FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Sequestration Order) [2025] FCA 999
File number(s): VID 222 of 2025 Judgment of: DOWNES J Date of judgment: 27 August 2025 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – creditor’s petition filed on 28 February 2025 – hearing of creditor’s petition in July and August 2025 – creditor’s petition based on bankruptcy notices served by email on respondents pursuant to reg. 102 Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) – where bankruptcy notices also served by post – bankruptcy notices based upon non-payment of costs orders made against respondents by Supreme Court of Victoria – whether court should go behind costs orders – where respondents failed to file applications to set aside bankruptcy notices within required time – where respondents claim to have genuine and arguable claims which exceed the costs orders – where applicants alleged to have engaged in course of conduct such that sequestration orders should not be made – sequestration orders made
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where respondents took steps to interfere with the proper hearing of creditor’s petition – where rulings made during the hearing so as to best promote the overarching purpose
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g), 41(1), 43(1), 44(1), 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20A, 37AF, 37AG, 37AH, 37M, 37N
Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) regs 10A, 102
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) rr 1.04, 4.02, 4.05, 4.06
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.61, 10.11, 30.28(3), 42.12
Cases cited: Bechara v Bates (2021) 286 FCR 166; [2021] FCAFC 34
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343
CSM Lawyers Pty Ltd v Manzo, in the matter of Manzo [2023] FCA 236
Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 343 ALR 632; [2017] FCAFC 8
De Robillard v Carver (2007) 159 FCR 38; [2007] FCAFC 73
Fitzgerald v Fitzgerald [2021] FCAFC 225
Glew v Harrowell, in the matter of Glew (2003) 198 ALR 331; [2003] FCA 373
John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of NSW (1991) 26 NSWLR 131
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512
Kitay, in the matter of Frigger (No 2) [2018] FCA 1032
Kuksal v Victorian Legal Services Board [2024] VSC 732
Lamb v Sherman (2023) 298 FCR 79; [2023] FCAFC 85
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19
Lowbeer v De Varda (2018) 264 FCR 228; [2018] FCAFC 115
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132; [2017] HCA 28
Ritson v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2021] FCAFC 208
Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Youssef Berro [2022] FCA 497
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Adjournment of Creditor’s Petition) [2025] FCA 852
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) [2025] FCA 801
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (No 2) [2025] FCA 646
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Recusal Application) [2025] FCA 828
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 999
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether it should consider the merits of the costs orders and whether the respondents' conduct warranted refusal of sequestration orders. It found that the respondents did not establish that the bankruptcy notices were based on irregular or unenforceable costs orders, and that they failed to apply to set aside the notices within the required time. The court also noted that the respondents took steps to interfere with the proper hearing of the creditor's petition, and made rulings to best promote the overarching purpose.
The court held that the respondents did not show sufficient cause for the court to refuse to make sequestration orders. The applicants had a prima facie right to a sequestration order, and the respondents failed to satisfy the court that there was other sufficient cause to dismiss the creditor's petition. The court exercised its discretion to make sequestration orders against the respondents' estates.
In conclusion, the court made sequestration orders against the respondents' estates, with the date of bankruptcy noted as 13 February 2025. The respondents' costs and the applicants' costs, including reserved costs, were to be taxed and paid from the respondents' estates. Certain documents and information were to be treated as confidential and not be published, disclosed, or accessed for 15 years from the date of the order. The orders were entered on the day they were authenticated.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The estates of SHIVESH KUKSAL, LULU XU AND PETER ANSELL be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. The applicant creditors’ costs and the costs of the supporting creditor, including reserved costs, be taxed and paid from the estates of the respondent debtors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
3. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following parts of the following documents filed in this proceeding are to be treated as confidential and not be published, disclosed or accessed except pursuant to an order of the Court for 15 years from the date of this Order:
(a) paragraphs 55.1, 56.1 to 56.14, 144 and 147 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025;
(b) paragraph 3 (consisting of 11 paragraphs of material across pages 3 to 4) of the Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 23 July 2025.
4. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice:
(a) the person referred to in paragraph 55.1 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “Person 1”;
(b) the person referred to in paragraph 56.7 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “Person 2”;
(c) publication of any information tending to reveal the identities of Person 1 or Person 2 be prohibited for a period of 15 years from the date of this Order.
5. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, publication of any information, submission or document in this proceeding that refers to or records the allegations set out in paragraphs 56.1 to 56.14 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding is prohibited for a period of 15 years from the date of this Order.
6. This order is taken to be entered on the day that it is authenticated.
The Court notes that the date of the act of bankruptcy in respect of each of the respondents is 13 February 2025.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows that the applicants have a prima facie right to a sequestration order.WHETHER COURT OUGHT TO MAKE A SEQUESTRATION ORDER The Court retains a discretion whether or not to make a sequestration order even when all of the jurisdictional requirements are established. This discretion is unfettered, and if the respondents seeks to satisfy the Court under s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act that there is some “other sufficient cause” to dismiss the creditor’s petition, they bear the onus of satisfying the Court of those matters: Bechara v Bates (2021) 286 FCR 166; [2021] FCAFC 34 at [27] (Allsop CJ, Markovic and Colvin JJ). As observed by Burley J in Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Youssef Berro [2022] FCA 497 at [33]–[34]:The petitioning creditor has a prima facie right to a sequestration order once proof of the matters required by s 52(1) has been satisfied: Cain v Whyte [1933] HCA 6; 48 CLR 639 at 646 and 648 (Rich J, Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ agreeing); Rozenbes v Kronhill [1956] HCA 65; 95 CLR 407 at 414 (Dixon CJ, Webb and Fullagar JJ).Nevertheless, the Court retains a discretion to refuse such an order if the debtor is able to pay their debts (s 52(2)(a)) or for “other sufficient cause” (s 52(2)(b)). The onus is on the debtor, Mr Berro, to establish either or both of the preconditions. The circumstances which may constitute “other sufficient cause” are variable, and it is inappropriate to catalogue or circumscribe them: Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] FCA 4; 5 FCR 1 at 5 (Fisher, Morling and Wilcox JJ); Liang v LV Property Investments Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1057 at [52] (Beach J).(Emphasis omitted.) At [37] of Toyota Finance, Burley J further stated that: Even if “other sufficient cause” has been shown, that merely enlivens the court’s discretion to refuse to make a sequestration order. “The power in s 52(2) is permissive, not mandatory. Even if a debtor can bring himself or herself within s 52(2)(b), that does not entitle him or her to have a sequestration order refused”…(Citations omitted.) The Grounds will now be addressed.Ground 1: personal service of the petition on Mr Kuksal This has been addressed. Ground 2: no act of bankruptcy was committed The respondents assert that no act of bankruptcy was committed on two bases, namely: (1)by paragraph 2.1 of the Grounds, the bankruptcy notices are based on irregular and unenforceable cost orders and are premised on the erroneous assumption that the respondents are jointly and severally liable for the costs orders; and (2)by paragraph 2.2 of the Grounds, on the basis that the respondents applied to set aside the bankruptcy notices within 21 days of being served with them. As to paragraph 2.1 of the Grounds:(1)the evidence did not establish that bankruptcy notices are based on “irregular and unenforceable costs orders”. In particular, the costs order made in S ECI 2022 03994 and which refers on its face to “ruling delivered 19 February 2024” and the date authenticated as being 19 February 2024 contains an obvious typographical error where it states “Date Made: 19 February 2023”. Such a slip does not render the costs order irregular or unenforceable;(2)the bankruptcy notices are not premised on the posited erroneous assumption, for the reasons explained above.