Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND   APPELLANT
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

AND

NADASARA RAJAMANIKKAM & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam
[2002] HCA 32
8 August 2002
S122/2001

ORDER

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Order 1 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 3 August 2000 set aside and in lieu thereof:

a)     appeal to that Court allowed;

b)     Orders 1 and 2 made by Einfeld J on 19 November 1999 set aside; and

c)   application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of 29 September 1998 dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

J Basten QC with S B Lloyd for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

D K Catterns QC with N C Poynder for the respondents (instructed by Craddock Murray Neumann)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   This appeal concerns the meaning and effect of provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") relating to judicial review of administrative decisions by the Federal Court of Australia on the ground that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision in question. Those provisions have since been repealed. Even so, the case is of general importance, because they are to the same effect as provisions in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("the ADJR Act").

  2. The respondents, husband and wife, are citizens of Sri Lanka. They arrived in Australia in May 1996, and applied for protection visas under the Act. Their contention was that the first respondent was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations on the ground that he was a refugee within the definition of the Refugees Convention and Refugees Protocol, having a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka. The applications were refused by a delegate of the appellant. The respondents appealed to the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate. The respondents applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. They were successful, both at first instance before Einfeld J, and later before the Full Court (Kiefel, North and Mansfield JJ)[1].

  3. The decision of the Full Court was based upon narrower grounds than that of Einfeld J.  The present appeal concerns only the reasoning of the Full Court, and that Court's conclusion that the "no evidence" ground of judicial review of the Tribunal's decision had been made out.

  4. The decision of the delegate was made pursuant to s 65 of the Act, which provides that if, after considering a visa application, the Minister is satisfied that the relevant criteria have been met, the visa is to be granted, and if the Minister is not so satisfied, the visa is to be…

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Details
Case
[2002] HCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The dispute concerned the Refugee Review Tribunal's refusal of a protection visa and refugee status to the respondent, Dr Rajamanikkam, a Sri Lankan national. The Tribunal had concluded that Dr Rajamanikkam's claims of persecution were concocted, based on several factors that undermined his credibility.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the scope of the "no evidence" ground of review under sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine whether an adverse credibility finding by the Tribunal could be invalidated if it was based on a particular fact that, upon judicial review, was found not to exist or to be unsupported by evidence, and if that fact was critical to the Tribunal's decision. This involved distinguishing between a merits review of factual conclusions and a judicial review of administrative decisions on statutory grounds.

The High Court reasoned that the "no evidence" ground of review, as interpreted in the context of sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4) of the *Migration Act*, required the court to identify whether a specific factual finding made by the Tribunal was demonstrably absent from the evidence before it, and whether that non-existent fact was critical to the Tribunal's ultimate decision. The court noted that the Full Court had found that the Tribunal had misunderstood an answer given by Dr Rajamanikkam regarding the security situation in Point Pedro, attributing to him a denial that had not been made. This misapprehension of evidence, the High Court agreed, constituted a factual error that was critical to the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding and thus fell within the "no evidence" ground of review.

The High Court allowed the Minister's appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court. Consequently, the application for review of the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Order 1 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 3 August 2000 set aside and in lieu thereof:

a) appeal to that Court allowed;

