Mehajer (Bankrupt) v Weston (Trustee)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mehajer (Bankrupt) v Weston (Trustee) [2020] FCA 596

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713
File number: NSD 2185 of 2019
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 6 May 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal – where no explanation for delay – where proposed appeal has no merit and no reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153B

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36.03, 36.05, 36.57

Cases cited:

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd (2018) 237 CLR 473

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Sami v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 128

Date of hearing: 15 April 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr D Calabria of Bridges Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A Leopold SC and Mr B Koch
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

ORDERS

NSD 2185 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SALIM MEHAJER (A BANKRUPT)

Applicant

AND:

PAUL GERARD WESTON IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF SALIM MEHAJER

First Respondent

SC LOWY PRIMARY INVESTMENTS, LTD

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MAY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal filed on 30 December 2019 is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. This is an application under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) for an extension of time in which to appeal from orders dismissing an application made by the present applicant, Salim Mehajer, to annul his bankruptcy: see Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713 (Primary Judgment or PJ).

  2. On 10 October 2019 the primary judge delivered ex tempore reasons and made orders including an order that, pursuant to r 36.03(b) of the Rules, the date by which any notice of appeal is to be filed be fixed as the date 28 days after the provision by the Court to the parties of the revised reasons for judgment. His Honour’s revised reasons were received by Mr Mehajer on 25 October 2019. The last day by which Mr Mehajer was to file any appeal was thus 22 November 2019. Mr Mehajer filed his application for an extension of time in which to appeal on 30…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 596
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Mehajer (Bankrupt) v Weston (Trustee) involved an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against the orders made in the Second Annulment Proceeding. The applicant, Mr Mehajer, sought to appeal the decisions made in the proceeding that was brought against him and the trustee of his bankrupt estate, the respondent. The central legal issues before the court were whether the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal was adequate, whether there was any prejudice to the respondents caused by the delay, and whether the proposed appeal had merit and reasonable prospects of success. The court found that the applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal. Furthermore, the proposed appeal grounds had no merit, and the appeal did not have reasonable prospects of success. Consequently, the application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal was dismissed.

The court examined the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal. According to Mr Mehajer, he suffered an injury due to asbestos particles falling into his eye on or about 15 December 2019. He attended medical facilities for treatment on 18, 19, and 27 December 2019, and he was unable to lodge the appeal documents on 27 December 2019 due to the closure of the court registry. However, the applicant did not provide any explanation for the steps taken between the date he was provided with the primary judgment and 22 November 2019, the last day by which he was to file his notice of appeal. The applicant also did not provide an explanation for the delay in the period between 22 November 2019 and 15 December 2019, when he suffered an injury to his eye. Given these circumstances, the court concluded that Mr Mehajer had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal.

The court also considered the issue of prejudice to the respondents caused by the delay in filing the notice of appeal. The trustee raised the issue of costs he had incurred to date in defending proceedings brought by Mr Mehajer and in which he had the benefit of costs orders in his favour but which remained unsatisfied. The trustee submitted that if the application was successful and an extension of time was granted, it ought to be conditional on security being provided by Mr Mehajer to compensate the trustee for the costs incurred by him to date in defending the proceedings brought by Mr Mehajer as well as the costs he would incur in defending any appeal. However, the court did not need to consider this submission further due to its conclusion that the application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal should be dismissed.

