BDT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BDT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2023] FCA 452 

Appeal from:  BDT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3133
File number: NSD 2316 of 2018
Judgment of: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 12 May 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION — Application for protection visa — application refused by delegate of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection — refusal affirmed by Immigration Assessment Authority decision — judicial review of Authority’s decision in Federal Circuit Court — appeal from Circuit Court — whether primary judge erred in finding that Authority did not fail to consider two elements of claim said to arise from visa application — claims not articulated in or otherwise evident on the face of the application — whether primary judge erred in finding that the Authority did not deny procedural fairness to appellant by improperly dealing with s 473GB certificate and notification — certificate invalid — notification contended to bar disclosure of Minister’s report opining that appellant’s evidence was non-genuine — appellant never requested disclosure of report such that no practical injustice arose from non-disclosure — no obligation to disclose report under s 473DA — no obligation to disclose s 473GB notification — no failure to exercise discretion to notify appellant of report — appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 473GB
Cases cited:

BDT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3133

BIK17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1086

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29; [2019] HCA 34

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111; [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CED16 (2020) 380 ALR 216; [2002] HCA 24

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 45
Date of hearing: 2 March 2022
Counsel for the appellant: Appellant was self-represented
Counsel for the first respondent: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the first respondent: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

NSD 2316 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BDT17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 MAY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WIGNEY J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who on 28 September 2012 entered Australia by boat without a visa.  He was subsequently permitted to apply for a protection visa and did so on 21 December 2015.  His visa application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.  That decision was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority for review.  The Authority affirmed the Minister’s decision.  The appellant challenged the Authority’s decision in judicial review proceedings commenced in the…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 452
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BDT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant sought judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse a protection visa. The appellant claimed that the Authority failed to consider two elements of his claim and denied him procedural fairness by improperly dealing with a section 473GB certificate and notification. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal and the appellant sought leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court considered the grounds of appeal, focusing on whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Authority did not fail to consider the two elements of the claim and that the Authority did not deny procedural fairness to the appellant by improperly dealing with the section 473GB certificate and notification.

The High Court found that the two elements of the claim were not articulated in or otherwise evident on the face of the application. The appellant did not request disclosure of the Minister’s report opining that his evidence was non-genuine, such that no practical injustice arose from non-disclosure. There was no obligation to disclose the report under section 473DA, nor to disclose the section 473GB notification. There was no failure to exercise discretion to notify the appellant of the report. The Court held that the primary judge did not err in finding that the Authority did not fail to consider the two elements of the claim or that it denied procedural fairness to the appellant by improperly dealing with the section 473GB certificate and notification.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal. The Court found that the Authority’s review and decision were lawful and that the appellant’s claims were without merit. The Court noted that the Authority had considered the relevant country information and had made findings on the evidence provided by the appellant. The Court also found that the Authority had considered the new information provided by the appellant and had determined that it was able to have regard to it. The Court held that the Authority’s decision was not flawed by any failure to consider the two elements of the claim or by any denial of procedural fairness. The Court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and that the appellant should pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, BDT17, applied for a protection visa in Australia. On 10 January 2017, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the application. The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the criteria in either section 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The delegate did not accept that the appellant had been detained, interrogated, or assaulted by the Sri Lankan army and found that the two letters from the police which the appellant had provided in support of his application were fraudulent. Based on the findings and country information about Sri Lanka, the delegate concluded that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka and that there was no risk that he would suffer significant harm upon return. The delegate's decision was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority for review, which affirmed the decision on 24 February 2017. The Authority considered new information provided by the appellant, including a letter from an attorney in Sri Lanka and a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report. The Authority accepted that the appellant, his wife, and their daughter were detained during the final stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009 and that the appellant was released after about 25 days. However, his wife and daughter were not released and were presumed to have gone missing. The Authority found that the appellant's wife was not released because she was suspected of supporting the LTTE, and the appellant was released because he was not considered an LTTE member or supporter.

The appellant's protection visa application was refused by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 10 January 2017. The decision was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority for review, as it was a fast-track reviewable decision under section 473BB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Authority reviewed the decision on 24 February 2017 and affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant sought judicial review of the Authority's decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge dismissed the application, and the appellant appealed to the High Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 10 January 2017, the delegate decided to refuse the appellant’s visa application. The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the criteria in either ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The delegate did not accept that the appellant had been detained, interrogated or assaulted by the Sri Lankan army and found that the two letters from the police which the appellant had provided in support of his application were fraudulent. Given those findings, and having regard to detailed “country information” concerning the current state of affairs in Sri Lanka, the delegate found that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka and that there was no risk that he would suffer significant harm upon return. THE AUTHORITY’S REVIEW AND DECISION The delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” as defined in s 473BB of the Act. The Minister therefore referred the decision to the Authority as required by s 473CA of the Act and the Authority conducted a review of the decision as required by s 473CC of the Act. The Authority was required to conduct a review “on the papers”; the “papers” being the “review material” provided by the Secretary of the Minister’s department and any “new information” provided by the visa applicant, or requested by the Authority, which met certain requirements: see ss 473CB, 473DB, 473DC and 473DD of the Act. In the appellant’s case, the Authority determined that it was able to have regard to certain new information. That information was contained in a submission from the appellant’s migration adviser, which attached a letter from an attorney based in Sri Lanka, and a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report concerning Sri Lanka. The letter from the Sri Lankan attorney contained information about the appellant’s detention by the Sri Lankan police. The Authority was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information and that the other requirements of s 473DD of the Act were met in relation to it. The Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Authority provided the appellant with a lengthy and detailed record of its Decision and Reasons dated 24 February 2017. Given the appellant’s relatively narrow appeal grounds, it is unnecessary to give detailed consideration to the Authority’s reasons. It suffices to briefly note the following findings. First, the Authority accepted that the appellant, his wife and their daughter were detained in an army camp during the final stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009. The Authority also accepted that the appellant was released after about 25 days, but that his wife and daughter were not. That was the last contact the appellant had with his wife and daughter: Reasons [14]. The Authority accepted that the appellant’s wife and daughter had “tragically gone missing”: Reasons [17]. Second, the Authority appeared to accept that the appellant’s wife was not released because she was from Jaffna and was suspected of supporting the LTTE: Reasons at [14]. As for the appellant, the Authority found that he was released from the army camp because the “authorities … did not consider him to be an LTTE member or supporter and nor did they consider it necessary to detain him further on account of his connection to his wife”: Reasons [15].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the primary judge correctly determined that the Authority did not fail to consider the appellant's claims which were not clearly articulated in the visa application. The court found that the appellant's claims were not sufficiently detailed or evident in the application to warrant the Authority's consideration. The court then turned to whether the Authority denied procedural fairness by dealing with an invalid s 473GB certificate and a notification intended to prevent disclosure of the Minister's report. The court concluded that the Authority did not act unfairly because the invalidity of the certificate and the content of the notification did not prejudice the appellant's right to a fair review. The court also considered whether the non-disclosure of the Minister's report constituted practical injustice, noting that the appellant did not request the report and there was no legal obligation to disclose it. The court held that there was no practical injustice because the appellant had no entitlement to the report's disclosure. Finally, the court assessed whether there was a failure to exercise the discretion under s 473DA to notify the appellant of the report, finding no such failure given the absence of a statutory obligation to notify the appellant of the report. The binding legal principle established is that procedural fairness does not require disclosure of documents not requested by the applicant and where there is no statutory obligation to disclose them.