Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CZBP

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CZBP [2014] FCAFC 105

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CZBP [2014] FCAFC 105
Appeal from: CZBP v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 659
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v CZBP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: ACD 27 of 2014
Judges: GORDON, ROBERTSON AND GRIFFITHS JJ
Date of judgment: 22 August 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a Protection (Class XA) visa – the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the visa – decision of Tribunal set aside by Federal Circuit Court for jurisdictional error – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether the primary judge erred in finding jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 422B, 425, 430
Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510
Cachia v Hanes [1994] HCA 14; (1994) 179 CLR 403
FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26; (2014) 88 ALJR 754
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 136 ALD 547
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16; (2014) 309 ALR 67
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; (2009) 259 ALR 429
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40; (2009) 238 CLR 642
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108; (2010) 187 FCR 362
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2002] HCA 32; (2002) 210 CLR 222
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405; (2000) 168 ALR 407
SZBJW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1356
WAJR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 106; (2004) 204 ALR 624

JD Heydon, LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence (at 1 August 2014) at [13015], [15160]   

Date of hearing: 6 August 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 111
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Lloyd SC with Mr J Smith
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hughes
Solicitor for the First Respondent: D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 27 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection sought to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) that had affirmed the decision of the Minister's delegate not to grant the visa applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa. The Federal Circuit Court had found that the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the visa applicant's evidence, particularly in relation to the evidence provided by her family members and the documentary evidence she provided regarding her conviction and sentence. The central legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Circuit Court was correct in finding that the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the evidence, and if not, whether the Tribunal's decision should be upheld.

The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the evidence provided by the visa applicant's family members. The Tribunal had dismissed the family members' evidence without proper evaluation, solely based on their relationship with the visa applicant. This approach was found to be flawed as it did not undertake the proper evaluative task required by statute. The court also found that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the documentary evidence provided by the visa applicant regarding her conviction and sentence. The Tribunal had misunderstood the nature of the claim and did not adequately consider the distinctive aspects of the visa applicant's claim as revealed in the documentary evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part. The court set aside the order made by the Federal Circuit Court that the visa applicant pay the costs of the respondent and ordered instead that the respondent pay the visa applicant's costs, given that she was self-represented. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the visa applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal. The decision underscores the importance of proper evaluative assessment of evidence by the Tribunal, and the necessity for the Tribunal to adequately consider the distinctive aspects of a visa applicant's claims as revealed in the documentary evidence provided.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed in part.

2. Order 4 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 4 April 2014 be set aside and, in its place, order that the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs on the basis that she was self-represented.

3. Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Minister accepted that the Tribunal’s consideration at [91] did not extend to the visa applicant’s claim also to have received the court documents by post from her lawyer in Iran. We accept the visa applicant’s submission that once that concession is made the fact that an email did not appear to the Tribunal to have any attachments cannot be a rational basis for concluding that the documents sent by post did not originate in Iran. The Tribunal has not taken that material into account in reaching its conclusion in [91]. It is not to the point that [90], and the conclusions in it, might extend to the court documents claimed by the visa applicant to have been sent by post since the conclusion at [91] is one of the conclusions which, “taken collectively” at [95], led the Tribunal to reject the entirety of the visa applicant’s claims.Giving no weight to the evidence of the visa applicant’s son, daughter and son-in-law It will be recalled that at [94] the Tribunal said it placed no weight on the evidence of the visa applicant’s son, daughter and son-in-law for the reason that, because of their relationship with the visa applicant, they “have a strong motivation to give evidence to assist her case”. In turn that conclusion informed the Tribunal’s later conclusion at [94] that the visa applicant was unable to provide any probative evidence about her relationship with Hamid beyond her own assertions, thus leading the Tribunal to conclude that the visa applicant did not live in a de facto relationship with Hamid. The daughter, son and son-in-law had each sworn statutory declarations and the son and son-in-law had also given oral evidence. In our opinion, so to deal with this evidence, that is, without any evaluation of its content, is not to review the visa applicant’s claim. This corroborative evidence was an essential part of her claim and the dismissing of it by reason of the witnesses’ relationships with the visa applicant was, as the Tribunal said, a central matter in the finding of the Tribunal that the visa applicant did not live in a de facto relationship with Hamid. In turn, this was a reason of substance in the Tribunal finding that the two subpoenas and the verdict provided by the visa applicant to the Tribunal were not genuine documents. The Tribunal did not deal on the merits with the evidence that these people spoke to the visa applicant and Hamid together many times and for lengthy periods on Skype or with the evidence that the son was contacted by the visa applicant’s Iranian lawyer, whose name he gave, when the visa applicant was detained some one and a half years before. As we have said, the Minister relied on JD Heydon, LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence (at 1 August 2014) at [13015] which, of course, is concerned with the rules of evidence. Chapter 7 is concerned with the competence and compellability of witnesses. The paragraph is found in the historical introduction and after dealing with non-Christians and convicts the following appears:C – INTERESTED PERSONS Until the nineteenth century, those who had a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the proceedings were incompetent to act as witnesses in them. In the middle of the nineteenth century the legislature abolished incompetence through interest except in the case of the parties and their spouses. Interest is now something which only affects the weight of a person’s evidence.(Footnotes omitted)The footnote to the final sentence states relevantly that the fact that a witness has a motive for falsifying evidence may provide a reason for a judge, as a matter of prudence, seeking corroboration or warning the jury to scrutinise the evidence with care. There is a reference to [15160] in a chapter entitled “Corroboration” and dealing in that context with disputed confessions, which includes the following:The inflexibility of the old rules and the change in attitude demonstrated by the judges and legislatures of the last decades have caused the courts to approach the question of unreliability of witnesses on an individual basis and by requiring a warning to the jury which is tailored to the particular evidence in question and directed to the care with which it must be approached by the jury. …

