FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cox (Administrator) v Mahommed [2025] FCA 1063
File number(s): NSD 970 of 2023 Judgment of: YOUNAN J Date of judgment: 5 September 2025 Date of publication of reasons: 19 September 2025 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – creditor’s petition for a sequestration order against the respondent debtor under s 43 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – where failure to comply with bankruptcy notice – whether act of bankruptcy under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether “other sufficient cause” sequestration order should not be made under s 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – petition granted
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondent debtor for adjournment or stay of petition until final determination of related proceedings – where no further extension of expiration period permitted – application dismissed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act1966 (Cth) ss 40, 40(1)(g), 40(1)(g)(i), 43, 43(1), 43(1)(a), 43(1)(b), 44(1), 44(1)(a), 44(1)(c), 44(2), 44(3), 47, 47(1), 49, 51, 52, 52(1), 52(1)(a), 52(1)(b), 52(1)(c), 52(2), 52(2)(a), 52(2)(b), 52(4), 52(5), 109, 109(1), 109(1)(a), 115(1), 116(1), 153A, 153A(1), 153B(1), 156A, 156A(1)(a), 244, 244(11), 244(12), 306(1)
Bankruptcy Regulations2021 (Cth) reg 10A
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) rr 4.02, 4.04, 4.04(1)(a)(i), 4.05, 4.05(a), 4.06, 4.06(3), 4.06(3)(a), 4.06(3)(b), 4.06(3)(c), 4.06(4), 4.06(5), 39.05(f)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(f)
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 141
Cases cited: Ahern v DCT (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137
Baker v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2012) 204 FCR 593
Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253
Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd v Jordanou [2018] FCCA 2972
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Qureshi [2009] FMCA 1111
Compton v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 132
Cusack v De Angelis [2008] FMCA 18
Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509
Ebert v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346
Hrycenko v Hrycenko (2022) 294 FCR 233
Karen Ann Cox as Administrator of the Deceased Estate of David William Dixon [2025] HCADisp 182
King v Henderson (1898) AC 720
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19
Mahommed v Cox [2024] FedCFamC2G 1299
Mahommed v Cox as Administrator of the Deceased Estate of Dixon [2022] FCA 886
Mahommed v Cox as Administrator of the Deceased Estate of Dixon [2023] FCAFC 107
Mahommed v Westpac Banking Corporation Limited & Ors [2023] HCASL 73
Mahommed v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd (ACN 007 457 141) & Ors [2025] HCADisp 25
Re Hanby; Ex parte Flemington Central Spares Pty Ltd (1967) 10 FLR 378
Re James; Ex Parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 51 FCR 14
Re Schmidt; Ex Part Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111
Re Svir; Ex Parte Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 314
Re Vella; Ex parte Seymour (1983) 67 FLR 287
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- AGLC
- Cox (Administrator) v Mahommed [2025] FCA 1063
- Case
- [2025] FCA 1063
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the failure to comply with the bankruptcy notice constituted an act of bankruptcy under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act and whether there was "other sufficient cause" to not grant the sequestration order under section 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the respondent's application for an adjournment or stay should be granted.
The court found that the failure to comply with the bankruptcy notice did indeed constitute an act of bankruptcy. The court was not satisfied that the respondent had a counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand that equaled or exceeded the amount claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice. The court dismissed the respondent's interlocutory application for an adjournment or stay, finding that no further extension of the expiration period was permitted. Consequently, the court granted the petition and ordered the sequestration of the respondent's estate. The respondent was also ordered to pay the petitioner's costs associated with the interlocutory application and the creditor's petition.
The final orders of the court were as follows: the respondent's interlocutory application was dismissed, the respondent was ordered to pay the petitioner's costs for the interlocutory application, the estate of Peter Shah Mahommed was sequestered under section 43(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, and the petitioner's costs (of the interlocutory application and creditor's petition) were to be taxed and paid from the respondent's estate. The court noted that the act of bankruptcy occurred on 31 August 2023 and that a consent to act as trustee had been filed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s interlocutory application dated 30 June 2025 be dismissed.
2. The respondent pay the applicant creditor’s costs of the interlocutory application dated 30 June 2025.
3. The estate of Peter Shah Mahommed be sequestered under s 43(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
4. The applicant creditor’s costs (of the interlocutory application and creditor’s petition) be taxed and paid from the estate of the respondent in accordance with ss 51 and 109(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
1. The act of bankruptcy is 31 August 2023.
2. A consent to act as trustee signed by Bruce Gleeson has been filed under s 156A(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Grounds 5-7, pertaining to alleged defects in the petition, and ground 8, regarding the application of s 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, remain in issue.7.1 Can the sequestration order be made? The first question is whether the Court is satisfied with the proof of the matters in s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. There was no contest on this question. I am satisfied:(a)of the matters stated in the petition, for which purpose I accept as sufficient the affidavit verifying the petition sworn by Ms Cox on 6 September 2023: Bankruptcy Act s 52(1)(a);(b)that the petition was served on Mr Mahommed, as evidenced in the affidavit of service of creditor’s petition sworn by Sarah Folpp on 20 September 2023: Bankruptcy Act s 52(1)(b); Bankruptcy Rules r 4.05(a); and(c)that each debt on which the creditor relies is still owing, as evidenced in the affidavit of final debt sworn by Karen Ann Cox on 20 August 2025, filed the day before the hearing: Bankruptcy Act s 52(1)(c); Bankruptcy Rules r 4.06(4). In relation to the matters stated in the petition, I accept that Mr Mahommed failed within 21 days of service of the Bankruptcy Notice (which time was extended to 31 August 2023) to pay the debt owed to the applicant creditor (viz., a judgment debt of $25,900 and a lump sum costs order of $28,598.94), or make an arrangement to the creditor’s satisfaction for payment of the debt, as stipulated in paragraph 1 of the Bankruptcy Notice. I am satisfied that the act of bankruptcy occurred on 31 August 2023, by way of the failure to comply with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Notice: Bankruptcy Act s 40(1)(g). Mr Mahommed did not contest his failure to comply with the notice. While Mr Mahommed did not take issue with any matter in s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, and indicated at the hearing that his challenge was based solely on s 52(2)(b), ground 6 of the notice of opposition claimed that the petition is not founded upon an available act of bankruptcy within the meaning of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. Consistently with Mr Mahommed’s oral submissions, I take that challenge to be one of the assertion of a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or more than the sum claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice, that Mr Mahommed could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained: Bankruptcy Act s 40(1)(g). I am not satisfied of such a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand, despite multiple proceedings in which the question of Mr Mahommed’s interest in the Maitland property has been raised (e.g., Supreme Court proceeding 2020/00247595; [2021] NSWSC 1178; [2022] FCA 886; [2023] NSWCA 11; [2024] NSWSC 669; [2024] FedCFamC2G 1299; [2024] NSWCA 267; [2025] FCA 469). Mr Mahommed claims that the question of ownership of the Maitland property has never been determined. That is a partial truth – often repeated by Mr Mahommed – which belies the fact that Mr Mahommed had the chance to prosecute his claim for ownership of the property, which claim was dismissed by Lindsay J in the Supreme Court for failure to provide security for costs, having considered an argument as to stultification in making those orders.