BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1463

Appeal from: BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1408
File number: VID 772 of 2017
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 26 September 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court decision dismissing application for judicial review of adverse International Treaties Obligations Assessment decision – whether primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error – failure by assessor to apply correct legal standard in determining whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution – failure by assessor to consider the whole of the appellant’s claims and evidence – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A)

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987), articles 1(1), 1A(2), 33

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954), as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967), articles 1, 33

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), including the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature 15 December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414 (entered into force 11 July 1991), articles 6(1), 7

Cases cited:

Abebev Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510

Aporo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 123; 113 ALD 46

BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Another [2017] FCCA 1408

BDJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1281

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; 169 CLR 379

Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] FCA 19; 142 ALR 474

Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 577

Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 449

Machmud v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1041

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CZBP [2014] FCAFC 105

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; 259 CLR 180

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship vSZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs vWu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingham [1999] FCA 719;

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1463
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court addressed an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court which had dismissed an application for judicial review of an adverse International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA). The appellant, a Pakistani citizen, sought to challenge the finding that Australia did not have non-refoulement obligations towards him under various international treaties. The core legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge had erred in concluding that the assessor had not made a jurisdictional error in determining the appellant’s eligibility for refugee status. Specifically, the court examined whether the assessor had failed to apply the correct legal standard in evaluating the appellant's claims of a well-founded fear of persecution, and whether the assessor had adequately considered the entirety of the appellant's claims and evidence.

The court found that the primary judge had erred in several respects. The reasoning hinged on the assessor's approach to the appellant's claims, particularly in relation to the credibility of the appellant's assertions and the weight given to the appellant's evidence. The court highlighted that the assessor had not properly considered the appellant's detailed accounts of past persecution and threats, and had instead focused predominantly on discrediting certain aspects of the appellant's narrative. Furthermore, the court noted that the assessor had failed to adequately weigh the appellant's mental health issues and the potential impact of returning to Pakistan on these conditions. The court concluded that the assessor's approach was flawed as it did not sufficiently take into account the evaluative nature of refugee status determinations, where the focus should be on the likelihood of future persecution rather than the absolute truth of past events.

In light of these findings, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the original decision-maker for reconsideration in accordance with the court’s directions. The court emphasized the importance of a comprehensive and balanced assessment of all relevant evidence when determining refugee status, ensuring that the decision-maker does not exclude material from consideration solely on the basis of a belief about its credibility. The court also underscored that the decision-maker must provide clear and detailed reasons for their conclusions, particularly when rejecting significant aspects of a claimant's account.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the amended application for judicial review, as agreed or assessed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, I would allow the appeal.SUMMARY OF THE BACKGROUND FACTS The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan, who arrived at Christmas Island by boat on 24 December 2010. An ITOA began on 15 June 2015 to determine whether the appellant was a person in respect of whom Australia has non-refoulement obligations under the following international instruments:(a)1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, in force from 22 April 1954 and 4 October 1967 respectively (Refugees Convention);(b)Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in force from 26 June 1987 (CAT); and(c)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in force from 23 March 1976, including its Second Optional Protocol, in force from 11 July 1991 (ICCPR). Broadly speaking, a non-refoulement obligation is engaged if the level of risk to a person such as the appellant if forcibly returned to a place meets one of the following treaty-specified thresholds:(a)the life or freedom of a person would be threatened, if forcibly returned to that place, on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion: see article 33(1) of the Refugees Convention;(b)if forcibly returned to that place, that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture: see article 3 and the definition of “torture” in article 1(1) of the CAT; or(c)that to protect that person’s right to life, or to prevent that person from being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see articles 6(1) and 7 of the ICCPR), it is necessary that the person not be forcibly returned to that place. Before the assessor, the appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution by the Taliban in Pakistan due to:(a)his imputed political opinion of opposition to the Taliban and support for the Pakistani authorities;(b)his status as a returnee from the West to Khyber Paktunkhwa Province (KPK), formerly known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP); and(c)his Sunni Muslim religion and Pashtun ethnicity. In particular, the appellant claimed that: (a)one of his brothers was a driver in the Pakistani army;(b)soon after visiting his sister in a village in the KPK in 2010, the Pakistani army raided a nearby area and arrested or killed members of the Taliban;(c)relatives of Taliban members involved in the raid accused the appellant of being a spy or informant and blamed him for the raid;(d)the appellant was subsequently kidnapped by the Taliban and later released on condition that he surrender his army brother to the Taliban; and(e)he fled to Malaysia, but was targeted by people with connections to those who had accused him of being a spy and he returned to Pakistan before arranging his departure for Australia. The appellant further claimed that:(a)another brother and that brother’s wife went missing during a raid by the Pakistani army in the KPK in 2008/2009, and that the appellant feared that they had been killed or taken away by Taliban (with the uncertainty as to year apparently stemming from the assessor’s reasons); and (b)a teenage boy associate with the Taliban “beat up” his daughter in 2015, and his wife had “been told by neighbours that the boy’s father was killed by the Pakistani army”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

