Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Appeal from:

BBS16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 4

File number: NSD 242 of 2017
Judges: KENNY, TRACEY AND GRIFFITHS JJ
Date of judgment: 10 November 2017
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from  Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether appellant was denied procedural fairness because FCCA upheld first respondent’s judicial review challenge on an issue not previously raised

MIGRATION – whether primary judge erred in finding that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) erred in rejecting the first respondent’s claim for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1058 (Cth) (the Act) – whether terms of ICCPR relevant to complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act – Pt 7AA of the Act – where notice of contention filed – whether IAA misapplied the “real chance” test in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act and the “real risk” test in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and failed to reach the requisite “satisfaction” under ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act – whether IAA failed to consider and determine a claim which arose clearly on the material before it – whether IAA acted on an invalidly issued s 473GB certificate or denied first respondent procedural fairness – whether MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1 applied to Pt 7AA of the Act – whether IAA misconstrued “exceptional circumstances” in s 473DD(b) of the Act and so constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction – whether BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958 applied

Held: appeal allowed and notice of contention upheld in part

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5J, 36, 359A, 360, 375A,422B, 424A, 424AA, 425, 427, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DD, 473DE, 473GA, 473GB, 473GD, Pt 7, Pt 7AA

Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  Opened for signature 10 December 1984. 1465 UNTS 85 art 1, 2, 7. (entered into force 26 June 1987)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Opened for signature 16 December 1966.  999 UNTS 171. (entered into force 23 March 1976)  

Cases cited:

AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 136

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 71; 216 CLR 473

Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; 252 CLR 38

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163

Dhiman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 221

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89

Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen [1982] HCA 27; 153 CLR 168

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 176
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had allowed a judicial review challenge by the first respondent, BBS16, to a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The first respondent sought a protection visa on the basis of his fear of persecution in Iran on the grounds of his religion and ethnicity. The IAA had rejected his claims and this decision was upheld by the Minister’s delegate. The first respondent then brought a judicial review action in the FCCA, which was successful. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection appealed this decision to the High Court.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Minister was denied procedural fairness because the FCCA upheld the first respondent’s challenge on an issue not previously raised and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the IAA had erred in rejecting the first respondent’s claims for protection. The High Court found that the Minister was not denied procedural fairness because the FCCA had not erred in upholding the first respondent’s challenge on the new issue. The Court also found that the primary judge was correct in finding that the IAA had erred in rejecting the first respondent’s claims for protection.

The High Court held that the appeal should be allowed and the notice of contention upheld in part. The parties were required to seek to agree on orders, including as to costs, which give effect to these reasons for judgment. If they were unable to agree, they should file and serve a brief outline of written submissions, not to exceed five pages in length, setting out the orders for which they contend and why. Final orders, including as to costs, would be made on the papers and without another oral hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The notice of contention be upheld in part.

3. Within 14 days hereof, the parties are to seek to agree orders, including as to costs, which give effect to these reasons for judgment. If they are unable to agree, within that time each should file and serve a brief outline of written submissions, not to exceed five pages in length, setting out the orders for which they contend and why.

