SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v HCZ [2025] QCA 147
PARTIES:
R
v
HCZ
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 106 of 2024
SC No 91 of 2024DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 13 May 2024 (Sullivan J)
DELIVERED ON:
15 August 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
2 June 2025
JUDGES:
Bond and Boddice JJA and Freeburn J
ORDERS:
1. Leave to appeal sentence granted.
2. Appeal against sentence allowed.
3. The sentence below is varied such that it be further ordered that the applicant be released from detention after serving 60 per cent of the sentence of detention imposed in respect of count 2.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – JUDGE ACTED ON WRONG PRINCIPLE – where the applicant, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to one count of burglary (by breaking, in the night, while armed, in company) (count 1), one count of murder (count 2), one count of malicious act with intent (count 3) and one count of assault occasioning bodily harm, in company (count 4) – where the applicant was sentenced to detention for a period of 14 years in respect of the count of murder and lesser concurrent periods of detention in respect of the remaining counts – where no specific order was made in relation to the time to be served in detention prior to release – where the applicant was required to serve 70 per cent of the ordered detention period prior to release – where the sentencing judge found that the offence of murder was “particularly heinous” – whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the offence of murder was “particularly heinous” – whether the sentencing judge failed to give any or any adequate weight to the applicant’s pleas of guilty and personal circumstances
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was sentenced to detention for a period of 14 years in respect of the count of murder – where the applicant submits that the sentence imposed for murder was manifestly excessive as the offence did not involve an intention to kill, or do grievous bodily harm – where the basis for the plea was felony murder – whether the sentence imposed for murder was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 176, s 277
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, applied
R v Maygar; ex parte A-G (Qld); R v WT; ex parte A-G (Qld)[2007] QCA 310, approved
R v William (a pseudonym)[2020] QCA 174, approvedCOUNSEL:
A M Hoare KC, with M W Harrison, for the applicant
D Nardone for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Hannah Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
BOND JA: I have had the…
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- AGLC
- R v HCZ [2025] QCA 147
- Case
- [2025] QCA 147
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the arguments raised by the applicant, including whether the sentencing judge erred in finding the murder offence to be "particularly heinous" and whether the judge adequately considered the applicant's pleas of guilty and personal circumstances. The Court also examined whether the sentence for murder was manifestly excessive, given that the basis for the plea was felony murder, and the offence did not involve an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm. The Court found that the sentencing judge erred in finding the offence to be "particularly heinous" and failed to give adequate weight to the applicant's pleas of guilty and personal circumstances. The Court also found that the sentence for murder was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the sentence and varied the sentence to require the applicant to serve 60 per cent of the detention period imposed for the murder count before being eligible for release. The Court emphasised the importance of considering all the circumstances, including the subjective factors affecting the child, when determining the severity of the sentence for a juvenile offender. The Court also noted that the community expects offenders who commit crimes that are revolting and offensive beyond the norm to suffer a punishment that is proportional to the insult they have inflicted upon the community's sensibility.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal sentence granted.
2. Appeal against sentence allowed.
3. The sentence below is varied such that it be further ordered that the applicant be released from detention after serving 60 per cent of the sentence of detention imposed in respect of count 2.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the sentencing judge found that having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence, the applicant’s age and previous convictions and the impact of recording a conviction, it was appropriate to record convictions for each of the counts. The applicant had a criminal record which spanned some two and a-half years with a repetition of breaking into premises and houses and whilst there were indications of an ability to rehabilitate and convictions may have some future effects on employment prospects, those factors did not outweigh the factors which supported a recording of convictions for the offences.ConsiderationGround 1 Section 176(3) of the Act limits the period to which a child may be detained for no longer than 10 years, unless the offence for which the person is to be sentenced is an offence for which a person sentenced as an adult would be liable to life imprisonment and the offence involved the commission of violence against a person and the court considers the offence to be a particularly heinous offence, having regard to all the circumstances.[10] If those conditions are met, the maximum period of detention is life.[10]The Act, s 176(10); s 176(3)(b). In R v William (a pseudonym),[11] Sofronoff P observed:“[25] The word heinous is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.) to mean, ‘Hateful, odious; highly criminal or wicked; infamous, atrocious: chiefly characterising offences, crimes, sins, and those who commit them’. One might think that any act of attempted murder would be a heinous offence. That is why the word ‘heinous’ is qualified by two things. First, it is not enough for the offence to be heinous. It must be, in the court’s opinion, particularly heinous. Second, the heinousness of the offence is not to be judged by the objective facts involved in the commission of the offence only. It is to be evaluated ‘having regard to all the circumstances’.[26]All the circumstances include subjective factors. In cases involving child offenders the subjective circumstances of the offence necessarily loom large. The Charter of Youth Justice Principles set out in Schedule 1 of the Act include the requirement that a child who commits an offence should be ‘held accountable and encouraged to accept responsibility for the offending behaviour’ and should be ‘dealt with in a way that will give the child the opportunity to develop in responsible, beneficial and socially acceptable ways’. These requirements cannot possibly be satisfied if the relevant subjective factors affecting the child are ignored. Thus, for example, if William were to have been sentenced as a child, his prospects for development in a responsible, beneficial and socially acceptable way would require consideration to be given to the fact that his mental disability is one that was induced by his mother’s reckless cruelty in feeding him poisons from a young age and to the fact that, as his history before and after the offence shows, he has a huge capacity for normalising his own behaviour if afforded a sane and safe environment.[27]Why is an offender who commits an offence that is a ‘particularly heinous having regard to all the circumstances’ to be treated more severely than another offender committing the same offence but in circumstances that do not warrant that characterisation? It is because the community rightly expects that offenders who commit crimes that are revolting and offensive beyond the norm must suffer a punishment that is proportional to the insult that they have inflicted upon the community’s sensibility. That is why it was relevant for Keane JA in R v Maygar, to refer, as relevant to the question whether an offence was particularly heinous, that it did not ‘inspire a sense of outrage’.[28]The frenzied stabbing by a boy of his mother might rightly be described as heinous. But, when one has regard to the conditions which drove this offender to commit the offence, that is to say, when one has regard to all the circumstances, the character of the offence may be regarded differently and very far from an offence that is particularly heinous.”[11][2020] QCA 174 at [25]–[28].