A Full Court of this Court in WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 referred at [34]-[35] to the passage from Abebe quoted above, and also cited with approval the statements of Brooke LJ (Robert Walker LJ agreeing) in the English Court of Appeal in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 449 at 469-470. Brooke LJ there said that the proper approach to evidence in asylum seeker cases: … does not entail the decision-maker … purporting to find “proved” facts, whether past or present, about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities. What it does mean, on the other hand, is that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future unless it feels it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur (or, indeed, they are not occurring at present). …For the reasons much more fully explained in the Australian cases, when considering whether there is a [real chance] of persecution for a convention reason if an asylum seeker is returned, it would be quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration in the balancing process simply because the decision-maker believes, on what may sometimes be somewhat fragile evidence, that they probably did not occur. (Emphasis added) In the same case, Sedley LJ described the role of the departmental officers who were required to assess a claimant’s refugee status, saying at 479:Such decision-makers, on classic principles of public law, are required to take everything material into account. Their sources of information will frequently go well beyond the testimony of the applicant and include in-country reports, expert testimony and—sometimes—specialised knowledge of their own (which must of course be disclosed). No probabilistic cut-off operates here: everything capable of having a bearing has to be given the weight, great or little, due to it. What the decision-makers ultimately make of the material is a matter for their own conscientious judgment, so long as the procedure by which they approach and entertain it is lawful and fair and provided their decision logically addresses the convention issues. Finally, and importantly, the convention issues from first to last are evaluative, not factual. The facts, so far as they can be established, are signposts on the road to a conclusion on the issues; they are not themselves conclusions. … There is no closed class of information that may inform the evaluation of the future risk of harm. As Lord Clyde said in the House of Lords in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 577 at 598:In assessing the existence of a real risk of the violation of rights occurring, anything which may bear on the likelihood of the incidence of the violation will be relevant. It is the applicant’s fear which is in issue, and so matters particularly relating to him will be important. For example, his prominence in society or political life, or anything else which might make him a particular target of persecution may be relevant. The history of past violations, the extent to which the applicant has personally been directly affected, either by being the victim of violence or the recipient of threats of violence, consideration of geographical location, of all the factors which might stimulate or facilitate a violation, will be among the circumstances to be taken into account. As also will factors which may discourage or deter or render a violation less likely. The political and legal situation in the country should be taken into account.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Also under the heading, “Procedural fairness”, the assessor detailed what she termed the “adverse information put to the [claimant]” in correspondence and at the ITOA interview and set out his responses. The adverse information was in the nature of country information. Immediately after the assessor’s descriptions of the “adverse information” and the responses, the assessor set out the following list of “Conclusions” (but still under the heading of “Procedural fairness”).ConclusionsŸThe claimant has completed year 12 high school and has been self-employed over many years in Pakistan and Malaysia.Ÿ[The claimant] speaks Pashtu and Urdu as well as Malay and English (fair), having lived in Malaysia and Australia each respectively for five years.ŸI consider the claimant to be literate with employment skills.Ÿ[The claimant] has two brothers who are presently working and residing legally in Malaysia.ŸAnother brother … has been employed as a driver in the Pakistan Army … .ŸHis eldest brother and wife have been missing since 2008 in a suspected Taliban attack.ŸThe country information submitted by the claimant does not indicate that women in Pashtun culture would not be blamed for spying.ŸHis family remain unharmed and have not been targeted for harm by the Taliban in the six years he has been absent from Pakistan.ŸPakistan has a large Pushtun population and is a dominant Muslim Sunni country which has a Constitution which allows for movement within.Ÿ[The claimant] is a Pashtun Sunni Muslim.Ÿ[The claimant] has stated that his mental health needs and financial situation will be of ongoing concern if returned to Pakistan.Ÿ[The claimant] has provided little evidence he would be unable to resettle in Pakistan, given his range of languages and work related skills.ŸThe claimant did not raise specific claims that he would be at real risk of being subject to the death penalty or being tortured in Pakistan by State authorities.ŸThe claimant has travelled to and from Pakistan on several occasions. He has not claimed any harassment or interest from the Pakistan immigration or security umbrella upon arrival or departure from the airports in Pakistan even though he entered Pakistan on a false passport which was confiscated.ŸI find the claim of being kidnapped by the Taliban, released unharmed in order to surrender his brother to the Taliban to face certain death without any further threat in the past six years to his own family lacking credibility.ŸI find that the claim of being targeted in Malaysia on two occasions to be an embellishment of his claims.ŸHaving claimed three targeted attacks on his life the claimant then chooses to return to the KPK, Pakistan. This indicates to me that he does not hold a fear of non-state actors in the KPK.