re Brauch (A Debtor) Ex parte Britannic Securities & Investments Ltd (1978) 1 Ch 316 at 335 per Goff LJ) which he submitted emphasised the significance of occupation to a conclusion that there was a dwelling-house. Mr Tucker relies on the affidavit of his mother, Anne Tucker, in which she deposed to having lived at the Portsea address on a full-time basis since 2003. Annexed to her affidavit was a copy of the title search for the Portsea address which identified Mrs Tucker as the registered proprietor with an estate in fee simple. Mrs Tucker deposed that while she was happy for her three adult children to stay at the Portsea address as guests for short duration - for example, at weekends or during the summer holidays – none of her children (including Mr Tucker) had ever:(a)owned a set of keys permitting access to the Portsea address;(b)had access to the Portsea address so they could stay when they liked;(c)rented the Portsea address as a tenant;(d)contributed financially to the Portsea address including by paying utility bills or rates;(e)stayed at the Portsea address without Mrs Tucker’s knowledge or agreement;(f)conducted repairs to the Portsea address without Mrs Tucker’s knowledge or agreement; or(g)maintained a wardrobe of clothes and personal belongings at the Portsea address.