Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

Matter No S146/2011

BRETT ANDREW GREEN  APPELLANT

AND

THE QUEEN  RESPONDENT

Matter No S143/2011

SHANE DARRIN QUINN  APPELLANT

AND

THE QUEEN  RESPONDENT

Green v The Queen
Quinn v The Queen
[2011] HCA 49
Date of Order:  3 August 2011
Date of Publication of Reasons:  6 December 2011
S146/2011 & S143/2011

ORDER

In each matter:

1.     Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the Order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales of 17 December 2010 and, in its place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

J T Gleeson SC with D P Barrow for the appellant in S146/2011 (instructed by Legal Aid NSW)

G A Bashir with A Betts for the appellant in S143/2011 (instructed by Ford Criminal Lawyers)

C K Maxwell QC with P A Leask for the respondent in both matters (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. The primary purpose of appeals against sentence by the Attorney-General or Director of Public Prosecutions ("Crown appeals") under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) ("the Criminal Appeal Act") is "to lay down principles for the governance and guidance of courts having the duty of sentencing convicted persons."[1] That purpose distinguishes Crown appeals from appeals against severity of sentence by convicted persons, which are concerned with the correction of judicial error in particular cases. The Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under s 5D, has a discretion to decline to interfere with a sentence even though the sentence is erroneously lenient. That discretion is sometimes called the "residual discretion".

    [1]Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 at 310 per Barwick CJ; [1977] HCA 44; Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295 at 300 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; [1994] HCA 49, discussed in Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 578-584 [8]-[20] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; [2011] HCA 10. See also R v Borkowski (2009) 195 A Crim R 1 at 18 [70].

  2. In Crown appeals, circumstances may combine to produce the result that if the appeal is allowed the guidance provided to sentencing judges will be limited and the decision will occasion injustice.  Relevant circumstances include consequential disparity relative to an unchallenged sentence imposed on a co‑offender and delay in the appeal process which may be associated with disruption of the offender's progress towards rehabilitation.  In such cases it may be appropriate for a court of criminal appeal, in the exercise of its residual discretion, to dismiss a Crown appeal. 

  3. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed appeals by the Crown against sentences imposed upon Shane Quinn and Brett Green[2], participants in a substantial enterprise…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCA 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by Green and Quinn against decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, which had increased their sentences. The original sentences were imposed by the District Court of New South Wales after the appellants pleaded guilty to cultivating a large commercial quantity of cannabis. The Crown had appealed against the sentences imposed on Green and Quinn, arguing they were manifestly inadequate, but had not appealed against the sentence imposed on a co-offender, Taylor.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in allowing the Crown appeals and increasing the sentences of Green and Quinn, thereby creating a disparity with Taylor's sentence. This also involved determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeal was justified in finding Taylor's sentence manifestly inadequate, absent any submission to that effect from the Crown, and in light of the purpose of Crown appeals against sentence under s 5D of the *Criminal Appeal Act 1912* (NSW).

The High Court reasoned that the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in its approach. While acknowledging that the purpose of Crown appeals against sentence includes laying down principles for the guidance of courts, the High Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal had improperly introduced the issue of Taylor's sentence being manifestly inadequate without it being raised by the Crown. The Court noted that the Crown had not appealed Taylor's sentence and had sought to distinguish his case from those of Green and Quinn. The High Court concluded that, given the significant delays in the appellate process and the disparity that would arise from the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision, the Court ought to have exercised its discretion to dismiss the Crown's appeals.

In each matter, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, and in their place, ordered that the appeals to that Court be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

In each matter:

