Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rahman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 368

MIGRATION – meaning of “decision” in s 476(1)(g) Migration Act 1985 (Cth) – relationship between s 476(1)(g) and s 476(4) – whether decision regarding objective basis for fear of persecution affected by error of law within the meaning of s 476(1)(e)

WORDS AND PHRASES – “error of law”, “decision”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 430(1), 476(1)(e), 476(1)(g), 476(2), 476(4)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(2)(g), 6(2)(g)

Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 referred to
Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 264 applied
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Li Yue [2000] FCA 856 applied
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 applied
Australian Broadcasting Tribunalv Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274 referred to

MD MAZIBAR RAHMAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1076 OF 2000

GYLES J
SYDNEY
3 APRIL 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1076 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MD MAZIBAR RAHMAN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 APRIL 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant to pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1076 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MD MAZIBAR RAHMAN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE:

3 APRIL 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application to review the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 25 August 2000 (handed down on 13 September 2000), whereby the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs not to grant the applicant a protection visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. The applicant, who is a citizen of Bangladesh, arrived in Australia on 10 April 1999, and lodged an application for a protection visa on 12 April 1999.  The delegate refused the application on 22 April 1999, and on 17 May 1999 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision.  The essence of the applicant’s case was that he feared that he would be subjected to persecution (in the form of violence) by the supporters of the Awami League political party by reason of his support for and association with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) if he returned to Bangladesh. 

  3. The applicant made various claims which were rejected by the Tribunal, and no complaint is made about that.…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 368
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant contested the decision of the Tribunal not to grant him a protection visa, arguing that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the evidence and the application of relevant legal principles. The applicant, a Bangladeshi national, alleged that he faced persecution in his home country due to his political affiliations and activities. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the Tribunal's decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to determine whether the Tribunal's findings were legally sound.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's finding that the attacks on the applicant were not specifically targeted at him was supported by evidence, and whether the Tribunal correctly applied the "real chance" test from the High Court decision in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's conclusion regarding the nature of the attacks was not reasonably open and that the Tribunal failed to properly apply the real chance test. The respondent contended that the Tribunal's decision was supported by evidence and that no legal error was made.

The court examined the evidence presented to the Tribunal and found that while there was some basis to suggest that the applicant was targeted during a political event, there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the attacks were impersonal. The court noted that the Tribunal's finding was not supported by any evidence or other material, which meant that the decision was not reasonably open. However, the court held that this did not necessarily constitute an error of law under s 476(1)(g) of the Act, as the Tribunal's ultimate decision was based on the applicant's subjective fear rather than the specific finding regarding the nature of the attacks. Regarding the application of the real chance test, the court found that the Tribunal had considered the political situation in Bangladesh and the applicant's political profile, leading to a factual conclusion that there was no real chance of persecution. The court concluded that while the applicant's arguments had some merit, the Tribunal's decision involved no error of law.

The court dismissed the applicant's appeal and ordered that the application be dismissed with costs. The applicant was required to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant to pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant, Rahman, appealing a decision by the Tribunal not to grant him a protection visa. The Tribunal's decision was based on findings that the attacks on Rahman were the result of broad disputes and not specifically targeted at him, and that there was no real chance of persecution based on the political situation in Bangladesh and Rahman's profile. The applicant contested the Tribunal's findings on two grounds: first, that the finding regarding the nature of the attacks was not reasonably open as there was no evidence or material to justify it, and second, that the Tribunal erred in law by not applying the decision of the High Court in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs to the facts as found.

