R v Piukala; R v Taufahema

[2025] NSWDC 318

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Piukala; R v Taufahema [2025] NSWDC 318

Hearing dates:

8 August 2025

Date of orders:

15 August 2025

Decision date:

15 August 2025

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Newlinds SC DCJ

Decision:

(1)   After a 25% reduction for the early plea of guilty, the Offender, Mr Piukala, is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 22 months to date from 15 October 2024 and to expire on 14 August 2026.

(2)   There will be an aggregate non-parole period of 15 months which will expire on 14 January 2026, which is the first date the Offender will be eligible for release on parole.

(3)   After a 25% reduction for the early plea of guilty, the Offender, Ms Taufahema, is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 13 months to date from 1 June 2025 and to expire on 30 June 2026.

(4)   There will be an aggregate non-parole period of 6 months which will expire on 30 November 2025, which is the first date the Offender will be eligible for release on parole.

Catchwords:

CRIME – Drug offences – Supply prohibited drug – Large commercial quantity – Co-offenders operating small scale drug supply business – Involving various types of illicit drugs – Charged matters – Cannabis and psilocybin (“magic mushrooms”)

SENTENCING – Aggravating factors – Prior criminal history – Offences committed whilst on conditional liberty – Offences committed for financial reward

SENTENCING – Mitigating factors – Contrition and remorse – Prospects of rehabilitation – Significantly deprived upbringing engaging “Bugmy principle”

SENTENCING – Co-offenders – Parity – Co-offenders charged with same offences – Explanation for different sentences

Legislation Cited:

Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; s 21A; s 25D(2)(a)

Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) s 25(1); s 25(2)

Cases Cited:

Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571

Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462

Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120

Parente v R [2017] NSWCCA 284

R v Hamilton [20221 NSWDC 229

R v Jenkinson [2023] NSWDC 120

R v Qi [2019] NSWCCA 73

Robertson v R [2017] NSWCCA 205

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Mr Piukala (First Co-offender)
Ms Taufahema (Second Co-offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr Stainer (Solicitor) (Crown)
Mr Hughes (First Co-offender)
Mr Kondich (Second Co-offender)

Solicitors:
ODPP (Crown)
Criminal Law Group (First Co-offender)
Karnib & Co Lawyers Pty Ltd (Second Co-offender)

File Number(s):

2024/5558; 2024/5573

Publication restriction:

Nil

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. In January 2024 Mr Piukala and Ms Taufahema had been in a relationship with each other for about 10 years.

2. They were both aged 30 and had extensive criminal histories which, whilst not identical, are similar. They were both addicted to illicit drugs and had been for some time.

3. In January 2024, they were arrested and charged with the same two offences. They both pleaded guilty at the same time and now stand to be sentenced.

4. Each of them has asked me to take into account the same series of matters to be dealt with on a “form 1."

5. The objective seriousness of the offending as between the Offenders is largely identical. The distinguishing feature is that it is common ground that Mr Piukala was the instigator and that he encouraged Ms Taufahema to become involved, which she did.

6. The Offenders have both had to deal with significantly disadvantaged upbringings which, in both cases, have involved being directly and indirectly exposed to violence and other factors which led to their taking up drugs, both at a young age, which drug-use escalated over the years and, starting with Children's Court matters, both have established long and not encouraging criminal histories. They are both entitled to the full weight of the principle described in cases like Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571.

The charges

7. The Offenders have pleaded guilty to the following offences:

Seq	Offence	Section and Act	Particulars	Maximum Penalties	SNPP
1	Supply prohibited drug – small quantity-T2	s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)	14 grams – cannabis leaf 5 January 2024 at Coogee, NSW	10 years imprisonment and/or fine – 2000 penalty units	No
5	Supply prohibited drug – large commercial quantity-SI	s 25(2) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)	385.8 grams – psilocybin 5 January 2024 at Botany, NSW	Life imprisonment and/or fine – 5000 penalty units	Yes. 15 years imprisonment

