FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84
Citation: Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84 Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clapham [2012] FCA 1068 Parties: IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM and ELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA File number: NSD 1456 of 2012 Judges: NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ Date of judgment: 7 August 2013 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – appeal against sequestration order – whether “other sufficient cause” within the meaning of s 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify adjourning or dismissing the Creditor’s Petition – cross-claim against petitioning creditor – whether primary judge’s exercise of discretion affected by mistaken or incomplete view of evidence – whether cross-claim against respondent sufficiently strong to justify dismissing or adjourning Creditor’s Petition – whether Creditor’s Petition should be dismissed or adjourned pending determination of cross-claim by Supreme Court.
Held: appeal allowed – sequestration order set aside and Creditor’s Petition adjourned pending determination of cross-claim.
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.12
Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW) s 56, s 57Cases cited: Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FMCA 498
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Re James; Ex Parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 51 FCR 14
Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19
Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407
Re Schmidt; Ex Parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111
Re Svir; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 314Date of hearing: 13 February 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 61 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr DAC Robertson (Pro Bono) Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Sulan Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1456 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM
First AppellantELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM
Second AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGES:
NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
7 AUGUST 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the primary judge on 28 August 2012 be set aside.
3.The Creditor’s Petition be adjourned until the determination of the appellants’ cross-claim (including any amended cross-claim) filed in proceedings between the appellants and the respondent in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Case Number 2010/361682) or such earlier date as may be determined by a Judge of the Court.
4.The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the hearing before the primary judge and of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…
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- Case
- [2013] FCAFC 84
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue was whether the primary judge's decision to not adjourn or dismiss the Creditor's Petition was affected by a mistaken or incomplete view of the evidence. The Court had to assess whether the primary judge overlooked or misinterpreted certain facts, particularly regarding the timing of certain representations made by the Bank's officer to the Claphams. The Claphams argued that the primary judge's decision was based on a misunderstanding of the evidence concerning the sequence of events and the representations made by the Bank.
The Court found that the primary judge indeed exercised his discretion based on a mistaken view of the facts. The primary judge had concluded that Mr Clapham did not consider purchasing a second property until the Bank's officer suggested it, but this conclusion was based on an incorrect assumption. Mr Clapham's affidavit indicated that the idea of buying two farms was first suggested by the Bank's officer much earlier, on 14 June 2005. This error in fact influenced the primary judge's decision and thus constituted a material error in exercising his discretion.
Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders, and adjourned the Creditor's Petition until the determination of the Claphams' cross-claim. The Court also ordered the Bank to pay the Claphams' costs of the hearing and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the primary judge on 28 August 2012 be set aside.
3. The Creditor’s Petition be adjourned until the determination of the appellants’ cross-claim (including any amended cross-claim) filed in proceedings between the appellants and the respondent in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Case Number 2010/361682) or such earlier date as may be determined by a Judge of the Court.
4. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the hearing before the primary judge and of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the Bank answered these submissions in a number of different ways. First, he submitted that the primary judge had not overlooked Mr Clapham’s evidence of the 14 June 2005 conversation, and that his Honour’s focus upon the meeting of 9 September 2005 merely reflected the fact that, as pleaded in Mr and Mrs Clapham’s cross-claim, the conversation of 14 June 2005 was not one alleged to have been relied upon by Mr and Mrs Clapham. In support of this submission counsel for the Bank relied not only on the terms of the cross-claim but also on the account of the relevant conversation appearing in Mr Clapham’s affidavit which indicates that Mr Clapham reacted negatively to Mr Chapman’s suggestion that Mr and Mrs Clapham buy two farms. Secondly, it was submitted that no argument was put to the primary judge below concerning the 23 September 2005 meeting, and that it “cannot therefore be said to be a material matter to which the primary judge failed to have regard.” Thirdly, and in any event, the Bank submitted:By 11 September 2005 the appellants had purchased Brooklet Farm and had negotiated an arrangement for the purchase of Clan Macadam … Therefore as a matter of causation it is highly unlikely that any representation made by a Bank officer on 23 September 2005 after Mr Clapham had decided to purchase the properties could be operative to give rise to a cause of action based on misleading and deceptive conduct.CONSIDERATION There was no dispute as to the relevant principles that are applicable in this appeal. As we have mentioned, counsel for Mr and Mrs Clapham accepted that in refusing to either adjourn or dismiss the creditor’s petition on account of Mr and Mrs Clapham’s extant cross-claim against the Bank, the primary judge was required to exercise a judicial discretion. As the High Court explained in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505:The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. In our view the primary judge has exercised his discretion in the present case upon a mistaken view of the facts. We say this because it appears to us that his Honour concluded that Mr Clapham’s evidence that he did not consider purchasing a second property until Mr Chapman suggested that he do so was not credible given that Mr Clapham had negotiated terms for the purchase of Clan Macadam by the time he sent his email of 11 September 2005 to Mr Chapman. However, this view of the facts assumes that on Mr Clapham’s own evidence, Mr Chapman first suggested that Mr and Mrs Clapham buy a second farm only a few days before this email was sent. In fact, as counsel for Mr and Mrs Clapham pointed out, Mr Clapham’s affidavit clearly indicates that the idea that Mr and Mrs Clapham should buy two farms was first suggested by Mr Chapman in a telephone conversation with Mr Clapham on 14 June 2005.