4. Final orders, including as to costs will be made on the papers and without another oral hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the appeal should be allowed. The notice of contention should also be upheld in part. Summary of background facts The relevant background facts are not in dispute. Drawing primarily on the primary judge’s description of them, they may be summarised as follows. The first respondent was born in Iraq but says that he is a citizen of Iran by descent and is a Sabean-Mandaean from the Province of Ahwaz. He applied for a protection visa on 13 August 2015 and claimed to fear persecution in Iran on the basis that he is a member of the Sabean-Mandaean community and also because he is an Arab. He relied on both ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. On 17 February 2016, he was refused a protection visa by the Minister’s delegate. His matter was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) under Pt 7AA of the Act. Amongst the material provided to the IAA by the Secretary was a certificate which had purportedly been made pursuant to s 473GB(5) of the Act. It post-dated the delegate’s decision. On 11 April 2016, the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision. This is the decision which was judicially reviewed in the FCCA. Broadly, the IAA accepted that the first respondent was of the Sabean-Mandaean faith and that such people “face harassment by authorities” which is “intensifying”. It accepted that such people face discriminatory treatment and that the acts of discrimination are not trivial. Nevertheless, the IAA concluded that it was not satisfied that the discrimination would amount to serious harm. The IAA accepted that the first respondent would be associated with the Arab community by both Iranian authorities and society at large. Although accepting that there is a “high level of societal discrimination against Arabs”, including the first respondent, and that the risk of violence would “increase dramatically” for Arabs who attempt publicly to assert cultural or political rights, the IAA concluded that it was not satisfied that the first respondent would become politically active on return to Iran because he did not practice his religion often. The IAA also concluded that the “high level” of discrimination that the first respondent would face did not amount to serious harm in the first respondent’s particular circumstances. The IAA made express reference to various country information in relation to these findings, including a report dated 29 November 2013 by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), as well as a report dated 16 January 2013 by the Home Office of the United Kingdom. It is desirable to set out [28]-[30] and [36] of the IAA’s reasons, which explain why the IAA rejected the first respondent’s claims regarding persecution (footnotes omitted): 28.I accept the applicant belongs to a religious minority and country information supports religious minority groups in Iran, including Sabean Mandaeans, face discriminatory treatment. While the acts of discrimination against Sabeans Mandaeans are not trivial, I have taken into consideration the personal circumstances of the applicant and considered how this treatment will affect him and whether there is a real chance he will face serious harm upon return to Iran. 29.Based on his own evidence the applicant did not practise his religion while in Iran, and only attended the temple on special occasions. He was not a prominent member of the Sabean community. During the protection visa interview, the applicant detailed that he has been able to attend the Mandi, the place of worship for Mandaeans and that there were two Mandi’s near his house in Ahwaz. While I note the applicant did not and does not practise regularly, he was able to practise and participate in religious activity in Iran when he chose to do so and that despite country information indicating that there may be some interference with religious activity, I am not satisfied the applicant would be prevented from practising in a similar manner in the future. 30.I have considered the acts of discrimination on account of the applicant’s religion individually and in their totality but am not satisfied it amounts to serious harm in his particular circumstances. Despite the applicant’s business being robbed as well as restrictions on him gaining employment within the public sector, the applicant has demonstrated the capacity to subsist and earn a livelihood in the past and there is no evidence before me to indicate that he cannot continue to be self-employed or work in the private sector in the future. I note the applicant would not be able to access higher education if he sought to do so. The applicant is past school age and I accept a denial of obtaining a higher education is unfavourable treatment, however there is no evidence before me to indicate the applicant cannot continue to access other forms of employment, including operating his own business, despite not gaining access to higher education. I note there is a possibility the applicant may face limitations in accessing medical treatment upon return, country information only states a limitation and not denial of accessing medical treatment. The applicant claimed that his family were threatened to be killed on account of their religion and if he returns to Iran he will be attacked and murdered. There is no country information before me to indicate that the discrimination or harassment extends to any harm causing physical mistreatment. The only information before me is that of two Mandaean boys being killed in a minor road accident in 2013, however there is no evidence the accident was a result of religious based discrimination or persecution. I have taken into consideration the country information in relation to the applicant and his personal circumstances in their totality and considered the threshold of serious harm. I have already found the applicant will face discrimination and harassment upon return to Iran and acknowledge this is not trivial. However, in the applicant’s circumstances I do not accept that the level of this harassment and discrimination against the applicant