FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Recusal Application) [2025] FCA 828
File number(s): VID 222 of 2025
VID 642 of 2025Judgment of: DOWNES J Date of judgment: 21 July 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal on grounds of actual and apprehended bias – allegation of obstruction of rights for the improper purpose of either pursuing a policy or ideological objective or pursuing a personal interest or benefit – allegation that conduct of proceedings has been arbitrary and unreasonable – application refused Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 8.12, 42.12
Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2022 (Cth) reg 2.11(1)(c)
Cases cited: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v James [2021] FCA 768
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) [2025] FCA 801
Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal (No 2) [2025] FCA 646
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 139 Date of hearing: 17 July 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Mukerjea Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth Counsel for the Respondents: The Respondents appeared in person ORDERS
VID 222 of 2025 BETWEEN: VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD
Applicant
AND: SHIVESH KUKSAL
First Respondent
PETER ANSELL
Second Respondent
LULU XU
Third Respondent
JOBWATCH, INC
Supporting creditor
ORDER MADE BY:
DOWNES J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for orders in terms of prayer 1 of the respondents’ interlocutory application filed in this proceeding on 23 June 2025 is refused.
2.Costs reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DOWNES J:
SYNOPSIS
Mr Shivesh Kuksal, Mr Peter Ansell and Ms Lulu Xu are respondents in proceedings commenced in this Court by the Victorian Legal Services Board (Board) and others (the applicants).
The first of those proceedings, VID222 of 2025, was commenced by the applicants following the filing of a creditor’s petition (bankruptcy proceeding). In the bankruptcy proceeding, there are nine supporting creditors who are represented by the first supporting creditor, Jobwatch, Inc.
The second proceeding, VID642 of 2025, is a collateral proceeding commenced by the Board which seeks (inter alia) injunctions restraining the respondents from engaging in certain conduct and other orders.
By prayer 1 of their interlocutory application dated 23 June 2025, the respondents apply for an order that I recuse myself from hearing the creditor’s petition and the collateral proceeding. The hearing of the creditor’s petition is set down on 27 and 28 June 2025 and so there is some urgency in deciding this application.
By prayer 2 of that application, the respondents seek an order that “any further hearings” in the bankruptcy proceeding be postponed…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 828
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the allegations in detail, noting that the respondents had not identified any specific policy or ideological objective or personal interest that the judge might have been pursuing. The judge concluded that there was no substantial ground to contend that she was disqualified from hearing and deciding the case. The court found that the respondents' claims of bias were not supported by the evidence and that the judge had acted fairly and impartially.
The court refused the application for recusal and reserved costs. The decision underscores the importance of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice and the duty of judges to hear cases assigned to them unless there is a substantial ground for recusal. The judge's impartiality and adherence to legal principles were affirmed in the ruling.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for orders in terms of prayer 1 of the respondents’ interlocutory application filed in this proceeding on 23 June 2025 is refused.
2. Costs reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), the plurality observed at [19]:Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.ConsiderationGrounds advanced by the respondents at the recusal hearing The respondents identified five grounds for my recusal, being: (1)there is a reasonable inference that I sought to obstruct the respondents’ enforcement of their rights for the improper purpose of either pursuing a policy or ideological objective or pursuing a personal interest or benefit. This was stated to include the “mitigation of embarrassment or distress to government bodies as a derivative … [as] reciprocal consideration”;(2)I have conducted the proceeding in a manner that is arbitrary and is unreasonable, because there are contradictory and inconsistent directions that have been made which are not innocent but are actuated by the policy objective or to gain an improper benefit;(3)I have failed to conduct the proceedings in a way that complies with my obligations at law, including to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice; (4)I have acted as an advocate for the applicants and made decisions to penalise the respondents; and(5)the manner that the proceedings have been conducted has caused material prejudice to the respondents in the proceedings and has caused damage to the reputation of the respondents. Mr Kuksal outlined specific conduct that the respondents relied upon in support of these grounds, which is addressed below. As Mr Kuksal spoke for about three hours and no written submissions were filed by the respondents, I have divided the impugned conduct into categories. I observe that, as to grounds 1 and 2, the “policy or ideological objective” and “personal interest or benefit” were not identified by the respondents. Description in Kuksal No 2 about communications between respondents and my chambers The respondents referred to Kuksal No 2 and submitted that “the wording that your Honour used [in the judgment] was that we sent multiple emails to your Honour’s chambers that exhibited voluminous documents”. The relevant paragraphs of Kuksal No 2 state at [4] and [5]: … The parties were requested to provide draft orders and any affidavit material not yet filed by 2.00 pm on 16 June 2025. In response to that request, the applicants provided available dates for the hearing of the creditor’s petition which were included in their draft order. The respondents did not respond to that request with either a draft order or any further affidavit material. Instead, the respondents sent numerous emails to my chambers which included various attachments and embedded links…(Emphasis added.)