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal’s decision and written statement must comply with s 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which provided:430 Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions etc.(1)Where the Tribunal makes its decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written statement that:(a)sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and(b)sets out the reasons for the decision; and(c)sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and(d)refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based.… It will be necessary to return to s 430 of the Act when considering the Tribunal’s decision.Proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court On 23 October 2012 the visa applicant applied for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal. The grounds of her application were: (i) The Tribunal didn’t ask me to documents email [sic] which was needed;(ii)The Tribunal didn’t consider my medical conditions, even though I provided doctor certificate;(iii)I had witness present in my court who are ready to testify my words but the Tribunal never asked me to present them. The primary judge said that in a lengthy, hand-written statement attached to the application, the visa applicant expanded upon the grounds of review and contended, in summary, that:(a)the visa applicant had witnesses available in Iran who could give evidence on her behalf but she did not know that calling them was possible;(b)in part because the Tribunal did not accept the visa applicant’s medical certificate, the Tribunal was biased against her because it had already made up its mind in relation to the visa applicant;(c)the Tribunal did not respond (properly or at all) to the visa applicant’s offer to ensure that the email from her lawyer in Iran, and its attachment, were translated and forwarded to the Tribunal, which led the Tribunal to form an inaccurate view of the visa applicant’s evidence/credibility;(d)the visa applicant feared for her safety if she returned to Iran because, as a woman, she contended that she is discriminated against by Mullahs in that country. Early in the reasons, in relation to the evidence from the family members, the primary judge said the Tribunal did not undertake any evaluative assessment of their evidence, but rather dismissed all the family evidence out of hand because it could not (or would not) be reliable or accurate. In not undertaking that evaluative course, the process was necessarily flawed. True it was that the Tribunal heard from two members of the visa applicant’s family, which it noted at [65]–[70]. However, such references apart, the next reference was the finding or ruling, at [94], rejecting the evidence from family members for the reason there given of their “strong motivation to give evidence to assist her case.” Put in more conventional terms, the primary judge said, the failure properly to evaluate the evidence of the visa applicant’s family members, rather than to make (as it did) a blanket assertion that imputed necessary and fatal bias on their part in favour of the visa applicant, indicated that the Tribunal failed in its statutory task to review the evidence and relevantly come to a “state of satisfaction” in its conclusion. The primary judge, at [67], said in this respect that in his view the Tribunal did not undertake the proper evaluative task.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The visa applicant submitted a further matter arose from the verdict document in connection with the sentence that the visa applicant claimed to have received. The verdict referred to “article 22 of Islamic penal rules and calculation of apprehension period”. The Tribunal did not appear to have considered these words or their significance. The visa applicant submitted the Tribunal’s task was to consider her claims and evidence. Where a visa applicant was unrepresented, significant aspects of the claims were only likely to be revealed in the evidence or information put before the Tribunal by the visa applicant: SHKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 545 at [24] (affirmed in SHKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 11). In the present case, the documentary material put forward by the visa applicant revealed a different claim to the one that the Tribunal considered. The documentary material revealed the claim that the visa applicant had been tried and convicted of a composite or multiple offence, and then received a sentence that was calculated by reference to an “apprehension period”. The Tribunal misunderstood this claim and did not consider it. That was most clearly revealed at [91], where the Tribunal spoke of “the penalty” for an “unmarried adulteress”. Properly understood, the claim was not so limited.ConsiderationThe verdict It will be recalled that, at [90], the Tribunal gave as one reason for finding that the two subpoenas and the verdict provided by the visa applicant were not genuine documents the discrepancy between the visa applicant’s sentence as set out in the verdict as against the penalty in article 88 of the Penal Code. The Tribunal placed considerable weight on this issue, it said. The assumption made by the Tribunal involved, in our view, accepting provisionally that the verdict was not a forgery in order to take account of its contents and make a comparison with article 88 of the Penal Code, which the Tribunal had put to the visa applicant at [43]. However, on this assumption, the difficulty is that the Tribunal did not attempt to deal with what was said in the verdict, that is that the visa applicant was guilty in accordance with article 52 of the Islamic penal rules and also in compliance with article 22 of the Islamic penal rules and calculation of apprehension period and according to virtue 7 of article 10 of the civil and Islamic offences rules. The content of the verdict was an essential part of her claim and the difference between the sentence set out in it and the penalty stated in article 88 of the Penal Code was, as the Tribunal said, a matter of considerable weight in finding that the verdict was a forgery. It must be assumed that the reasoning in [90] discloses the Tribunal’s entire reasoning process on this issue as the Tribunal has an obligation to give its reasons: s 430 of the Act. It is one thing to reason from a comparison of the substance of the sentences and to say that no examples had been found of a punishment of above 100 lashes under article 88 of the Islamic penal rules (compare Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 (Yusuf) at [91]) but there is a missing step which is to form a view, one way or the other, about the three articles of the rules on which the visa applicant relied. This shows, in our opinion, that the Tribunal did not review this distinctive aspect of the visa applicant’s claim and thereby constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction. We say this not as a matter of a review of the merits but by virtue of a failure of the process by which the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion: see Abebe at [195] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; SZJSS at [36].