WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399

MIGRATION – judicial review – Refugee Review Tribunal – protection visa – application of “real chance” test – mistaken finding of fact – Tribunal’s failure to consider possible occurrences

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal – out of time – extension granted

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476(1)(b), (c), (e)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r15(1), r15(2)

Burns v Grigg [1967] VR 871 applied
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 applied
Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257 applied
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 applied
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 applied
Ratnam v Cumarasamy [1965] 1 WLR 8 applied
Surita v Immigration and Naturalization Service 95 F3d 814 (9th Cir 1996) referred to
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 applied
Abebev Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 applied
Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 449 cited
N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 94 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 applied
W396/01 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) FCAFC 103 applied
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte “A” (2001) 185 ALR 489 referred to

WAAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W 460 of 2001

LEE, R D NICHOLSON & FINKELSTEIN JJ

6 DECEMBER 2002
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 460 of 2001

On Appeal from a Single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

WAAD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

LEE, RD NICHOLSON & FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The time for filing a notice of appeal be extended to the date of lodgement of the notice of appeal.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The Orders made on 31 July 2001 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

“(1)          The decision of the Tribunal made 20 February 2001 be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination.

(2)             The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”

4.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 460 of 2001

On Appeal from a Single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

WAAD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

LEE, RD NICHOLSON & FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE:

6 DECEMBER 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal against orders made on 31 July 2001 by a Judge of this Court (Emmett J), dismissing an application to review a decision of the Refugee…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 399
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, a citizen of Iran, who sought to challenge the Minister's decision to revoke his protection visa. The central issue was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility and the risk of persecution if he were to return to Iran. The court was tasked with determining if the Tribunal correctly balanced the evidence regarding the appellant's claims and whether the Tribunal's decision was rational and based on the evidence presented.

The legal issues in this case revolved around the correct approach to assessing the risk of persecution for a refugee applicant. The court needed to determine whether the Tribunal appropriately considered the possibility of the appellant's claimed past events and future risks, despite not fully accepting all the details of his account. The key issue was whether the Tribunal was obligated to consider the appellant's entire claim, including the possibility of the events he described, in assessing his risk of persecution. This required the court to interpret the appropriate standard of proof and the Tribunal's obligations under refugee status assessment procedures.

The court found that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the possibility that the events claimed by the appellant might have occurred. The court emphasized that the Tribunal should not exclude certain matters from consideration merely because it did not believe them to be true. Instead, the Tribunal was required to assess the risk of persecution by balancing all the evidence, including the possibility of the events claimed by the appellant. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to do so was a misdirection, leading to an irrational decision. The court further noted that the Tribunal's acceptance of most of the appellant's claims indicated it had not reached a stage where it had no real doubt about the appellant's story, thereby requiring consideration of all possible events.

The final orders of the court were to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, allow the appeal, set aside the orders made on 31 July 2001, remit the matter to the Tribunal for re-determination, and order the respondent to pay the appellant's costs. The court ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be set aside, and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for a new assessment, taking into account the proper balancing of all evidence and the possibility of the events claimed by the appellant. Additionally, the respondent was directed to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time for filing a notice of appeal be extended to the date of lodgement of the notice of appeal.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The Orders made on 31 July 2001 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

“(1) The decision of the Tribunal made 20 February 2001 be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination.

(2) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”

4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Such a construction has been accepted as consonant with the manner of assessment of refugee status in the United Kingdom. As stated by Brooke LJ in the Court of Appeal (Robert Walker LJ agreeing) in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 449 at 469-470: “For the reasons much more fully explained in the Australian cases, when considering whether there is a [real risk] of persecution for a convention reason if an asylum seeker is returned, it would be quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration in the balancing process simply because the decision-maker believes, on what may sometimes be somewhat fragile evidence, that they probably did not occur.” (Emphasis added). The statement by the Tribunal that it “[did] not accept” that the appellant had received letters from the Revolutionary Court soon after release by the Sepah Pasdaran did not dispose of the appellant’s application. Clearly that statement by the Tribunal was not a finding that the appellant was not a credible witness nor a positive finding, based on probative material, that the claimed event did not occur. It was an expression of the Tribunal’s view on the likelihood of the occurrence of that event and a statement by the Tribunal that it was unpersuaded by the appellant’s account that it had occurred. Given that the Tribunal accepted most of the significant elements of the appellant’s claims, the Tribunal’s failure to accept that the letters had been received as claimed was obviously a qualified finding, if it may be described as a finding. As noted already, this was not a case in which the Tribunal found the appellant to be a dishonest witness, or in which a positive finding had been made, on probative material and logical grounds, that an event central to the appellant’s claims had not occurred. The Tribunal had not reached the stage that it had no real doubt about its findings on past and future events so that “a finding that […the appellant] had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason would have been irrational” (Guo per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 576). Not having reached that degree of persuasion, the Tribunal was obliged to have regard to the possibility of the occurrence of the claimed events in assessing the degree of risk of persecution faced by the appellant (Abebe per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J at [85]-[86]). The question the Tribunal had to address was whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason having regard to possible past occurrences and possible future events. (See: Abebe per Gummow and Hayne JJ at [192], [199]). The Tribunal had to consider the possibility that notices from the Revolutionary Court had been received by the appellant as claimed by him, and also, therefore, that the appellant and his family had departed Iran on false passports and that his family in Iran had been harassed after the appellant left Iran. The Tribunal had to assess the risk that the appellant may suffer persecution if returned to Iran by having regard to the possibility that the claimed events had occurred and by balancing the material as a whole. (See: N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 94 at [54]).