AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89

Appeal from: AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2886
File number: QUD 726 of 2017
Judges: COLLIER, MCKERRACHER AND BANKS-SMITH JJ
Date of judgment: 18 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – where the IAA affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – where a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the application for judicial review – whether the primary Judge erred in concluding that the IAA did not fall into jurisdictional error by failing to consider a claim or issue contended by the appellant, to have arisen on the material – the scope of the IAA’s obligation to consider a claim or issue which “clearly emerges” from its findings – whether “claims” are distinguishable from “issues” – appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(1), 473CA, 473CC, 473DB, Pts 5, 7, 7AA
Cases cited:

ACE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1054

AWT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 512

BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 448

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

Kasupene v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 49 AAR 77

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sameh [2000] FCA 578

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1

Senthilnathan Tharmalingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 537

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZDFZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 1

SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 214

Date of hearing: 30 May 2018
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr LJ Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fisher Dore Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

QUD 726 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AYY17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

COLLIER, MCKERRACHER AND BANKS-SMITH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This appeal raises for consideration the question of the duty of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to consider claims and/or issues that arise from its own findings. In…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was asked to review the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) not to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa to the appellant, a national of Afghanistan. The appellant, who arrived in Australia by boat in 2012, argued that his employment history in Afghanistan with the Independent Election Commission and Dish TV would place him at risk if he were returned to his home country. He contended that the IAA did not properly consider the potential risks he would face if he were to seek employment using his skills without disclosing his previous employment. The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA erred in not considering a claim or issue that "clearly emerged" from its own findings. Specifically, the court needed to determine the scope of the IAA’s obligation to consider claims or issues arising from its findings and whether there is a distinguishable difference between "claims" and "issues."

