HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJTHE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS APPELLANT
AND
CHARLIE DALGLIESH (A PSEUDONYM) RESPONDENT
Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym)
[2017] HCA 41
11 October 2017
M1/2017
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 18 March 2016.
3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria for determination of the appeal against sentence.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria
Representation
G J C Silbert QC with B L Sonnet for the appellant (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Vic))
O P Holdenson QC with P S Tiwana for the respondent (instructed by Joseph Burke Law)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
KIEFEL CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ. Section 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ("the Sentencing Act") provides that in sentencing an offender a court must have regard to current sentencing practices.
In the present case, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria dismissed an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions ("the Director") against a sentence for the offence of incest. The relevant ground of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate[1]. The Court of Appeal held that the sentence was within the range indicated by current sentencing practices and, on that basis, dismissed the Director's appeal, even though the Court also concluded that this range is so low that it "reveals error in principle" in that it is not proportionate to the objective gravity of the offending or the moral culpability of the offender[2]. Given that conclusion, the Court of Appeal erred by treating the range established by current sentencing practices as decisive of the appeal before it. Accordingly, the appeal to this Court must be allowed.
[1]The Director appealed on two grounds. The second ground related to orders for cumulation, and was not the subject of appeal to this Court.
[2]Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 148 at [64], [128].
The Sentencing Act
Section 5(2) of the Sentencing Act relevantly provides:
"In sentencing an offender a court must have regard to –
(a)the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence; and
…
(b)current sentencing practices; and
(c)the nature and gravity of the offence; and
(d)the offender's culpability and degree of responsibility for the offence; and
…
(daa)the impact of the offence on any victim of the offence; and
(da)the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence; and
(db)any injury, loss or damage resulting directly from the offence; and
(e)whether the offender pleaded guilty to the offence and, if so, the stage in the proceedings at which the offender did so or indicated an intention to do so; and
(f)the offender's previous character; and
(g)the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender or…
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- Case
- [2017] HCA 41
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Court of Appeal erred in its approach to sentencing, particularly in relation to the requirement under section 5(2)(b) of the *Sentencing Act 1991* (Vic) to have regard to "current sentencing practices." Specifically, the High Court considered whether the Court of Appeal's conclusion that current sentencing practices for incest were too low, yet constrained by them, prevented it from intervening to correct an error of principle.
The High Court reasoned that while sentencing involves balancing various factors, including current practices, this does not permit an appellate court to perpetuate an error of principle. The Court of Appeal had itself recognised that the sentence imposed was significantly lower than warranted by the gravity of the offence, the respondent's culpability, and the impact on the victim, but felt bound by the perceived narrow band of current sentencing practices. The High Court held that section 5(2)(b) did not mandate adherence to sentencing practices that were themselves demonstrably too low and reflected an error of principle.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, and remitted the matter back to the Court of Appeal for a determination of the appeal against sentence, with the direction that the Court of Appeal should not be constrained by its previous interpretation of current sentencing practices.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 18 March 2016.
3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria for determination of the appeal against sentence.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KIEFEL CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ, GAGELER AND GORDON JJ