8. The charges to be dealt with on a Form 1 are:

Seq	Offence	Section and Act	Particulars	Maximum Penalties	SNPP
Sequences 2, 3 and 4 - attached to Sequence 5
2	Supply prohibited drug – over indictable quantity	s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)	12.67 grams – methylamphetamine 5 January 2024 at Botany, NSW	15 years imprisonment and/or fine – 2000 penalty units	No
3	Supply prohibited drug – over indictable quantity	s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)	7.21 grams – cocaine 5 January 2024 at Botany, NSW	15 years imprisonment and/or fine – 2000 penalty units	No
4	Supply cannabis – over indictable quantity	s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)	1349.1 grams – cannabis leaf 5 January 2024 at Botany, NSW	10 years imprisonment and/or fine – 2000 penalty units	No
Sequence 8 - attached to Sequence 1
8	Deal with property proceeds of crime – <$5000	s 193C(2) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)	$5,955 (AUD) cash 5 January 2024 at Botany, NSW	3 years imprisonment	No

The facts

9. The facts have been agreed between the Crown and the Offenders in a very detailed document. In summary, they are:

Seq 1 – Supply Prohibited Drug s25(1) DMTA 1985 (14g cannabis)

10. On 5 January 2024, Ms Taufahema handed a man a yellow envelope containing 14 grams of cannabis in a vacuum sealed plastic bag in exchange for $270 in cash.

11. Police arrested and cautioned Ms Taufahema.

12. During the recorded conversation, Ms Taufahema was asked if she had any drugs in the car. She told police officers she had a needle in her handbag that contained “ice”.

13. Ms Taufahema also told police there was "a pound of pot" and "a pound of mushrooms" in the unit she shared with Mr Piukala and told officers where the substances were located. She also told officers there was also "ice” and "coke” in the unit and said where it would be found.

14. At the time of her arrest, Ms Taufahema was in possession of $1600 in cash located in a wallet.

15. Police lawfully executed a search warrant at the unit occupied by both Offenders.

16. Upon entry, officers found Mr Piukala inside the bathroom holding an unlocked Google Pixel mobile phone that was seized by police.

17. Analysis of the mobile phone identified:

1. Advertisements for the supply of cannabis, cocaine and psilocybin, offering delivery or pick up from Botany.

2. Messages consistent with the supply of prohibited drugs with references to a “Subaru" as the delivery vehicle. Ms Taufahema had been driving a Subaru when she sold the cannabis.

3. Photographs and videos appearing to depict cannabis and psilocybin sent via the encrypted "Telegram" application to prospective buyers. The flooring and kitchen benchtop depicted in the photographs appears to be the same as within the unit.

18. Mr Piukala was cautioned and arrested. He falsely told police that he lived alone at the unit.

19. The premises was lawfully searched by police. Seized items included:

1. 4 x mobile phones.

2. A packet of yellow envelopes on the dining room table similar to the yellow envelope that Ms Taufahema gave the man on 5 January 2024.

3. A small blue book containing a handwritten drug ledger in the clothes basket under the bed.

4. A coverless notebook drug ledger located in the bedroom wardrobe.

5. A safe, orange envelopes, freezer bags, small clear resealable bags, heat/vacuum sealer, used gloves, and scales.

Seq 8 - Deal with proceeds of crime s193C(2) Crimes Act 1900 ($5,955) FORM 1

20. Police located $505 in cash in the pocket of the jacket Mr Piukala was wearing when he was arrested.

21. A further $5450 in cash was seized by police in various locations throughout the unit:

Seq 2 – Supply Prohibited Drug s25(1) DMTA 1985 (12.67g methylamphetamine) FORM 1

22. Police found a total of 12.67 grams of methylamphetamine in various locations in the unit.

23. The indictable quantity of methylamphetamine is 5 grams. A commercial quantity is 250 grams.

Seq 3 – Supply Prohibited Drug s25(1) DMTA 1985 (7.21g cocaine) FORM 1

24. A total of 7.21 grams of cocaine was located at various locations in the unit.

25. The indictable quantity of cocaine is 5 grams. Commercial quantity is 250 grams.

Seq 4 – Supply Prohibited Drug s25(1) DMTA 1985 (1,349.lg cannabis) FORM 1

26. A total of 1,349.1 grams of cannabis leaf was found at various locations in the unit.

27. The indictable quantity of cannabis leaf is 1 kilogram. Commercial quantity is 25 kilograms

Seq 5 – Supply large commercial quantity prohibited drug s25(2) DMTA 1985 (385.8 grams of psilocybin)

