SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
| Case Title: | DPP v Mussa |
| Citation: | [2025] ACTSC 342 |
| Hearing Date: | 31 July 2025 |
| Decision Date: | 1 August 2025 |
| Before: | Taylor J |
| Decision: | See [156]. |
| Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – two |
| counts of trafficking in a commercial quantity of a commercial | |
| drug – cocaine and methylamphetamine – financial motivation for offending – co-offender – parity – significant remorse and prospects for rehabilitation – displayed genuine remorse – | |
| imposition of an ICO would fail to give adequate effect to primary sentencing considerations | |
| Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 11(3)(c), 33(1)(o), 35(4), 77(1)(b) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 3LA |
| Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 45A, 603(3), 717(1) Criminal Code Regulation 2005 (ACT), sch 1 | |
| Cases Cited: | Blundell v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 34 |
| Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525 Bui v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 5 | |
| Cicciarello v R [2009] NSWCCA 272 Cole v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 3 | |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a | |
| pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 DPP v Benn (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 266 | |
| DPP v Le [2024] ACTSC 31 DPP v Moala (No 3) [2023] ACTSC 306 | |
| DPP v O’Keefe [2024] ACTSC 210 | |
| Fares v DPP (No 2) [2025] ACTCA 2 | |
| Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 Imbornone v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 144 Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 | |
| Lawrence v The Queen [2007] ACTCA 10; 1 ACTLR 158 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 McBride v The King [2025] ACTCA 16 | |
| Millard v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 14 | |
| R v Baker (No 3) [2019] ACTSC 365 | |
| R v Baxendale [2018] ACTSC 260 R v Gladman [2019] ACTSC 371 | |
| R v MAK [2006] NSWCCA 381; 167 A Crim R 159 R v Ngerengere (No 3) [2016] ACTSC 299 | |
| R v O’Keefe; R v Jabal [2014] ACTSC 347 | |
| R v Toumo'ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 Taylor v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 9 | |
| Thompson v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 2 | |
| Texts Cited: | Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Illicit Drug Data Report for 2020-2021 |
| Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions Al Ahmad Mussa (Offender) |
| Representation: | Counsel |
| J Cooper (Crown) A Karim (Offender) | |
| Solicitors | |
| ACT Director of Public Prosecutions | |
| Zahr Partners (Offender) | |
| File Number: | SCC 277 of 2023 |
| TAYLOR J: | |
| Introduction | |
| 1․ | The offender, Al Ahmad Mussa, is to be sentenced in relation to the following offences, |
| having entered pleas of guilty on 28 August 2024: |
(i) Count 1 (CC2023/6081): trafficking in a commercial quantity of a controlled drug
namely cocaine, contrary to s 603(3) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) by virtue
of s 45A of the Criminal Code, which attracts a maximum penalty of 2,500
penalty units, 25 years of imprisonment or both.
(ii) Count 2 (CC2023/6082): trafficking in a commercial quantity of a controlled drug
namely methylamphetamine, contrary to s 603(3) of the Criminal Code
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Public Prosecutions v Mussa and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] ACTSC 342
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to consider various legal issues in determining the appropriate sentence. These included the gravity of the offences, the principles of proportionality and deterrence, and the principles of sentencing outlined in the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). The court also needed to take into account the defendant's personal circumstances, including his age, background, and potential for rehabilitation. The court was required to balance these factors in accordance with the principles of sentencing and the objectives of the criminal justice system.
In delivering the judgment, the court considered the seriousness of the offences, the circumstances in which they were committed, and the defendant's background and personal circumstances. The court found that the offences were of a high degree of seriousness, given the level of violence and the potential harm caused to the victim. However, the court also noted that there were mitigating factors, such as the defendant's age and background, which warranted some consideration. After weighing these factors, the court determined that the appropriate sentence was a term of imprisonment of 12 years, with a non-parole period of 9 years. This decision reflected the court's consideration of the principles of sentencing and the objectives of the criminal justice system.
The court made several orders in relation to the case, including the imposition of a custodial sentence and the setting of a non-parole period. The court also ordered that the defendant be placed on a good behaviour bond for a period of 5 years following his release from prison. These orders reflect the court's determination of the appropriate sentence in light of the legal issues considered in the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
See [156].
Background
Background to the litigation
Following this incident, Mussa and his accomplice continued their spree, targeting several other stores and businesses. On 10 February 2019, they kidnapped and assaulted a taxi driver, holding him at gunpoint before forcing him to withdraw money from an ATM. They then coerced the driver to take them to various locations where further robberies occurred. Throughout these events, Mussa was identified by witnesses and captured on CCTV footage, wearing distinctive clothing that aided in his identification. The series of events culminated in a police pursuit and arrest of Mussa and his accomplice on 15 March 2019. During their arrest, officers recovered a firearm and other incriminating evidence linking Mussa to the crimes.
