Zyfi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zyfi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 978

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430, 476

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405 cited
Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 615 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al‑Miahi [2001] FCA 744 applied
Jegatheeswaran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 865 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li (2000) 176 ALR 66 cited
Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 368 cited
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 58 ALD 352 explained

PELLUMB ZYFI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 578 OF 2000

SUNDBERG J
26 JULY 2001
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V578 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

PELLUMB ZYFI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V578 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

PELLUMB ZYFI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE:

26 JULY 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Albania who arrived in Australia on a visitor’s visa in June 1997 and on 31 July applied for a protection visa. The visa was refused by the Minister’s delegate, and that decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision under Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958.

    APPLICANT’S CLAIMS

  2. In his application form the applicant claims that during the March 1997 civil war in Albania he was called‑up for military service.  He refused to comply as he did not wish to shoot fellow Albanians.  He said that in March 1997 his brother was in the army doing his basic service training, and during the civil unrest was forced into riot control and ordered to fire on unarmed civilians.  His brother became involved in the unrest and killed two officers who were ordering army personnel to kill civilians.  His brother also killed another soldier, but refused to kill fellow civilians.  The applicant says his brother was then killed and the secret police targeted the applicant’s family, whose house was bombed by the authorities.  The applicant split his family (wife and two children) up among friends and travelled to Macedonia where he left for Australia.  He claims that if he returns to Albania he will be killed like his brother by…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 978
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Zyfi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Zyfi, challenged the decision of the Tribunal regarding his application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had failed to adequately consider certain evidence and make specific findings, which led to an incorrect outcome in his case. The legal issues in the case involved whether the Tribunal was obliged to refer to certain evidence, whether the Tribunal was required to make specific findings, and whether the Tribunal's decision was based on supposed facts that did not exist.

The court examined the applicant's arguments and found that the Tribunal was not obliged to refer to certain evidence, nor was it required to make specific findings. The court relied on previous cases, such as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham, to support its position that the Tribunal is not obliged to expressly reject or refer to evidence that is inconsistent with its findings. Furthermore, the court held that the Tribunal was entitled to assume the existence of a subjective fear of persecution and assess whether any such fear would be well-founded, as demonstrated in Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

Regarding the supposed facts that the Tribunal's decision was based on, the court found that the applicant's arguments did not hold up to scrutiny. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not based on the supposed facts that did not exist, as it could not be established that those facts were not susceptible of disproof by the calling of evidence. The court distinguished the case from the earlier case of Guden, where the fact that did not exist was related to the construction of a question posed in a form, which required a specific answer from the applicant.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court found that the applicant's arguments did not succeed in establishing that the Tribunal had made an error in its decision, and therefore, the application had to be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant complained of a failure by the Tribunal to refer to certain parts of the evidence ‑ a newspaper article, an explanation by the applicant for the outdated country name on the call‑up notice, and the seal on the notice displaying the current name. The Tribunal is not obliged expressly to reject or refer to evidence that is inconsistent with its findings: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 at [46], [56], [93] and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405 at [64]‑[65]. In fact the Tribunal did refer to the newspaper article and gave reasons for concluding that it was unreliable (pages 20‑21). The applicant also contended that the Tribunal failed to address or make findings in relation to the applicant’s subjective fear of persecution. The Tribunal was not obliged to make such a finding. It was entitled to assume the existence of a subjective fear and then assess whether any such fear would be well‑founded: Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 615 at [40]. That is what the Tribunal did here. See par 6 above and page 24 of the Tribunal’s reasons. Finally it was contended that the Tribunal failed to make a finding on the applicant’s claim that the Democratic Party opposition was still calling on the government to prosecute people who disobeyed orders during the time of national emergency. The Tribunal was not obliged to make such a finding: Yusuf. In any event, since the Tribunal clearly rejected the claim that there was a call‑up in March 1997, this particular claim did not raise a question of material fact.No evidence ‑ s 476(1)(g) The submission here is that the Tribunal’s decision was based on the following supposed facts that did not exist:·the documents relating to the death of the brother and the bombing of the house had all been typed on the same typewriter with a smudged letter “a”·the translation of the Summons had not been prepared by the translator who had prepared the other translations·documents from Albanian government departments would always be typed on official letterhead·documents from Albania would always be typed in Albanian script·a person could not be summoned to an Albanian court by means of a photocopied pro forma. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al‑Miahi [2001] FCA 744 at [35] a Full Court said:“The application of s 476(1)(g) and s 476(4)(b) in any particular case requires the following steps:·A relevant particular fact first must be identified.·Then it is necessary to determine whether there was any evidence before the Tribunal to justify a finding of that fact. If there was such evidence, the ground cannot be made out.·If there was no such evidence, it is next necessary to apply the second limb of (4)(b). If there is no evidence, on review, to show that the fact did not exist, the ground cannot be made out.·If there is evidence, on review, to show that the fact did not exist, it is then necessary to apply the first limb of (4)(b). That requires an analysis of the Tribunal’s reasoning to determine whether its decision was based on that fact.”See also Jegatheeswaran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 865 at [31].

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J (dissent)
Attractively and persuasively though the submission was put by Mr Palmer, who appeared pro bono for the applicant, I am unable to accept that the third, fourth and fifth supposed facts are analogous to the supposed fact in Guden. The Guden fact was not susceptible of disproof by the calling of evidence. On the other hand, if it is the case that documents emanating from Albanian government departments are often typed on plain paper without an official letterhead, and are often not typed in Albanian script, evidence to that effect could have been led. Similarly, if persons are often summoned to Albanian courts by means of photocopied pro forma documents, that could have been the subject of evidence. The initial submission in which the applicant in Guden did not mention his early political involvement was his application for a protection visa. The Court pointed out that the only relevant question in the application form (which asked the applicant a number of questions he was required to answer) was “Why did you leave that country?”. The Court was of the view that this required an answer which referred to the events that crystallised the decision to leave, or acted as a catalyst in the appellant making that decision. It did not call for an historical explanation going back over twenty years. The Court concluded (at [17]):“Thus, the fact which did not exist was the fact that the appellant was required to set out, in effect, the whole of his case which bore upon the issue of his political persecution.”In other words, the decision was based on the construction of the question posed in the form. The question did not require the applicant to tell his life story, only why he decided to leave Turkey at the time he did. As a result of the Court’s conclusion as to the construction of the question in the form, it was able to say that the fact that did not exist was that the appellant was required to set out the whole of his political persecution case in answer to the question why he left Turkey. Contrary to Mr Palmer’s submission, there was thus no unarticulated generalisation on the Tribunal’s part that “an applicant is required to set out, in his or her initial application, the whole of his or her case which bears upon the issue of his or her political persecution”.CONCLUSION The application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.