28. A total of 385.8 grams of psilocybin (magic mushrooms) was found in various locations in the unit.

29. The indictable quantity of psilocybin is 0.25 grams, and commercial quantity is 25 grams. Large commercial quantity is 100 grams.

General approach to sentencing

Section 3A

30. It is necessary to take into account the purpose of sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Procedure Act”).

Pleas of guilty

31. The Offenders both entered pleas of guilty in the Local Court at the first available opportunity and are both entitled to a 25% discount on sentence (s 25D(2)(a)).

Standard non-parole period

32. The standard non-parole period of 15 years for the supply prohibited drug charge do not apply when an offender pleads guilty, but they are still available to be used as a guidepost for an appropriate sentence.

Sentencing principles for drug supply offences

33. When sentencing an offender for drug-supply offences, the following general principles identified in Parente v R [2017] NSWCCA 284 at [108]-[112] should be applied, namely:

1. The Court must be mindful of the general purposes of sentencing listed under s 3A of the Sentencing Procedure Act, specifically deterrence and community protection.

2. A consistent message of deterrence is necessary by sentencing Courts for offences of this kind, as is community protection a significant consideration as well.

3. The Court must remain mindful of the maximum penalties and any standard non-parole period that apply for each offence, specifically drug-supply offences which are set at a high level: R v Qi [2019] NSWCCA 73.

34. In Robertson v R [2017] NSWCCA 205 at [50], Simpson JA observed that:

““examination and analysis of sentencing practices establishes that, where the facts of an offence demonstrate drug dealing ‘to a substantial degree’, a sentence of imprisonment will ordinarily be imposed. Moreover, recognition of the serious social implications of drug dealing (reflected, if in nothing else, in the maximum prescribed sentences) suggests that, in the ordinary case, a sentence other than imprisonment will fail to meet sentencing objectives.”

Objective Seriousness

Sequence 1

35. In relation to the supply of 14 grams of cannabis on 5 January 2024, Mr Piukala was not directly involved, it was Ms Taufahema who sold the drugs.

36. However, as I have said, it is common ground that it was Mr Piukala who initiated and encouraged Ms Taufahema to do what she did. They were both involved in what was obviously a drug supply operation, albeit on a comparatively small scale.

37. There was a level of planning and sophistication involved. The drugs were the subject of “advertisements" on various messaging apps and there must have been a reasonable degree of planning involved, to the extent that the 14 grams of cannabis was packaged and concealed in an envelope.

38. As far as the form 1 offence attached to this charge is concerned, it is inherently characteristic of drug supply offences that the offender will receive or expect to receive some form of financial benefit. Whilst the amount of cash seized is not substantial, the offending took place for financial gain, albeit I think it inevitable that the intention of getting money from the sale of drugs was in large part to fund the purchase for personal use of further drugs by the Offenders.

Sequence 5

39. As far as the supply prohibited drugs charge is concerned, the drug is psilocybin, commonly known as “magic mushrooms”. There was four times the amount of the “large commercial quantity” deeming provision. Whilst the form and purity of the mushrooms are not known, it comprised four separate quantities, each packaged for commercial sale.

40. Again, the offence involved a reasonable degree of sophistication and prior planning. There were advertisements and packaging involved, and the offending took place within the offender’s unit.

41. As far as the form 1 offences attached to this charge are concerned, three additional prohibited drug types were located inside the unit in various quantities and forms of commercial packaging.

42. It has been submitted by Mr Hughes on behalf of Mr Piukala that it is significant that the drug involved is psilocybin. This submission, which appears to be supported by the known sentencing statistics, is that, generally, the use and supply of this drug is treated as less objectively serious than other drugs prescribed for the same offences.

