Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Recusal Application)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Recusal Application) [2025] FCA 828

File number(s): VID 222 of 2025
VID 642 of 2025
Judgment of: DOWNES J
Date of judgment: 21 July 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal on grounds of actual and apprehended bias – allegation of obstruction of rights for the improper purpose of either pursuing a policy or ideological objective or pursuing a personal interest or benefit – allegation that conduct of proceedings has been arbitrary and unreasonable – application refused
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 8.12, 42.12

Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2022 (Cth) reg 2.11(1)(c)

Cases cited:

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v James [2021] FCA 768

Dunstan v Orr [2022] FCA 1006

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) [2025] FCA 801

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (No 2) [2025] FCA 646

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal [2025] FCA 558

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 139
Date of hearing: 17 July 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Mukerjea
Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the Respondents: The Respondents appeared in person

ORDERS

VID 222 of 2025
BETWEEN:

VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD

Applicant

AND:

SHIVESH KUKSAL

First Respondent

PETER ANSELL

Second Respondent

LULU XU

Third Respondent

JOBWATCH, INC

Supporting creditor

ORDER MADE BY:

DOWNES J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for orders in terms of prayer 1 of the respondents’ interlocutory application filed in this proceeding on 23 June 2025 is refused.

2.Costs reserved.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DOWNES J:

SYNOPSIS

  1. Mr Shivesh Kuksal, Mr Peter Ansell and Ms Lulu Xu are respondents in proceedings commenced in this Court by the Victorian Legal Services Board (Board) and others (the applicants). 

  2. The first of those proceedings, VID222 of 2025, was commenced by the applicants following the filing of a creditor’s petition (bankruptcy proceeding).  In the bankruptcy proceeding, there are nine supporting creditors who are represented by the first supporting creditor, Jobwatch, Inc. 

  3. The second proceeding, VID642 of 2025, is a collateral proceeding commenced by the Board which seeks (inter alia) injunctions restraining the respondents from engaging in certain conduct and other orders.

  4. By prayer 1 of their interlocutory application dated 23 June 2025, the respondents apply for an order that I recuse myself from hearing the creditor’s petition and the collateral proceeding.  The hearing of the creditor’s petition is set down on 27 and 28 June 2025 and so there is some urgency in deciding this application. 

  5. By prayer 2 of that application, the respondents seek an order that “any further hearings” in the bankruptcy proceeding be postponed…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 828
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal, the respondents, led by Mr Shivesh Kuksal, sought the recusal of Justice Downes on the basis of actual and apprehended bias. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The respondents argued that the judge had obstructed their rights, conducted the proceedings in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, failed to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, acted as an advocate for the applicants, and caused material prejudice and reputational damage.

The court examined the allegations in detail, noting that the respondents had not identified any specific policy or ideological objective or personal interest that the judge might have been pursuing. The judge concluded that there was no substantial ground to contend that she was disqualified from hearing and deciding the case. The court found that the respondents' claims of bias were not supported by the evidence and that the judge had acted fairly and impartially.

The court refused the application for recusal and reserved costs. The decision underscores the importance of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice and the duty of judges to hear cases assigned to them unless there is a substantial ground for recusal. The judge's impartiality and adherence to legal principles were affirmed in the ruling.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for orders in terms of prayer 1 of the respondents’ interlocutory application filed in this proceeding on 23 June 2025 is refused.