The court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time in which to appeal from the orders made by the primary judge in the Second Annulment Proceeding. The applicant had not adequately explained the delay, and the proposed grounds of appeal had no merit and did not have reasonable prospects of success. Accordingly, the application should be dismissed with costs. The court made orders accordingly, dismissing the application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and ordering the applicant to pay the respondents' costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal filed on 30 December 2019 is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 10 October 2019 the primary judge delivered ex tempore reasons and made orders including an order that, pursuant to r 36.03(b) of the Rules, the date by which any notice of appeal is to be filed be fixed as the date 28 days after the provision by the Court to the parties of the revised reasons for judgment. His Honour’s revised reasons were received by Mr Mehajer on 25 October 2019. The last day by which Mr Mehajer was to file any appeal was thus 22 November 2019. Mr Mehajer filed his application for an extension of time in which to appeal on 30 December 2019, some five weeks out of time.BACKGROUND On 20 March 2018 a sequestration order was made against Mr Mehajer’s estate. The first respondent, Paul Gerard Weston, is the trustee of Mr Mehajer’s bankrupt estate (Trustee). On 17 April 2018 Mr Mehajer commenced proceeding NSD617/2018 seeking an order pursuant to s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act) that his bankruptcy be annulled (First Annulment Proceeding). The Trustee was a respondent to the First Annulment Proceeding. In the First Annulment Proceeding Mr Mehajer sought interim relief (Interim Relief Application) including an order that the sequestration order be stayed. On 26 April 2018 Mr Mehajer’s Interim Relief Application was dismissed: see Mehajer v Weston (Trustee), in the matter of Mehajer [2018] FCA 608 (Mehajer v Weston (No 1)). On 21 June 2018, at the final hearing of the First Annulment Proceeding, on the application of Mr Mehajer and with the Trustee’s consent, the First Annulment Proceeding was discontinued. On 12 October 2018 SC Lowy Primary Investments, Ltd (SC Lowy) filed an originating application commencing proceeding NSD1902/2018 against Mr Mehajer and the Trustee as first and second respondents respectively, seeking declarations that certain property had vested in the Trustee (Vesting Proceeding). SC Lowy subsequently filed an amended originating application in the Vesting Proceeding. On 11 December 2018, the Trustee filed a notice of cross-claim in the Vesting Proceeding seeking additional but related declarations that certain property had vested in him. The Vesting Proceeding was heard on 19 December 2018 and adjourned until 25 January 2019 for closing submissions. On 25 January 2019:(1)the primary judge gave ex tempore reasons in favour of the relief sought by SC Lowy in its amended originating application and by the Trustee in his notice of cross-claim in the Vesting Proceeding; and (2)Mr Mehajer sought informally to commence a new proceeding seeking annulment of his bankruptcy. That informal commencement became proceeding NSD144/2019 (Second Annulment Proceeding). The Trustee and SC Lowy were the first and second respondents respectively to the Second Annulment Proceeding and are the first and second respondents to the present application. The Second Annulment Proceeding was ultimately listed for hearing for three days commencing on 8 October 2019. Mr Mehajer was legally represented by a solicitor and senior counsel.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, Mr Mehajer raises a number of other matters in his submissions, none of which identifies any error on the part of the primary judge in dismissing the Second Annulment Proceeding. Mr Mehajer complains about the conduct of the Trustee and makes submissions about the First Annulment Proceeding, the alleged claim against SC Lowy and the circumstances in which SC Lowy became a creditor. None of those matters is relevant to the Primary Judgment nor do they identify any error in his Honour’s reasons.CONCLUSION It is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time in which to appeal from the orders made by the primary judge in the Second Annulment Proceeding. In my opinion Mr Mehajer has not adequately explained the delay but, even if he had, the proposed grounds of appeal have no merit and the proposed appeal does not have reasonable prospects of success. Accordingly, the Application should be dismissed with costs. I will make orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The legal principles relevant to the consideration of an application under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act were summarised by the primary judge at PJ [15] (see [14] above).CONSIDERATION In determining whether I would exercise my discretion to grant an extension of time to Mr Mehajer to file his draft notice of appeal it is necessary to consider Mr Mehajer’s explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the Trustee and SC Lowy and the merits of the proposed appeal. I do so in turn below.Explanation for delay Mr Mehajer gave evidence as to the reasons for the delay in filing the Application in his affidavit sworn on 30 December 2019. To the extent his evidence was admitted into evidence that explanation was limited. According to Mr Mehajer:(1)on or about 15 December 2019 he was injured by asbestos particles falling into his eye;(2)on 18 and 19 December 2019 he attended NAS Advanced Medical Centre at Auburn and Sydney Eye Hospital respectively for treatment of that injury;(3)on the evening of 19 December 2019 he attended Wollongong Private Hospital for treatment for an unrelated issue which required him to have a Triamcinolone injection, which Mr Mehajer explains is a glucocorticoid treatment used for skin diseases; (4)on 27 December 2019 he attended the registry of this Court. Mr Mehajer’s evidence is that the Court was open but the registry was closed and he was therefore unable to lodge the documents on that day; and(5)it was not until 30 December 2019 that he was “able to successfully lodge [his] Notice to appeal and collate the missing information, notwithstanding medical obstacles [he] suffered during dates around 15 December – 23 December 2019”. Mr Mehajer provides no explanation of any steps taken between the date he was provided with the Primary Judgment and 22 November 2019, the last day by which he was to file his notice of appeal and, more critically, of the steps taken between 22 November 2019 and 15 December 2019, when he suffered an injury to his eye. According to the evidence before me, Mr Mehajer underwent medical treatment for two conditions between 15 and 19 December 2019. However, he provides no explanation for the delay in the period between 19 and 27 December 2019, when it seems that Mr Mehajer attended the Court’s registry but found that it was closed. While the delay is not extensive, being a period of some five weeks, in my opinion, Mr Mehajer has not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay. That is a factor to be taken into account in considering the Application.Prejudice The next issue that arises is that of any prejudice to the respondents caused by the delay. The Trustee raises as an issue the costs he has incurred to date in defending proceedings brought by Mr Mehajer and in which he has the benefit of costs orders in his favour but which remain unsatisfied. To that end, the Trustee submits that if the Application is successful and an extension of time is granted, it ought to be conditional on security being provided by Mr Mehajer to compensate the Trustee for the costs incurred by him to date in defending the proceedings brought by Mr Mehajer as well as the costs he will incur in defending any appeal. Given the conclusion I have reached it is not necessary for me to consider this submission any further.