FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Youssef Berro [2022] FCA 497
File number(s): NSD 715 of 2021 Judgment of: BURLEY J Date of judgment: 6 May 2022 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application by respondent to set aside sequestration orders and dismiss creditor’s petition – where no evidence of statement of affairs provided – where respondent failed to establish he is able to pay his debts as and when they fall due – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondent to set aside orders made in his absence dismissing his interim application – where evidence indicates the respondent did receive notice of the hearing date – application dismissed
Legislation: Acts Interpretations Act 1901 (Cth) s 29
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 43, 44, 47, 52, 54, 58, 116
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 160
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 35A
Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) r 102
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 r 7.05
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05
Cases cited: Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34; 388 ALR 414
Cain v Whyte [1933] HCA 6; 48 CLR 639
Civic Video Pty Ltd v Warburton [2013] FCA 934; 216 FCR 61
Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] FCA 4; 5 FCR 1
Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8; 343 ALR 632
Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 33; 228 FCR 334
Hardaker v Phair trading as Proctor Phair & Associates, in the matter of Hardaker [2002] FCA 1176
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; 172 CLR 84
Liang v LV Property Investments Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1057
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132
Re Sarina; Ex parte Wollondilly Shire Council [1980] FCA 66; 30 ALR 266
Rozenbes v Kronhill [1956] HCA 65; 95 CLR 407
Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 11
Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 88; 252 FCR 267
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 99 Date of hearing: 8 April 2022
14 April 2022
2 May 2022Solicitor for the Applicant and the trustee in bankruptcy: Mr D Farrar of Farrar Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent appeared in person ORDERS
NSD 715 of 2021 BETWEEN: TOYOTA FINANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ABN 48 002 435 181
Applicant
AND: YOUSSEF BERRO
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BURLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 MAY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Respondent’s interim application dated 21 March 2022 be dismissed.
2.The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the interim application dated 21 March 2022, they being costs of the administration of the bankrupt estate.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 497
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Toyota had provided sufficient evidence of the debt and service of the creditor's petition. Affidavits from Toyota's process server and legal staff confirmed Berro was served with the petition. Berro failed to provide evidence to counter Toyota's claims, and his assertion of lack of service was contradicted by the process server's affidavit. The court noted Berro's financial situation, including assets and income, but found he did not establish he could pay his debts as they fell due.
Regarding Berro's application to set aside the sequestration order made in his absence, the court held that there was evidence Berro did receive notice of the hearing. The court dismissed Berro's application to set aside the sequestration order and his application to review the decision, ordering Berro to pay Toyota's costs of the interim application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Respondent’s interim application dated 21 March 2022 be dismissed.
2. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the interim application dated 21 March 2022, they being costs of the administration of the bankrupt estate.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 8 April 2022. Mr Farrar informed the Court that, despite the lifting of the stay, the trustee had taken minimal steps in the bankruptcy pending the determination of Mr Berro’s application.2. APPLICATION TO REVIEW THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER 2.1 Introduction It is convenient to consider the application to review the sequestration order before addressing Mr Berro’s application to set aside the orders made on 14 February 2022. Mr Berro contends that the sequestration order should be set aside because:(1)He was not served with the Bankruptcy Notice or the sequestration order, or with notice of the proceedings;(2)He does not owe a debt to Toyota;(3)He is solvent. 2.2 Relevant principles In Totev v Sfar [2008] FCAFC 35; 167 FCR 193 at [13]-[15], Emmett J (citing Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; 172 CLR 84 at 124 (Dawson J), cited with approval in Bechara at [21]) said:[13]… the judge reviewing the order begins afresh and exercises for himself or herself any discretion exercised by the registrar. The parties commence the proceeding again, subject to any rules concerning the use of evidence adduced before the registrar. The hearing de novo involves the exercise of the original jurisdiction and the petitioner, in the case of a bankruptcy petition, must start again, call witnesses and make out the petitioner’s case.[14]… The judge who hears the review application must hear the petition afresh and must be satisfied as to the matters referred to in s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, the reviewing judge must herself or himself be satisfied with the proof of:•the matters stated in the petition;•the service of the petition; and•the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing.The reviewing judge must also exercise afresh the discretions conferred by s 52(2).[15]In particular, unless the Bankruptcy Rules are waived, the judge must have the affidavits referred to in r 4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules, which must be sworn shortly before the hearing. Except in the case of a review on the same day as the sequestration order was made, the affidavits relied upon before the registrar would not satisfy r 4.06. Section 52(1) of the Act provides that the Court may make a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor if it is satisfied with proof of:(a)the matters stated in the petition …;(b)service of the petition; and(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing. The petitioning creditor has a prima facie right to a sequestration order once proof of the matters required by s 52(1) has been satisfied: Cain v Whyte [1933] HCA 6; 48 CLR 639 at 646 and 648 (Rich J, Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ agreeing); Rozenbes v Kronhill [1956] HCA 65; 95 CLR 407 at 414 (Dixon CJ, Webb and Fullagar JJ). Nevertheless, the Court retains a discretion to refuse such an order if the debtor is able to pay their debts (s 52(2)(a)) or for “other sufficient cause” (s 52(2)(b)). The onus is on the debtor, Mr Berro, to establish either or both of the preconditions. The circumstances which may constitute “other sufficient cause” are variable, and it is inappropriate to catalogue or circumscribe them: Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] FCA 4; 5 FCR 1 at 5 (Fisher, Morling and Wilcox JJ); Liang v LV Property Investments Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1057 at [52] (Beach J).