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the Order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales of 17 December 2010 and, in its place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Having regard to the disparity consequential upon allowing the appeals and the significant delays which occurred in the appellate process, the Court ought to have exercised its discretion to dismiss the appeals. On 3 August 2011, the High Court allowed the appeals against the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, set aside its orders and in lieu thereof ordered that the appeals to that Court be dismissed. Our reasons for joining in those orders follow. Factual and procedural background On 20 July 2009, Shane Quinn and Brett Green each pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales to an indictment alleging that between July 2007 and May 2008 he cultivated a number of prohibited plants, namely 1,354 cannabis plants, which was not less than the relevant "large commercial quantity" of 1,000 applicable to cannabis plants prescribed by the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) ("the Drug Act")[6]. The offence to which they pleaded guilty carries a maximum penalty of 5,000 penalty units and 20 years' imprisonment[7]. [6]Drug Act, s 33(4) and Sched 1.[7]Drug Act, ss 23(2)(a) and 33(1)(a) and (3)(b). On 14 August 2009, Quinn was sentenced by Boulton ADCJ to six years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years to commence on 30 April 2008 and expire on 29 April 2011. Green was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years commencing on 17 May 2009 and expiring on 16 May 2011. As appears from a statement of agreed facts before the sentencing judge, Quinn and Green took part with others, including Taylor, in a commercial enterprise for the cultivation of cannabis plants and the production of cannabis leaf for supply. One thousand three hundred and fifty four cannabis plants connected with the enterprise were seized by the police. The weight of the cannabis leaf seized exceeded 145 kilograms. Quinn was the principal of the enterprise. Green was involved "at a senior level"[8], as was Taylor. Green's position was slightly more senior than Taylor's. Taylor was, however, a significant player in the organisation and administration of the enterprise. Both he and Green were active in carrying out tasks related to the enterprise and were to be paid for their work by sharing in the cannabis leaf finally produced. [8]R v Green (2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 154 [14]. The cannabis was cultivated at a number of sites between late 2007 and 30 April 2008. The cultivation was sophisticated and involved the use of fertiliser, watering, cameras and observers. There were up to nine crop sites, and three sheds for drying the leaf. A vehicle pool was established for use by members of the enterprise. The crop was valued at $2.7 million and the harvested cannabis was worth between $1.33 million and $1.47 million. When he sentenced Quinn and Green, the primary judge had already sentenced eight other offenders involved in the enterprise, including Taylor. Taylor was sentenced on 2 June 2009 to three years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 18 months for an offence relating to the supply of a commercial quantity of a prohibited drug, contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act. The maximum penalty applicable to that offence was 3,500 penalty units and 15 years' imprisonment[9].[9]Drug Act, s 33(1)(a) and (2)(b).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ (dissent) HEYDON J (dissent) BELL J (dissent)
The Crown appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the sentences imposed on Quinn and Green on a number of grounds including: .the degree of departure from the applicable standard non‑parole period was so great that it manifested error; and .the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.The Crown did not appeal against the sentence imposed upon Taylor.The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal Hulme J wrote the principal judgment for the majority in the Court of Criminal Appeal. McClellan CJ at CL wrote a separate concurring judgment. Latham J agreed with both. Aspects of the majority's treatment of the parity principle in relation to Crown appeals have been discussed above and will not be repeated here. Hulme J held that despite subjective features favouring each of Quinn and Green, a number of matters led to the conclusion that the sentences imposed on them were manifestly inadequate[83]. Those matters included[84]: (i)the sophistication of the growing operation, its planned deliberate criminality, the quantity of cannabis and the extent of the likely rewards from the operation; (ii)the roles of Quinn and Green in the operation; (iii)the absence of circumstances mitigating the objective criminality of Quinn's offence which lay at the "mid‑point of offences of the nature charged"; and(iv)Green's offence being appreciably, though not greatly below the mid‑point.[83](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 166-167 [86]-[88].[84](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 165-166 [82]-[85]. Hulme J said that the sentence imposed upon Taylor did not give rise to a case of "strict parity" as Taylor was charged with a different offence carrying a different penalty. However, because of the similarity in the charges and the similarity of offending, particularly as between Taylor and Green, "relative parity" should be taken into account[85]. His Honour held that there was no "blanket rule that the Court could not or should not increase manifestly inadequate sentences if the result of doing so is to create disparity."[86] In a Crown appeal upon the ground of manifest inadequacy of a sentence, any disparity between co-offenders that would be created by allowing the appeal and by the unexplained conduct of the Crown in permitting that situation to arise, was a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the appeal should be allowed and the extent of any substituted sentence to be imposed[87]. However, neither the disparity nor the Crown's conduct should be a bar to the success of the appeal[88]. [85](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 168-169 [100].[86](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 177 [126].[87](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 178-179 [133]. His Honour appropriately recognised the distinction between the "residual discretion" and the sentencing discretion under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act.[88](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 178-179 [133]. His Honour said[89]: "In the case of both offenders some allowance should be made for the fact that the sentences imposed will create disparity with the sentence imposed on Mr Taylor. Particularly relevant in that connection is that Mr Taylor's sentence was so obviously manifestly inadequate that it is prima facie extraordinary that the Crown did not appeal and the Crown provided no reason why it did not." (emphasis added)As asserted in the second ground of appeal to this Court, there was no argument put to the Court of Criminal Appeal, nor any intimation made by the Court in the course of argument, to the effect that Taylor's sentence was manifestly inadequate. To the contrary, the Crown, while submitting that Taylor had been treated "leniently", sought to distinguish his position from that of Quinn and Green by reference to the different offences to which they pleaded guilty, their different levels of involvement in the enterprise and the differences in their ages – Taylor being 22 years old and Quinn and Green 32 years and 25 years of age respectively. The Crown did not submit in this Court that there had been any intimation by the Court of Criminal Appeal that Taylor's sentence should be regarded as manifestly inadequate.[89](2010) 207 A Crim R 148 at 180 [142].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.