(Underling added) Under the next heading, “Findings of fact”, the assessor set out her understanding of the legal framework pursuant to which she was to determine whether the appellant was a refugee. The assessor noted that this determination “may require a decision-maker to assess the credibility of a claimant’s testimony”. The assessor added:When assessing credibility, a decision-maker must be sensitive to the difficulties often faced by asylum seekers and the benefit of the doubt should be given to those who are generally credible, but are unable to substantiate all of their claims. However, a decision-maker is not required to accept uncritically any and all allegations made by a claimant, nor is it necessary for a decision-maker to have rebutting evidence before he or she can find that a particular factual assertion by a claimant has not been made out. Nor is a decision-maker required to accept claims that are inconsistent with the independent evidence regarding the situation in the claimant’s country of nationality.[The claimant] claims that many people in [villages] know each other and many have relatives working in Malaysia. He claims to know a lot of people in both villages and that everyone knows his brother is in the army. I consider that as people would be aware of his absence whilst working in Malaysia it would not be considered unusual for him to be visiting his sister … upon his return as he had done so previously.I note that as everyone knows his brother is in the army …; there has not been any attempt to kidnap or harm any other member of the family to induce them to submit him to the Taliban [during his army service].The premise that the Taliban would not harm the claimant if they thought he was in fact a spy but release him unharmed with the view to then killing both the claimant and his brother upon their return is incredulous given the country information on the Taliban’s activities.Having made this claim of targeted harm to himself and his brother the claimant then goes to Malaysia where he asserts he is again unsuccessfully targeted on two occasions. Adding to the incredulity of the claims he then chooses to return to the KPK in Pakistan. Yet he claims to fear harm from non-state actors who will find him anywhere if he is returned to Pakistan.On the evidence before me I accept the following:Ÿ[The claimant] is a citizen of Pakistan.ŸHe is a Pashtun Sunni Muslim.ŸHe speaks Pashtu, Urdu, and Malay and has a fair grasp of English.ŸHe is in debt financially due to his departure from Pakistan to Australia.ŸHe is educated and has worked in Malaysia for 5 years where he claims 100,000 people from … reside.ŸHis brothers are working legally in Malaysia.ŸHe has spent five years in Malaysia where he lived and worked with other extended family members.ŸIndividuals are not subject to discrimination or violence in Pakistan on the basis of having spent time in the West.ŸHe has mental health issues since arriving in Australia.I do not accept that:ŸHe was targeted by the Taliban for being a spy.ŸHe was targeted for having a brother in the Army.ŸHe was kidnapped by the Taliban in Pakistan.ŸHe was targeted in Malaysia on two occasions.ŸHe needs to relocate if returned to Pakistan.(Underling added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In a written statement dated 17 July 2015, the appellant also claimed that his return would breach s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth), “which incorporates the non-refoulement obligations derived from the ICCPR and CAT, for the following reasons”:a) My mental illness places me at a greater risk of suffering significant harm; andb)My status as a failed asylum seeker from a Western country also increases my chances of discriminatorily being exposed to significant harm. The appellant also claimed that:a)My family … is well known in the … area. Since my arrival in Australia, my youngest brother … has been increasingly involved in anti-Taliban activities in this area. This has led to a presumption within that area that all members of my family are anti-Taliban. I additionally fear persecution on the basis that, as a member of [my] family, I am imputed with anti-Taliban political opinion.b)I suffer from serious mental health concerns which have resulted in two hospital admissions and multiple suicide attempts, for which I am currently undergoing treatment. This increases the risk to me of suffering significant/serious harm should [I] return to Pakistan. (See the latest country [sic] on mental health services in Pakistan below).c)My poor mental health is relevant to the questions of relocation. It is our submission that relocation to any part of Pakistan is unreasonable, in the sense it is impractical, in the context of my circumstances.d) Pakistan’s state authorities will not or cannot provide citizens in the position of me with the level of protection which they are entitled to expect according to international standards. In August and September 2015, the appellant gave the assessor medical records in relation to his mental health claims, indicating depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. In written submissions dated 24 March 2016, the appellant stated that he believed that the attack on his daughter was related to the attack on him in 2010 “in that both attacks were by supporters of the Taliban and inflicted because of [his] perceived support for the Pakistani army”. In an earlier interview with the assessor on 22 September 2015, the appellant claimed that his daughter’s assailant was the “son of a Talib”. The appellant also re-iterated that he was suffering from mental illness, which affected the reasonable practicability of his relocation in Pakistan, since he would be unable to access appropriate medical services in Pakistan.THE ASSESSOR’S DECISION The reasons for the assessor’s decision that Australia does not have non-refoulement obligations with respect to the appellant (ITOA decision) commenced by setting out the appellant’s migration history, the purpose for which the ITOA was being undertaken, Australia’s non-refoulement obligations, the material that was before her, and the appellant’s claims. The assessor found that the appellant was a national of Pakistan and that Pakistan was the relevant country “for the purpose of assessing whether the claimant engages non-refoulement obligations”.