The court concluded that the IAA properly discharged its duties. The appellant had ample opportunity to articulate his concerns regarding potential future employment, including the disclosure of his past employment history. The appellant did not clearly articulate this concern, and therefore, the IAA was not in jurisdictional error by not considering it. The court relied on previous cases such as Tharmalingam and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sameh, which established that the tribunal must address all substantial matters that might affect the applicant's eligibility for a protection visa. However, in this case, the appellant failed to raise the specific concern regarding future employment and disclosure of past employment adequately.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that the IAA was not required to consider claims or issues that were not clearly articulated by the appellant. The appellant's failure to raise this concern adequately meant that the IAA did not fall into jurisdictional error.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal raises for consideration the question of the duty of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to consider claims and/or issues that arise from its own findings. In the context of this case, the issue that was said to clearly arise from the IAA’s findings was whether the appellant, if returned to Afghanistan, would be able to find work utilising his particular skill set without disclosing certain previous employment and thereby potentially placing himself at relevant risk. The case also raises an issue as to whether there is a relevant difference between claims raised and issues arising in the course of claims being raised. For the reasons which follow, it is our view that the IAA properly discharged its duties. BACKGROUND The appellant aged 28, is a national of Afghanistan and of Tajik ethnicity. He arrived in Australia by boat in December 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. In the Statement of Claims accompanying his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV), the appellant spoke generally of his history of receiving threats from the Taliban, but specifically of this arising from his employment, first, as a computer operator for the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) in 2009 and then, secondly, for a foreign company, Dish TV, providing satellite television cabling to foreigners. The appellant’s contention was that his employment had attracted the enmity of the Taliban. Specifically, the appellant claimed that when he commenced employment with the IEC, he was allocated a pseudonym, but that about one and a half months after he started employment, his family received a letter from the Taliban demanding that he leave the IEC. He received another threat by phone and shortly afterwards a work colleague was shot and killed by the Taliban after receiving threats. The appellant claimed that he had not returned to work for almost two weeks after his colleague’s death, changing his phone number and address before doing so. While the appellant experienced a few months without trouble, he then claimed to have received a threatening phone call on his mobile phone from a Taliban member. His father subsequently informed him that one of his colleagues had been taken by the Taliban. The appellant then went to New Delhi for a month and then returned to Kabul, married and left the job at the IEC when told the position was no longer available. He then started working for Dish TV, operating out of Kabul International Airport. A month after commencement at Dish TV, the appellant claimed he received a threat on the phone by two men who said that he was not a Muslim. They told him that it would make no difference whether he continued to work for Dish TV or not because they had decided what to do with him and that if he wanted to stay alive he should join them for Jihad. He returned to India with his wife and found that he could not settle there, so he returned to Afghanistan. With the help of a people smuggler, he left that country and eventually came to Australia. He claimed to fear harm if returned to Afghanistan because of his employment with the IEC and Dish TV and also because he would be a returned asylum seeker from a western country.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The fundamental threshold requirement is that such a claim or issue must “clearly emerge” from such materials. In light of the opportunities that the appellant had to challenge the delegate’s finding that he would be at no risk on return to Afghanistan, there was ample opportunity for the appellant to make clear a particular concern that “might” arise should he seek alternative employment, be required to disclose his past employment history, that history be released to the Taliban and there be a response from the Taliban. Those matters were not articulated. There is no doubt, and nor is it raised on appeal, that the appellant did have an opportunity to raise these matters in support of his claim if they were a concern. CONCLUSION For all those reasons, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant argues that on a proper application of the principles, where a potential refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J(1) of the Migration Act for reason of imputed political opinion, much may depend on the way he will conduct himself or herself on return. It is argued for the appellant that the finding by the IAA, that he could be expected to seek employment in the field of computers or technology for an employer unrelated to media, government or the international community, was not a predictable finding and so it is unsurprising that the consequence of such behaviour was not addressed by the appellant in his submissions to the delegate of the Minister or to the IAA. Of course, a practical difference between the procedure before the Tribunal and the procedure before the IAA is that an applicant will not automatically be entitled to a hearing before the IAA to be informed that such a finding may be made. Mr Karp for the appellant submits that (assuming that such employment were available on his return to Afghanistan) the question, which was obvious, was how he could obtain such employment without revealing his past employment. He contends it is unrealistic to think that the appellant would not be required to tell a prospective employer of his previous experience in the field. This was an obvious matter not considered or evaluated by the IAA. The appellant contends that as a matter of common experience and common sense, an employer would ask a prospective employee for a skilled position about his previous employment experience in the field and the appellant, if answering honestly, would be obliged to tell a prospective employer of his experience in government and media. The appellant contends that if “word got around” and if the employer himself was sympathetic to the Taliban, he may place himself in danger. The appellant says that the fact that he may not have a profile with the Taliban now does not mean that he may not acquire one in the future. Consideration In Tharmalingam, the applicant had been forced to act as a “bagman” for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in his capacity as a bank employee. The Refugee Review Tribunal (as the Tribunal then was) accepted that he had acted as a bagman, but did not accept that he had already been persecuted because of that role. Lindgren J found that one of Mr Tharmalingam’s fears was that his role might be discovered. His Honour noted that the Tribunal found it “extremely implausible” that the bank’s officers in Colombo did not know of his activities. Lindgren J held (at 20-21) that the Tribunal was required to consider “in the light of the claims it did accept” whether Mr Tharmalingam’s role as an LTTE bagman may lead to his facing persecution in the future should that role become more widely known, especially to the police. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sameh [2000] FCA 578 (at [42]), the Full Court (Mathews, Tamberlin and Mansfield JJ) cited the majority (Wilcox and Madgwick JJ) in Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 to the effect that the Tribunal is required to address all substantial matters which might bear upon whether the applicant meets the criteria for a grant of a protection visa. The Tribunal’s conclusion in that case, summarised (at [10]) of the decision was that Mr Sameh, a stateless Bedoon did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Jordan. The Full Court observed, however, that the Tribunal had failed to take into account how, in Mr Sameh’s particular circumstances, he would be able to re-enter Jordan at all.