Esk18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ESK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 935

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal:  ESK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 3432
File number: NSD 74 of 2019
Judge: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 19 June 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION - application for extension of time to seek leave to appeal - where protection visa refused - where review application to Federal Circuit Court dismissed at show cause hearing - where persecution claim based on private family dispute, on inter-religious marriage and on alleged profile in India from offending in Australia - where challenge to country information - where applicant seeks to re-argue matters before Tribunal - where no sufficient prospects of success on appeal - application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.14, 36.05

Cases cited:

ASW17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1815

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344

Mehmood v Attorney‑General (Cth) [2013] FCA 406

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

WAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399

Date of hearing: 14 June 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 53
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Cabarrus
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 74 of 2019
BETWEEN:

ESK18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Application for an extension of time dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BANKS-SMITH J:

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia:  ESK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 3432. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse a protection visa.

    Background

  2. The applicant is a citizen of India who…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 935
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a citizen of India, sought an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant. The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review pursuant to s 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Any appeal to this Court should have been filed by 11 December 2018. On 17 January 2019 the applicant filed his application in this Court seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge. The applicant was required to demonstrate that the proposed appeal had sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave, and that the delay in filing the application did not prejudice the respondent. The Court considered whether the Tribunal's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and whether substantial injustice would result from a refusal of leave to appeal. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on the finding that the applicant's claims were contradictory, not supported by probative evidence and amounted to bare speculation, and was also based on its examination of country information. The Court found no error in the Tribunal's consideration of complementary protection, finding no error in the manner in which it adopted its factual findings in respect of the Refugee Convention criteria.

The Court found that the proposed grounds of appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. The Court held that it was not appropriate that there be any extension of time and dismissed the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge. Costs should follow the application in the usual way. The application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge is dismissed. The applicant is to pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for an extension of time dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia: ESK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 3432. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse a protection visa.Background The applicant is a citizen of India who arrived in Australia on 27 April 2008 on a student visa. That visa was renewed in 2009 and ceased on 28 February 2011, making him an unlawful non‑citizen from that date. The applicant married an Australian citizen on 29 November 2010. On 10 November 2011 he lodged an application for a partner visa, which was refused by the Minister's delegate. On 22 January 2015 that decision was overturned by the then Migration Review Tribunal. The application for a partner visa was remitted to the Department for reconsideration, but was refused on character grounds as the applicant had by that time been convicted on a number of offences. The decision to refuse the partner visa application was affirmed by a differently constituted Tribunal on 29 August 2017. The applicant sought judicial review of that decision in the Federal Circuit Court, but those proceedings have since been discontinued. On 11 April 2018 the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa. This application was refused by the delegate on 28 May 2018. The applicant sought review of the delegate's decision in the Tribunal. On 8 August 2018 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision. The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court. On 26 November 2018 the primary judge dismissed the application pursuant to s 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (a show cause hearing). Any appeal to this Court should have been filed by 11 December 2018. On 17 January 2019 the applicant filed his application in this Court seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge.Leave to appeal A dismissal of an application at a show cause hearing is interlocutory. Under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), an appeal from such interlocutory orders and judgment requires leave from the Court. The Court has a discretion as to whether to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment, but generally leave will not be granted unless the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and substantial injustice would result from a refusal of leave to appeal: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398‑399; Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125 at [19]. Leave will more readily be granted where, as here, the interlocutory decision effectively determines a substantive right: Decor Corporation at 400; Minogue v Williams at [19].Extension of time In considering whether to grant an extension of time to seek leave to appeal under r 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the Court will be guided by the principles governing an extension of time under r 36.05: Mehmood v Attorney‑General (Cth) [2013] FCA 406. The Court will be guided by the following factors: the length and explanation for the delay, any prejudice that the respondent might suffer due to delay and the prospects of the case succeeding if an extension were granted. There are many authorities to this effect: see in particular Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348‑349 (Wilcox J); and SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] (Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ). The proposed appeal should have such prospects of success so as not to render the extension of time an exercise in futility: WAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9] (Lee, R D Nicholson and Finkelstein JJ). If an appeal has no prospect of success, an extension of time, even for only a short period, may be refused: SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91 at [23] (Murphy J).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's claims to fear harm were 'baldly speculative and, in some respects, contrary to other facts he has provided about his family'. It considered his evidence inconsistent and unreliable, and was not satisfied that the applicant or his wife face a real chance of being persecuted for this reason. Having reached that conclusion about his wife, the Tribunal also was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of being persecuted as a consequence of mistreatment of his wife.Tribunal's conclusion Consequently, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the requirements of a refugee under s 5H(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and was not eligible for protection under s 36(2)(a). For similar reasons, it concluded that it was not satisfied that there were grounds to believe that as a consequence of being removed from Australia there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. Accordingly, the applicant did not meet the requirements of the complementary protection assessment under s 36(2)(aa). It therefore affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.Before the Federal Circuit Court The applicant raised eight grounds of review before the Federal Circuit Court. To the extent they are relevant to this appeal, they comprised claims to fear harm because of each of the land dispute, his criminal record and his intermarriage by way of marriage to a Christian, as detailed before the Tribunal. The primary judge rejected the applicant's claims of unreasonableness on the part of the Tribunal in the manner in which it assessed his claims. The primary judge noted that the Tribunal's decision was squarely based on its finding that the applicant's claims were contradictory, not supported by probative evidence and amounted to bare speculation, and were also based on its examination of country information. He found no error in the Tribunal's consideration of complementary protection, finding no error in the manner in which it adopted its factual findings in respect of the Refugee Convention criteria. The applicant also claimed before the primary judge that he should have legal representation. The primary judge refused his request for pro bono legal assistance having considered the claims, that there were no apprent arguable case of error and having regard to the nature of the show cause hearing. The primary judge considered it would only be if some arguable case of error was disclosed that a referral for legal assistance might be considered for any final hearing.Grounds of appeal The applicant's draft grounds of appeal provide for nine grounds. Some are properly understood as statements of the relief sought, rather than grounds of appeal. Those that comprise grounds can be viewed collectively as reiterations of the applicant's claims to fear harm because of the land dispute, his criminal record in Australia and his marriage to an Australian Christian woman. In the hearing before me, the applicant reiterated and confirmed that those were the matters he wished to raise on an appeal. Allowing some latitude for the fact that the applicant is self-represented, the hearing proceeded on the basis that the complaint was to be properly understood as a complaint that the primary judge failed to uphold the grounds of review insofar as they related to those matters.Request for adjournment

