FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Appeal from: File number: NSD 242 of 2017 Judges: KENNY, TRACEY AND GRIFFITHS JJ Date of judgment: 10 November 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether appellant was denied procedural fairness because FCCA upheld first respondent’s judicial review challenge on an issue not previously raised
MIGRATION – whether primary judge erred in finding that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) erred in rejecting the first respondent’s claim for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1058 (Cth) (the Act) – whether terms of ICCPR relevant to complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act – Pt 7AA of the Act – where notice of contention filed – whether IAA misapplied the “real chance” test in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act and the “real risk” test in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and failed to reach the requisite “satisfaction” under ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act – whether IAA failed to consider and determine a claim which arose clearly on the material before it – whether IAA acted on an invalidly issued s 473GB certificate or denied first respondent procedural fairness – whether MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1 applied to Pt 7AA of the Act – whether IAA misconstrued “exceptional circumstances” in s 473DD(b) of the Act and so constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction – whether BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958 applied
Held: appeal allowed and notice of contention upheld in part
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5J, 36, 359A, 360, 375A,422B, 424A, 424AA, 425, 427, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DD, 473DE, 473GA, 473GB, 473GD, Pt 7, Pt 7AA
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Opened for signature 10 December 1984. 1465 UNTS 85 art 1, 2, 7. (entered into force 26 June 1987)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opened for signature 16 December 1966. 999 UNTS 171. (entered into force 23 March 1976)
Cases cited: AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 136
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 71; 216 CLR 473
Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; 252 CLR 38
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Dhiman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 221
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 176
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Minister was denied procedural fairness because the FCCA upheld the first respondent’s challenge on an issue not previously raised and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the IAA had erred in rejecting the first respondent’s claims for protection. The High Court found that the Minister was not denied procedural fairness because the FCCA had not erred in upholding the first respondent’s challenge on the new issue. The Court also found that the primary judge was correct in finding that the IAA had erred in rejecting the first respondent’s claims for protection.
The High Court held that the appeal should be allowed and the notice of contention upheld in part. The parties were required to seek to agree on orders, including as to costs, which give effect to these reasons for judgment. If they were unable to agree, they should file and serve a brief outline of written submissions, not to exceed five pages in length, setting out the orders for which they contend and why. Final orders, including as to costs, would be made on the papers and without another oral hearing.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The notice of contention be upheld in part.
3. Within 14 days hereof, the parties are to seek to agree orders, including as to costs, which give effect to these reasons for judgment. If they are unable to agree, within that time each should file and serve a brief outline of written submissions, not to exceed five pages in length, setting out the orders for which they contend and why.
4. Final orders, including as to costs will be made on the papers and without another oral hearing.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is convenient to set out s 473GB, which deals with the disclosure of certain information. Section 473GB relevantly provides:473GBImmigration Assessment Authority's discretion in relation to disclosure of certain information etc(1) This section applies to a document or information if: (a)the Minister has certified, under subsection (5), that the disclosure of any matter contained in the document, or the disclosure of the information, would be contrary to the public interest for any reason specified in the certificate (other than a reason set out in paragraph 473GA(1)(a) or (b)) that could form the basis for a claim by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth in a judicial proceeding that the matter contained in the document, or the information, should not be disclosed; or(b)the document, the matter contained in the document, or the information was given to the Minister, or to an officer of the Department, in confidence. (2)If, in compliance with a requirement of or under this Act, the Secretary gives to the Immigration Assessment Authority a document or information to which this section applies, the Secretary: (a)must notify the Authority in writing that this section applies in relation to the document or information; and (b)may give the Authority any written advice that the Secretary thinks relevant about the significance of the document or information.(3)If the Immigration Assessment Authority is given a document or information and is notified that this section applies in relation to it, the Authority: (a)may, for the purpose of the exercise of its powers in relation to a fast track reviewable decision in respect of a referred applicant, have regard to any matter contained in the document, or to the information; and (b)may, if the Authority thinks it appropriate to do so having regard to any advice given by the Secretary under subsection (2), disclose any matter contained in the document, or the information, to the referred applicant. (4)If the Immigration Assessment Authority discloses any matter to the referred applicant under subsection (3), the Authority must give a direction under section 473GD in relation to the information.(5)The Minister may issue a written certificate for the purposes of subsection (1). As to ground 1 of the judicial review application, the primary judge noted that the IAA had refused to consider the new information provided by the first respondent concerning his political activities and that he did not challenge that decision in his judicial review action. The primary judge added that the excluded new information, if it had been accepted and believed, may well have changed the outcome for the first respondent but the information had been excluded from consideration by the IAA. After setting out various paragraphs from the IAA’s reasons for decision, including its references to country information, the primary judge stated in [73] of his reasons for judgment that the essence of the IAA’s reasoning was that the first respondent did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm on return to Iran by reason of his religion and ethnicity unless he publicly asserted cultural and political rights. In addition, the IAA did not consider some new information which indicated that the first respondent had publicly asserted those rights in the past and the IAA reasoned that he would not do so in the future. The primary judge rejected the first respondent’s claim that the IAA had misapplied the “real chance” test, but his Honour found that one aspect of ground 1 should be upheld. It is not entirely clear which specific particular in ground 1 the primary judge had in mind in concluding that the IAA had fallen into error, in considering the first respondent’s claim to complementary protection.