FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CIK23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 896
Appeal from: Application for an extension of time and leave to appeal: CIK23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 546 File number(s): NSD 965 of 2024 Judgment of: BROMWICH J Date of judgment: 5 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – whether extension of time should be granted – whether proposed notice of appeal has merits – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal found no jurisdiction to review decision – where primary judge found application for judicial review had no merits and upheld summary dismissal – HELD: application dismissed with costs
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – where extension of time and leave to appeal required if primary judge’s decision was interlocutory – where registrar summarily dismissed application for judicial review –where primary judge refused to grant extension of time to apply for review of registrar’s decision – whether decision of primary judge was interlocutory – HELD: decision of primary judge was interlocutory and extension of time and leave to appeal were necessary
Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 2021 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 143, 254(1), 256, 256(1)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A (repealed)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 24(1D), 24(1D)(b), 24(1D)(ca), 31A
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 494C(5)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 13.13(a), 21.01, 21.02, 21.04, table 21.1, Item 58
Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) r 35.13, Sch 3 [15.2]
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 4.31(2)
Cases cited: BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
CIK23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 546
EBW21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 341
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 32 Date of hearing: 5 August 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Taverniti of Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance ORDERS
NSD 965 of 2024 BETWEEN: CIK23
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BROMWICH J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2.The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 896
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles governing the granting of an extension of time and leave to appeal, referencing established legal precedents. These principles require consideration of the length and explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent due to the delay, and the prospects of the case succeeding if an extension were granted. The court noted that an extension of time and leave to appeal would be necessary if the primary judge's decision was interlocutory, and the proposed appeal had reasonable prospects of success. The court further examined whether the primary judge's decision was indeed interlocutory and whether the proposed appeal had sufficient merits.
In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the primary judge's decision was interlocutory, thus necessitating the granting of an extension of time and leave to appeal. However, despite this finding, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal because the proposed appeal lacked reasonable prospects of success. The court found that the applicant's case was devoid of merit, and therefore, granting an extension would have been futile. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $5,000.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter began with the applicant's application for judicial review of a decision made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was dismissed by a registrar of the court. The applicant sought leave to appeal this decision, arguing that the dismissal was incorrect. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was subsequently filed on 10 July 2024. The primary judge had earlier refused to grant the applicant an extension of time to apply for review of the registrar's decision. The applicant's application was considered by the court to determine whether the primary judge's decision was interlocutory and whether an extension of time and leave to appeal were necessary.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge's decision was interlocutory and thus required the applicant to apply for an extension of time and leave to appeal.
2. Whether the proposed notice of appeal has merits.
3. Whether the extension of time should be granted considering the applicant's personal circumstances and the prospects of success on the appeal.
Held
1. The court held that the decision of the primary judge was interlocutory, which required the applicant to apply for an extension of time and leave to appeal.
2. The court found that the proposed notice of appeal did not have merits.
3. Considering the applicant's personal circumstances and the prospects of success on the appeal, the court held that the extension of time should not be granted.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As such, I am satisfied that the applicant was required to apply to the Court for an extension of time and leave to appeal, as he did by his application filed 10 July 2024. Consideration of the application for an extension of time The application is made on the following grounds: [1]My Application dismissed from the federal circuit court of Australia on 17 June 2024, I have made application but I have received email that Your lodgement has been rejected for the following reason. Registry message: Wrong form has been used. If you wish to appeal the final judgment, you may file within 14 days from the date of judgment as order has been made on 17/6/2024 extension of time is needed therefore Form 118 (Application for extension of time and leave to appeal). You can use the same affidavit form and attach DRAFT form 121 back of the affidavit form.[2]I have made my application self, it’s not happened intensely. [apparently meant to be “intentionally”] [3]So please consider my application and give me extension of time because I am unemployed and too much stress about all these things. The principles to be applied by the court when considering an application for an extension of time are well established. They were set out by Banks-Smith J in ESK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 935 as follows (at [11]): In considering whether to grant an extension of time to seek leave to appeal under r 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the Court will be guided by the principles governing an extension of time under r 36.05: Mehmood v Attorney-General (Cth) [2013] FCA 406. The Court will be guided by the following factors: the length and explanation for the delay, any prejudice that the respondent might suffer due to delay and the prospects of the case succeeding if an extension were granted. There are many authorities to this effect: see in particular Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 (Wilcox J); and SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] (Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ). The proposed appeal should have such prospects of success so as not to render the extension of time an exercise in futility: WAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9] (Lee, R D Nicholson and Finkelstein JJ). If an appeal has no prospect of success, an extension of time, even for only a short period, may be refused: SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91 at [23] (Murphy J). See also the summary of principles in BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 (Yates, Wheelahan and O’Bryan JJ) at [33], reproduced in Franklin v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 18 (Perram, Burley and Downes JJ) at [25]. In particular, at [33(e)] in BQQ15, the following was stated:The merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension is to be granted. Leave will not be granted where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal: Kalanje v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1618 at [5]. The applicant will have no real prospects of success where the case is devoid of merit or clearly fails; is hopeless; or is unarguable. In making an assessment the Court is not required to go into too great a detail, but is to “assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way”: Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [7] – [9].