43. As to the objective seriousness of all the offences, I consider the Offenders were engaged in a small-scale drug supply operation for commercial gain. The offending was planned and had a degree of sophistication involving advertising and messages on various messaging services. The drugs, the subject of Sequence 5, were “magic mushrooms,” but the form 1 matters involve both cocaine and methamphetamine. They are not being sentenced for those matters, but it does tend to undercut the submission that the overall criminality involved is less serious because only magic mushrooms were involved. The profit made was undoubtedly to be used in the main to fund the Offenders’ own addiction. I consider the objective seriousness to be somewhat below the middle of the range for this type of offending. Because Mr Piukala was the instigator and encouraged Ms Taufahema to offend, I consider his moral culpability to be greater and, therefore, the objective seriousness of his offending to be greater than Ms Taufahema’s.

Aggravating factors

44. Again, there is substantial similarity between the Offenders as to aggravating factors.

45. The Offenders were both on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. This is an aggravating factor: s 21A(2)(j).

46. Both of the Offenders have not insignificant criminal histories. Although, their histories have little or no offending concerning the use or supply of drugs. Again, this is an aggravating factor: s 21A(2)(d). It is fair to say that Ms Taufahema’s criminal record is not as bad as Mr Piukala’s

47. I am comfortably satisfied that the Offenders offended to obtain financial benefit for themselves, albeit against this is the matter that I am equally satisfied of, which is that they really needed the money to fund their respective drug addictions. Nonetheless, this is an aggravating factor: s 21A(2)(o).

Mitigating factors

Remorse and contrition

48. Again, there are substantial similarities.

49. The Offenders pleaded guilty at the first opportunity (s 21A(3)(k)) and have expressed remorse to both me and various third parties, which I accept.

50. They both have shown remorse and contrition, over and above the statutory discount for the early plea. This is a mitigating factor: s 21A(3)(i).

51. Both Offenders have expressed, in various ways and actions, considerable insight and remorse, and both have expressed to me a recognition that their offending, and indeed their life of persistent repeat offending to date, is directly connected to their drug use.

52. I accept both of them subjectively is remorseful and has insight into why it is that they continue to come into contact with the criminal justice system.

Deprivation in childhood

53. As I have said, the Offenders have both had profoundly difficult lives to date and their childhoods can properly be described as horrific. I will not, in deference to their privacy, set out in these reasons the details of that upbringing. Suffice to say, it well and truly qualifies, in both cases, for full application of what is known as the “Bugmy principle."

54. I do not think it appropriate, let alone possible, for me to try and judge the relative deprivation suffered by each of the offenders in their upbringing. Rather, I approach the matter that they are both entitled to the full level of leniency to which their upbringing suggests.

Individual subjective cases

55. Dealing then with the subjective features of the Offenders’ case which are distinguishable.

56. In relation to this Mr Piukala, his background is expanded upon in detail in a lengthy and helpful psychological report of Ms Ann Marie De Santa Brigida, dated 1 August 2025.

57. Some matters of note that deserve emphasis are:

1. His father passed away 10 years ago as a result of Parkinson's disease and cancer. The Offender was a carer for his father before he passed away.

2. His father had a history of significant alcohol abuse.

3. His childhood was marred by physical abuse perpetrated by his father and his older brothers.

4. He was sexually assaulted while in the Cobham Juvenile Correction Centre.

5. He has a long history of substance abuse.

6. He has been assessed to meet the criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

7. Ms Ann Marie De Santa Brigida recommends that he have a cognitive/adaptive assessment to see whether he qualifies for NDIS funding, as he requires significant assistance to help with his psychological conditions.

58. Further matters from the NSW Corrective Services Sentencing Assessment Report that deserve emphasis are:

1. He has submitted a willingness and ability to undertake community service work, and to undertake interventions to address his offending behaviour, namely engagement with residential rehabilitation and counselling services.

2. Community Corrections assessed him as suitable to undertake community service work and provided a potential supervision plan if a supervised order is made.

