FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89
Appeal from: AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2886 File number: QUD 726 of 2017 Judges: COLLIER, MCKERRACHER AND BANKS-SMITH JJ Date of judgment: 18 June 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – where the IAA affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – where a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the application for judicial review – whether the primary Judge erred in concluding that the IAA did not fall into jurisdictional error by failing to consider a claim or issue contended by the appellant, to have arisen on the material – the scope of the IAA’s obligation to consider a claim or issue which “clearly emerges” from its findings – whether “claims” are distinguishable from “issues” – appeal dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(1), 473CA, 473CC, 473DB, Pts 5, 7, 7AA Cases cited: ACE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1054
AWT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 512
BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 448
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136
Kasupene v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 49 AAR 77
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sameh [2000] FCA 578
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1
Senthilnathan Tharmalingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 537
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZDFZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 1
SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 214
Date of hearing: 30 May 2018 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr LJ Karp Solicitor for the Appellant: Fisher Dore Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B McGlade Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
QUD 726 of 2017 BETWEEN: AYY17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
COLLIER, MCKERRACHER AND BANKS-SMITH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 JUNE 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
This appeal raises for consideration the question of the duty of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to consider claims and/or issues that arise from its own findings. In…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 89
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court concluded that the IAA properly discharged its duties. The appellant had ample opportunity to articulate his concerns regarding potential future employment, including the disclosure of his past employment history. The appellant did not clearly articulate this concern, and therefore, the IAA was not in jurisdictional error by not considering it. The court relied on previous cases such as Tharmalingam and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sameh, which established that the tribunal must address all substantial matters that might affect the applicant's eligibility for a protection visa. However, in this case, the appellant failed to raise the specific concern regarding future employment and disclosure of past employment adequately.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that the IAA was not required to consider claims or issues that were not clearly articulated by the appellant. The appellant's failure to raise this concern adequately meant that the IAA did not fall into jurisdictional error.
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant argues that on a proper application of the principles, where a potential refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J(1) of the Migration Act for reason of imputed political opinion, much may depend on the way he will conduct himself or herself on return. It is argued for the appellant that the finding by the IAA, that he could be expected to seek employment in the field of computers or technology for an employer unrelated to media, government or the international community, was not a predictable finding and so it is unsurprising that the consequence of such behaviour was not addressed by the appellant in his submissions to the delegate of the Minister or to the IAA. Of course, a practical difference between the procedure before the Tribunal and the procedure before the IAA is that an applicant will not automatically be entitled to a hearing before the IAA to be informed that such a finding may be made. Mr Karp for the appellant submits that (assuming that such employment were available on his return to Afghanistan) the question, which was obvious, was how he could obtain such employment without revealing his past employment. He contends it is unrealistic to think that the appellant would not be required to tell a prospective employer of his previous experience in the field. This was an obvious matter not considered or evaluated by the IAA. The appellant contends that as a matter of common experience and common sense, an employer would ask a prospective employee for a skilled position about his previous employment experience in the field and the appellant, if answering honestly, would be obliged to tell a prospective employer of his experience in government and media. The appellant contends that if “word got around” and if the employer himself was sympathetic to the Taliban, he may place himself in danger. The appellant says that the fact that he may not have a profile with the Taliban now does not mean that he may not acquire one in the future. Consideration In Tharmalingam, the applicant had been forced to act as a “bagman” for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in his capacity as a bank employee. The Refugee Review Tribunal (as the Tribunal then was) accepted that he had acted as a bagman, but did not accept that he had already been persecuted because of that role. Lindgren J found that one of Mr Tharmalingam’s fears was that his role might be discovered. His Honour noted that the Tribunal found it “extremely implausible” that the bank’s officers in Colombo did not know of his activities. Lindgren J held (at 20-21) that the Tribunal was required to consider “in the light of the claims it did accept” whether Mr Tharmalingam’s role as an LTTE bagman may lead to his facing persecution in the future should that role become more widely known, especially to the police. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sameh [2000] FCA 578 (at [42]), the Full Court (Mathews, Tamberlin and Mansfield JJ) cited the majority (Wilcox and Madgwick JJ) in Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 to the effect that the Tribunal is required to address all substantial matters which might bear upon whether the applicant meets the criteria for a grant of a protection visa. The Tribunal’s conclusion in that case, summarised (at [10]) of the decision was that Mr Sameh, a stateless Bedoon did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Jordan. The Full Court observed, however, that the Tribunal had failed to take into account how, in Mr Sameh’s particular circumstances, he would be able to re-enter Jordan at all.