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Otherwise, the applicant by his submissions sought to re-argue the claims about the land dispute and his father's death, the likelihood of being prosecuted or harmed because of his criminal convictions and the risk he asserts flows from his marriage to an Australian Christian who would be returning to India with him.Consideration Against that backdrop I have in any event reviewed the Tribunal's reasoning. I agree with the primary judge that no error is disclosed: the Tribunal understood the task it was required to undertake, and in fact undertook that task. As to the land dispute, the Tribunal's rejection of the claim rested on credibility findings. The reasons for that credibility finding were disclosed, as discussed above. No error is disclosed by that reasoning pathway. As to the concern about re‑prosecution, that was addressed by the Tribunal both in the context of s 300 of the Penal Code and also more generally as to the applicant's profile and the prospect of him being subjected to punishment by 'religious organisations'. The Tribunal gave reasons as to why it was not satisfied there was a relevant risk to the applicant and why it found the claims baseless and speculative. In particular, it did not accept the publicity was such that the applicant would be remembered to any significant degree. Again, its reasoning was disclosed: having come to that view, the generalised claim of harm from religious organisations without further explanation or evidence was considered baseless. That is a view to which the Tribunal was entitled to come, having weighed and assessed the evidence before it. No error is disclosed. As to the claim about risk from inter-religious marriage, the Tribunal was entitled to rely on the country information to which it had regard. The choice of country information is a factual matter for the Tribunal alone: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]‑[13]. This is not a case where the Tribunal ignored information provided by the applicant. To the contrary, it clearly read it and acknowledged the various articles in its reasons, but preferred to rely on the country information to the effect that honour killings were not systemic in Punjab or the rest of India, but that instances are evidently isolated to individual families and their prejudices. Having then formed the view on the evidence that it was unsatisfied of a risk to the applicant or his wife from the applicant's family, the Tribunal's conclusion was reasoned and no jurisdictional error is disclosed. The applicant seeks to have the Court come to a different view about those matters, but that is not the role of this Court, as I explained to the applicant. In the circumstances, I do not consider the proposed grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of success. A grant of leave to appeal would not be justified in those circumstances. Accordingly, it is not appropriate that there be any extension of time. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge is dismissed, and costs should follow the application in the usual way.