2. Costs reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I have determined that I should not recuse myself from either the creditor’s petition or the collateral proceeding. BACKGROUND The background to the filing of the creditor’s petition and the collateral proceeding has been set out in the following judgments, namely Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal [2025] FCA 558 at [4]–[8] (Meagher J), Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (No 2) [2025] FCA 646 at [1]–[4] (Downes J) (Kuksal No 2) and Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) [2025] FCA 801 at [3]–[11] (Lee J). The bankruptcy proceeding was re-allocated twice prior to being allocated to my docket on 11 June 2025. This is referred to in Kuksal No 2 at [2]–[3]. The first occasion was following a recusal application brought by the respondents after the proceeding was allocated to Bennett J. As to the second occasion, Moshinsky J wrote in a statement which was read out to the parties and dated 4 June 2025 that:On 28 May 2025, my chambers wrote to the parties stating that proceeding VID222/2025 had been re-allocated to my docket and that proceeding VID642/2025 had been allocated to my docket, and that my chambers would be in touch with the parties in due course regarding future listing arrangements. Subsequently, my chambers received a number of emails from Mr Peter Ansell regarding a potential conflict in my hearing these matters. Mr Ansell is one of the respondents to the proceedings. In one of these emails, Mr Ansell drew to my attention a previous proceeding in this Court, namely Maria Di Gregorio v Lumi Finance Pty Ltd (VID 104 of 2022). …Having reviewed that proceeding, I consider that there is a conflict in my hearing the present proceedings. As I accepted during the hearing, no recusal application was made by the respondents in relation to Moshinsky J. However, Kuksal No 2 does not state that such an application was made. As the respondents make numerous allegations about the conduct of these proceedings since I became the docket judge, it is necessary to set out some of the relevant facts in detail. Correspondence prior to the first case management hearingCorrespondence in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding On 12 June 2025 at 11.46 am, being the day after the re-allocation, my chambers sent the following email to the parties in relation to listing the bankruptcy proceeding for a case management hearing on 17 June 2025 at 9.30 am: Dear parties Please be advised that this matter has been reallocated to the docket of Justice Downes. Please direct all future correspondence in this matter to the chambers of Justice Downes. This matter has been listed for a case management hearing on Tuesday, 17 June 2025 at 9.30 am in Brisbane.The parties are permitted to appear by Microsoft Teams, or a courtroom in the Melbourne registry may be used with videoconferencing software. Would the parties please indicate which option would be suitable?The parties are requested to provide draft orders, whether competing or by consent, as well as details of appearances and any affidavit material not yet filed by 2.00 pm on Monday, 16 June 2025.Kind regards(Original emphasis removed; emphasis added.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At 3.18 pm on 20 June 2025, Mr Kuksal responded to my chambers on behalf of the respondents. Mr Kuksal’s email stated: Dear Associate,I write on behalf of the Respondents. We request Downes J to provide reasons for Her Honour’s decisions delivered via the attached email received today. We further request that Downes J provide them at her earliest convenience.Whilst we consider it inappropriate for Downes J to make any decisions in the matters before hearing us regarding Her Honour's disqualification from the proceeding, we note the oppressive effect of the orders, and the imminent threat posed by the self-executing order Her Honour has made in paragraph 2 of her orders, without giving us an opportunity to be heard. The order was relevantly made without an application, let alone any evidence justifying its necessity. It sets an unjustifiably short deadline in circumstances where no benefit arises from such stringency. It is self-evident that the purpose underpinning the orders is to create an arbitrarily strict qualification to the exercise of rights and privileges that are available without restriction (except that they may not be abused to create oppression for others) to litigants in hearings conducted by competent, independent and impartial judges.Moreover, the orders and the reasons have the implicit effect of determining that the Respondents may not call any witnesses or seek any other orders in the proceeding. The appropriateness or necessity of such measures ought to have been raised with the parties when Downes J first considered them. Many of the matters decided by Downes J involve the exercise of an evaluative judgment. Not only does the process usually involve a fair and public hearing so affected parties may address the Court, which we were denied, in this case, we have not been heard at all.We plan to amend the interlocutory application we had lodged (which was improperly rejected by the registry on 17 June 2025) to additionally seek an urgent hearing for our application seeking Her Honour’s recusal and orders concerning other pressing matters, including those that have arisen following the hearing on 17 June 2025.To clarify, we do not imply that it is necessary or preferable to file an application seeking a judge’s recusal (see QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15, Gordon