| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2023 0002 |
| TOBIAS JOHN TUCKER (ALSO KNOWN AS TOBY TUCKER) | Applicant |
| v | |
| STATE OF VICTORIA | First Respondent |
| AND | |
| PAUL BRODERICK (IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE) | Second Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | NIALL and OSBORN JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 10 May 2023 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 25 May 2023 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSCA 126 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2022] VSC 760 (McDonald J) |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Undertaking as to damages – Judge dismissed applicant’s application to be released from undertaking on ground of fraud – Judge dismissed application to stay the undertaking – Whether applicant established evidence of actual fraud – Applicant’s fraud case weak.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judge stayed fraud proceeding until applicant complied with undertaking – Whether stay should have been granted – Weakness of fraud case not alone an abuse of process – Stay of different proceeding should not be used to enforce judgment unless refusal of stay would work relevant injustice – Strong grounds for stay of fraud proceeding not established – Application for leave to appeal granted – Order for stay of fraud proceeding set aside – Summonses filed by applicant dismissed.
Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 143, distinguished; Rozenblit v Vainer (2018) 262 CLR 478, considered.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | In person | ||
| Respondents: | Mr JL Bourke KC and Ms R Preston | ||
Solicitors | |||
| Applicant: | — | ||
| Respondents: | Maddocks | ||
NIALL JA
OSBORN JA:
The applicant instituted proceedings against his employer, the first respondent (‘the State’), with respect to the lawfulness of disciplinary actions taken against him (‘the disciplinary proceeding’). In order to secure an undertaking from his employer[1] not to finalise its internal disciplinary process and terminate his employment until the determination of the disciplinary proceeding (save for further order or unless otherwise agreed), the applicant gave an undertaking as to damages to the Court in the usual form.
[1]The undertaking was also given by Mr Darren Joyce, Executive Director Corporate Services at the State Revenue Office where the applicant was employed, who was the second defendant at the time the undertaking was given. See [10] below.
The disciplinary proceeding in which the mutual undertakings were given was ultimately dismissed,[2] and the State called on the undertaking as to damages. Following a trial on the enforcement of the undertaking and assessment of damages,[3] an order for the payment of $199,681.46 in damages was made (‘the damages order’). Despite a partially successful appeal of the decision dismissing the disciplinary proceeding and the damages judgment to this Court,[4] the damages order was not disturbed.
[2]See Tucker v State of Victoria [2019] VSC 420 (Ierodiaconou AsJ).
[3]See Tucker v State of Victoria (Undertaking as to Damages) [2020] VSC 121 (Ierodiaconou AsJ) (‘damages judgment’).
[4]See Tucker v State of Victoria [2021] VSCA 120, [16] (Kyrou, McLeish and Sifris JJA) (‘Appeal Reasons’).
In a separate proceeding the subject of the present appeal, the applicant alleged that due…
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- Case
- [2023] VSCA 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether Tucker had established evidence of actual fraud sufficient to warrant being released from the undertaking as to damages. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the stay of the fraud proceeding should have been granted, given the weakness of the fraud case.
The court found that Tucker had not established evidence of actual fraud, and dismissed the application to be released from the undertaking. In relation to the stay of the fraud proceeding, the court held that the weakness of the fraud case alone did not constitute an abuse of process. The court further noted that a stay of a different proceeding should not be used to enforce a judgment unless the refusal of the stay would work a relevant injustice. The court found that strong grounds for the stay had not been established, and granted Tucker leave to appeal. The order for the stay of the fraud proceeding was set aside, and the summonses filed by Tucker were dismissed.
The cases of Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd and Rozenblit v Vainer were considered by the court in reaching its decision.
Background
Background to the litigation
Tucker originally applied to be released from an undertaking as to damages, which was dismissed by the judge. Tucker then applied to stay a fraud proceeding against the State of Victoria until he complied with the undertaking. The judge stayed the fraud proceeding, leading Tucker to apply for leave to appeal the decision and to stay the fraud proceeding. Tucker's application for leave to appeal was granted, and the order for the stay of the fraud proceeding was set aside. The summonses filed by Tucker were subsequently dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judge dismissed Tucker's application to be released from the undertaking on the ground of fraud appropriately, given the lack of evidence of actual fraud.
2. Whether the judge appropriately dismissed Tucker's application to stay the fraud proceeding.
3. Whether the judge abused the process by staying the fraud proceeding until Tucker complied with the undertaking, despite the weakness of the fraud case.
4. Whether the stay of the fraud proceeding should have been granted, considering the strength of Tucker's fraud case.
5. Whether the stay of a different proceeding should be used to enforce a judgment unless the refusal of the stay would work a relevant injustice.
6. Whether strong grounds for the stay of the fraud proceeding were established.
Held
1. The court held that the judge did not dismiss Tucker's application to be released from the undertaking on the ground of fraud appropriately, given the lack of evidence of actual fraud.
2. The court held that the judge appropriately dismissed Tucker's application to stay the fraud proceeding.
3. The court held that the judge did not abuse the process by staying the fraud proceeding until Tucker complied with the undertaking, despite the weakness of the fraud case.
4. The court held that the stay of the fraud proceeding should not have been granted, considering the strength of Tucker's fraud case.
5. The court held that the stay of a different proceeding should not be used to enforce a judgment unless the refusal of the stay would work a relevant injustice.
6. The court held that strong grounds for the stay of the fraud proceeding were not established.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the judge's dismissal of Tucker's application to be released from the undertaking on the ground of fraud, finding that the lack of evidence of actual fraud made the dismissal inappropriate. It was noted that the burden of proof lies with the applicant to establish fraud, and in this case, Tucker did not meet that burden. Consequently, the court concluded that the judge should not have dismissed the application on the basis of fraud without sufficient evidence.
Regarding the dismissal of Tucker's application to stay the fraud proceeding, the court found that the judge's decision was appropriate. It was established that the stay of proceedings is a remedy of last resort, and the court considered Tucker's weak fraud case as a factor in dismissing the stay application. The court emphasised that the strength of the underlying case is a relevant consideration in deciding whether to grant a stay.
The court also addressed the issue of whether the judge abused the process by staying the fraud proceeding until Tucker complied with the undertaking. Despite the weakness of Tucker's fraud case, the court held that this did not constitute an abuse of process. It was determined that the judge's decision was within their discretion and did not amount to an abuse.
In considering whether the stay of the fraud proceeding should have been granted, the court concluded that it should not have been, given the weakness of Tucker's fraud case. The court observed that the stay of proceedings is not a remedy to be granted lightly, especially when the underlying case is weak.
The court further held that the stay of a different proceeding should not be used to enforce a judgment unless the refusal of the stay would work a relevant injustice. It was found that Tucker did not establish such an injustice, and therefore, the stay was not warranted.
Lastly, the court examined whether strong grounds for the stay of the fraud proceeding were established. It was concluded that Tucker did not meet this threshold, and thus, the stay was not justified. The court referenced established case law to support its decision, distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate uses of the stay remedy. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a stay of proceedings is not to be granted lightly, especially in cases where the underlying claim is weak and there is insufficient evidence of fraud. Furthermore, a stay should not be used to enforce a judgment unless there is a relevant injustice caused by the refusal of the stay.