b) Orders 1 and 2 made by Einfeld J on 19 November 1999 set aside; and

c) application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of 29 September 1998 dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge had reached similar conclusions with respect to other facts upon which the Tribunal member had based his decision. However, after special leave was granted to the Minister to appeal to this Court, no notice of contention was filed for the respondents seeking, upon grounds different from those upheld by the Full Court, to sustain the orders requiring redetermination of their combined application for review by the Tribunal. In particular, the respondents did not seek to restore the conclusions of the primary judge with respect to the other factual findings that he decided had been flawed for want of evidence. In this way, the present appeal has been confined to consideration of the legal effect, under s 476 of the Act as it previously stood, only of the concurrent findings of factual error in which the primary judge and the Full Court had agreed. As the argument developed, the entitlements of Mrs Rajamanikkam were treated as dependent upon the outcome of Dr Rajamanikkam's arguments. She sought a protection visa as a member of the same family unit as her husband[35].[35]Rajamanikkam (2000) 179 ALR 495 at 497 [2].The relevant facts Dr Rajamanikkam was born in Sri Lanka in 1921. He is a retired medical practitioner. He has two daughters living in Australia. He claims to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol ("the Convention"). In accordance with the Convention definition of "refugee", incorporated in the Act, Dr Rajamanikkam claimed that he feared persecution "both from the Sri Lankan authorities because of his perceived association with the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], and from the LTTE because he is perceived by them to be a moderate Tamil"[36].[36](2000) 179 ALR 495 at 497 [7]. For most of his life Dr Rajamanikkam lived and worked in Point Pedro, a town near Jaffna, in the north of Sri Lanka. However, in 1992 he moved to Trincomalee, a district to the south of Jaffna, principally inhabited by ethnic Tamils. The Tribunal dismissed the claim by Dr Rajamanikkam that he was "of interest" to the Sri Lankan authorities or the LTTE or other Tamil militants. It concluded that he had "concocted his primary claims". In giving its reasons for this opinion, the Tribunal said:"The Tribunal had a number of concerns with the applicant's claim that he was of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities. … There are a range of factors, which when considered together, and while allowing for difficulties with translation and the applicant's age, lead the Tribunal to doubt the applicant's credibility. It is the number of difficulties with his evidence which in the end tell strongly against the applicant's credibility." The Tribunal identified eight "factors" as leading to this conclusion[37]. It is the first and fifth of those factors which the Full Court found to have been flawed, and indeed mistaken, to the extent that they represented "particular fact[s] [which] … did not exist" upon which the Tribunal, making the decision in Dr Rajamanikkam's case, had "based the decision" within the meaning of s 476(4)(b) of the Act, as it then stood.[37]Set out in the reasons of Gaudron and McHugh JJ at [69].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ HUGH JJ KIRBY J CALLINAN J
The Tribunal set out in detail its reasons for disbelieving the first respondent, listing, and explaining, eight factors which constituted what had earlier been described as "difficulties with his evidence". The Full Court analysed each of those factors. It concluded that, in relation to two of them, the reasoning of the Tribunal involved not only error, but error of a kind that was covered by the ground of judicial review invoked by the respondents.The decision of the Full Court The Federal Court was not conducting what is sometimes called a merits review of the kind that had been conducted by the Tribunal in relation to the decision of the delegate. What was involved was judicial review of an administrative decision upon statutory grounds; hence the need for the Full Court to express its conclusions in a fashion that brought them within the statutory rubric. This explains what might otherwise appear to be a surprisingly oblique manner of expressing disagreement. Of the eight factors referred by the Tribunal in explaining why it did not accept the first respondent as a credible witness, the Full Court found relevant error in part of factor one, and in factor five. In each case, the error consisted in attributing to the first respondent a representation which the Tribunal regarded as misleading, but which the Full Court found had not been made. Factor one involved what the Tribunal regarded as misleading information given by the first respondent to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in respect of two matters: the payment of a pension; and the security situation that applied in Point Pedro. It is the second matter that assumed significance in the Full Court. Its connection with the first respondent's claims arose out of the Tribunal's suggestion that, although the LTTE had at one time occupied Point Pedro, they had been cleared out of the area by government forces, and if the first respondent returned there he would have nothing to fear. The Tribunal attributed to the first respondent a denial that Point Pedro had been taken over by government forces. It then said: "The Tribunal is of the view that in relation to his evidence to the Department concerning … the security situation in Point Pedro the applicant was attempting to give misleading evidence which would raise concerns about whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to return to Jaffna/Point Pedro or otherwise relocate." The Full Court found as a fact that the first respondent had not denied that Point Pedro had been taken over by government forces. The Tribunal was found to have misunderstood an answer given by the first respondent. The Court said: "It does appear that the tribunal erroneously understood that the [first respondent] had said 'no' rather than 'now' when asked whether Point Pedro was being taken over by the Sri Lankan government. There was no evidence from the [first respondent] denying that Point Pedro had been taken over by the Sri Lankan government. The tribunal attributed that denial to him. The fact that he denied that to the department is a fact which did not exist."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, HUGH JJ, KIRBY J, CALLINAN J