on account of his religion will hinder his capacity to subsist, or result in significant physical harassment or ill-treatment or any other type of serious harm. I am not satisfied the harm feared amounts to serious harm and therefore find there is no well-founded fear of persecution on account of the applicant’s religion. …36.I have also taken into consideration whether the applicant’s treatment on return will be greater considering both his religion and association to the Arab community, or will amount to serious harm when considered cumulatively. The country information does not indicate Sabeans from Ahwaz who are associated with the Arab community face a level of discrimination or harm beyond that faced by Sabeans generally. The applicant does not have a profile which would attract the adverse attention of the authorities, apart from his illegal departure from Iran, which is considered below. I am not satisfied the applicant will become politically active on return to Iran and based on his own evidence, he does not practise his religion often, even in Australia where is has the liberty to do so. I am not satisfied that the harm which I have found the applicant will face on account of his religion and association with the Arab community amounts to serious harm, either alone or cumulatively.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For completeness, it might be noted that there was other new information provided by the first respondent to the IAA which the IAA refused to consider for reasons which are set out in [11] and [12] of its reasons for decision. This other new information, which included a letter of support from the President of the Sabean-Mandaean Association in Australia, a video and various country information, was not considered by the IAA and is not included in ground 3 of the notice of contention. Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal should be allowed and the notice of contention upheld in part. The parties should, within 14 days hereof, seek to agree orders, including as to costs, which give effect to these reasons. If they are unable to do so, they should within that time each file and serve a brief written submission, not exceeding five pages in length, setting out the orders for which they contend and reasons in support. Finalisation of orders will then be made on the papers and without a further oral hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is convenient to set out s 473GB, which deals with the disclosure of certain information. Section 473GB relevantly provides:473GBImmigration Assessment Authority's discretion in relation to disclosure of certain information etc(1) This section applies to a document or information if: (a)the Minister has certified, under subsection (5), that the disclosure of any matter contained in the document, or the disclosure of the information, would be contrary to the public interest for any reason specified in the certificate (other than a reason set out in paragraph 473GA(1)(a) or (b)) that could form the basis for a claim by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth in a judicial proceeding that the matter contained in the document, or the information, should not be disclosed; or(b)the document, the matter contained in the document, or the information was given to the Minister, or to an officer of the Department, in confidence. (2)If, in compliance with a requirement of or under this Act, the Secretary gives to the Immigration Assessment Authority a document or information to which this section applies, the Secretary: (a)must notify the Authority in writing that this section applies in relation to the document or information; and (b)may give the Authority any written advice that the Secretary thinks relevant about the significance of the document or information.(3)If the Immigration Assessment Authority is given a document or information and is notified that this section applies in relation to it, the Authority: (a)may, for the purpose of the exercise of its powers in relation to a fast track reviewable decision in respect of a referred applicant, have regard to any matter contained in the document, or to the information; and (b)may, if the Authority thinks it appropriate to do so having regard to any advice given by the Secretary under subsection (2), disclose any matter contained in the document, or the information, to the referred applicant. (4)If the Immigration Assessment Authority discloses any matter to the referred applicant under subsection (3), the Authority must give a direction under section 473GD in relation to the information.(5)The Minister may issue a written certificate for the purposes of subsection (1). As to ground 1 of the judicial review application, the primary judge noted that the IAA had refused to consider the new information provided by the first respondent concerning his political activities and that he did not challenge that decision in his judicial review action. The primary judge added that the excluded new information, if it had been accepted and believed, may well have changed the outcome for the first respondent but the information had been excluded from consideration by the IAA. After setting out various paragraphs from the IAA’s reasons for decision, including its references to country information, the primary judge stated in [73] of his reasons for judgment that the essence of the IAA’s reasoning was that the first respondent did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm on return to Iran by reason of his religion and ethnicity unless he publicly asserted cultural and political rights. In addition, the IAA did not consider some new information which indicated that the first respondent had publicly asserted those rights in the past and the IAA reasoned that he would not do so in the future. The primary judge rejected the first respondent’s claim that the IAA had misapplied the “real chance” test, but his Honour found that one aspect of ground 1 should be upheld. It is not entirely clear which specific particular in ground 1 the primary judge had in mind in concluding that the IAA had fallen into error, in considering the first respondent’s claim to complementary protection.