TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83

Citation: TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83
Appeal from: Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1214
Parties: TCL AIR CONDITIONER (ZHONGSHAN) CO LTD v CASTEL ELECTRONICS PTY LTD
File numbers: VID 1042 of 2012
VID 1043 of 2012
VID 1044 of 2012
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, MIDDLETON J & FOSTER J
Date of orders: 26 November 2013
Date of published reasons: 16 July 2014
Catchwords:

ARBITRATION – international commercial arbitration – where appellant sought the setting-aside and non-enforcement of an arbitral award under Arts 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the ground that there had been a breach of the rules of natural justice and hence that the award was contrary to the public policy of Australia under s 19 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) – where the alleged breach of natural justice was a supposed absence of probative evidence for the arbitrators’ factual findings – consideration of whether and when such an absence would constitute a breach of natural justice in an international arbitral context – interpretation of “public policy” and “natural justice” in this context – discussion of unfairness as the basic prerequisite for the setting-aside or non-enforcement of international arbitral awards – discussion of the operation of the discretion in Arts 34 and 36.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – where UNCITRAL Model Law was the product of international negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations – whether legislation implementing the Model Law in Australia should be construed in light of reasoned foreign decisions dealing with the Model Law – discussion of the importance of uniformity of approach.

Legislation:

Constitution s 75(v)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(a), (5)(1)(h), 5(3)
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) ss 2D, 16, 19
International Arbitration Amendment Bill 1988 (Cth)
Arbitration Act 1996 (Eng) s 68
Arbitration Act 1996 (NZ) sch 1
Arbitration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance (No 64 of 1989) (HK)
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) (HK)
International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (Sing) s 24
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 (UK) sch 7

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Art V

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (As adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985, and as amended by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006) Arts 2A, 18, 34, 36

Cases cited: AJU v AJT [2011] SGCA 41; [2011] 4 SLR 739
Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corporation Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 614
Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 16
Armah v Government of Ghana [1968] AC 192
Atkinson v Hastings Deering (Queensland) Pty Ltd (1985) 71 ALR 93
Attorney General of Canada…
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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 83
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd, the appellant sought to set aside and refuse enforcement of an arbitral award under the UNCITRAL Model Law. The primary dispute centred on alleged breaches of natural justice by the arbitrators, which the appellant argued contravened the public policy of Australia under the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). The court was tasked with determining whether the absence of probative evidence for the arbitrators' factual findings constituted a breach of natural justice in the context of international commercial arbitration and whether such a breach would render the award contrary to Australian public policy.

The court examined the interpretation of “public policy” and “natural justice” within the context of international arbitration. It considered whether the absence of probative evidence for the arbitrators’ findings constituted a breach of natural justice and whether such a breach would justify setting aside or refusing enforcement of the award. The court also deliberated on the role of unfairness as a prerequisite for setting aside or refusing enforcement of arbitral awards and the discretion afforded by Arts 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Furthermore, the court considered whether Australian legislation implementing the Model Law should be construed with reference to reasoned foreign decisions to ensure uniformity in approach.