The matter came before the court as an appeal against the decision of the Tribunal not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The Tribunal had previously considered the application and made findings that were challenged by the applicant on appeal. The appeal was heard by the court which assessed the merits of the arguments presented by both the applicant and the respondent. The court examined the evidence and legal arguments to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was correct and whether there were any errors of law.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As the applicant’s case was ultimately framed (after amendment), it had two limbs:1.The finding that the attacks on the applicant which were accepted to have occurred were the result of broad disputes and not specifically targeted at him was not reasonably open as there is no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision, contrary to s 476(1)(g) of the Act;2.That, whether or not the first argument is successful, the Tribunal erred in law by not correctly applying the decision of the High Court in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (“Chan”) to the facts as found by it, contrary to s 476(1)(e) of the Act.NO EVIDENCE A short answer to the applicant’s contention would be if, as submitted by counsel for the respondent, there were evidence or other material to justify the impugned finding. Counsel for the respondent has referred me to passages from material cited by the Tribunal in its decision from answers provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, from the 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and an earlier United States Department of State Report. I can see that those passages might, at a stretch, form a basis for finding that the incident in which the applicant says he was shot at was impersonal in the sense that he was targeted because he happened to be speaking at a political meeting rather than because of his identity. I cannot, however, see that this material provides any basis at all for describing the physical attack upon him in that way. This conclusion necessitates a closer look at the application of s 476(1)(g) and s 476(4) of the Act. I do so on the basis that the Tribunal accepted the existence of the relevant subjective fear by the applicant and that what was at issue was the objective basis for that fear. The essence of the decision of the Tribunal was that the fear was not objectively well founded. In the present case, that finding is the basis for the finding that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations which, in turn, was the basis for the actual decision to affirm the decision not to grant a protection visa. The difficulties of making out the requirements of s 476(1)(g) by an unsuccessful applicant before the Tribunal who has failed to satisfy the Tribunal as is necessary are obvious. The issue was noted, but did not need to be resolved, by the Full Court in Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 264 at par 20 (“Mohammed”) (see also Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Li Yue [2000] FCA 856 at pars 53 and 54). The argument for the applicant was that the finding about the nature of the incident in 1994 to which I have referred, and which I agree was not supported by any evidence or other material, was part of the chain of reasoning of the Tribunal which led to the ultimate reviewable decision which therefore was based upon that finding for the purposes of s 476(4)(b). It was not agreed on behalf of the respondent that the finding is a finding as to the existence of a particular fact which did not exist within the meaning of s 476(4)(b). My own inclination is to think that the finding made here is not of a particular fact within the meaning of s 476(4)(b). The Tribunal found that the primary facts occurred but was not prepared to find a further fact, namely, that the applicant had been targeted. However, assuming that it is a particular fact which did not exist, there is a question as to whether the reviewable decision was based upon the particular fact in the sense explained by Black CJ in Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 220-221.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J
As submitted on behalf of the respondent, the Tribunal referred to Chan in terms, and also set out the substance of what has become known as the real chance test, in the earlier part of the reasons. When it came to make the findings, the Tribunal did not, in terms, repeat that test. I would not conclude from that circumstance that the test had been forgotten. The reasons show that the Tribunal took a particular view as to the political situation in Bangladesh, and as to the political profile of the applicant, which meant that there was no real chance of persecution. In my opinion, although the argument of the applicant is not without substance, and the decision by the Tribunal may be harsh, it was a factual decision which, whether or not it was reasonable, involved no error of law within the meaning of s 476(1)(e). CONCLUSION As each basis for appeal has been rejected, the application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J

The court examined the evidence presented to determine whether the finding that the attacks on the applicant were the result of broad disputes and not specifically targeted at him was reasonably open. The court found that there was insufficient evidence or material to justify the making of this decision, contrary to s 476(1)(g) of the Act. The court considered the submissions by counsel for the respondent, who referred to passages from material cited by the Tribunal. However, the court concluded that this material did not provide a basis for describing the physical attack upon the applicant in the way the Tribunal had. The court then considered the application of s 476(1)(g) and s 476(4) of the Act, noting that the Tribunal had accepted the existence of the relevant subjective fear by the applicant but was not satisfied that the fear was objectively well founded. The court found that the finding about the nature of the incident in 1994 was not supported by any evidence or other material, but it did not consider this finding to be a particular fact which did not exist within the meaning of s 476(4)(b).

The court also examined whether the Tribunal erred in law by not correctly applying the decision of the High Court in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs to the facts as found. The court found that the Tribunal had referred to Chan in terms and set out the substance of the real chance test, but did not repeat the test when making the findings. The court did not conclude that the test had been forgotten, as the reasons showed that the Tribunal had taken a particular view as to the political situation in Bangladesh and the political profile of the applicant, which meant that there was no real chance of persecution. The court held that the decision by the Tribunal, although harsh, was a factual decision which involved no error of law within the meaning of s 476(1)(e) of the Act.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court will not intervene in a factual decision made by the Tribunal unless there has been an error of law. In this case, the court found no such error and dismissed the appeal.