59. Turning then to Ms Taufahema.

60. The psychological report explains that she has a complex psychological profile that has been piloted by significant trauma and stress over the space of her life. At the time of these offences, she had significant unresolved trauma.

61. The mental condition suffered by her has resulted in her self-medicating with numerous illicit substances. She now recognises that she needs to address and treat the underlying trauma to address her addiction. She further understands that she needs professional help to effectively treat these issues.

62. Since being released on bail, Ms Taufahema has undergone significant intensive rehabilitation at the time of sentencing including:

1. Completion of a 10-week residential rehabilitation program at Jarrah House.

2. Community restorative centre.

3. Commencement at the St Vincent De Paul Society’s Continuing Coordinated Care Program.

4. Jarrah House after care extension program.

5. Through Odyssey House, she has attended 7 online SMART Recovery program sessions between 24 February 2025 and 5 May 2025.

6. Through Odyssey House, she has completed all six face-to-face Relapse Prevention Program sessions between 4 March 2025 and 6 May 2025.

Prospects of Rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending

63. Historically, Mr Piukala has not done well under supervision in the community. He breached the parole he was on at the time of this offending, not just because of this offending but also because he was not complying with treatment conditions being imposed by his parole officer.

64. As Mr Hughes, who has appeared for Mr Piukala, properly concedes, Mr Piukala’s history to date does not bode well for the future in terms of becoming drug-free. However, Mr Hughes has pointed to a number of indicators which do tend to suggest some small incremental steps in the right direction by Mr Piukala.

63. Unfortunately for Mr Piukala, he has been in custody since the time of his arrest. Because of this, he has had little opportunity to demonstrate any newfound willingness to engage meaningfully with treatment. Although, it must be said, he has, perhaps for the first time, successfully completed some courses whilst in custody.

64. In contrast, Ms Taufahema has been on bail and has taken every advantage of her conditional release since the offending. During that time, she has engaged meaningfully and enthusiastically in a series of rehabilitation programs, appears to be drug-free, and has a real determination to stay that way.

65. The Offenders are no longer a couple and, as far as the evidence goes, there is no suggestion that they propose to resume their relationship at the end of any sentences which I impose. I think this is probably a good thing for Ms Taufahema, as it will be important for her prospects of staying drug-free to not mix with criminal elements in society, which unfortunately I think is more likely if she spends time with Mr Piukala.

66. In relation to both the Offenders, the simple fact is their prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of them reoffending are inextricably tied up with their prospects of staying drug-free.

67. There is a significant difference between the two cases here and, whilst I am satisfied that Mr Piukala has some prospect of becoming drug-free, I do not think it is nearly as great as Ms Taufahema, who I think has significant prospects of staying drug-free, which means that I think that Mr Piukala has a medium likelihood of reoffending, and Ms Taufahema a significantly lesser likelihood.

Presentence custody

70. Mr Piukala has been bail refused since 5 January 2024, a period approaching 20 months. However, as I have already observed, he was on parole at the time. His parole was not just revoked because of this offending. It was also revoked because of non-compliance with parole conditions.

71. Mr Hughes has submitted, and the Crown accepts, that it would be reasonable in all the circumstances to attribute 50% of the time spent in custody to these offences and any sentence I impose will be backdated by 10 months.

72. Ms Taufahema spent five days in custody prior to being released on bail.

73. She has spent time under very stringent bail conditions, which I think can be closely equated to some form of house arrest, and a period of what might be described as quasi-custody whilst at residential rehabilitation facilities.

74. She was in those facilities for a total period of 10 weeks.

75. Mr Kondich, who has appeared on behalf of Ms Taufahema, accepts that it would not be appropriate to equate, one for one, time in residential facilities with time in custody. However, when I take into account the very stringent bail conditions which have deprived Ms Taufahema of her liberty to a large extent over the same period, I think it is appropriate to allow that full 10 weeks. Accordingly, I propose to backdate the sentence by 75 days to take into account the time actually spent in custody, quasi-custody, and under strict bail conditions.