The court concluded that if the rules of natural justice were interpreted to require probative evidence for factual findings or logical reasoning for factual conclusions, it would risk undermining the international commercial arbitral system. The court emphasised that judicial review should not involve a re-examination of the factual findings of experienced arbitrators, particularly when the hearing was conducted fairly and regularly. The court found that the primary judge had undertaken a careful and correct analysis of the facts, and the appeal was essentially a disguised attack on the arbitrators’ factual findings presented as a complaint about natural justice. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the release of monies paid into court to provide security for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. Monies paid into Court to provide security for costs, pursuant to the orders of Tracey J of 26 February 2013, be released to the respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ground 8 was similar to ground 3. It challenged the primary judge’s reliance upon the importance of uniformity of decisions with those of other jurisdictions in dealing with public policy, in circumstances where the legislature had delineated (and constrained) the concept of public policy by reference to the rules of natural justice in Australia.Grounds concerning the application of the rules of natural justice to the facts here Grounds 4 to 7 took up five pages of the notice of appeal. In effect, these paragraphs were a comprehensive re-agitation of the arguments made before the primary judge as to the inadequacies of the factual findings of the arbitrators. Grounds 4, 5 and 6 concerned the asserted lack of evidence for the three critical findings: the 14% Starting Point Finding, the Uplift Finding and the Lost Sales Finding, respectively. Ground 7 dealt with the hearing rule ground, that, in the light of Mr Acton’s conceded lack of expertise, it could not reasonably be anticipated that the arbitrators would make findings as to loss other than ones based on, or in accordance with, Mr Williams’ evidence. All of grounds 4 to 7 were without merit. They involved the dressing up of complaints about the factual findings into a claim concerning asserted procedural unfairness. The primary judge (as he himself recognised) went more deeply into the facts than was necessary for the proper and efficient resolution of the matter. That is not said by way of criticism of the primary judge, who undertook a careful, and correct, analysis of the facts. Rather, it is said to make clear that nothing in the IAA is likely to permit a party to an arbitration award to spend three days before a judge arguing about the factual findings made by experienced arbitrators after a ten-day hearing, when the substance of the complaint is the evidential foundation for, and reasoning process towards, facts as found.The proper approach to ss 8(7A) and 19 in relation to natural justice and public policy It is convenient to state our conclusions immediately in order that the following discussion of the statutory and jurisprudential background be given some greater focus. If the rules of natural justice encompass requirements such as the requirement of probative evidence for the finding of facts or the need for logical reasoning to factual conclusions, there is a grave danger that the international commercial arbitral system will be undermined by judicial review in which the factual findings of a tribunal are re-agitated and gone over in the name of natural justice, in circumstances where the hearing or reference has been conducted regularly and fairly. That danger is acute if natural justice is reduced in its application to black-letter rules, if a mindset appears that these rules can be “broken” in a minor and technical way and if the distinction between factual evaluation of available evidence and a complete absence of supporting material is blurred. All these things occurred in the argument in this case. Their presence persuaded or required the judge to spend three days reviewing the award that was the product of a ten-day reference. That should not be how such a review takes place. We are not being critical of the primary judge. His reasons are careful, thorough and substantially correct. The application was a disguised attack on the factual findings of the arbitrators dressed up as a complaint about natural justice.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The complaints of TCL focus upon the method and findings of the arbitrators in coming to the view that Castel’s lost sales were not 7.4% of the OEM sales, but 22.5%.The “no evidence rule” At J[104]-[109], the primary judge set out the so-called “no evidence rule” as a part of the rules of natural justice by reference to R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 (“Moore”) at 487-488 (where Diplock LJ expressed the rules of natural justice as encompassing first the bias rule; secondly, that the decision must be based on evidence; and thirdly, that the contentions should be fairly listened to; the question of “evidence” being expressed by his Lordship as the requirement, not for the application of the rules of evidence, but for “material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence” of relevant facts); Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808 at 820-821 (where Lord Diplock, writing for the Judicial Committee, applied Moore and restated the principle therefrom); Downer-Hill Joint Venture v Government of Fiji [2005] 1 NZLR 554 at 570 [83] (where Wild and Durie JJ, sitting in the High Court, applied Mahon in the context of natural justice in the part of the New Zealand legislation equivalent to ss 19(b) and 8(7A)(b) of the IAA); Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407 at 411 (where Fox, Deane and Morling JJ were dealing with whether there was an error of law for the purposes of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44); Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2009] FCA 757; 179 FCR 437 at 503-504 [339] (where Lindgren J was dealing with whether there was an error of law for the purposes of the common law and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 5(1)(f)); and Haider v JP Morgan Holdings Australia Ltd [2007] NSWCA 158 at [33] (where Basten JA was dealing with a question of law as the basis for a review of a decision under workers compensation legislation). We will say something about this categorisation in due course. It is sufficient to note at this point that Castel did not argue, either before the primary judge or on appeal, that if the arbitrators found relevant facts without the support of probative material, that was not, nor could have been, a breach of the rules of natural justice.The application of the principle to the three impugned findingsThe 14% Starting Point Finding At J[110]-[124], the primary judge considered the attack on the arbitrators’ use of 14% as a starting point for their assessment of Castel’s lost sales. Having rejected Mr Acton’s 100% figure, they commenced with an analysis of Mr Williams’ 7.4%. The crucial paragraphs in the award concerning the finding of 22.5% (the 14% Starting Point Finding and the Uplift Finding) were A[231]-[237]. The reasoning of the arbitrators for the 14% Starting Point Finding was contained at A[231]-[234], as follows:231 What the evidence does establish is that there would have been some lost sales and brand damage from OEM sales through competing retailers, but that while some factors would suggest a significant loss of sales, others would indicate only a minimal effect.232 Factors which would suggest a minimal effect are:(a)the TCL brand and the OEM brands were sold in different retailers and in different stores;(b)if a competing store to one selling TCL products had not sold OEM products it would have stocked TCL products;(c)TCL was not such an established brand at this lower level of the market that it was at all likely that another retailer would have stocked the TCL brand had it not an OEM brand available;(d)there was no real brand loyalty to TCL at the end-user level, and accordingly a potential TCL customer in a retail outlet was likely to have bought a non-TCL brand if it was available in one retailer and not have instead sought out the TCL brand stocked by TCL’s retailers; and;(e)there was a high degree of substitutability between the TCL brand and OEM brands on one hand and competing non-TCL and OEM brands on the other, meaning that those who were potential TCL-branded products buyers had a wide selection of Level 4 and Level 5 models to choose from.233 As against those facts, there is some evidence which would suggest the impact, though not approaching the 1:1 approach of Mr Acton, was much higher than the 7.4% approach of Mr Williams:(a)Castel sold not directly to end users but to retailers, and accordingly it is the impact of OEM products on retailers rather than the impact on those retailers’ customers which must be considered.(b)Mr Francis gave evidence of a number of occasions on which he was told by former Castel customers that they would be purchasing OEM products which were TCL made, rather than TCL-branded products or that they were observing their own customers making the switch. The Tribunal accepts this evidence to the extent that some purchasers of TCL-manufactured OEM products were making those purchases because they were TCL made, so that in their absence a higher percentage of buyers might have bought the TCL-branded products.(c)Mr Francis also gave evidence, which we accept, of anger from some Castel customers that they were being under cut by other sellers who had TCL-manufactured OEM units for sale at lower prices than the TCL-branded goods, and that Castel had lost some sales where it could not meet the lower prices.(d)Mr Kwong gave evidence that Castel’s dealership network was being directly targeted by those for whom TCL had manufactured OEM products, such that the impact of TCL-manufactured OEMs fell disproportionately on Castel and its TCL-branded products.234 None of those factors are sufficiently reflected in Mr William’s evidence, which was that in the absence of the TCL OEM products Castel could have expected to gain 7.4% of the market share which those TCL OEM products had. He gave this as his best estimate on the basis that those who did not buy a TCL OEM would have bought another brand from Level 4 or level 5. In cross examination he agreed that if TCL manufactured OEM products were only competing with level 5 brands then Castel’s share would be doubled to around 14%. Mr Kwong’s evidence was that the TCL brand was at the bottom of the Level 4 market and that the TCL-made OEM products were in Level 5. We consider the 14% a better starting point for those reasons.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP CJ, MIDDLETON J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP CJ, MIDDLETON J