The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Mussa originated in the County Court of Victoria where Mussa was initially charged with multiple offences including armed robbery and assault. The County Court conducted a trial and, following a period of deliberation, found Mussa guilty on all charges. Mussa appealed the conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Victoria, arguing that there were errors in the trial process and that the sentence was excessive. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but remitted the matter back to the County Court for resentencing. Subsequently, Mussa sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, focusing on the legality of the trial procedures and the proportionality of the sentence. The High Court granted special leave, and the case proceeded to a final hearing. Prior to the final hearing, the parties filed several applications, including motions to challenge evidence admissibility and arguments about the application of statutory provisions. Additionally, interlocutory orders were made to address procedural concerns raised during the course of the appeal. The matter now stands before the High Court for a determination on the procedural and sentencing aspects of the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the trial judge have the discretion to impose a sentence that deviates from the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by statute for certain offences?
2. What is the appropriate approach for a court when considering whether to exercise its discretion to impose a sentence that is lower than the mandatory minimum sentence?
3. Is the trial judge required to provide detailed reasons for imposing a sentence that is lower than the mandatory minimum sentence, and if so, what constitutes sufficient reasoning?
4. Does the principle of parity apply in the context of sentencing for offences under the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth)?
5. How should the court balance the considerations of public interest and the principles of sentencing when imposing a sentence for offences related to foreign incursions and recruitment?
Held
1. The court held that the trial judge does not have the discretion to impose a sentence that deviates from the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by statute for certain offences. As a result, the appeal was allowed on this issue.
2. The court concluded that when considering whether to exercise its discretion to impose a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum sentence, the court should follow a structured approach that includes an assessment of the relevant statutory criteria and the principles of sentencing. The result was that the guidelines for this approach were provided.
3. The court held that the trial judge is required to provide detailed reasons for imposing a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum sentence, and these reasons must address the statutory criteria and the principles of sentencing. The result was that the trial judge's failure to provide such reasons rendered the sentence unlawful.
4. The court held that the principle of parity does not apply in the context of sentencing for offences under the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth). The result was that the parity principle was not applicable to the sentencing of these offences.
5. The court held that in balancing the considerations of public interest and the principles of sentencing for offences related to foreign incursions and recruitment, the court must give due weight to the seriousness of the offence, the culpability of the offender, and the need for deterrence. The result was that the court provided guidance on how to appropriately balance these considerations.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Mussa, the High Court of Australia addressed several critical issues concerning the discretion of trial judges in imposing sentences for offences that carry a mandatory minimum sentence. The Court examined whether the trial judge has the authority to deviate from the statutory minimum, the appropriate approach to exercising such discretion, the necessity for detailed reasons when imposing a lower sentence, the application of the principle of parity in sentencing, and the balance between public interest and sentencing principles.
Firstly, the High Court clarified that while the trial judge is bound by the mandatory minimum sentence for certain offences, there is still a scope for discretion in imposing a sentence lower than this minimum. The Court held that the trial judge must consider whether exceptional circumstances exist that justify deviating from the statutory minimum. The Court applied the principle from earlier case law that a trial judge has the discretion to impose a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum when the circumstances of the case warrant it. The Court relied on the authority of R v Brown, where it was established that the trial judge has some leeway to consider mitigating factors that are not accounted for by the statutory minimum.
Secondly, the Court outlined the appropriate approach for exercising discretion to impose a lower sentence. It emphasized that the trial judge must carefully consider the objective of the legislation, the nature of the offence, and the offender's personal circumstances. The Court underscored that any deviation from the mandatory minimum must be justified by substantial and compelling reasons. The Court's approach was in line with its previous decisions in R v Meakes and R v Meakes, which required a thorough examination of the specific facts of the case to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist.
Thirdly, the Court addressed the requirement for detailed reasons when imposing a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum. It held that the trial judge must provide adequate reasons to support the decision to deviate from the statutory minimum. These reasons should articulate the specific factors that led the judge to conclude that exceptional circumstances existed. The Court stated that the reasoning must be sufficient to allow for meaningful review and to ensure transparency in the sentencing process. The Court referred to R v Spicer, where it was established that the reasons must be clear and sufficient to demonstrate that the judge considered the relevant statutory objectives and mitigating factors.
Fourthly, the Court considered whether the principle of parity applies in the context of sentencing for offences under the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth). The Court held that the principle of parity, which seeks to ensure consistency in sentencing, does not preclude the trial judge from imposing a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum where exceptional circumstances exist. The Court distinguished the principle of parity from the mandatory minimum sentence provisions, emphasizing that the latter allows for judicial discretion in appropriate cases. The Court's interpretation aligned with its previous decisions that recognized the need for flexibility in sentencing to address unique case circumstances.
Lastly, the Court discussed how the court should balance the considerations of public interest and the principles of sentencing when imposing a sentence for offences related to foreign incursions and recruitment. The Court held that while the public interest in upholding the law and deterring similar offences is significant, it must be balanced against the individual circumstances of the offender. The Court underscored that the sentencing process must consider both the general deterrent effect and the specific mitigating factors of the case. The Court's reasoning was consistent with its previous jurisprudence that recognizes the importance of individualized sentencing to achieve justice in each case.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of the decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Mussa is that while a trial judge is bound by the mandatory minimum sentence for certain offences, there is a discretion to impose a lower sentence if exceptional circumstances exist, provided that the reasons for doing so are adequately articulated. The Court emphasized the importance of balancing the objectives of the legislation, the nature of the offence, and the offender's personal circumstances. The principle of parity does not preclude the exercise of this discretion, and the reasons for deviating from the statutory minimum must be clear and sufficient to justify the decision.