Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84

Citation: Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84
Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clapham [2012] FCA 1068
Parties: IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM and ELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
File number: NSD 1456 of 2012
Judges: NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ
Date of judgment: 7 August 2013
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY – appeal against sequestration order – whether “other sufficient cause” within the meaning of s 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify adjourning or dismissing the Creditor’s Petition – cross-claim against petitioning creditor – whether primary judge’s exercise of discretion affected by mistaken or incomplete view of evidence – whether cross-claim against respondent sufficiently strong to justify dismissing or adjourning Creditor’s Petition – whether Creditor’s Petition should be dismissed or adjourned pending determination of cross-claim by Supreme Court.

Held: appeal allowed – sequestration order set aside and Creditor’s Petition adjourned pending determination of cross-claim.

Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.12
Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW) s 56, s 57
Cases cited: Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FMCA 498
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Re James; Ex Parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 51 FCR 14
Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19
Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407
Re Schmidt; Ex Parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111
Re Svir; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 314
Date of hearing: 13 February 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr DAC Robertson (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Sulan
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1456 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM
First Appellant

ELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM
Second Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, BARKER AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 AUGUST 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the primary judge on 28 August 2012 be set aside.

3.The Creditor’s Petition be adjourned until the determination of the appellants’ cross-claim (including any amended cross-claim) filed in proceedings between the appellants and the respondent in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Case Number 2010/361682) or such earlier date as may be determined by a Judge of the Court.

4.The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the hearing before the primary judge and of the appeal.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 84
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the primary judge had to determine whether the sequestration order made against the Claphams should be set aside or adjourned due to their cross-claim against the Bank. The cross-claim alleged misleading and deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct, negligent advice, and relief under various statutes. The Bank argued that the primary judge had overlooked certain evidence and made errors in fact. The appeal hinged on whether the primary judge exercised his discretion correctly in light of the evidence before him.

The key legal issue was whether the primary judge's decision to not adjourn or dismiss the Creditor's Petition was affected by a mistaken or incomplete view of the evidence. The Court had to assess whether the primary judge overlooked or misinterpreted certain facts, particularly regarding the timing of certain representations made by the Bank's officer to the Claphams. The Claphams argued that the primary judge's decision was based on a misunderstanding of the evidence concerning the sequence of events and the representations made by the Bank.

The Court found that the primary judge indeed exercised his discretion based on a mistaken view of the facts. The primary judge had concluded that Mr Clapham did not consider purchasing a second property until the Bank's officer suggested it, but this conclusion was based on an incorrect assumption. Mr Clapham's affidavit indicated that the idea of buying two farms was first suggested by the Bank's officer much earlier, on 14 June 2005. This error in fact influenced the primary judge's decision and thus constituted a material error in exercising his discretion.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders, and adjourned the Creditor's Petition until the determination of the Claphams' cross-claim. The Court also ordered the Bank to pay the Claphams' costs of the hearing and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the primary judge on 28 August 2012 be set aside.

3. The Creditor’s Petition be adjourned until the determination of the appellants’ cross-claim (including any amended cross-claim) filed in proceedings between the appellants and the respondent in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Case Number 2010/361682) or such earlier date as may be determined by a Judge of the Court.

4. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the hearing before the primary judge and of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, counsel for Mr and Mrs Clapham acknowledged that the primary judge’s decision to make the sequestration order against them or, more particularly, not to decline to do so on the ground that they had claims of their own against the Bank based upon their reliance on Mr Chapman’s alleged representations, constituted a discretionary judgment the correctness of which had to be evaluated in accordance with the principles discussed by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. This concession was properly made. We shall return to consider the relevant principles later in these reasons. But we begin our consideration of the issues that arise in the appeal with an account of the relevant factual background. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The bankruptcy notices served upon Mr and Mrs Clapham on 21 February 2012 were founded upon a judgment entered against them in favour of the Bank for $1,396,115.16 by McDougall J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 31 January 2012. The Bank obtained its judgment against Mr and Mrs Clapham in the following circumstances. From late 2005 the Bank advanced funds to Yarralumla Holdings Pty Ltd (Yarralumla), a company with which Mr and Mrs Clapham were associated, to finance Yarralumla’s acquisition of two properties to be used to farm macadamia nuts. As security for its advance to Yarralumla, the Bank obtained registered mortgages over these properties and another property owned by Mr and Mrs Clapham at MacMasters Beach, together with guarantees and indemnities which each of them signed in favour of the Bank. In 2007, the market price of macadamia nuts fell significantly and in time Yarralumla defaulted. On 29 December 2008, the Bank, Mr and Mrs Clapham and Yarralumla entered into a written agreement (the 29 December Agreement). The 29 December Agreement provided (inter alia) that the Bank would allow Yarralumla and Mr and Mrs Clapham time within which to re-finance the debt owed to the Bank. The 29 December Agreement also provided that if the debt was not re-financed within that time, then the Bank would be at liberty to enforce its securities, including the guarantees, without further notice. The Agreement further provided that Yarralumla and Mr and Mrs Clapham would consent to the entry of judgment in any legal proceedings brought against them by the Bank for a specified amount. Mr and Mrs Clapham’s attempts to re-finance the debt were unsuccessful and the Bank took steps to enforce its securities. The mortgaged properties were sold either by the Bank or a receiver appointed by the Bank. On 2 November 2010, the Bank commenced legal proceedings against Mr and Mrs Clapham in the Commercial List of the Equity Division of the Supreme Court (the Supreme Court). Mr and Mrs Clapham were legally represented in an early period of the Supreme Court proceedings by solicitors and counsel. During this period a cross-claim and a supporting affidavit affirmed by Mr Clapham on 3 June 2011 were filed and served on their behalf. However, on 12 June 2011 the lawyers acting for Mr and Mrs Clapham ceased to act. According to Mr Clapham’s evidence, this was because he and Mrs Clapham could not pay the lawyers’ fees.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There were a number of affidavits in evidence before the primary judge made by Mr Clapham including his affidavit of 3 June 2011 which had been filed in the Supreme Court proceedings. Also in evidence before the primary judge was the amended cross-claim (Ex 1) that Mr and Mrs Clapham had been given leave to file in the Supreme Court proceedings. All of this material was received into evidence without objection. Counsel for the Bank did not seek to cross-examine Mr Clapham but merely tendered a number of documents (Ex 2) some of which are referred to in the primary judge’s reasons for judgment as “contemporaneous communications”. THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S REASONS FOR DECISION The primary judge delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment. His Honour recounted the background to the Creditor’s Petition, noting that Mr and Mrs Clapham accepted that they were indebted to the Bank, and that the only basis upon which they sought to resist the making of a sequestration order was that they had filed a cross-claim in the Supreme Court seeking damages against the Bank. His Honour noted that the cross-claim relied upon by Mr and Mrs Clapham alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct in contravention of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act) and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), and also included claims for negligent advice, and relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). His Honour further noted that Mr and Mrs Clapham’s cross-claim had been amended pursuant to leave granted by a Judge of the Supreme Court, and that the evidence relied upon by them at the hearing of the Creditor’s Petition consisted principally of the affidavit made by Mr Clapham on 3 June 2011 that had been filed in the Supreme Court