R v Craig Barton (a Pseudonym) - [2025] HCATrans 63

[2025] HCATrans 063

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M38 of 2025

B e t w e e n -
THE KING
Applicant
and
CRAIG BARTON (A PSEUDONYM)
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GORDON A‑CJ
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA AND BY VIDEO CONNECTION

ON THURSDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 2025, AT 9.29 AM

GORDON A‑CJ: In accordance with the protocol for remote hearings, I will announce the appearances for the parties.

MS E.H. RUDDLE, KC appears with MR L.C.A. McAULIFFE for the applicant. (instructed by Office of Public Prosecutions (Vic))

MS R.B. SHANN, SC appears with MR J.R. MUPRHY for the respondent. (instructed by Doogue + George Defence Lawyers)

GORDON A‑CJ: Ms Ruddle. We would be grateful if you could direct your submissions to ground 4.

MS RUDDLE: Yes, your Honours. Do your Honours wish to hear in regard to any of the other grounds, or primarily just in regard to ground 4?

GORDON A‑CJ: Primarily in relation to ground 4. If there are particular things that you really wish to say in relation to grounds 1, 2 and 3 then we, of course, will not stop you, but our primary interest for the moment is ground 4.

MS RUDDLE: Thank you, your Honour. In our respectful submission, ground 4 is not, we accept, the sort of matter that we would ordinarily bring on its own before this honourable Court. It forms part of a problematic set of decisions which form and inform the more substantive grounds of grounds 1, 2 and 3 which we rely on.

The difficulty that we submit this case presents to sentencing courts in Victoria is the issue of the assessment of intimate partner violence and its importance. Not just by reason of the numbers provided but by reason of, essentially, what conclusions have to be drawn from those decisions. That is, we would submit, that intimate partner violence does not deserve condign punishment. It is not able to hold the kind of sentences that are the subject of this appeal.

Now, no invitation was made to the applicant to address the additional grounds of rape that were the subject of the additional reductions by the court. In our submission ‑ ‑ ‑

GORDON A‑CJ: Am I right that they fall into two categories? There are those which were, as I understand it, dealt with by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that they were excessive and not the subject of submission by you.

MS RUDDLE: Yes, your Honour.

GORDON A‑CJ: And then there is another one which is reduced, and that is count 14.

MS RUDDLE: Yes, your Honour.

GORDON A‑CJ: Without the Court of Appeal identifying that it was excessive itself.

MS RUDDLE: Yes, your Honour. In our submission, there was a wholesale failure by the Court of Appeal to assess the objective gravity of each of the charges that was the subject of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Craig Barton (a Pseudonym)

Details

AGLC: R v Craig Barton (a Pseudonym) [2025] HCATrans 63
Case: [2025] HCATrans 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Craig Barton (a pseudonym), sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against decisions of the Court of Appeal. The dispute concerned the assessment of intimate partner violence in sentencing and the Court of Appeal's reduction of certain sentences imposed on the applicant. The High Court was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its assessment of the objective gravity of the offences and the appropriateness of the sentences imposed.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Court of Appeal had failed to properly assess the objective seriousness of each charge, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal had made errors in reducing sentences for certain charges, including rape and indecent assault, without adequate notice or proper reasoning, and that these reductions undermined the seriousness with which intimate partner violence should be treated by sentencing courts. A further issue was whether the Court of Appeal's reasoning, particularly concerning the assessment of intimate partner violence and the reduction of sentences for offences like indecent assault and threats to kill, established a problematic precedent for future sentencing.

The applicant's submissions contended that the Court of Appeal had fundamentally misunderstood the objective gravity of intimate partner violence, leading to an erroneous reduction of sentences. It was argued that the Court of Appeal's approach, exemplified by its treatment of charge 17 (an incident involving a victim breastfeeding three weeks post-cesarean section), demonstrated a failure to appreciate the seriousness of the offending. The applicant further argued that the Court of Appeal had reduced sentences for charges that were not the subject of appeal by the respondent, and that this was done without proper opportunity for the Crown to present arguments on their objective seriousness, including aggravating features such as the vulnerability of victims and the use of threats or violence. The applicant submitted that these reductions, particularly for indecent assault charges, effectively created a de facto maximum penalty, signalling to sentencing courts that such severe offending did not warrant significant penalties, thereby undermining the established seriousness of intimate partner violence.

The respondent argued that the case was an inappropriate vehicle for the High Court to consider broader issues of sentencing practices for intimate partner violence, particularly given legislative amendments to the sentencing regime for rape. The respondent also contended that the Crown had not adequately raised these broader issues at the trial or appellate court levels, and that the High Court was not a sentencing court equipped to undertake a broad analysis of sentencing statistics for the first time. The respondent further noted that some of the conduct in question was now covered by new offences, diminishing the utility of considering the current sentences against current sentencing practices.

Orders