J at [88]). We simply intend to seek the urgent separate listing of the recusal application through the interlocutory application. We had intended the same through the directions sought by my email on 17 June 2025, contrary to Her Honour's interpretation in Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (No 2) [2025] FCA 646 at [11].We request Her Honour to reserve half a day (4 hours) on 30 June 2025 (Downes J had previously advised that she was available to hear the parties on that date) for the hearing of our application seeking Her Honour's recusal. To avoid ambiguity, we note that we require the stipulated time to make the application. The time doesn’t account for the participation of other parties. Although, in our experience, the Applicants take no position in respect of our recusal applications; at least not legitimately at the time they are heard (though they often find illegitimate ways of criticising them for their unjust enrichment after the fact).For the reasons referred to above, though we do not believe it was appropriate for Downes J to make further orders in the proceedings before hearing our recusal application after we had indicated that we believe Her Honour is disqualified from presiding over the proceedings, to avert the imminent threat presented by one of Downes J’s oppressive and unjust orders, we request Downes J to set aside the order specified in paragraph 2 of her orders and amend the order in paragraph 4 of her orders to remove any reference to order 2.We commit to lodging the interlocutory application by no later than 5:00 pm on Wednesday, 25 June 2025 and lodging an affidavit setting out the grounds for the urgent listing of the recusal application on 30 June 2025 as per the same deadline, given Downes J provides the reasons requested through this email by 5:00 pm on 23 June 2025 (or within 48 hours of the publication of the reasons, otherwise). This assurance is meant to relieve against any concern regarding the timeliness of the lodgment of the interlocutory application.For clarification, we do not imply that the other orders made by Downes J in either proceeding are just, reasonable or error-free. We intend to raise our grievances in relation to them in the grounds for Her Honour's recusal. We have not asked for their amendment because it is inappropriate for Her Honour to make further orders in the proceeding before hearing our application. Moreover, as we have expressed above, orders of the sort made by Downes J today, ought not be made without a hearing of the relevant issues.We will also file a Constitutional Notice in VID 642/2025, which will raise issues underpinning the orders made by Meagher and Downes JJ in the proceeding, in addition to paragraphs 5-7 of the attached (amended) Constitutional Notice next week.We thank Downes J for her urgent consideration of the matters raised in this correspondence. Please acknowledge its receipt as soon as possible.Sincerely,Shivesh Kuksal(Emphasis original.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), the plurality observed at [19]:Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.ConsiderationGrounds advanced by the respondents at the recusal hearing The respondents identified five grounds for my recusal, being: (1)there is a reasonable inference that I sought to obstruct the respondents’ enforcement of their rights for the improper purpose of either pursuing a policy or ideological objective or pursuing a personal interest or benefit. This was stated to include the “mitigation of embarrassment or distress to government bodies as a derivative … [as] reciprocal consideration”;(2)I have conducted the proceeding in a manner that is arbitrary and is unreasonable, because there are contradictory and inconsistent directions that have been made which are not innocent but are actuated by the policy objective or to gain an improper benefit;(3)I have failed to conduct the proceedings in a way that complies with my obligations at law, including to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice; (4)I have acted as an advocate for the applicants and made decisions to penalise the respondents; and(5)the manner that the proceedings have been conducted has caused material prejudice to the respondents in the proceedings and has caused damage to the reputation of the respondents. Mr Kuksal outlined specific conduct that the respondents relied upon in support of these grounds, which is addressed below. As Mr Kuksal spoke for about three hours and no written submissions were filed by the respondents, I have divided the impugned conduct into categories. I observe that, as to grounds 1 and 2, the “policy or ideological objective” and “personal interest or benefit” were not identified by the respondents. Description in Kuksal No 2 about communications between respondents and my chambers The respondents referred to Kuksal No 2 and submitted that “the wording that your Honour used [in the judgment] was that we sent multiple emails to your Honour’s chambers that exhibited voluminous documents”. The relevant paragraphs of Kuksal No 2 state at [4] and [5]: … The parties were requested to provide draft orders and any affidavit material not yet filed by 2.00 pm on 16 June 2025. In response to that request, the applicants provided available dates for the hearing of the creditor’s petition which were included in their draft order. The respondents did not respond to that request with either a draft order or any further affidavit material. Instead, the respondents sent numerous emails to my chambers which included various attachments and embedded links…(Emphasis added.)