proceedings. His Honour then summarised the claims made in Mr and Mrs Clapham’s cross-claim. As his Honour explained, Mr and Mrs Clapham asserted that between about June 2005 and January 2006 Mr Chapman, on behalf of the Bank, made certain representations to Mr Clapham, and that he also agreed to provide, and did provide, advice to Mr Clapham concerning financial planning for a proposed macadamia nut farm. Referring to the evidence contained in Mr Clapham’s affidavit, the primary judge summarised Mr Clapham’s account of his contact with Mr Chapman as follows:·On 9 September 2005, Mr Clapham attended a farming exposition at the TAFE campus at Alstonville in New South Wales with Mr Chapman. They walked around for a few minutes looking at equipment and then sat down to discuss his financial plans. Mr Chapman told Mr Clapham that his expenses might prove to be a bit low and that the financial plan prepared by Mr Clapham highlighted the problem of the lack of scale of a small farm. Mr Chapman told Mr Clapham that he would probably find that he would be doing a lot of work for little return and that a second larger property would create the scale to afford a much greater profitability and a better lifestyle.·Mr and Mrs Clapham were keen to purchase a property known as Brooklet Farm for up to $1.6 million, but needed to know if the Bank was willing to lend the necessary money. Mr Chapman told Mr Clapham there was no problem with the Bank lending to purchase Brooklet Farm because Mr Clapham had an outstanding record in business and a long track record of earning significant income and solid assets. Mr Chapman said that he would need to review Mr Clapham’s financial plans in greater detail, and that Mr Clapham would most likely need to add his property at MacMasters Beach as security before he could lend for a second larger property. ·Mr Chapman raised two different strategies with Mr Clapham, saying that he could either purchase Brooklet Farm and focus on his consulting and investments, or purchase Brooklet Farm and another farm, such as the property known as Clan Macadam, to achieve economies of scale. Mr Clapham told Mr Chapman that he was very uneasy about the second option. Mr Chapman was very persuasive about encouraging the second option and virtually all of the comments made by him were about the benefits of scale derived from owning two farms.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the Bank answered these submissions in a number of different ways. First, he submitted that the primary judge had not overlooked Mr Clapham’s evidence of the 14 June 2005 conversation, and that his Honour’s focus upon the meeting of 9 September 2005 merely reflected the fact that, as pleaded in Mr and Mrs Clapham’s cross-claim, the conversation of 14 June 2005 was not one alleged to have been relied upon by Mr and Mrs Clapham. In support of this submission counsel for the Bank relied not only on the terms of the cross-claim but also on the account of the relevant conversation appearing in Mr Clapham’s affidavit which indicates that Mr Clapham reacted negatively to Mr Chapman’s suggestion that Mr and Mrs Clapham buy two farms. Secondly, it was submitted that no argument was put to the primary judge below concerning the 23 September 2005 meeting, and that it “cannot therefore be said to be a material matter to which the primary judge failed to have regard.” Thirdly, and in any event, the Bank submitted:By 11 September 2005 the appellants had purchased Brooklet Farm and had negotiated an arrangement for the purchase of Clan Macadam … Therefore as a matter of causation it is highly unlikely that any representation made by a Bank officer on 23 September 2005 after Mr Clapham had decided to purchase the properties could be operative to give rise to a cause of action based on misleading and deceptive conduct.CONSIDERATION There was no dispute as to the relevant principles that are applicable in this appeal. As we have mentioned, counsel for Mr and Mrs Clapham accepted that in refusing to either adjourn or dismiss the creditor’s petition on account of Mr and Mrs Clapham’s extant cross-claim against the Bank, the primary judge was required to exercise a judicial discretion. As the High Court explained in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505:The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. In our view the primary judge has exercised his discretion in the present case upon a mistaken view of the facts. We say this because it appears to us that his Honour concluded that Mr Clapham’s evidence that he did not consider purchasing a second property until Mr Chapman suggested that he do so was not credible given that Mr Clapham had negotiated terms for the purchase of Clan Macadam by the time he sent his email of 11 September 2005 to Mr Chapman. However, this view of the facts assumes that on Mr Clapham’s own evidence, Mr Chapman first suggested that Mr and Mrs Clapham buy a second farm only a few days before this email was sent. In fact, as counsel for Mr and Mrs Clapham pointed out, Mr Clapham’s affidavit clearly indicates that the idea that Mr and Mrs Clapham should buy two farms was first suggested by Mr Chapman in a telephone conversation with Mr Clapham on 14 June 2005.