Parity

76. What is described as the “parity principle” is an important aspect of the criminal justice system, in so far as it relates to sentencing. Without such a principle, the objects of sentencing, of consistency and equality before the law, might be lost or at least be seen to have been lost. In short, the parity principle requires the treatment of like cases alike and different cases differently: see Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462 at [28]. Unjustifiable disparity between sentences imposed upon offenders involved in the same criminal conduct is a matter that is “required or permitted to be taken into account by the court” under s 21A(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act. It is this principle which encourages courts, prosecutors, and defence counsel to make every attempt to have related offenders sentenced by the same sentencing judge, preferably at the same time.

77. The Offenders are each charged with the same offences and have both asked for the same form 1 matters to be taken into account. They were each involved in the underlying criminality in, slightly different, but substantially similar ways.

78. Accordingly, it is important when considering appropriate and just sentences for each Offender, that I endeavour to not leave either with a justifiable sense of grievance as to any difference in the outcome. If there is to be a difference, then it is important that I explain my reasons for such a difference.

Resolution

Mr Piukala

79. I accept that the objective seriousness of the offending is towards the lower end of the range. Mr Piukala has had an extremely difficult life to date and is entitled to leniency to take into account the fact that his descent into drug abuse and a life of crime was close to inevitable as a result of that upbringing. On the other hand, the very fact of that difficult upbringing makes it a harder road for him to rehabilitate and become a good and productive member of the community.

80. He has a poor criminal record which points against leniency. He was on conditional release on parole at the time of the offending, which is an aggravating factor. It also does not bode well for his future rehabilitation on any form of conditional release.

81. Unfortunately, whilst I accept that Mr Piukala is remorseful, shows insight into why he offended, and wants to become drug-free, I think his prospects of rehabilitating, becoming drug-free, and not reoffending must be guarded. I wish him well in that regard and have not given up on him. I am conscious that any significant sentence may “crush” him, in the sense of destroying any prospect of rehabilitation.

82. Mr Hughes, in very moderate but persuasive submissions, while suggesting that immediate release on conditions either by a Community Corrections Order or Intensive Corrections Order was open to me, conceded that might be considered by many to be too lenient.

83. I think that concession was well made.

84. The cases relied upon in writing by both Mr Hughes and Mr Kondich are R v Hamilton [20221 NSWDC 229, a decision of Scotting DCJ, and R v Jenkinson [2023] NSWDC 120, a decision of Bennett SC DCJ.

85. As is well understood, there is no such thing as a perfectly comparable case. The decisions relied upon are very different in terms of objective criminality and subjective case.

86. Whilst I have considerable sympathy for Mr Piukala’s plight, which I acknowledge cannot be all attributed to his own moral failings, I consider the threshold imposed by s 5 of the Sentencing Procedure Act has been crossed and that it would be inappropriate to consider the 10 months already spent in custody to be an appropriate period of full-time custody. My reasoning is, that even though general deterrence may be afforded less weight where the offender suffers from a mental condition because they are not an appropriate person to be made an example of, (see for example Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [53] and [54]), general deterrence remains a significant factor to be given weight in these types of cases.

87. The fact is the community, through Parliament, considers these offences as extremely serious. So much is obvious from the prescribed penalties. I do not feel I can ignore the aggravating factors, being the considerable criminal history, and critically to my mind, the fact that the Offender was on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. Moreover, he was also in breach of his parole for other reasons at that time.

88. It is an unfortunate for Mr Piukala that he has been remanded in custody since his arrest. This has deprived him of the opportunity to demonstrate, during that period, his commitment to become drug-free.

89. The indicative head sentences for each offence, after taking into account the matters on the form 1, that I consider appropriate are:

1. Sequence 1 – supply cannabis – 6 months fixed term of imprisonment.

2. Sequence 5 – supply large commercial quantity of prohibited drugs – 2 years and 6 months imprisonment.

90. From each of those is to be deducted 25% for the early plea of guilty which reduces each sentence to:

1. Sequence 1 – 4.5 months fixed term imprisonment; and

2. Sequence 5 – 22.5 months imprisonment.

91. I propose that the sentences be served wholly concurrently so as to result in an aggregate sentence for both counts of 1 year, 10 months, and 15 days (22.5 months), which I propose to round down to 1 year, 10 months (22 months).

