Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Sequestration Order)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Sequestration Order) [2025] FCA 999  

File number(s): VID 222 of 2025
Judgment of: DOWNES J
Date of judgment: 27 August 2025
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – creditor’s petition filed on 28 February 2025 – hearing of creditor’s petition in July and August 2025 – creditor’s petition based on bankruptcy notices served by email on respondents pursuant to reg. 102 Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) – where bankruptcy notices also served by post – bankruptcy notices based upon non-payment of costs orders made against respondents by Supreme Court of Victoria – whether court should go behind costs orders – where respondents failed to file applications to set aside bankruptcy notices within required time – where respondents claim to have genuine and arguable claims which exceed the costs orders – where applicants alleged to have engaged in course of conduct such that sequestration orders should not be made – sequestration orders made

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where respondents took steps to interfere with the proper hearing of creditor’s petition – where rulings made during the hearing so as to best promote the overarching purpose   

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g), 41(1), 43(1), 44(1), 52

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20A, 37AF, 37AG, 37AH, 37M, 37N

Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) regs 10A, 102

Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) rr 1.04, 4.02, 4.05, 4.06

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.61, 10.11, 30.28(3), 42.12

Cases cited:

Bechara v Bates (2021) 286 FCR 166; [2021] FCAFC 34

Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343

CSM Lawyers Pty Ltd v Manzo, in the matter of Manzo [2023] FCA 236

Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 343 ALR 632; [2017] FCAFC 8

De Robillard v Carver (2007) 159 FCR 38; [2007] FCAFC 73

Fitzgerald v Fitzgerald [2021] FCAFC 225

Glew v Harrowell, in the matter of Glew (2003) 198 ALR 331; [2003] FCA 373

John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of NSW (1991) 26 NSWLR 131

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512

Kitay, in the matter of Frigger (No 2) [2018] FCA 1032

Kuksal v Victorian Legal Services Board [2024] VSC 732

Lamb v Sherman (2023) 298 FCR 79; [2023] FCAFC 85

Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19

Lowbeer v De Varda (2018) 264 FCR 228; [2018] FCAFC 115

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132; [2017] HCA 28

Ritson v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2021] FCAFC 208

Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Youssef Berro [2022] FCA 497

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Adjournment of Creditor’s Petition) [2025] FCA 852

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) [2025] FCA 801

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (No 2) [2025] FCA 646

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Recusal Application) [2025] FCA 828

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal [2025] FCA 558

Wren v Mahony (1972) 126…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 999
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the Victorian Legal Services Board, the applicant, and Shivesh Kuksal, Lulu Xu, and Peter Ansell, the respondents, the Federal Court was required to determine whether the respondents' estates should be sequestrated. The court heard a creditor's petition based on bankruptcy notices served on the respondents, which were grounded on non-payment of costs orders made by the Supreme Court of Victoria. The respondents failed to file applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices within the required time. They claimed to have genuine and arguable claims that exceeded the costs orders. The applicants alleged that the respondents engaged in conduct warranting refusal of sequestration orders.

The court examined whether it should consider the merits of the costs orders and whether the respondents' conduct warranted refusal of sequestration orders. It found that the respondents did not establish that the bankruptcy notices were based on irregular or unenforceable costs orders, and that they failed to apply to set aside the notices within the required time. The court also noted that the respondents took steps to interfere with the proper hearing of the creditor's petition, and made rulings to best promote the overarching purpose.

The court held that the respondents did not show sufficient cause for the court to refuse to make sequestration orders. The applicants had a prima facie right to a sequestration order, and the respondents failed to satisfy the court that there was other sufficient cause to dismiss the creditor's petition. The court exercised its discretion to make sequestration orders against the respondents' estates.

In conclusion, the court made sequestration orders against the respondents' estates, with the date of bankruptcy noted as 13 February 2025. The respondents' costs and the applicants' costs, including reserved costs, were to be taxed and paid from the respondents' estates. Certain documents and information were to be treated as confidential and not be published, disclosed, or accessed for 15 years from the date of the order. The orders were entered on the day they were authenticated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The estates of SHIVESH KUKSAL, LULU XU AND PETER ANSELL be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

2. The applicant creditors’ costs and the costs of the supporting creditor, including reserved costs, be taxed and paid from the estates of the respondent debtors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

3. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following parts of the following documents filed in this proceeding are to be treated as confidential and not be published, disclosed or accessed except pursuant to an order of the Court for 15 years from the date of this Order:

(a) paragraphs 55.1, 56.1 to 56.14, 144 and 147 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025;

(b) paragraph 3 (consisting of 11 paragraphs of material across pages 3 to 4) of the Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 23 July 2025.

4. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice:

(a) the person referred to in paragraph 55.1 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “Person 1”;

(b) the person referred to in paragraph 56.7 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “Person 2”;

(c) publication of any information tending to reveal the identities of Person 1 or Person 2 be prohibited for a period of 15 years from the date of this Order.

5. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, publication of any information, submission or document in this proceeding that refers to or records the allegations set out in paragraphs 56.1 to 56.14 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding is prohibited for a period of 15 years from the date of this Order.

6. This order is taken to be entered on the day that it is authenticated.

The Court notes that the date of the act of bankruptcy in respect of each of the respondents is 13 February 2025.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

When cross-examining Mr Heath, Ms Xu asked a question to the effect of whether it was his client’s intention that each of the respondents should individually or cumulatively pay the amounts set out in the bankruptcy notices. I disallowed the question as any answer given by Mr Heath would have been irrelevant. Oral evidence On 30 July 2025, being the third day of the hearing, Mr Kuksal indicated that respondents wanted to call Mr Flitner to give oral evidence. Although he submitted that he gave the same indication on the first day of the hearing, I did not understand from Mr Kuksal’s submissions on the first day of the hearing that the respondents intended that Mr Flitner be called as a witness to give oral evidence in chief. On the third day, Mr Kuksal also indicated that he wanted to call Mr Ansell or Ms Xu to give oral evidence. On 15 August 2025, being the fourth day of the hearing, Ms Xu indicated that she also wished to give oral evidence. I did not allow the respondents to call any witness to give oral evidence for the following reasons. After filing numerous affidavits as identified above, the respondents each filed their respective Notice which contained the Grounds on 22 July 2025. By that document, it was stated that:The other Respondents and I have filed multiple affidavits in support of the grounds stipulated above. We are in the process of finalising an additional affidavit on which we will additionally rely in support of the grounds mentioned above. By this statement, the respondents recognised that they were required to file affidavit material to support the Grounds (being something which Lee J had also explained to them in his Honour’s reasons). They were therefore not prejudiced by being prevented from calling any person to give oral evidence, and they had ample opportunity to file affidavit material in support of the Grounds (and had done so). Further, permitting oral evidence in chief would have unnecessarily prolonged the hearing, and it would have been unfair to the applicants who would not have had proper notice of the evidence intended to be adduced by the respondents.Oral submissions and further refusal of leave to appeal Considering the multiple sets of submissions filed by the respondents as well as the fact that Mr Kuksal and Mr Ansell were being given the opportunity to file further submissions, it was inconsistent with the overarching purpose and unnecessary to allow these respondents the opportunity to make oral submissions. This is especially as I had no confidence that Mr Kuksal would not seek to further prolong the hearing, and interfere with its progress, by making applications instead of oral submissions. Mr Kuksal applied for leave to appeal my orders that he and Mr Ansell file written submissions instead of being permitted to make oral submissions. The application for leave to appeal is refused. My decision is not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal. Nor did Mr Kuksal demonstrate that substantial injustice would result if leave was refused.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, the unexplained delay in filing such a stay application and the lack of coherent basis for overturning each of the costs orders (if that is intended) means that I am not persuaded that other sufficient cause has been shown such that I should proceed to exercise my discretion to refuse to make a sequestration order.CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION For these reasons, the estates of the respondents will be sequestrated with the date of bankruptcy noted as being 13 February 2025. Costs should follow the event and be treated as costs of the administration of the bankrupt estate, including in relation to the supporting creditor. ANNEXURE – REASONS FOR RULINGSRecusal applications Notwithstanding that judgment was delivered one week earlier on 21 July 2025 in Kuksal (Recusal Application), the respondents commenced the hearing of the creditor’s petition by making an oral application for my recusal. This application was repeated a number of times throughout the hearing. On each occasion when an oral application for my recusal was made by the respondents, I declined to recuse myself. When the first oral recusal application was made on 28 July 2025, I asked the respondents what had occurred in the last week to justify another application for my recusal. It became apparent not only through oral submissions but through written submissions filed by the respondents and entitled “Partial Outline of Submissions” that the respondents wished to repeat many of the same complaints which had been addressed in Kuksal (Recusal Application). For that reason, I rely on the same reasons as given in that judgment in relation to these complaints. The written submissions filed by the respondents and which contain additional matters which are said to support my recusal are difficult to follow. The thrust of the first complaint in the written submissions is that I caused certain documents to be suppressed. My