92. There is no doubt in my mind that Mr Piukala would benefit from a longer period than usual on parole.

93. I propose the minimum period for him to spend in custody to be 15 months.

94. The sentences will be backdated by 10 months, so as to commence on 15 October 2024. It will therefore expire on 14 August 2026 and Mr Piukala will first be eligible for parole on 14 January 2026.

Ms Taufahema

95. Ms Taufahema has been at liberty for most of the time since her arrest, and to her credit, has taken full advantage of that opportunity and has shown a real commitment, perhaps for the first time in her life, to rid herself of the scourge of drug addiction, and to date has been successful in that regard.

96. It is for that reason that I have concluded that her prospects of being rehabilitated and not reoffending are significantly greater than Mr Piukala’s.

97. The offences for sentence and all of the criminality before me as between the Co-offenders is largely the same. Although, I do think, from a moral culpability point of view, the fact that Mr Piukala encouraged Ms Taufahema to participate in the criminality is of some significance.

98. Both Offenders have had to endure and deal with the consequences of substantially deprived childhoods, and as I have said, I think it is inappropriate for me to seek to compare those childhoods. Suffice to say, they are both entitled to the full measure of leniency provided by the law to take account of that important factor.

99. Both have substantial, but not identical, criminal records. Ms Taufahema’s is not as serious as Mr Piukala’s. Both were on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. These are both aggravating factors.

100. Taking into account the differences between the two cases which I have identified, being firstly, that, as far as objective seriousness is concerned, she was not the instigator of the criminality, but rather was led by Mr Piukala, and secondly, as to her subjective case, I think she has much better prospects of rehabilitation than does Mr Piukala, therefore her prospects of reoffending are lower, and thirdly, her less significant criminal history. Notwithstanding Mr Kondich’s submissions that an ICO would be available, I consider that a period of full-time imprisonment is necessary, so as to give necessary effect to the principles of sentencing so far as they apply in this case.

101. Ms Taufahema’s sentence will be substantially less than Mr Piukala’s. I have explained why that is so and do not believe Mr Piukala would have a justifiable grievance as to the disparity. It reflects what I consider to be the significant differences between the two cases.

102. Again, I think a substantially longer period than usual of the sentence ought be spent on parole, so as to assist her efforts to stay drug-free, and I propose to adjust the proportion significantly.

103. My indicative sentences are:

1. Sequence 1 – supply cannabis – 4 months fixed term of imprisonment.

2. Sequence 5 – supply large commercial quantity of prohibited drugs –18 months imprisonment.

104. From each of those there should be deducted 25% to give effect to the early guilty plea, which brings the head sentences down to 3 months and 13 months respectively, with some rounding in her favour.

105. Again, I consider it appropriate that the sentences be served wholly concurrently which leads to an aggregate head sentence of 13 months, to be backdated by 75 days so as to commence on 1 June 2025 and expire on 30 June 2026.

106. I think it appropriate that Ms Taufahema be eligible to be released on parole after serving 6 months. She will be eligible for parole on 30 November 2025.

Orders

107. For those reasons, my orders are as follows:

Mr Piukala

1. After a 25% reduction for the early plea of guilty, the Offender, Mr Piukala, is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 22 months to date from 15 October 2024 and to expire on 14 August 2026.

2. There will be an aggregate non-parole period of 15 months which will expire on 14 January 2026, which is the first date the Offender will be eligible for release on parole.

Ms Taufahema

1. After a 25% reduction for the early plea of guilty, the Offender, Ms Taufahema, is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 13 months to date from 1 June 2025 and to expire on 30 June 2026.

2. There will be an aggregate non-parole period of 6 months which will expire on 30 November 2025, which is the first date the Offender will be eligible for release on parole.

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Decision last updated: 16 August 2025