reasons for suppressing those documents were explained in Kuksal (Adjournment of Creditor’s Petition) at [15]–[16]. In summary, it was necessary to cause those documents to be accepted for filing but then suppressed to enable proper consideration of the adjournment application. As there was insufficient time to hear from the applicants as to whether any of that material should be suppressed, I caused it to be suppressed on an interim basis but notifying my intention to be heard on the issue of whether or not those documents should remain on the file or the conditions of leave should be varied. There is no proper basis for a recusal based on these facts. The next complaint in the written submissions refers to “the ChatGPT produced profile of Justice Downes referred to above”. This would appear to be some form of submissions based on artificial intelligence. To the extent that these complaints are additional to the complaints already addressed in my previous judgments, these will now be addressed: (1)The first complaint is that I refused to authorise subpoenas or discovery requests by the respondents. However, these matters were dealt with at the hearing and my reasons for my rulings in relation to these matters are set out below. (2)The next complaint is that I refused to allow Mr Kuksal to make submissions about misconduct on behalf of the Board’s counsel. I did not regard these complaints as relevant or founded upon any evidence. This complaint does not support an application that I should recuse myself.(3)The next complaint is that I constructed a misleading narrative around procedural history and that I omitted material facts beneficial to Mr Kuksal’s position, and instead emphasised points prejudicial to him. This complaint is misconceived and so is rejected. (4)The next complaint is that I repeatedly scheduled hearings in ways that limited Mr Kuksal’s ability to prepare and respond effectively. This complaint is baseless when one has regard to the relevant chronology. (5)The next complaint is that I ignored constitutional notices which omission was strategic. I am not sure of the factual basis for this complaint or how it is “strategic”. This complaint is misconceived and so is rejected. (6)The next complaint is that I have shown inconsistency indicative of either arbitrary decision making or deliberate deception. This appears to be a rehash of earlier complaints surrounding my ongoing refusal to read unsolicited emails received by my chambers in circumstances where I have requested on multiple occasions that such emails not be sent. This complaint is baseless and is rejected.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that the applicants have a prima facie right to a sequestration order.WHETHER COURT OUGHT TO MAKE A SEQUESTRATION ORDER The Court retains a discretion whether or not to make a sequestration order even when all of the jurisdictional requirements are established. This discretion is unfettered, and if the respondents seeks to satisfy the Court under s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act that there is some “other sufficient cause” to dismiss the creditor’s petition, they bear the onus of satisfying the Court of those matters: Bechara v Bates (2021) 286 FCR 166; [2021] FCAFC 34 at [27] (Allsop CJ, Markovic and Colvin JJ). As observed by Burley J in Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Youssef Berro [2022] FCA 497 at [33]–[34]:The petitioning creditor has a prima facie right to a sequestration order once proof of the matters required by s 52(1) has been satisfied: Cain v Whyte [1933] HCA 6; 48 CLR 639 at 646 and 648 (Rich J, Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ agreeing); Rozenbes v Kronhill [1956] HCA 65; 95 CLR 407 at 414 (Dixon CJ, Webb and Fullagar JJ).Nevertheless, the Court retains a discretion to refuse such an order if the debtor is able to pay their debts (s 52(2)(a)) or for “other sufficient cause” (s 52(2)(b)). The onus is on the debtor, Mr Berro, to establish either or both of the preconditions. The circumstances which may constitute “other sufficient cause” are variable, and it is inappropriate to catalogue or circumscribe them: Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] FCA 4; 5 FCR 1 at 5 (Fisher, Morling and Wilcox JJ); Liang v LV Property Investments Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1057 at [52] (Beach J).(Emphasis omitted.) At [37] of Toyota Finance, Burley J further stated that: Even if “other sufficient cause” has been shown, that merely enlivens the court’s discretion to refuse to make a sequestration order. “The power in s 52(2) is permissive, not mandatory. Even if a debtor can bring himself or herself within s 52(2)(b), that does not entitle him or her to have a sequestration order refused”…(Citations omitted.) The Grounds will now be addressed.Ground 1: personal service of the petition on Mr Kuksal This has been addressed. Ground 2: no act of bankruptcy was committed The respondents assert that no act of bankruptcy was committed on two bases, namely: (1)by paragraph 2.1 of the Grounds, the bankruptcy notices are based on irregular and unenforceable cost orders and are premised on the erroneous assumption that the respondents are jointly and severally liable for the costs orders; and (2)by paragraph 2.2 of the Grounds, on the basis that the respondents applied to set aside the bankruptcy notices within 21 days of being served with them. As to paragraph 2.1 of the Grounds:(1)the evidence did not establish that bankruptcy notices are based on “irregular and unenforceable costs orders”. In particular, the costs order made in S ECI 2022 03994 and which refers on its face to “ruling delivered 19 February 2024” and the date authenticated as being 19 February 2024 contains an obvious typographical error where it states “Date Made: 19 February 2023”. Such a slip does not render the costs order irregular or unenforceable;(2)the bankruptcy notices are not premised on the posited erroneous assumption, for the reasons explained above.